out many inventions.' From whence it appears clearly, that it is to man alone that his ruin must be imputed, since, having received by the favour of God a natural uprightness, he hath by his own folly fallen into vanity.

"We assert, therefore, that man is naturally corrupted. Not that this corruption springs from the foundation of his nature, but we express ourselves thus, in order to shew that it is rather a quality superadded to human nature, than a property of its substance, which hath from the beginning belonged to it. We, however, call this corruption natural, in order that no one may imagine, that it is acquired or contracted by example or evil customs; since we all take possession of it from our birth, by a successive and hereditary right. This we do not assert without authority. It is on this account that the apostle designates mankind, by nature, the children of wrath.”*

* Instit. lib. ii. cap. 1,

SECTION IX.

On Free-will.

HAVING thus established the fact of the entire depravity of human nature, our author naturally proceeds to discuss the question of free-will, which has given rise to so much controversy in the christian world, and which is far from being settled at the present day. The sentiments of Calvin on this subject, being appreciated only through the medium of modern Calvinists, who without any acquaintance with the works of their venerable founder, have adopted his general sentiments without examination, and maintained them in many instances upon different grounds than those upon which he professedly rested them; a few extracts will, perhaps, serve the double purpose of correcting the mistakes too prevalent on the subject, and of doing justice to our author.

"Having shewn," he observes, "that the tyranny of sin, since it subdued Adam our first father, has not only been extended over all men, but has also taken possession of their whole

souls, we are now to enquire whether, since we have been thus engaged in this miserable slavery, we have entirely lost our liberty, or whether we retain any portion of it, and of what strength it is. But the more easily to throw light upon this question, it is necessary to propose an end to which we may refer the whole dispute. The best means to avoid error is to consider attentively the dangers which present themselves on either side. When man discovers himself to be destitute of all good, he immediately takes occasion to become careless. For being told that he has no ability in himself to do good, he takes no pains to endeavour so to do, as though he had no concern in it. On the other hand, if any thing good be attributed to him, immediately a false confidence is excited, and he robs God of a part of the glory which is his due. In order to avoid these equally dangerous rocks, we must, in my opinion, take the following course. In convincing man, that in him there dwelleth no good thing, and that he is on all sides surrounded, thus to speak by a miserable indigence, we should at the same time teach him to aspire both to the good of which he is destitute, and to the liberty of which he is deprived, and that he should attend more earnestly to those duties than if he believed that he was enriched with goodness, and endowed with extensive ability.

"With respect to the first, which consists in making him feel his poverty and his misery, many persons entertain doubts which they need not. It is true that man ought not to be deprived of any thing belonging to him; but it is infinitely important to deprive him entirely of vanity and false glory. The scriptures, when they speak of the excellent dignity with which man was adorned at his creation, refer it to his having been created in the image of God. By which they clearly shew that he was not independantly rich, and that all his opulence and blessedness was derived to him through the communion which he enjoyed with God, and by the participation of his favours.

"It is, besides, no less useful to us, than it is necessary to support the glory of God undiminished, to deprive us of all the praise of virtue and of wisdom. To walk and to fight depending upon our own strength, what is it, but to lean upon a reed which will break under us? On which account, Austin so frequently remarks, That those who defend free-will, while they are endeavouring to establish its rights, rather overthrow than support it.'"*

Having thus introduced the subject, our author proceeds to quote the sentiments of the

* In Evangel. Joan. tract 22.--Instit. lib. ii. cap. 2.

ancient philosophers, as well as those of the fathers of the Christian church, in which, however, we shall not follow him, as the object of the present work is rather to display the sentiments of the reformer, than to treat any particular subject fully. Those who are inclined to pursue this question at length, will see it discussed in a masterly and convincing manner, by the celebrated Jonathan Edwards, in his work on the Freedom of the Will, in which the subject is treated with the acumen of a Locke, and the piety of a Watts.

Pursuing the subject, our author observes, "That sentence of Chrysostome has ever pleased me, that the foundation of our philosophy is humility. The discourse of Austin still more, where he uses these expressions; As Demosthenes, the celebrated Greek orator, being asked what was the first rule of eloquence, replied, that it was action, and when asked what was the second, and what the third, gave still the same answer, that it was action: So,' saith he, if you ask me what are the precepts of the Christian religion, I will reply that the first, the second, and the third are-Humility.' By this humility he by no means intends a disposition of soul, which simply prevents a man, upon the supposition of some good quality, from becoming proud; but a virtue which makes him truly