space." Now, were the proposition but fairly put, its absurdity would become transparent at once. Clearly, there is no mere difficulty in the case. The assertion intended, if presented according to its intention, and without sophistry, would run thus :-"The mind admits the idea of limitless, through the greater impossibility of entertaining that of limited, space."

It must be immediately seen that this is not a question of two statements between whose respective credibilities— or of two arguments between whose respective validities— the reason is called upon to decide-it is a matter of two conceptions, directly conflicting, and each avowedly impossible, one of which the intellect is supposed to be capable of entertaining, on account of the greater impossibility of entertaining the other. The choice is not made between two difficulties; it is merely fancied to be made between two impossibilities. Now of the former, there are degrees, but of the latter, none-just as our impertinent letter-writer has already suggested. A task may be more or less difficult; but it is either possible or not possible-there are no gradations. It might be more difficult to overthrow the Andes than an ant-hill; but it can be no more impossible to annihilate the matter of the one than the matter of the other. A man may jump ten feet with less difficulty than he can jump twenty, but the impossibility of his leaping to the moon is not a whit less than that of his leaping to the dog-star.

Since all this is undeniable; since the choice of the mind is to be made between impossibilities of conception; since one impossibility cannot be greater than another; and since thus, one cannot be preferred to another; the philosophers who not only maintain, on the grounds mentioned, man's idea of infinity, but on account of such supposititious idea, infinity itself—are plainly engaged in demonstrating one impossible thing to be possible by showing how it is that some one other thing is impossible too. This, it will be said is nonsense, and perhaps it is; indeed I think it very capital nonsense, but forego all claim to it as nonsense of mine.

The readiest mode, however, of displaying the fallacy of the philosophical argument on this question is by simply adverting to a fact respecting it which has been hitherto quite overlooked-the fact that the argument alluded to both proves and disproves its own proposition. "The mind is impelled," say the theologians and others, "to admit a First Cause, by the superior difficulty it experiences in conceiving cause beyond cause without end." The quibble, as before, lies in the word "difficulty," but here what is it employed to sustain? A First Cause. And what is a First Cause? An ultimate termination of causes. And what is an ultimate termination of causes? Finitythe Finite. Thus the one quibble in two processes, by God knows how many philosophers, is made to support now Finity and now Infinity; could it not be brought to support something besides? As for the quibbles, they at least, are insupportable. But, to dismiss them; what they prove in the one case is the identical nothing which they demonstrate in the other.

Of course, no one will suppose that I here contend for the absolute impossibility of that which we attempt to convey in the word "Infinity." My purpose is but to show the folly of endeavouring to prove Infinity itself, or even our conception of it, by any such blundering ratiocination as that which is ordinarily employed.

Nevertheless, as an individual, I may be permitted to say that I cannot conceive Infinity, and am convinced that no human being can. A mind not thoroughly self-conscious, not accustomed to the introspective analysis of its own operations, will, it is true, often deceive itself by supposing that it has entertained the conception of which we speak. In the effort to entertain it, we proceed step beyond step, we fancy point still beyond point; and so long as we continue the effort, it may be said in fact, that we are tending to the formation of the idea designed; while the strength of the impression that we actually form or have formed, is in the ratio of the period during which we keep up the mental endeavour. But it is in the act of discontinuing the endeavour-of fulfilling (as we think) the

idea of putting the finishing stroke (as we suppose) to the conception-that we overthrow at once the whole fabric of our fancy by resting upon some one ultimate, and therefore, definite point. This fact, however, we fail to perceive, on account of the absolute coincidence in time, between the settling down upon the ultimate point and the act of cessation in thinking. In attempting, on the other hand, to frame the idea of a limited space, we merely converse the processes which involve the impossibility.

We believe in a God. We may or may not believe in finite or in infinite space; but our belief in such cases is more properly designated as faith, and is a matter quite distinct from that belief proper-from that intellectual belief-which presupposes the mental conception.

The fact is, that, upon the enunciation of any one of that class of terms to which "Infinity" belongs—the class representing thoughts of thought—he who has a right to say that he thinks at all, feels himself called upon not to entertain a conception, but simply to direct his mental vision toward some given point in the intellectual firmament, where lies a nebula never to be resolved. To solve it, indeed, he makes no effort; for with a rapid instinct he comprehends not only the impossibility, but as regards all human purposes, the inessentiality of its solution. He perceives that the Deity has not designed it to be solved. He sees at once that it lies out of the brain of man, and even how, if not exactly why, it lies out of it. There are people, I am aware, who, busying themselves in attempts at the unattainable, acquire very easily by dint of the jargon they emit, among those thinkers-that-they-think with whom darkness and depth are synonymous, a kind of cuttle-fish reputation for profundity; but the finest quality of Thought is its self-cognisance; and with some little equivocation, it may be said that no fog of the mind can well be greater than that which, extending to the very boundaries of the mental domain, shuts out even these boundaries themselves from comprehension.

It will now be understood that in using the phrase "Infinity of Space," I make no call upon the reader to en

tertain the impossible conception of an absolute infinity. I refer simply to the "utmost conceivable expanse" of spacea shadowy and fluctuating domain, now shrinking, now swelling, in accordance with the vacillating energies of the imagination.

Hitherto, the Universe of stars has always been considered as coincident with the Universe proper, as I have defined it in the commencement of this Discourse. It has been always either directly or indirectly assumed at least since the dawn of intelligible Astronomy-that, were it possible for us to attain any given point in space, we should still find on all sides of us, an interminable succession of stars. This was the untenable idea of Pascal when making perhaps the most successful attempt ever made at periphrasing the conception for which we struggle in the word "Universe." "It is a sphere," he says, "of which the centre is everywhere, the circumference nowhere." But although this intended definition is, in fact, no definition of the Universe of stars, we may accept it, with some mental reservation, as a definition (rigorous enough for all practical purposes) of the Universe proper--that is to say, of the Universe of space. This latter, then, let us regard as "a sphere of which the centre is everywhere, the circumference nowhere." In fact, while we find it impossible to fancy an end to space, we have no difficulty in picturing to ourselves any one of an infinity of beginnings.

As our starting point, then, let us adopt the Godhead. Of this Godhead, in itself, he alone is not imbecile-he alone is not impious who propounds-nothing. "Nous ne connaissons rien," says the Baron de Bielfeld-" Nous ne connaissons rien de la nature ou de l'essence de Dieu:-pour savoir ce qu'il est, il faut être Dieu même."- "We know absolutely nothing of the nature or essence of God-in order to comprehend what he is, we should have to be God ourselves."

"We should have to be God ourselves!"--With a phrase so startling as this yet ringing in my ears, I nevertheless venture to demand if this our present ignorance of the Deity is an ignorance to which the soul is everlastingly condemned.

By Him, however now, at least, the Incomprehensible -by Him-assuming him as Spirit-that is to say, as not Matter a distinction which for all intelligible purposes will stand well instead of a definition-by Him, then existing as Spirit, let us content ourselves to-night with supposing to have been created, or made out of Nothing by dint of his Volition—at some point of Space which we will take as a centre-at some period into which we do not pretend to inquire, but at all events immensely remote-by Him, then again, let us suppose to have been created-What? This is a vitally momentous epoch in our considerations. What is it that we are justified-that alone we are justified in supposing to have been primarily and solely created?

We have attained a point where only Intuition can aid us-but now let me recur to the idea which I have already suggested as that alone which we can properly entertain of intuition. It is but the conviction arising from those inductions or deductions of which the processes are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our capacity of expression. With this understanding, I now assert-that an intuition altogether irresistible, although inexpressible, forces me to the conclusion that what God originally created that that Matter which, by dint of his Volition, he first made from his spirit, or from Nihility, could have been nothing but Matter in its utmost conceivable state of -what-of Simplicity?

This will be found the sole absolute assumption of my Discourse. I use the word "assumption " in its ordinary sense; yet I maintain that even this my primary proposition is very very far indeed from being really a mere assumption. Nothing was ever more certainly-no human conclusion was ever, in fact, more regularly-more rigorously deduced-but, alas! the processes lie out of the human analysis—at all events are beyond the utterance of the human tongue.

Let us now endeavour to conceive what Matter must be when, or if, in its absolute extreme of Simplicity. Here the Reason flies at once to Imparticularity-to a particle -to one particle-a particle of one kind-of one character