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possess her of it, would be not to understand the interests of the Swedish people. Such a conquest would occasion expences which Sweden is not in a condition to support, and the acquisition, admitting that it could be accomplished, would never compensate for the risk which she must incur. The English, while she was pursuing this wild career, might give her fatal blows; her ports would be burnt or destroyed, and her maritime towns reduced to ashes. Besides, so soon as a change should be effected in the political system of Russia, whether after success or defeat, her ancient views upon Finland would not fail to make a disastrous war weigh heavy upon Sweden. The gulph of Bothnia separates the two states; no motive of division exists, and the national hatred daily disappears in consequence of the pacific dispositions of the two sovereigns. If France will acknowledge the armed neutrality of Sweden, a neutrality which must carry with it the right of opening her ports with equal advantages for all powers, she has no motive to interfere in the events which may occur. Let France restore Pomerania; but if she should refuse this restitution, which, at the same time, the rights of nations and the faith of treaties demand, Sweden will accept for this object only, the mediation of the emperors of Austria and Russia. Sweden will agree to a reconciliation compatible with the national honour and with the interests of the north.”

The government of Sweden, persuaded that all the preparations made by Russia were for a purpose purely defensive, and intended but to prepare for the Russian empire that armed neutrality, which Sweden wished, in concert with Russia, to establish, engaged to use all its efforts to prevent a rupture till a period should be fixed for Swedish, French, Austrian, and Russian plenipotentiaries to meet, and agree,

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in a friendly manner, upon a system pacification, which might insure to Europe a durable repose. Such were the sentiments which the Swedish government avowed till the last moment, when it was forced into an open rupture with France, by the obstinate violence of Buonaparte. It is impossible, therefore, to accuse Sweden of precipitation

it is unfair to charge her with enmity towards France, and absurd to pretend, that she did not scrupulously maintain her faith, until every obligation was dissolved by the insolence and perfidy of her enemies.

On the 20th of April, 1812, the King of Sweden assembled the diet of his kingdom at Orebro, and opened the sitting by a speech, in which he announced, in terms by no means equivocal, the policy of his government. "I have called you together," said he, " at a moment when great and important occurrences, out of our native country, seem to threaten Europe with new misfortunes. Guarded by her situa tion from the necessity of paying obedience to foreign sway, which possibly might not accord with her own interests, Sweden has every thing to hope from unity, valour, and conduct; everything to fear if she gives herself up to intestinedivision."--He also announced his determination to unite with his son, (Bernadotte) in defiance of threats from without, and possibly of opinions at home, to maintain the liberty and independence of the country.-The Crown Prince, in his speech, addressed the following remark particularly to the burghers; " you will shew what a nation is capable of effecting, when determined to free its commercial industry from all foreign yokes,"-thus clearly intimating his opinion of the continental system.

A Russian general had already been sent on a mission to Stockholm; Mr Thornton, the British minister, although appearing in no public charac

ter, had joined him. But soon after the assembling of the diet, orders were dispatched to the coast, to afford British ships in distress the assistance which they might require; and Mr Thornton was afterwards received at Orebro as the accredited minister of Great-Britain at the Swedish court. About the same time a decree relative to commerce was issued, which announced a departure from the continental system.

was satisfactory to both parties; and they agreed to make common cause against the measures of France. With a view to the security of Sweden, it was stipulated that Norway should, in the first instance, be conquered for that power; after which, a diversion by their united forces should be made on the continent. The result of this interview was, however, for some time prudently concealed.

The measures adopted by Sweden in 1812 had a considerable influence upon the Russian campaign of that year. The troops assembled in Swedish ports detained a considerable French force in the north of Germany. By dispensing with the immediate fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by Russia, the Swedish government set at liberty a force of 18,000 men, which had been assembled in Poland, and which was afterwards sent to join the army of Wittgenstein, and contributed materially to the destruction of the French on the Berezina.

On the 18th of August the Swedish diet terminated its sittings. The king again took occasion to observe, that no foreign power could loosen those bonds of union, which maintain the independence of Sweden. He also informed the diet, that, confident in the maxim, that strong defensive preparations are the best means to ensure the tranquillity of a state, he had found it necessary to pay particular attention to the military force of the kingdom; and he further announced, that on the 18th of July he had concluded a peace with the King of Great-Britain, which had been ratified on the 16th of August Bernadotte also addressed the diet, and commended the coolness maintained in the deliberations of that as sembly," amid the din of arms resounding from the Dwina to the Tagus, and the animosity of their neighbours."-ably commented on.-"The manifestaHe added, "that should there be no hope that Sweden might pursue her way in peace, then will your king have recourse to your manly courage, and our watch-word will be-God, liberty, and our native country."

A treaty had for some time been proposed between Sweden and Russia; and a Russian general was at Stockholm for the purpose of opening the negociations. Some difficulties, however, having arisen, a personal interview between the Emperor of Russia and Bernadotte was decided upon. These personages accordingly met at Abo, in Finland, on the 28th of August; the result of the conference

In the beginning of the year 1813, the Swedish government resolved on decisive measures, and explained its views to all Europe. The numerous injuries which France had inflicted upon Sweden were clearly explained and

tions of ill-will, on the part of France, it was observed, which, during the course of 1810, had often threatened serious pretensions, at first were confined to the rigid maintenance of the continental system in Pomerania, but were at last openly directed against the independent existence of Sweden, A demand was made to exclude the Americans from Swedish ports. The government succeeded by perseverance and moderation in averting the consequences. It was to be presumed, however, that this fortunate situation affording Sweden the means of recruiting her strength, already exhausted by a destructive war, would not be of any

long duration. Buonaparte had laid down for subjugated Europe a peremptory rule, that he would acknowledge as the friends of France only the enemies of Great Britain; that neutrality, formerly the bulwark of the weaker states, amidst the contests of the most powerful, no longer had any real meaning; and that all the combina tions of policy, as well as every feeling of dignity, must disappear before the omnipotence of arms.

"Scarcely was the declaration of war by Sweden against England published, and the commerce of Sweden abandon. ed to the discretion of the British cabinet, when the French minister began to develope a plan, pursued without interruption, to force Sweden to take upon herself the same obligations which ha e brought so many misfortunes on the confederated states. A consider able body of seamen was at first demanded for the purpose of manning the French fleets at Brest,-next, a corps of Swedish troops to be in the pay of France, then the introduction into Sweden of a tariff of 50 per cent. on colonial produce-and, finally, the establishment of French douaniers at Gottenburgh. All these demands having been rejected, the consequence was, that the measures of the French government towards Sweden soon assumed a hostile character.

"Soon after his arrival, M. Alquier, the French agent at Stockholm, spoke of the necessity of a closer alliance between Sweden and France; and though he received a polite answer, the reply had no effect. He then proposed an alliance between Sweden, Denmark, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, under the protection and guarantee of France. This proposal had for its object to create a confederation of the north, similar in its obligations and in its object to that which combined the strength of Germany under French

domination. In the mean time the season fit for navigation arrived, and with it the capture of Swedish vessels by French privateers. The Swedish minister at Paris demanded redress for the injuries done to Swedish commerce; representations with the same view were addressed to the French minister Alquier; his answers had all the marks of a dictator, the character which he had resolved to play in Sweden.

"If the English government viewed with a pitying eye the situation of Sweden, and did not consider her declaration of war as a sufficient motive for directing hostilities against Swedish commerce-if this tolerant system facilitated to a certain degree a vent for the immense stores of Swedish iron, and so far obviated the pernicious effects of the war-still Sweden could not expect that the French government would have built its accusations against her on the forbearance of England. The Swedes were, on the contrary, rather entitled to hope, that the French ruler would see with satisfaction their country treated with forbearance by a power, which had so many means of annoying Sweden.

"The depredations of the French privateers on Swedish vessels were daily augmenting. The Swedish minister at Paris represented, in suitable terms, the losses which thence resulted to the nation; but the prize courts of France always decided in favour of the captors. The privateers being thus secure of impunity, had a fine field for exercising their piracies. Not satisfied with condemning as good prizes Swedish vessels under the pretence that they were provided with English_licences not satisfied with capturing in the Sound small coasting vessels la den with provisions, and the produce of the native manufactures-not contented with seizing such as were in

German ports waiting for cargoes France even treated as prisoners of war the Swedish seamen. They were put in irons, and sent to Antwerp and Toulon, there to serve in the French fleets. When the season of the year again removed the English fleet from the Baltic, the French privateers renewed their acts of violence with more activity than ever. Sweden then felt herself under the necessity of ordering her marine to seize those pirates who had annoyed her commerce from port to port. The French privateers, which insulted the Swedish coasts, were chased away. The Swedish government learned that the Prince of Eckmuhl, commanding the French army in the north of Germany, had announced that he would order his troops to enter Pomerania, and the island of Rugen, so soon as the ice should permit him. The instructions which the Swedish commandant had received ought to have induced him to defend the German possessions against every foreign aggression. But unfortunately cunning prevailed over duty; the courage of the Swedish troops was paralyzed by the weakness of their chief, and Pomerania was invaded. The events which took place in that province had been made public, that it might be impossible to mistake the true nature of that extraordinary measure. The insolence of the French cabinet was unabated, and every thing announced an approaching rupture between that power and Russia. The season approached when the British fleets would revisit the Baltic, and there was reason to presume that the British ministry, in return for the tolerance granted to Swedish commerce, would demand a conduct on the part of Sweden more decidedly pacific. Sweden in consequence saw herself exposed, either to the resentment of France, or to the hostilities of Great Britain, supported by the court of

VOL. VI. PART I.

Russia. Denmark also had already assumed a menacing attitude.

After the annexation of the duchy of Oldenburgh to the French empire, it was known, with certainty, that differences both on that point and on the continental system had taken place between the courts of Russia and France. The preparations for war, which were made on both sides, indicated open hostilities. France, however, had never testified the smallest desire, nor made any overture to Sweden, tending to engage her in a war with Russia. Although all friendly relations must have have been regarded as broken by the occupation of Pomerania, a proposition was at last made, not officially, but through a channel not less authentic on the part of the French government. After giving a long exposi tion of the pretended deviations of Sweden from the continental system, which, it was said, had at last compelled Buonaparte to order his troops to enter Pomerania, without, however, occupying it, the French ruler demanded that a new declaration of war should

be issued against England; that all communication with English cruisers should be severely prohibited; that the coasts of the Sound should be armed with batteries, and that English vessels should be fired upon with artillery. Finally, that Sweden should organize an army of from 30 to 40,000 men, to attack Russia at the moment when hostilities should commence be tween that power and France.

But Sweden could not overlook the fact, that a state of active warfare with Russia, the necessary consequence of which must be open hostilities with Great Britain, surpassed her strength and resources; that the presence of an English fleet in the Baltic would paralyze, during summer, the Swedish operations; and that, since the treaty with Russia, there existed no ground of complaint against that power; That,

in the mean time, the Swedish coasts and ports would be abandoned to the vengeance of England; that the complete stagnation of commerce, and the interruption of the coasting trade, would occasion general misery; that the pressing wants of Sweden with respect to grain, imperiously required pacific relations both with Russia and England; that the sudden termination of war between France and Russia would infallibly leave Sweden without any augmentation of territory, especially if the Swedish army, in consequence of the war with England, were prevented from leaving its own confines; and that such preparations, and a single year of war, would require an expenditure of from 12 to 15 millions of rix-dollars. A multitude of other considerations determined the Swedish government to look to nothing but the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the kingdom; and with this view the ports were opened to the flags of all nations.

Ancient habits had long induced Sweden to consider France as her na tural ally. This opinion of times past -these impressions generally received -long acted powerfully on the minds of her rulers. But when France wish ed to interdict peninsular Sweden from traversing the seas which almost surround her, and to deprive her of the right of ploughing the waves which wash her shores, it became the duty of the government to defend the rights and interests of the nation-to avoid the situation of those powers, which, by their submission to France, found themselves without ships, without commerce, and without finances. The alliance of France, while it exacted in the first instance the loss of independence, conducted by degrees to all the sacrifices which annihilate the prosperity of states. To become her ally, it was necessary for Sweden to have no connection with England, and to make

good the loss of the revenue of customs, and of the profits of commerce, by imports always increasing. All this must have been done merely for the purpose of supporting the wars into which the capricious politics of France had drawn her during the last eight years. Had Sweden submitted to the demands of France, her sons would have been seen fighting, for a cause the most unhallowed, in Spain, along with Germans, Italians, and Poles. They would have been seen even in Turkey, had Buonaparte conquered the Emperor Alexander. If, to secure the destinies of Sweden, by esta blishing her safety for the present, and security for the future, the government was compelled to put the armies in motion, this was not done with a view of conquering provinces, useless to the prosperity of the Scandinavian peninsula. The independence of that peninsula was the sole object; and no sacrifice could be reckoned too costly by the Swedes to attain that great and important result. Sweden rejected the degrading treaty which France tried to make her subscribe; she placed herself above a subservient and versatile policy; and she did not fear to make her appeal to the courage, the loyalty, the patriotism, and the honour of her children. The government had formed a just opinion of the Swedes, and its reward was found in the unbounded confidence which they placed in its wisdom.

This developement of the views of Sweden was followed by a treaty betwixt that power and Great Britain, which was signed at Stockholm on the 3d March, 1813. By this treaty, Sweden bound herself to employ a corps of 30,000 men against the common enemy, to act with the troops which were to be furnished by Russia and Prussia; and to grant to Great Britain, for 20 years, the right of entrepot in the ports of Gottenburgh, Carlsham, and

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