courfe, which our homeward trade was likely to hold; and from the fituation of both fleets, and the ftate of the wind, might have taken them in the British admiral's fight, without a poffibility of his prevent ing it.

Nor was this ftate of things rendered lefs irksome, nor the apprehenfions refulting from it qualified, by any well founded confidence that it might not be of long continuance. On the contrary, our own naval hiftories record an example in the reign of King William, when the celebrated Admiral Ruffel was obliged to undergo for two months the mortification of being almost in the daily view of the French fleet, without his being able in all that time to bring them to action. The admiral had also another motive for his anxiety to bring on an engagement upon any terms what ever. This motive was founded in his inftructions. For although he did not for prudential reafons think fit to produce them on his trial, he made no fcruple of declaring freely to the court, that his inftructions went directly and abfolutely to that point of fighting the enemy.

In this purfuit of the French fleet, the preferving of a regular line of battle, with any hope of bringing them to action, was evidently impracticable. That fignal was accordingly hauled down from the 23d, and that for chacing to windward kept conftantly flying. In this meafure, the admiral was fupported not only by his own judgment, but by the practical example of fome of the greatest names who had ever fupported or eftablished the honour of the British flag. But the measure was of a nature which rendered all preceVOL. XXII.

dent unneceffary for its juftification. The affiduous and continual endeavours of the French admiral to avoid an engagement, afforded full caufe for apprehending that he expected a reinforcement, and that, independent of all other motives, would have been fuflicient for using every means to bring it fuddenly on.

By adhering to a line of battle, the French fleet would have been evidently out of fight in a very fhort time, and the probable confequence would have been, either the lofs of our foreign convoys, or infult to the coast of England. The admiral accordingly continued the chace without intermilion, keeping his fleet at the fame time as much collected as the nature of a purfuit would admit of, in order to feize the firft opportunity which a change of wind might afford of bringing the enemy to a clofe and decifive action.

On the morning of the 27th of July, the French feet were at daybreak as much to windward, and at as great a diftance, as they had generally been during the preceding days; and feemed alfo to avoid an action with as much industry as ever. The vice-admiral of the blue was then rather more to leeward than his ftation required, and having his mainfail up, it obliged the fhips of that divifion to continue under an eafy fail. This induced the commander in chief to throw out a fignal for feveral fhips of that divifion to chace to windward. The enemy's fleet were then near three leagues to windward, and going off clofe by the wind with a preffed fail. The motive affigned for the fignal was to collect as many of thofe fhips to windward as could be done, in order to fill

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up that interval between the commander in chief's fhip and the viceadmiral which had been occafioned by the latter falling fo far to leeward; and thus, by ftrengthening the main body of the fleet, to be ready for any chance that might occur of bringing the enemy to action. And the reason why the fignal was not made to the whole divifion, inftead of particular fhips, was, that they then must have chaced in a body, which would have retarded the best going fhips, by an attendance on their immediate commander. Indeed, the vice-admiral feemed fo fenfible of the object of the fignal, that it produced an immediate effect in the conduct of his own fhip, by a confiderable augmentation of

fail.

Some changes of the wind, and a dark fquall, which came on before 11 o'clock, produced feveral evolutions in both fleets, the nature and effect of which are not eafily explained to the fatisfaction of landmen. It feems, upon the whole, that fome fudden fhifts of the wind, together with the unexpected and unintentional effect produced by an evolution on the French fide, being all improved upon by the moft malterly efforts on the other, brought the two fleets foclofe, that they could not part without an engagement. But as this was a fituation not fought, and a decifion not wifhed by the French commanders, they endeavoured to evade its confequences as much as poffible; and accordingly, inftead of fhortening fail, and lying to, in order to receive the British fleet in a line of battle on the fame tack, by which every fhip on either fide would have been fairly engaged with her

adverfary in the oppofite line, and the action could fcarcely fail of being decifive, they fuddenly, put about on the contrary tack. By this manoeuvre, the heads and courfe of the fhips in each fleet being directed to oppofite points of the compafs with thofe of the other, they could only engage as they paffed, inftead of lying fide to fide, fo as to make an effectual impreffion.

Thus it will be eafily conceived, that in this courfe of engagement, any British fhip that could-fetch the head of the French fleet would receive and return the fire of every hip from firft to laft in their line; which would have been still kept up by thofe that followed, until both fleets had totally paffed each other. It neceffarily followed, of course, that thofe fhips which engaged first would be the fooneft out of action; and that the continuance of each in it muft depend upon the part of the French line which fhe was able to fetch, and the confequent number of fhips fhe had ftill to pafs. Although this mode of fighting did not at all prevent the lofs of men, or damage to the fhips, yet it tended greatly to defer, if not totally to evade, the confequences incident to thofe circumftances; as it prevented the fuccefsful adverfary from being ca pable of immediately pursuing with effect either the blow which he had given to a fingle fhip, or the general impreffion which he had made in the enemy's line. The neceffity which induced the British commander to bring on an engage. ment, and the determined perfeverance of the enemy in avoiding it, rendered him, of courfe, incapable of prefcribing the terms.

The

The French began the engage ment by firing, at a great diftance, at the headmost of Sir Robert Harland's divifion, as they led up; who, on the contrary, did not return a fhot until they came within a very clofe distance. The example was followed, or a fimilar conduct purfued, by the fleet in general, as faft as each fhip could close up with the enemy; and notwithstanding their being neceffarily extended by the chace, they were all foon in battle. As the fleets paffed each other very close on the oppofite tacks, the cannonade was very heavy, and the effect confiderable. The action lafted, from first to last, fomething about three hours. As the French, in their ufual way, directed their fire principally at the rigging, feveral of the Britifh fhips were a good deal crippled, and fuffered confiderably in their mafts, yards, and fails. The fire on their fide, which was principally levelled at the hulls of the enemy, was not deficient in its effect of another kind.

As foon as the commander in chief had paffed the rear of the enemy, and that the fmoke was fo far cleared as to admit of any observation, his first object was to look round to the pofition of the fhips which were already come out of action, and to confider of the sbeft means of bringing on a clofe and general engagement as foon as the remainder of the fleets, which were still fighting, had paffed and cleared each other. He foon perceived that the vice-admiral of the red, with part of his divifion, had already tacked, and was ftand ing towards the enemy; but ob ferved, at the fame time, that none of the other ships which were come

out of action had yet tacked, and that fome of them were dropping to leeward, and feemingly employed in repairing their damages. His own fhip, the Victory, had fo confiderable a fhare in the action, as not to be in condition for immediate tacking; nor, if it had been otherwife expedient, could he immediately wear, and stand back on the fhips coming up aftern of him out of the action, without throwing them into the utmost disorder and confufion.

This movement was, however, performed as fpeedily as poffible, and notwithstanding the damages fuftained by the Victory, fhe was not only the first ship that wore of the center divifion, and that got round again towards the enemy, but it was fome time before the example could be followed, and not above three or four were then able to close up with her. In this fituation of the fleet, the admiral hauled down the fignal for battle, which he judged improper to be kept abroad, until the fhips could recover their stations, or at least get near enough to fupport each other in action; and in order to call them together for that purpose, he immediately made the fignal to form the line of battle a-head, which is, of all others, that confidered by feamen as the most forcible, and as commanding the most prompt obe dience.

At this time the Victory was a-head of all the center and red divifions, and had time to unbend her maintopfail (which had been rendered totally unferviceable) while the fhips aftern were endeavouring to get into their respective ftations. As the vice-admiral of the blue commanded the rear-divi

fion, which was of course the laft out of action, he was at this time a-head of the Victory, which was now become his proper station; yet, without regard to the fignal, he (on whatever motives, poffibly juftifiable ones) quitted his ftation in the front of that line of battle for which it was flying, and paffing his admiral to leeward on the contrary tack, whilft he was advancing to the enemy, never came into the line dur-, ing the reft of the day.

The following is reprefented as being then the exact fituation of the fleet. The Victory was the nearest fhip to the enemy, with no more than three or four of her own divifion in any fituation, either to have immediately fupported her or each other in action; Sir Robert Harland, with fix or feven fail of his divifion, was to windward, and ready for inftant fervice; the viceadmiral of the blue was on a contrary tack, and totally out of the line; other fhips were far aftern, and five that were difabled in their rigging at a great distance to leeward. Thus the admiral could not at that time, which was about three o'clock in the afternoon, collect above twelve ships to renew the engagement.

The French had now got to leeward, and, under the expectation of being immediately attacked, had buddled most of their fhips haftily together in a kind of clufter, in the operation of wearing, from whence they were gradually ftretching out into a line of battle; but, upon obferving the expofed fitua tion of thofe British hips which bad fallen to leeward to repair their damages, it induced fome alteration in their movements, and they began to edge away, with an

evident intention of cutting them off from the rest of the fleet. The admiral inftantly penetrated into their defign, and the danger of thofe fhips obliged him fuddenly to wear, and to ftand athwart the van of the enemy, in a diagonal line, for their protection. At the fame time, he difpatched orders to Sir Robert Harland to form his divifion at a distance aftern of the Victory, in order to cover the rear, and to keep the enemy in check, until the vice-admiral of the blue fhould, in obedience to the signal, (which was kept conftantly flying) come with his divifion into his proper ftation. These orders were inftantly obeyed by the vice-admiral of the red, who was accordingly formed in the wake of the Victory before four o'clock.

It was this evolution which was afterwards made the foundation of one of thofe principal charges which were brought against the admiral, it being reprefented "as "carrying the appearance of a "flight, and bringing difgrace

upon the British flag, by afford❝ing an opportunity to the enemy. "of claiming the victory, and of "publishing to the world that "the fleet had ran away." And it was alfo this movement, which fome of the bravest and most experienced officers in the British fervice, and who were prefent at the time, declared, upon oath, to have appeared, and to have been confidered by them, both then and after, as a great and neceffary ma

nœuvre.

In the mean time the admiral, perceiving that he was nearing the enemy, by the courfe which he fteered for the protection of the crippled fhips, and that the viceadmiral

admiral of the blue ftill continued to lie to windward, and, by fo doing, kept his divifion back from joining him, and from fupporting the fleet, he made a signal for all fhips to windward to bear down into his wake. This fignal was repeated by the vice-admiral, although he had not repeated that for the line of battle; but as he did not bear down himself, his repeating this fignal feems to have been peculiarly unlucky; it having been interpret ed, by the fhips of his divifion, as an order for coming into his own wake, and not for their going into that of the admiral.

Thefe appearances of neglect of duty in the vice-admiral of the blue were attributed to the difabled condition of his fhip, to which feveral witneffes were produced on his trial, and on the credit of which he was afterwards acquitted. The protection of the difabled fhips being accomplished, and the French fleet continuing to form their line, ranging up to leeward parallel to the center divifion, it became the admiral's immediate and most urgent object to form his as fpeedily as pollible, in order to bear down upon them and renew the battle, whilft it could yet be done with full effect. He therefore, after having repeated the fig nal for fhips to come into his wake with no better effect than before, fent to Sir Robert Harland, to ftretch away a-head, and to take his proper ftation in the line; in which he was inftantly obeyed with the ufual promptnefs of that excellent officer; and feeing the vice-admiral of the blue ftill to windward, with his foretopfail unbent, and without any vifible effort, either towards fetting it to

rights, or for obeying that fignal which had been fo long flying, he fene Captain Windfor, of the Fox frigate, at five o'clock, with exprefs orders to him, to bear down into his, the admiral's wake, and to tell him, that he only waited for him and his divifion to renew the battle. We muft obferve, that there is a confiderable variation with regard to the exact time at which this meffage was delivered, in the evidence given upon the trials of Admiral Keppel and Sir Hugh Pallifer.

This order not producing the defired effect, and having before hauled down the fignal for coming into his wake, the admiral threw out that for all fhips to come into their ftations; and again, at feven o'clock, being wearied out with fruitless expectation, he made the Lignal for each particular fhip of the vice-admiral of the blue's divifion to come into her ftation in the line; but before they had complied with this fignal, night put an end to all further operations. It will fcarcely escape obfervation, that no fignal had been particularly thrown out to the Formidable, the vice-admiral of the blue's own fhip; this the admiral afterwards attributed to a motive of delicacy, founded on the long services of that officer, as well as a due compliment to his rank in his double capacity, both as a lord of the admiralty, and as the third in the prefent command; a delicacy which, whether juftifiable or not, brought great inconveniencies on Mr. Keppel; poffi. bly crimination; and is not likely to be imitated on future occafions.

Although the French, by their drawing up and forming a line pa.. rallel to the British fleet, shewed a

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