Such was the unfortunate fitua tion, fuch the calamitous picture, which Great Britain exhibited in the year 1778. So awful a crifis, fo perilous a state of public affairs, demanded thofe fupreme degrees of wifdom in counfel, and of efficacy in action, which are fo feldom united with each other, and which are still more rarely united with true patriotifm. If fuch fituations are fometimes bleft with the extraordinary good fortune, of calling forth great talents from inertnefs or obfcurity, it much more frequently happens that they produce a totally contrary effect. For the vastness of the occafion is too liable to dazzle, to bewilder, and to confound, that useful mediocrity of talents and abilities, which, however uneqal to the fituation, is exceedingly well calculated for the common conduct and purposes of mankind.

However it was, or from whatever causes it proceeded, whether from a fluctuation or difcordance of opinions, difagreement in temper and views among the minifters, whether from the want of any previous or established fyftem, or that the flattering ideas of fome partial or general accommodation, ftill in terfered with and counteracted all other modes of proceeding, fo it was, that fome appearance of irrefolution and indecifion, which at that critical period prevailed in the counfels and meafures of Great Britain, was fo palpable, as neither to escape the obfervations of friends or of enemies. Notwithftanding repeated caufes of alarm, we feemed to be taken by furprize. The language of the court, as foon as it could collect itself, was fufficiently firm; and feemed in

fpired by a spirit of vigour fuited to an occafion which called for efforts of an extraordinary kind. It was rather even the tone of indignation and vengeance, than mere conftancy and refolution. But this fpirit very foon evapo rated; and nothing was talked of in a war of conquest and vengeance but felf-defence.

The enemies of ministry were loud on this occafion. They faid, that by this timid plan, neither fuited to the emergency, nor to the language held upon it, the opportunity was loft, by fome fudden, great, and fignal blow, of reviving our antient name and character; and of infpiring that reverence to our national vigour and military prowess, which it was fo neceffary for us to maintain and eftablifh with other nations, whether friendly or inimical, at the outfet of fuch a war.

It was fuppofed, that a double fcheme of partial accommodation, the one part avowed, and the other fecret, and founded upon fyftems directly oppofite, was about that period prevalent, and had no fmall fhare in influencing the conduct of public affairs. The first part of this scheme was founded on the idea of detaching America, through the intervention of the commif fioners, from the alliance with France. Nothing could poffibly have been more effential to the interefts, the reputation, and to the grandeur of Great Britain, than the fuccefs of this measure. France would then have been left to encounter all her force alone, which, if properly directed, the was yet by no means capable of enduring.

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The

The event of that part of the fcheme we have already feen. The fecond was, that of detaching France from America; and confequently leaving the latter expofed to that refentment, which in the other instance, would have been directed against the firft. Although this part of the fcheme, even fuppofing it capable of fuccefs, could not ftand in any degree of real comparative value with the former, yet it held out certain flattering ideas, which might even render it, in fome degree, a favourite. For the dereliction of America by France, would have left the former open, and now totally hopeless, to that complete and final fubjugation, or unconditional submission, which had fo long been the great object of court and minifters. But this scheme feemed from the beginning hopeless, though it for a while entertained the imaginations of many. Great Britain had no bribe of fufficient magnitude to purchase from France this dereliction of her object. If fuch could have been of fered, and offered with effect, it must have been before the conclufion of the treaty: but the treaty was concluded.

Every part of the conduct of France from the commencement of the American troubles, either tended directly, or but ill difguifed her defign, to bring matters to the prefent crifis. To the period of that treaty, however, her policy lay open to the influence of circumitances, and her conduct was, and undoubtedly would have been in any cafe, governed by them. But when once fhe had taken the decided and dangerous part, of publicly avowing her fentiments

and views, and of openly binding herself in the face of the world to the performance and fupport of thofe treaties which she had concluded with the Americans, it was then not only evident that she had gone too far to recede, but that she had alfo chofen her ground, and was fully difpofed and determined to abide the confequences. So that every hope founded upon her change of fyftem feemed little better than vifionary.

There were fome strong indications, that a third and more comprehenfive fcheme of pacification than either of the foregoing, was at one time in agitation. This was no lefs, than the conclufion of an immediate peace and alliance with the Colonies, under the acknowledgment of that independence, which it was laid down as a principle, they had already virtually and irretrievably obtained, and thereby cutting off, at one ftroke, every cause of war, and of difpute with America. In that cafe, if a plan of prudence, not very glorious, had been purfued, there was an end of the quarrel both with America and France. If the reduction and punishment of France was the object, the war against her might be pursued with undiffipated force. On the very day of the delivery of the French refcript, a paper to that purpose, written by an old and strong advocate for the American war, was delivered at the doors of the two Houses.

If this scheme ever had any substancial being in the miniftry, it was, however, but of fhort duration; and was fo far from being brought forward, or any more heard of in that quarter, that when

pro

propofitions of a fimilar nature were foon after made by the oppofition in both Houfes of Parliament, and ftrongly fupported, on the ground both of expedience and neceffity, they were violently op. pofed, and accordingly over-ruled (as we have formerly feen) by the minifters.

To fome fuch variety of opinions, with respect to the means of accommodation, the grand queftions of peace and war, and the mode of profecuting the latter, may probably be attributed thofe appearances of fluctuation, and indecifion, which, at that period, were fo ftrongly and repeatedly charged, as the characteristic marks of our counfels and meafures. And to fuch caufes must be attributed the reception of the report of a reproach faid to be thrown out by the French minifter at the moment of his departure from London, viz. "That the British counfels "were fo totally undetermined and "indecifive in every matter, whe"ther of public or private con"cern, that he never could get a "pofitive answer from the mi"nifters upon any bufinefs, whe"ther of small or of the highest "importance." March 13th,

On the very day that the French re

1778. fcript had been delivered to the Secretary of State, an addrefs and petition from the City of London, praying for the adoption of fuch meafures as would moft forward the restoration of internal peace, tend to refcue public affairs from unwife and improvident management, and obtain, improve, and fecure, the returning confidence of the people, was prefented to his Majefty. This

piece, which was of unusual length. and a mafterly compofition in point of writing, contained, in the most qualified language, and the moft guarded and refpectful terms, a series of the fevereft ob fervations and cenfures on (what they termed) thofe fatal counfels, and that conduct of public affairs and measures, which equally mif leading and deceiving the Prince and the people, led to the prefent dangerous and unhappy crifis. Along with a recapitulation of the loffes, misfortunes, and difgraces of the war, with a striking picture of the various calamities and miferies, which they attri. bute to that public conduct they fo ftrongly. condemn, they by no means forget to take notice how repeatedly they had deprecated, and how truly foreboded, in their former applications to the throne, (and in concurrence with the fense of many other refpectable public bodies, and of many of the wifeft and beft of his Majesty's fubjects) the prefent evils and dangers, as well as thofe greater to which the nation is ftill liable, as the inevi table confequences of the measures which were purfued; neither did they pafs without notice the inefficacy of their former applications, and the answers which had been given to their addreffes and remon ftrances upon public affairs.

Among other political obfervations, all implying or charging neglect or misconduct on the fide of government, they particularly noticed, in the prefent inftance, that there was no appearance of our having formed any alliance with any of the other great powers of Europe, in order to cover us from the complicated perils fo ma. nifeftly

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nifeftly imminent over this nation, at a time when there was but too much reafon to apprehend, that alliances of the most dangerous kind were formed against us.

The answer, which was longer than ufual, feemed alfo to indicate. a greater attention both to the fubject of the addrefs, and to the body whofe act it was, than had been always manifefted upon fimilar occafions. It comprehended in fubftance, that, although it could not be allowed, that the force and refources of the ftate had been unwifely and improvidently exerted, when the object was the main tenance of that conftitutional fubordination which ought to prevail through its feveral parts; yet the calamities infeparable from a state of war had been conftantly lamented; and an affurance was given, that his Majefty would moft earneftly give all the efficacy in his power to those measures which the legiflature had adopted, for the purpose of reftoring, by a happy and permanent conciliation, all the bleffings and advantages of peace.

Whatever hopes or motives operated towards a temporizing conduct on the fide of England, it was foon perceivable, that no fimilar caufes influenced that of France. No fooner was the account conveyed with unufual dispatch to that court, of the immediate effects which the delivery of the refcript from their minifter feemed to have produced in London, than orders March 18th. for the feizure of all were inftantly iffued thofe British veffels, which were found in any of the French ports. This example was followed by a fimilar order in Great Britain.

But these measures produced no great effect on the one fide or the other, as there were few ships in the ports of either.

The order for the feizure of the British veffels was in three days followed by another measure ftill more decifive, and which feemed as if it was intended by France to affix fuch a feal to her late declaration as would not only convince her new allies of her fincerity, but put it out of her own power to retract from her engagements with them. This was the public audience and reception given to the three American deputies, Dr. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, as ambaffadors from the United States, by the French monarch. The deputies were introduced by M. de Vergennes, and received by the King with the ufual formalities and ceremonials which the etiquette of courts has established on the introduction of minifters from fovereign ftates. A great and striking event as any which has been known in the latter ages. Nothing could be defired more mortifying to the Crown of Great Britain.

Zift.

Certain appearances were, however, ftill to be preferved by France as well as by England; and the King's ordinance, affording new and extraordinary advantages to the captors of prizes, as an encouragement and fpur to the vigour of the marine fervice, although it was figned on the 28th of March, was kept dormant, withbeginning of July. out publication or effect, until the

To complete the defenfive plan, which was declared to be only preliminary to one more effectual, to be taken up in due time, in Eng

land