most brilliant success, and the enemy, driven from one of the strongest positions which it was possible for troops to occupy, were soon in full retreat to wards their own frontier. To cover their retreat they placed a strong rearguard in the pass of Donna Maria, from which, however, it was driven by Lord Dalhousie. The retreat now resembled a flight; many prisoners were brought in, and a large convoy with baggage was taken at the town of Elizonda. The French endeavoured, however, to make another stand at the Puerto de Echalar, immediately within the Spanish frontier; but two of their divisions were driven from these heights in the most brilliant style, by a single British division; and Soult was compelled reluctantly to abandon the object of all his exertions.

Thus terminated these great conficts. How different was the result from that expected by the French general, may be discovered by attending to his proclamation to the army on taking the command. In this address he states, "that he had been sent by the emperor to the command of his armies in Spain; and that his imperial majesty's instructions and his own intentions were, to drive the British across the Ebro, and celebrate the emperor's birth-day in the town of Vittoria." It so happened, however, that the Prince of Orange arrived in Lon. don with the intelligence of the enemy's having been driven into France on the very day which they had fixed for celebrating their own triumphs.

Soult expected not only to relieve Pampluna, but to fix himself again on the Ebro, and unite with Suchet's army. That he should so soon have collected a force of 70,000 men-the number engaged in the late battles, might appear extraordinary; but it must be recollected that the armistice in the north was signed the day before

the battle of Vittoria, and as troops were not immediately wanted in Germany, many divisions which must otherwise have been sent thither, were dispatched to the frontiers of Spain, where hostilities were still carried on, and the danger was most pressing.

Much speculation was now excited as to the future operations of the British commander. Some affected to doubt whether he would enter France, while others conceived this step to be the necessary result of his previous operations. A descent into the south of France seemed to be advisable in every point of view, military as well as moral-military, because while the allies remained on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees, the enemy must always have had the power of attacking the different passes, while it must have been impossible for them, unless they established a post in France, to ascertain his movements-what reinforcements he received-or what projects he had in contemplation: moral, because Buonaparte had always represented France as a country not exposed to invasion: "the sacred country," which none of her antagonists dared to enter ; but when the people of France found a British army in their own territories, this circumstance, it was thought, must abate very much their pride and confi. dence in their arms. When they saw an invading army in France, they could have no doubt of the failure of their projects upon Spain; and the allies might then say to them with truth, See the result of your treacherous attempts against this fine country: history does not furnish an instance of greater crime, an example of more infamy, than this invasion of Spain. But mark the result-the unburied bones of half a million of your countrymen whiten the valleys and mountains of the invaded country, and yet you have not been able to effect your purpose. Spain

has been wrested from your grasp, and a British army has come to turn the evils of invasion against yourselves. -Such, it was said, must be the moral advantages of the invasion of France. The measure, besides, could be attended with no hazard to the invader. Stationed on this side the Pyrenees, Lord Wellington could have no apprehension for his rear while he commanded the passes; and if he had done nothing more than occupy the country to Bayonne, he would not only have wounded the pride and weakened the character of the French government, but he would have been able, if he had chosen, to make the south of France provide subsistence for his troops.

How bitter were the disappointments which the French had already sustained, was apparent from a variety of circumstances. The proclamation which Soult addressed to the troops on taking the command, and which has already been noticed, seems to prove that the French armies had lost much of their ardour in the course of this peninsular war, and required every stimulus to encourage their exertions.In this curious document there was much promise of what the general would effect himself, with the usual sprinkling of French falsehood. Soult had the folly to assert what no one could believe that the British army was much superior in numbers to that of the enemy when it advanced to the Douro; he added, however, that a good general might have "discomfited this motley levy." Timorous and pusillanimous councils, however, he says, were followed; fortresses were abandoned; the marches were disorderly; and a veteran army was compelled to yield all its acquisitions. Of the battle of Vittoria he says, that the result would have been different had the general been worthy of his troops, although he confesses that the disposi

tions of Lord Wellington were prompt, skilful, and consecutive; and that the valour and steadiness of the British troops were admirable. He desired his soldiers not to forget, however, that it was to the benefit of their example the British owed their present military character. This was certainly true; it had been to the example the French afforded Europe of being invariably beaten when they hazarded a battle with British troops, that the latter owed their present military character. Lord Wellington and Lord Nelson were indebted for their reputation to an uninterrupted series of victories over the land and sea forces of France; and no small addition had been made by this very Soult to the military character of the British general and his armies.After this censure of his predecessor, and boast of what he would effect himself-after threatening to drive the British across the Ebro, and date his dispatches from Vittoria, what had Soult been able to do against this "motley levy," which a skilful general might easily have discomfited? The very same thing that Jourdan had done. Jourdan was beaten and driven out of Spain; and nobody could affirm that the fate of Soult was very different.

The efforts of the enemy in the field had proved unavailing to avert the downfall of their fortresses. At St Sebastian, however, they had displayed more than their usual dexterity in fortifying the place; but a breach having been effected, the assault was ordered to take place at day-break of the 25th. The storming party, (about 2000 men,) were ordered to assemble in the trenches, and the explosion of the mine was to be the signal for advance. The uncovered approach from the trenches to the breach was about 300 yards in length, before an extensive front of works, and over very difficult ground, consisting of rocks covered with sea

weed and intermediate pools of water. The fire of the place was yet entire, and the breach was flanked by two towers, which, though considerably injured, were still occupied.

At five in the morning the mine was sprung, which destroyed much of the counterscarp and glacis, and created astonishment in the enemy posted on the works near to it. They abandoned them for the moment, and the advance of the storming-party reached the breach without much resistance. When they attempted to ascend the breach, however, the enemy opened a destructive fire, and threw down a profusion of shells from the towers on the flanks, and from the summit of the breach. The assaulting party returned into the trenches with the loss of nearly 100 men killed, and 400 wounded. The advanced guard, with Lieutenant Jones, who led them, were made prisoners on the breach, and Lieutenant Colonel Sir R. Fletcher was wounded at the same time in the trenches.-This assault does not appear to have failed from want of exertion, but because the fire of the place had been left entire, and the distance of the covered approaches from the breach was too great. The troops are said in the Gazette to have done their duty; but it was beyond the power of gallantry to overcome the difficulties opposed to them. Sir T Graham's words are, "notwithstanding the distinguished gallantry of the troops employed, the attack did not succeed. The enemy occupied in force all the defences of the place which looked that way, and from which, and all around the breach, they were enabled to bring so destructive a fire of grape and musketry, flanking and enfilading the column, and to throw over so many hand-grenades on the troops, that it became necessary to desist from the attack. Though this attack has failed, it would be great injustice not

to assure your lordship that the troops conducted themselves with their usual gallantry, and only retired when I thought a further perseverance in the attack would have occasioned a useless sacrifice of brave men."

The breach having thus proved impracticable, all the operations of the siege were to be recommenced; the repulse of the French army, however, left the allies at full liberty to carry them on. Their first object was to cut off the communication which the besieged carried on by sea with the coast of France; and Sir George Collier, with a party of marines, stormed the island of Santa Clara, which lies at the mouth of the harbour, and took the garrison prisoners. New breaching batteries were, in the mean time, raised and carried forward with such vigour, that on the 31st of August it was determined to make another assault The result of this, however, appeared in the first instance to be very doubtful.

The columns for the assault moved out of the trenches, and in a few minutes after the advance of the forlorn hope the enemy exploded two mines, which destroyed part of the walls, but as the troops were not in very close order, nor very near the wall, their loss was not great. From the Mirador and battery del Principe, on the castle, the fire of grape and shells was opened on the columns, and continued while they were disputing the breach. The main curtain, which had been completely breached, was strongly occupied by grenadiers; the left branch of the horn-work was also well-manned; a heavy fire was maintained on the breach, great part of which was exposed; but a tower called Amezquita, on the left, was fortunately not manned. By the extremity of the curtain the breach was accessible; but the enemy's position there was commanding, and

the ascent much exposed to the fire of the besieged. Behind the breach was a perpendicular fall from 15 to 25 feet in depth, under which were the ruins of the houses, and part of the walls still left at intervals, by which alone it was possible to descend. A line of retrenchment, carried along these ruins, was strongly occupied by the enemy, and entirely swept the confined summit of the breach.

The storming parties advanced to the breach, and remained on the side of it without ascending the summit, as they were prevented by the heavy fire from the entrenched ruins within. Many desperate efforts were made to gain the summit without effect; fresh troops were sent on successively, as fast as they could be filed out of the trenches; and 500 Portuguese, in two detachments, forded the river Urumea, near its mouth, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry.

The greatest difficulties had thus presented themselves after the troops had got to the breach. "Never was any thing," says Sir Thomas Graham, "so fallacious as its external appearance. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall, to the right of the curtain, formed a perpendicular scarp of at least 20 feet to the level of the streets, so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the opera tions of the siege, from want of ammu. nition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses in the horn-work-on the ramparts of the curtain-and within the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of mus

ketry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain. Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge; yet a secure lodgement could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.”

The breach was now covered with troops remaining in the same unfavour. able situation, and unable to gain the summit: upwards of two hours of continued and severe exertion had elapsed. On the instant Sir Thomas Graham adopted a new expedient; he ordered the guns to be turned against the curtain. It was manifest that unless this could be done with almost unexampled precision, the assailants must have suffered more severely than their enemies

-for the fire, to be effectual, must have been elevated only a few feet above the heads of our own troops in the breach. But it was directed with admirable precision, and proved effectual. By a happy chance a quantity of combustibles exploded within the breach, and the French began to waver; the assailants made fresh efforts; the ravelin and left branch of the horn-work were abandoned by the enemy; the entrenchment within the breach was soon deserted by them, and the assailants got over the ruins and gained the curtain.

The troops being now assembled in great numbers on the breach, pushed into the town; the garrison, dispirited by its severe loss, and intimidated by the perseverance and bravery of the assailants, was quickly driven from all its intrenchments (except the convent of Teresa,) into the castle. From the su perior height of the curtain-a circumstance of which Sir T. Graham had so promptly availed himself, the artillery

in the batteries on the right of the Urumea were able to keep up a fire on that part during the assault; and as the artillery was extremely well served, it occasioned a severe loss to the enemy, and probably produced the explosion which led to final success.

The assailants had upwards of 500 men killed, and 1500 wounded; of the garrison, besides those who were killed and wounded during the assault, 700 were made prisoners in the town. Of the engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart. Captains Rhodes and Collier, were killed; LieutenantColonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenants Barry and Marshall, were wounded.

So soon as the town was carried, preparations were made to reduce the castle. The plan of attack was to erect batteries on the north of the town, and breach some of the main points of the defences of the castle. The town, which had been on fire ever since the assault, from the quantity of ammunition and combustibles of all sorts scattered around, was now nearly consumed; and the flames had proved a great impediment to carrying the approaches forward. The enemy's fire, however, had been nearly silenced since the assault; and the roofs of the remaining houses and the steeples were prepared for musketry, the fire of which was to open when the assault on the castle should commence.

The batteries opened on the castle from the left of the attack. The fire was extremely powerful and well directed, ploughing up every part of the confined space of the castle: the enemy kept concealed chiefly in little narrow trenches, which they had made along the front of the heights, but they lost many men. A white flag was at last hoisted, and the garrison surrendered prisoners of war :-its numbers had been reduced to 80 officers and 1756 men, of whom 23 offi

cers and 512 men were in hospital.— There were expended by the besiegers in these operations, more than 70,000 shot and shells, and upwards of 500,000lbs. of gunpowder.

From the account which has been given of this siege, it must be evident that the defence of breaches made and stormed under such circumstances is so very advantageous, that against an intelligent governor, and a brave garrison, accident alone can give the assault a tolerable chance of success. As the fire of the batteries is entirely directed to breaching, the enemy's troops, previously to the assault, sustain little or no loss; and as their front is restricted, it can be fully occupied, while a sufficient number of men remain to form strong reserves. The assailants have no help from their works, and depend for success entirely on their own exertions; while the height of situation, with the difficulty of ascent up the ruins of the wall, give a decided superiority to the besieged. But if, in addition, the breach be well intrenched, and the governor has made use of the precautions recommended in every treatise on defence, by covering the approach to the breach, and preserving a powerful flank fire, both direct and vertical, to play on the columns during the struggle, no conceivable superiority of courage over a brave enemy will counterbalance such advantages. It is no disparagement, therefore, to the troops, that they failed in the first assault on the 25th of July, and succeeded on the 31st of August, in a great measure by the unexpected accuracy of fire from distant batteries, and the accidental explosion of the enemy's shells and ammunition, which gave their heroic exertions a chance of success. Had the contest been merely that of man to man, the result would not have remain. ed long doubtful-for the troops carried the breach and gained the summit