tory of the war, and as glorious as ever adorned the British name, was obtained; that victory which was felt by the enemy to the utmost extremities of his force; because our illustrious and excellent commander had accom plished this, was there any reason whatever to suppose that the entire French power on the peninsula would be at once annihilated, and the allies enabled to march to the Pyrenees? The public mind was apt to become too sanguine, and to believe that the effect of a defeat like this would be the total destruction of the enemy in Spain. But when people reflected, that, at the commencement of the campaign, the French force in the peninsula amounted to 200,000 men, which was perhaps reduced by detachments sent to the north to 150,000, at the period of the battle of Salamanca, they would be inclined to take a different and more correct view of the subject. They would observe that such a force, when spread over Spain, might have maintained possession of the country by keeping down the spirit of its population, which they were unable to do when collected into two great masses. After the memorable battle of Salamanca, they were rendered too feeble to keep possession of Spain, and instead of driving the British into the sea, as they had often vainly threatened, they were driven in confusion before the British. But when they gave up the provinces and became a concentrated army, any man looking with a soldier's eye, must observe, that even after the battle of Salamanca, the Marquis of Wellington had a heavy task to perform to drive the French out of Spain. Every one must applaud the spirit of the people of this country, whose exultation on the triumphs of their gallant countrymen in Spain was so great as to induce sanguine feeling, not warranted by

the actual state of affairs. But whatever were the expectations of the people, it was right to state, that as far as Lord Wellington's prospects, with his knowledge and information, went, they had been largely and li berally accomplished.

"Lord Wellington had of late received supplies and reinforcements to a greater extent than ever. In the course of last year, 20,000 men had been sent to join him, and although large reinforcements had not arrived since the battle of Salamanca, the impossibility of sending men with all the dispatch which might be desired was the sole cause of the delay. The exertions of the government, and in a peculiar manner of his royal highness the commander-in-chief, to bring regiments to such a state of proficiency as to render them fit for foreign, service had been incessant and strenuous. The grants from the militia had not been available as a regular force earlier than the month of May, and neither the internal state of the country, nor that of Ireland, would at a former period admit of those forces being spared, which might now be united to their gallant comrades in the glorious task of delivering the peninsula. The greatest pos sible efforts had been made for an active campaign. It was perfectly true that the aid to Russia ought to be given in Spain; and in proportion as the north opened prospects of greater success, so ought we to make more strenuous efforts in the peninsula. With respect to the war in the north all the world must feel, and none felt it more than the illustrious person at the head of the Russian empire, that it was not to be expected from this country that it should make larger sacrifices, or in other quarters, than it did at present. That great monarch did not call on us for pecu. piary support. He said, "You are

fighting my cause, and the cause of the world in Spain, and there it is that your efforts will be most available and efficacious." His Imperial Majesty felt this to be the proper policy in the common cause, and in stead of looking to us for aid in the north, he had counted on the patriotism, the liberality, the spirit, and the loyalty of his people, to support him in the great struggle for independence, in which he was engaged, and to us he had looked for the effectual carrying on of the contest in Spain.

"Russia had taken the field to resist the encroachments of her adversary, and therefore there could be no impropriety in speaking openly of her measures; but as Sweden had not yet taken a step so decided, ministers had a duty to perform which rendered it very difficult to make any open or explicit statement on this point. Yet if the exertions of Sweden, necessarily more limited than those of Russia, had required the pecuniary aid of the country, to effect a diversion in the rear of the French ar mies, ministers would have been ready to assist her operations to that extent. France had committed an unqualified aggression on the Swedish monarchy, which had as yet been only met by a qualified resistance. What was the motive for collecting the force upon her coasts ministers could not be expected to explain; but it would be observed with a feeling of hope, that between these great northern powers, (for they were both great) and out of the late contention, which had led to the dismemberment of the province of Finland from Sweden, a system had ansen, which happily had linked them together in the bonds of the closest friendship and alliance. This fact was obvious from the very commencement of the campaign, when it was easy to perceive that a perfect understand

ing existed between the two countries. It was evident that Russia reposed confidence in Sweden, as she withdrew the mass of her troops from their cantonments in Finland. But those who were not satisfied with this demonstration of friendship, must have every apprehension relieved by the event of the personal interview at Abo, after which 18,000 men from the port of Swinburgh, were dispatched to Riga, where they arrived in time to join general Wittgenstein at the most critical period, and enabled him to turn the tide of war in that quarter, and to defeat the object of the enemy. If there had been no actual military exertion on the part of Sweden, yet much benefit had been reaped from the posture she assumed. Much as we might wish other powers to enter into resistance against the enemy with as great energy as our selves, yet when we considered that they did not possess our advantages, and were not so remote from danger as we were, we ought to look with forbearance to their measures, and not impute want of virtuous feeling to them, because they might not embark in hostilities with all the decision which we desired. The position assumed by Sweden had the effect of detaining two corps of the French army from active operations, which were left in the confines of Denmark. These corps amounted to 60,000 men. The most advanced, that of Victor, the enemy had not ventured to employ till after the battle of Borodino; and in fact it had not advanced till September, when it proceeded by detachments to join the main army.

The other corps,

that of Augereau, was still more retired in Germany, and completely withdrawn from hostile operations. Russia had a well-grounded confidence in the amity of Sweden, and the demonstration made by the latter

power had paralysed 60,000 men of the enemy's force. On these grounds ministers would be prepared to meet any future discussion on such subjects which might be thought necessary. "With respect to America, it was true, that in negociation too much for bearance had been shewn towards her. But the war after its commencement was not carried on wit greater for bearance than was dictated by a con sideration of the other contests in which this nation was unhappily engaged. Ministers would justly have drawn down the vengeance of the country, had they withdrawn a force from the peninsula for the purpose of originating belligerent measures against America. It was admitted that the declaration issued by America, if persevered in, would preclude for ever any prospect of peace: but the speech from the throne in its allusion to this topic, referred to the state of America at the period when this declaration was issued. Ministers had never assured the House, nor the country, whatever had been done by others, that the concessions which they were induced to make to America would lead to peace; on the contrary, when the repeal of the orders in council was discussed, they said,-in answer to those who contended, that if these measures were abandoned, peace would be the consequence, that the claims relative to blockade and impressment would disappoint their expectations. It was not however till after the war broke out, that the American government alledged other grounds of war, than the orders in council and the system of blockade. The question of impressment was previously only urged as an angry point of discussion.-With respect to the course taken by ministers when they acquired a knowledge of the actual commencement of the war, they had done what was tantamount to complete hostility;

and it was not from a spirit of forbearance, but from a consideration of the other circumstances of the country, that they had refrained from the immediate issue of letters of marque and reprisal, and from publishing to the world their case against the United States. But although letters of marque and reprisal were not issued, war was as effectually waged in another mode; and this course was followed from a desire to keep the councils of government ready to meet any disposition which might arise on the part of America towards peace. Had they not acted in this manner, they would have justly provoked censure, if America had on the receipt of the intelligence from this country withdrawn her declaration, and restored the British property which had been seized, while the British government was unable to meet this pacific dispo sition by a correspondent restitution, without coming to parliament to obtain that sum which had found its way into the coffers of the captors of American ships. The moment the declaration of war was received, and so soon as it was known that the Americans had proceeded to the condemnation of British property, and refused to ratify the armistice concluded between them and the governor of Upper Canada, that moment the letters of marque and reprisal were issued. It had been justly represented as strange, that no answer had been published to the American declaration which could be so readily refuted, and it had been added, that government was bound to give some grave and weighty reasons for not taking that official step. But let it be remembered, that although we were actually at war with America, yet negociations had not absolutely terminated. A mission had been entrusted to Admiral Warren, and a proposition submitted by him to the American government,

to which no answer had been received. The same proposition was intended to have been made through Mr Foster; but as he had left the country before the dispatch arrived, the business had of necessity devolved upon the admiral on the station. Under these circum stances, and waiting for the reply of the American government, ministers would have more consulted their feelings than their judgments had they hastily put forth the answer which they felt themselves prepared to give to the calumnies of America.-It was true, that the British government had never endeavoured to force, through the intervention of neutrals, British manufactures into France. With regard to the mission of Henry, it was not necessary that ministers should now publish any disavowal of it. They had disavowed it in their places in parliament, and declared they never knew of it until they saw the publications by the American execu tive. Government had disavowed it to the American cabinet, to satisfy whom they had sent over all the papers with which they were acquainted on the subject."

Leaving these details, and reverting to the general state of affairs, it was asked, "When had a speech been delivered on the opening of parliament, which contained so cheering a list of successes, or displayed a brighter prospect of advantages to the country? If it could not be said that the enemy was altogether discomfited, and finally and effectually repressed, yet he never was so dangerously involved in two great wars in the opposite extremities of Europe. These were wars in which he was not merely committed against the governments of countries, but in which the nations were arrayed against him. They were not, as formerly, wars productive only of means to recruit his resources, augment his forces, and

open to him a prospect of more extended conquests. Though he could drag his tributary states into the field, and amass a powerful force from those whom he had already overcome, yet in the great scale on which he was engaged he met with no aids to enable him to carry on the war vigorously he met at all points with national resistance, he was obliged to bring his supplies from a distance, and to exhaust the miserable nations over whom he exercised his rigorous sway. In Russia the spirit of opposition to his aggressions was, as noticed in the speech, unparalleled in history. The people of that country had been spoken of as barbarians, and as being a century behind the other nations in civilization; but could we find, that in any country a resistance to invasion so glorious as that which was now displayed had ever been made—a spirit of resistance, firing every rank and description of men, in the vast Russian empire? Nor was it for courage alone that the Russians had shone conspicuous during this contest; that heroic valour for which they were famed on former occasions, was not now their only praise; the military councils and skill of the commanders also shone forth pre-eminently; and the whole conduct of the campaign proved them to be equal to the most difficult situa tions and trying emergencies. The retreat of the numerous bodies of troops from the Niemen to the Moskwa, and the able and judicious manner in which it was conducted under pressing circumstances, was scarcely to be equalled in the history of the most celebrated military transactions. The retreat of Moreau, on which his highest fame rested, no military man would say could be placed in competition with this in Russia. How few armies had marched over 500 miles of country before they united into one mass, invariably baffling the immense