all, and appeared to Moses, or to Abraham, or to Jacob, and which, in different circumstances, was called an angel, a glory, or a man, remained a power inseparable from the Father*, just as a beam of light is inseparable from the sunt, which is in the heavens, and which, when it sets, it carries along with it. Thus the Father, whenever he pleases, they say, makes this power to come out of him, πроdav; and whenever he wills, he calls it back into himself again. And in the same manner they say he makes angels. But that angels are permanent beings, I have already shown; and that this power, which the prophets call God, and an angel, is not like a beam of light, but remains numerically distinct from its source, I have shown at large; observing that this power, duvaμm, is produced by the power and will of the Father, but not so as that the Father loses any thing by its emission, but as one fire is lighted by another-It is called Lord in the history of the destruction of Sodom, and rained fire from that Lord who was in heaven, and who was' the Lord of that Lord who was on earth, as his Father and God; being the cause of his being, of his being powerful, and of his being Lord, and God 1."

We see in this passage in how plausible a manner, and how little likely to alarm men of plain understandings, was the doctrine of the divinity of Christ as it was first proposed. At first it was nothing more than

Ατμητον δε και αχώριστον του πατρος ταυτην την δυναμιν ύπαρ χειν. Ρ. 412.

† A beam of light was then imagined to be something connected with the sun, and not matter emitted from him, and not returning to him.

† Ὁς και του επι γης Κυριου Κυριος εστιν, ώς πατηρ και θεος, αιτίος τε αυτῷ του είναι και δυνατῳ και κυρίῳ και θεῳ. p. 413.

the divine power, occasionally personified, (a small step indeed, if any, from pure unitarianism,) and afterwards acquiring permanent personality; but still dependent upon the will of God, from whence it proceeded, and entirely subservient to him; which was very different from what is now conceived concerning the second person in the trinity. I am, &c.

LETTER VII.

Considerations relating to the Doctrine of the Trinity. DEAR SIR,

I CANNOT help, in this place, making a few remarks on some of your observations with respect to the doctrine of the trinity, your ideas of which appear to be those which are commonly termed Athanasian; implying a perfect equality in all the three persons. Indeed, as a strenuous advocate for the church of England, they can be no other.

I.

"The advantage," you say, p. 69. " to be expected from these deep researches, is not any insight into the manner in which the three divine persons are united; a knowledge which is indeed too high for a man, perhaps for angels; which in our present condition at least is not to be attained, and ought not to be sought. But that just apprehension of the christian doctrine which will show that it is not one of those things that 'no miracles can prove' will be the certain fruit of the studies recommended. They will lead us to see the

scripture doctrine in its true light: that it is an imperfect discovery, not a contradiction."

A contradiction, you acknowledge, p. 67. is that 66 a part is equal to the whole, or that the same thing, in the same respect, is at the same time one and many." This you admit that nothing can prove. "No testimony," you say, "that a contradiction is, should be allowed to overpower the intuitive conviction that it cannot be. An inquiry, therefore, into the reasonableness of our faith, as well as just views of its history, is of great importance.'

Now I ask, Wherein does the Athanasian doctrine of the trinity differ from a contradiction, as you have defined it? It asserts, in effect, that nothing is wanting to either the Father, the Son, or the Spirit, to constitute each of them truly and properly God; each being equal in eternity and all divine perfections; and yet that these three are not three Gods, but only one God. They are, therefore, both one and many in the same respect, viz. in each being perfect God. This is certainly as much a contradiction as to say that Peter, James, and John, having each of them every thing that is requisite to constitute a complete man, are yet, all together, not three men, but only one man. For the ideas annexed to the words God or man cannot make any difference in the nature of the two propositions. After the council of Nice, there are instances of the doctrine of the trinity being explained in this very The fathers of that age being particularly intent on preserving the full equality of the three persons, they entirely lost sight of their proper unity. And explain this doctrine as you will, one of these things must ever be sacrificed to the other.

manner.

II.

Notwithstanding what I have quoted from you above, you seem to countenance some sort of explanation of the doctrine of the trinity. "The sense" [viz. of Athenagoras] you say, p. 55. " is, that the personal existence of a divine Logos is implied in the very idea of a God. And the argument rests on a principle which was common to all the platonic fathers, and seems to be founded in scripture, that the existence of the Son flows necessarily from the divine intellect exerted on itself, from the Father's contemplation of his own perfections. But as the Father ever was, his perfections have ever been, and his intellect has been ever active. But perfections which have ever been, the ever active intellect must ever have contemplated; and the contemplation which has ever been, must ever have been accompanied with its just effect, the personal existence of the Son."

I wish you had shown what it is in the scriptures, or indeed in the fathers, that gives any countenance to this curious piece of reasoning; and in your reply to me I hope you will not fail to point it out. In the mean time, as we cannot pretend to draw any conclusions from the necessary operations of one mind, but from their supposed analogy to those of other minds, that is our own, you will find yourself embarrassed with a difficulty similar to that of Tertullian, Lactantius, and Athanasius; and must explain to us how it comes to pass, that if the contemplation of the divine perfections of the Father necessarily produced a distinct person in him, fully equal to himself, a man's contemplation of such perfections, or powers, as he is

possessed of, should not produce another intelligent person fully equal to himself?

You will, perhaps, say (though you can have nothing to authorize it) that the impossibility of producing this in man, is the imperfection of his faculties, or his limited power of contemplating them. But to cut off that subterfuge, I will ask, why the contemplation of the Son's perfections, which you suppose to be fully equal to those of the Father, and whose energy of contemplation you must likewise suppose equal to that of the Father, does not produce another intelligent being equal to himself; and why are not persons in the Godhead, in this manner, multiplied ad infinitum? If, for any incomprehensible reason, this mysterious power of generation be peculiar to the Father, why does it not still operate? Is he not an unchangeable being, the same now that he was from the beginning, his perfections the same, and his power of contemplating them the same? Why then are not more sons produced? Is he become ayovos, incapable of this generation, as the orthodox fathers used to ask? Or does it depend upon his will and pleasure, whether he will exert this power of generation? If so, is not the Son as much a creature, depending on the will of the creator, as any thing else produced by him, though in another manner; and this whether he be of the same substance, poovoics, with him, or not?

I should also like to know in what manner the third person in the trinity was produced. Was it by the joint exertion of the two first, in the contemplation of their respective perfections? If so, why does not the same operation in them produce a fourth? &c. &c. &c.

Admitting, however, this strange account of the ge