upon only when in position, while to fight in position was not at the option of the allies, but of the enemy. The force which General Murray relied up. on, under all circumstances, was reduced, by his statements, to 4500 British; and it seems also, that in case of disaster, retreat was considered by the general as nearly impracticable. In his consideration, at least, the dangers and difficulties of the re-embarkation had become sufficiently apparent at a very early period. It was the opinion of the general also, that it would have been quite impossible to take Tarra gona by storm, or by a coup de main; for he did not make such attempt for many days, when the necessity of doing so, even with much risk, was so urgent. We learn from his dispatches, not only that a coup-de-main was considered as impracticable, but that even eight or ten days would have been insufficient, in Sir John Murray's judge ment, to have put him in possession of the fortress. But General Murray must necessarily have been possessed of nearly the whole of this information some days previously to that on which the re-embarkation took place; of the whole, of course, of that which concerned his own army and the state of the works of Tarragona. The reports concerning the enemy appear to have been, as stated by the general, in the main points consistent; and, with the exception of some slight variations as to numbers, nearly uniform; they were considered credible and appear to have agreed with the better and more certain knowledge possessed by General Murray. It is still more material to remark, that he himself seems at all times to have given them full credit. How, then, does this state of matters explain or justify his conduct? The town was not to be taken for eight or ten days; and according to what Colonel Thackaray, the chief engineer, stated to General Murray, it could not be reduced in

less than fourteen days. The numbers of the French, and the description of their troops were such, that, according to the opinion formed by the general, the enemy was not to be resisted in the field with any fair prospect of success by the allied army. The enemy was approaching, and from different circumstances, had the option of attacking the allies in the course of four or five days. Why, then, persist in the siege, and continue to land stores, provisions, heavy guns, and every thing requisite for the capture of the town? Why expose materials of such importance in the ensuing campaign, when the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the premises, if at all correct, is, that the general was at the time aware, that his measures could be of no avail as to the object in view? In such circumstances, his whole thoughts, plans, and exertions, should have been turned to the pursuit and security of other objects, the success of which, though always, until his return to Valencia, precarious, it was still in his power to promote and perhaps to confirm.

The force which the enemy could collect in Catalonia in a given time,the impossibility of any impression being made on Tarragona within that time,

the impropriety of risking an action, the necessity of raising the siege, and the consequent failure of one great object of the instructions ;— all this appears to be assumed in the dispatch written by General Murray to Lord Wellington; but the general consoles himself by stating, that he hopes to be able to shew that no time was lost, when he had decided upon abandoning the siege. On this point no great difference of opinion existed. He was charged with loss of time certainly; but this time was lost in coming to the decision, and not in the execution, in which an unnecessary haste and precipitation were conspicu ous. The delay with which he was

charged was in not returning instantly to Valencia, according to the instruc. tions received by him, so soon as the siege was abandoned. The charge of unnecessary delay was never applied to the manner in which the resolution of abandoning the siege, when once adopted, was put into execution.

In one of General Murray's dispatches to Lord Wellington, a sentence of condemnation seems, as it were, passed upon his own conduct, and that in very strong terms. " Upon a review of this case," says he, "I believe your lordship will rather be of opinion, that I continued the siege too long, than that I abandoned it too soon, and I can only plead an extreme anxiety to carry your lordship's views into execution as my excuse. I saw the moment when in all prudence the cannon ought to have been embarked, and the enterprise abandoned; but that followed," &c. And then he proceeds to state the reasons for not having acted on this opinion, which although they might justify him for not immediately re-embarking the whole of the infantry, and leaving the spot altogether, yet in no way explain his continuing on shore, and persevering to land the heavy guns, stores, provisions, &c. up to the very hour of reembarkation. Neither can they apply more than any other part of his statement, as an answer to the charge of lingering subsequently on the coast, and re-landing the whole expedition. The result of his statement appears tobe, that the following up one great object of his instructions was sacrificed to an anxiety to accomplish that which was admitted to be impracticable-a line of conduct seemingly at variance with the better judgment of the general himself, and with the instructions which ought to have been his guide.

On the 8th and 9th, it appears that nothing could be done; but on the 10th and 11th, when the raising

of the siege had become inevitable, instead of being employed in landing more stores and guns, or carrying them forward into situations of greater danger and exposure, the most zealous effort should have been made to prepare for re-embarking every thing which had been already endangered; and which from the period, when the attempt upon the town was considered as impracticable, remained expoed without any possibility of advan tage. This certainly appears to have been the moment seen by the general himself, "When in all prudence the cannon ought to have been embark. ed, and it must be regretted that his conduct was not more consistent with his conviction. In one of his letters there is the following passage: "For days an embarkation might be impracticable, and that consideration made me extremely anxious, when the continuance of the siege became impracticable, to profit of the state of the beach, as it could not be depended upon from one day to another." Here again the general seemed to be the first to pronounce censure upon his own conduct.

As it appears then to have been clearly ascertained before the 10th, that nothing within the range of ordinary probabilities could have put the allies in possession of Tarragona, the proper use to have been made of the 10th and 11th was to have secured on board the fleet the materiel of the expedition, which had become useless on shore-which was then every instant in danger without any adequate object; and part of which, in consequence of the general's not having acted in pursuance of his own conviction, was ultimately abandoned. From the details given in the general's dispatches as to the use which was made of the 3d of June, on the first debarkation, the importance of a single day is sufficiently obvious; nearly all the in

success.

fantry-several field pieces, and a proportion of stores and baggage, were safely put on shore on that one day, when there was no particular stimulus to more than ordinary exertions -Al though a brisk attack is certainly recommended in the instructions, it has never been insinuated, that a more vigorous prosecution of the siege would have been practicable, or attended with One fact, however, mentioned by Sir John Murray, it does appear to be material to point out, viz. that six twenty-four pounders, four howitzers, and four mortars were not placed in the batteries, against the body of the place, until the night of the 10th, a period when, instead of more artillery being placed in a situation to make its desertion and destruction inevitable, all that was already in danger should have been removed.

With respect to the conduct pursued immediately after the siege was raised, it was remarked, that, according to Sir John Murray's instructions, the only remaining object then was, his immediate return to Valencia, to co-operate with and assist the Spanish armies in front of the French position on the Xucar. So soon as the plan of re-embarkation at Tarragona was decided upon, however, the cavalry and a part of the field-train were sent over land to the Coll de Ballaguer. It was afterwards judged expedient to land more infantry on that point, for the further protection of the re-embarkation. When the remainder of the infantry arrived it was resolved to reland the whole with a view of cutting off a division of Marshal Suchet's army at Bandilloz; and upon the 13th or 14th (the precise date not being stated) it appears that the re-landing of the expedition took place accordingly. That this conduct was contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of Lord Wellington's instructions, and inexpedient with a view to the only object now re

maining, there can be no doubt. It remains to be considered, therefore, whether there was a sufficient inducement to adopt this line of conduct so contrary to that which was pointed out by the commander of the forces?-It must always be recollected, that General Murray thought himself unequal to contend with the forces of Suchet when united. It was on this account the siege had just been raised, and the cannon, stores, and ammunition sacrificed. It was also the opinion of General Murray, that Suchet had the power of withdrawing any advanced posts of his army when he pleased, and of re-uniting the whole, and giving battle, when it suited his convenience. It is necessary only to refer to his various letters to prove that all expectation of cutting off any division of the enemy, was deemed by Sir John Murray to be visionary; that, unless the enemy should be guilty of the greatest folly, the attempt was impracticable. Yet with the full knowledge of all these facts, the danger of re-embarkation at the Coll de Ballaguer remaining the same as when General Murray before declined to embark the army at that point, the French armies remaining in force the same, and in situation improved, every ground of objection to continuing on shore still existing, all the causes of the former hasty reembarkation, and of the great sacrifices which had just been made, being in full force, in opposition to every principle upon which the general had just been acting-the very thing is done and the very risks are incurred, which before had been so strongly condemned, and this too when the inducement which had operated in the first instance no longer existed, and when no adequate object can be discovered to account for so strange a deviation from the instructions receiv ed.-To pursue the detail of facts, we find them precisely such as the ar

guments and statements in General Murray's letters would have led us to expect. On the night of the 15th, when the English approached, the French withdrew their corps from Bandillos; and, in the meantime. the corps from Barcelona advanced to Cambrills, about ten miles from the allied positions.-On the 16th, the English troops, in pursuit of the Bandillos French division, returned without having accomplished their object, just as might have been expected; and on the 17th, when the allied army, according to the instructions, ought to have been ready to act again in Valencia, General Murray found himself still near the Coll de Ballaguer. Here he remained, with every prospect of an impending general action, to avoid which, on the 12th so much had been sacrificed, and with every risk of a second re-embarkation to be still incurred. Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck then arrived on the 17th, and the final re-embarkation of the whole army, which had a second time been resolved upon by General Murray (the idea of a general engagement having been abandoned), was, by the orders of Lord William Bentinck, immediately carried into execu

tion.

The facts of a hasty and precipitate embarkation, without any previous arrangement, and the consequent abandoning of a considerable portion of artillery, stores, and ammunition, it seems difficult to dispute. So sudden was the resolution to re-embark fnally adopted, and so little were all parties prepared for this measure, that every arrangement was making, and every exertion employed, for a more vigorous prosecution of the siege, up to the very moment when the execution of this new resolution had actually commenced. General Copons, who commanded the Spanish army, acting in co-operation with, and under the

directions of General Murray, must have been led to suppose, from the instructions which he had received, that a battle with De Caen was on the eve of taking place, in which he was to take a principal share; and the Spanish general continued to act on that supposition, and to remain (of course with considerable risk to his own troops) undeceived until after the guns in the batteries were spiked, and a large portion of the allied army was actually on board the vessels. Nor was the resolution of sending the field artillery and cavalry for re-embarkation to a different and somewhat distant spot, near the Coll de Ballaguer, less extraordinary. This was the precise spot which had been represented by General Murray as so uncertain and dangerous, that for this very reason, he had declined embarking the whole army there. A separation of the different parts of the army was of course produced by the embarkation of the infantry alone, leaving the guns and cavalry without due protection, although it was mainly to avoid this very evil that General Murray had determined not to allow of a delay sufficient to enable the admiral to preserve the trophies, which were, in consequence, abandoned. The fact, also, that Admiral Hallowell did offer to secure every thing, if Sir John Murray would have consented to a certain delay, was very handsomely admitted by General Murray. Whether the delay proposed by the admiral might or might not, according to a fair calculation, have been permitted with safety, in the circumstances in which the general was placed; whether, from the immediate approach of the enemy, or other causes, all additional zeal, firmness, and exertion, would have been unavailing; and whether the delay required would or would not have involved the troops in a serious affair with a very superior force, and have

been attended with the probable destruction of a considerable portion of the army-These are the only points on which any difference of opinion can exist.

It is true, indeed, that in the instructions sent by Lord Wellington to General Murray, there is the following passage:" "It must be understood, however, by the general officers at the head of the troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack them in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed." By what ingenious argu. ments this passage can be fairly quoted in defence of Sir John Murray, it was difficult, said his accusers, to discover; scarcely, indeed, was it applicable at all to the circumstances in which he was placed. The meaning appears obvious: Several of the Spanish corps, it is well known, were composed of raw levies, not to be depended upon when opposed to veteran troops, more especially when the latter were assisted by position. It was also a matter of notoriety, that many of the previous failures of the Spaniards had arisen from their generals not being sufficiently impressed with this unpleasant truth; but, on the contrary, suffering their zeal and confidence to get the better of their prudence. Thus they continually risked general actions, which ought, except in cases of decided advantage and superiority, to have been most carefully avoided. On the other hand, the only advantage which the Spaniards possessed, was in the superiority of their numbers. The instructions, therefore, looking to the real state of affairs, appear naturally to prescribe, as a general rule in carrying on the cam

paign, that advantage should be taken of the circumstances which were favourable, and those errors avoided, the fatal effects of which had been already but too often experienced. It was Lord Wellington's object to use, and at the same time carefully preserve, that superiority of numbers which the Spaniards then enjoyed, and which the defeat and dispersion of any of their corps would have destroyed.-How then does the passage apply to the circumstances in which General Murray was placed? How does it apply, as a defence against a charge for not having risked a general action, when the result would have been attended with glory and benefit to the cause of the world then at stake? Giving it, however, all due weight, how can it account for the perseverance in the siege without object--for the consequent losses incurred-for the delay in coming to the decision of re-embarking that which was uselessly exposed on shore-for the want of previous arrangement-for the improper haste and confusion attending the re-embarkation when the measure was at last finally decided upon-and for the subsequent delay on the coast, and the relanding of the army? Next to the loss of a whole corps, the loss of the equipments of an army, the loss of guns, stores, and ammunition-the loss, in part, of the means of carrying on those sieges, which, in the general scope of the instructions, were evidently contemplated in the course of the campaign, was of the utmost importance; such losses were scarcely less embarrassing than the loss of a corps, more especially when the infinite difficulty of replacing them in Spain is duly considered; and according to the true meaning of the paragraph which has been quoted, they ought to have been most cautiously avoided. This proposition, although not literally expressed, must in all fairness be considered