position, volition, and means to assert that the affections or principles which lead to volition, have no moral character, are neither virtuous nor vicious, he contradicts a truth that is selfevident, or, at most, one that is acquired by a single deduction; which is, that those principles of the mind which invariably occasion virtuous or vicious volitions, are themselves. virtuous or vicious. That all mankind in all ages have made this deduction, appears from the fact, that in all languages, phrases are found expressive of virtuous and vicious disposi tions, inclinations, affections, &c. That some few, under the influence of a favourite hypothesis, may have denied this, does not disprove it, any more than the fact that some have denied the first principles of knowledge, disproves the exist ence of such principles.

Having treated of our moral powers, the "various branches of our duty" furnish the next subject of discussion in these volumes. The different theories" says Mr Stewart "which have been proposed concerning the nature and essence of virtue, have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action, such as a rational selflove, justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God." To avoid this error, he proposes, first, "to consider our duties in detail, and after having thus laid a solid foundation in the way of analysis, to attempt to rise to the general idea in which all our duties concur." He accordingly proceeds to consider the duties we owe 1, to God; 2, our fellow-creatures; and 3, ourselves.

An examination of the principles of natural religion forms a necessary introduction to the consideration of the first class of our duties. Previously to the exhibition of the argument for the existence of Deity, "the foundation of our reasoning from cause to effect" is discussed, and "the reality of our notion of power or efficiency" vindicated from the objections of Hume. The evidences of the existence, moral attributes, and government of God, and of a future state, are then set forth with clearness and force, and with a fine glow of moral eloquence peculiar to the author.

In treating of our duties he is more interesting than any ethical writer we have read, as he aims at establishing principles instead of enumerating precepts. Having considered our various duties, they are found to agree with each other in one common quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same autho

rity-the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word, virtue. This is the only definition he gives of virtue.

We have not attempted to give an analysis of this work, but to acquaint our readers with some of the more important subjects discussed. We would particularly recommend it to their attention, as none of the writings of Stewart will more richly repay a careful study.

In the appendix to this work, the learned author undertakes a defence of the self-determining power of the will. We cannot enter on this long controverted subject at present, but perhaps we may find an opportunity of discussing it in some future number of this work.

We have now taken a cursory survey of the labours of the late Dugald Stewart. In expressing our opinion of his talents, we need employ but few words, as it may be learned from the observations we have already made.

We do but repeat, when we say, that he was characterized by a facility in acquiring knowledge, a refinement and elevation of feeling, and sobriety and soundness of judgment, rather than by acuteness, comprehensiveness, and strength. As a metaphysician he has been overrated. This has been owing to a variety of causes. He entered on his career at a period peculiarly favourable for attracting the public attention. The writings of Hume, which had been extensively read, had occasioned perplexity and doubt on all subjects relating to mental and moral science. As this is a state of mind in which it is unpleasant to remain, many who were bewildered, as well as those whose principles had continued unshaken, rejoiced on the appearance of the sober doctrines of Reid. Beattie and other writers had contributed to render them exceedingly popular, when Stewart came forward to adorn them with his eloquence, a gift which he possessed in an eminent degree. Add to this his admirable talents for instruction, his intimate acquaintance with every department of literature, his uniform dignity, uprightness, and benevolence, and it is not surprising that his writings were received with a favour beyond their intrinsic merit.

We have dwelt on this subject, not from any sinister desire to lessen his reputation, but out of regard to the interests of mental science. It has been repeatedly asked in England, what are we to expect from the cultivation of a study which,

in the hands of such a man as Stewart, has produced so little?

But if we have not as high an opinion of his intellectual character as is sometimes entertained, we yield to none in our admiration of his moral worth. In this, he was far superior to his distinguished successor. Brown had greater acuteness, originality, and rapidity of thought, but he was influenced by an inordinate ambition, and often preferred novelty and ingenuousness, to soberness and truth. Though of an amiable disposition, yet he was not possessed of that warm and extended regard for the interests of humanity, which forms so noble and prominent a trait in the character of Stewart.

The same causes which we have noticed as having given undue celebrity to the writings of Stewart, have occasioned the diminished interest with which the science of mind is at present regarded in Scotland. Too high expectations were raised, a too rapid progress anticipated: these have been followed by a reaction.

All who are acquainted with this science, know that its progress must be slow, and that it can never acquire the certainty of demonstration. But let those who on this account deem it unworthy of cultivation, at least remember, that it numbers among its votaries some of the brightest ornaments of our race. We need but mention Bacon, Locke, Berkely, Butler, Leibnitz, Edwards, &c.

One word as to its prospects in our own country. They are, on the whole, encouraging. A taste for it is evidently increasing, and provision is made in most of our colleges for the study. But a spirit of rash speculation has gone abroad, which is, we fear, inconsistent with that cautious procedure requisite for the acquisition of truth in this difficult science.

There exists, too, an error in respect to the time proper for its study. It is introduced, we believe, into many academies and boarding-schools, but no benefit will result. Its successful study requires a discipline of mind, and a development of the reasoning faculty, rarely found even in the later stages of a collegiate course. Before this period it should not be studied; and, in regard to theological students, it may very properly be included in their professional course.

CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT AGE.

What

The object of this article is to direct the attention of thinking minds to the character of their own times. To us it seems to be the incumbent duty of intelligent men to know the character of their own age, not only because God has placed them in it, but because they may have influence in improving its aspect, and because they act under its influence. ever gives character to popular sentiment and action, should be carefully considered and well understood. There is a predominant influence under which men act, and by which the whole community is more or less swayed. The importance of correctly estimating this influence, will be obvious to those who consider its relation to all the concerns of human life. The prevailing spirit of the age should be well examined and carefully estimated, because it influences all the social relations, regulates the intercourse of human society, and operates on all the elements of the social state, not excepting the thoughts and feelings of men. It carries in its influence stability or caprice, happiness or misery, life or death. Its effects extend down the course of time, and form the subsequent age. All the interests of man, all the political interests of the nation, and all the religious interests of the church urge, to the consideration, due estimate, and proper direction of an influence so powerful. Nothing can excuse intelligent men from this examination for themselves, nor from exertions to secure a public sentiment, which shall combine a high intellectual character with unbending moral principle.

The customs of society are gradually introduced and perpetually changing by the operation of causes, which are not often contemplated, and which are entirely unknown to multitudes. But those causes govern the intercourse and pursuits of a community more effectively than the laws of the country, or the laws of God. For the time being, it is difficult to oppose the current of habits, or suddenly to change the prevailing customs of the age. But customs may change: and it may become the character of an age or country to change the prevailing habits, and break loose from all the established regulations of the community. Innovation, rather than improvement, may be the spirit of the times; and change, rather than reform, may mark the progress of a nation or church. The reverse may

also be the case. At one time, it is quite enough to put down all efforts for improving the social state, or the habits of the church, to raise the cry of innovation. Every prejudice is awake; the public mind is jealous; every thing new must be wrong, because the fathers had it not. At another time it is sufficient to set aside the most wholesome regulations to call them ancient. Whatever is new is popular, because it sets aside some former regulation under the name of antiquated usage. Thus men are always the slaves of custom. The habit of hearing, or telling, or doing some new thing, is as much the prevailing spirit of some times, as it is of others to resist every encroachment upon the old habits and prejudices of the fathers. It is therefore necessary to examine carefully the causes which operate to give stability and obstinacy to prejudices, whether political or religious; and what overturns the customs, opinions, doctrines and institutions of the fathers. The latter is immensely important to be understood, because habits and opinions, sanctioned by time, and hallowed by the associations of parental and filial relationships, and by lessons at the domestic fireside, are not easily swept away. The thing is, however, done. The spirit of innovation goes forth; the human mind becomes restless, and nothing satisfies; all the relations of life are broken up, or modified by the spirit of the age. The current breaks forth in various directions, and sweeps away whatever time, prejudice or philosophy may have interposed. Government and religion share the common influence, and are modified by the prevailing spirit. These include the most important interests of man, and are, therefore, made the grand objects of the influence. They must subserve the popular cause, or all their ties be dissolved.

The question now occurs, how are we to ascertain the character of the present age, and by what standard shall we estimate it? In answer, it is conceded that there is much difficulty in conducting an examination impartially, and perhaps more difficulty still in forming a proper estimate of the principles involved. But the concession of difficulty is not to be understood as a concession of impossibility. It may be very difficult, and yet not impossible. It requires care and skill to discern the true relations of facts and principles when we are so near them. It is like viewing a picture, whose blended colours soften in the distance, and from the proper station give so striking a resemblance that none would mistake its character; but approach very near it, and the eye of an artist