CONVICTION-continued. and sixthly, the judgment or adjudication. (Boscaw. Pen. Con. 7; R. v. Green, Cald. Cas. 396, 397). A conviction may be appealed, or removed to the Queen's Bench by certiorari. CONVOCATION. In like manner as the Commons were represented from 1265, or at any rate from 1295, by deputies chosen from themselves, so the lower clergy were represented from 1255 by one proctor from the chapter of the cathedral and two proctors from the body of the clergy in each diocese. Also, the like cause which necessitated the early assembling of the Commons in Parliament, necessitated also the early assembling of the clergy in Convocation, namely, the principle of the English constitution that the subject has the exclusive right of self-taxation. Thus, in 11 Edw. 1, when the cathedral clergy of the province of York met at the town of York by their proctors, and the cathedral clergy of the province of Canterbury met at the town of Northampton by their proctors, but the body of the clergy were not represented at all in either assembly, no tax was imposed owing to the absence of the latter. The clergy appear to have had no separate writ of summons, but to have been summoned originally by their respective archbishops, and subsequently, that is, from the reign of Edward I., by their respective bishops in virtue of the præmu nientes clause contained in the writ of summons which was issued to these latter, the bishop acting in some sense as an ecclesiastical sheriff for this purpose. The archbishops having objected to the clergy being summoned by the bishops, their objection was neutralised by means of a compromise, according to which the bishops were permitted to summon the clergy to Parliament, and the archbishops to summon them to Convocation; but the two assemblies, once summoned, were identical. The functions of the clergy assembled in Convocation or in Parliament (for the distinction is perfectly immaterial), were originally ill defined, judging at least from the language in which they are described, being sometimes the phrase "ad ordinandum de quantitate et modo subsidii," sometimes the phrase "ad faciendum et consentiendum," and latterly, i.e., from 5 Ric. 2, "ad consentiendum" only; and in fact their functions appear to have varied at different times. Thus, in 18 Edw. 3, there are instances of petitions of the clergy having been granted by the King and his Council, and thereby converted into statutes, and entered as such on the statute roll, notwithstanding that the Commons had not assented thereto. In 50 Edw. 3, CONVOCATION—continued. the Commons remonstrated against this interference with their legislative rights, and prayed the King that for the future no statute should be made upon the petition of the clergy unless with the assent of the Commons thereto. However, notwithstanding this protest, the practice continued in subsequent reigns, and notably in those of Richard II. and Henry IV., e.g., the statute "de hæretico comburendo," 2 Hen. 4, was so passed; and Hallam concludes that in these reigns the clergy assembled in Convocation did exercise a legislative power with the King and his Council apart from the Commons. These legislative acts of the clergy were confined to matters ecclesiastical; for in matters of a temporal nature the clergy assembled in Convocation neither enjoyed nor exercised any legislative power at all apart from, or even (semble) in conjunction with, the Commons. In the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, the clergy assembled in Convocation were consulted upon all or most of the momentous questions of those reigns affecting the national religion; e.g., in 1533, they approved the doctrine of the Royal Supremacy over the Church, and in 1562, they confirmed the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion. But in the former of these two reigns they were expressly deprived by statute of the power to enact fresh canons without the King's previous licence,-a disability which was confirmed and perpetuated by the doctrine of the Courts of Common Law, that new ecclesiastical canons are not binding on the laity until they are approved by both Houses of Parliament (Croft v. Middleton, 2 Atk. 669). Even the right of taxing themselves was made subject to the control of the House of Commons in the reign of Henry VIII., and the practice has been totally discontinued since the year 1664, since which year the clergy have been rated in the same manner and measure as the laity. From the last-mentioned date the functions of Convocation were reduced to nothing; its assembling at the commencement of each Parliament was for some time afterwards kept up as a formality merely, being followed on each occasion of its so assembling with an immediate prorogation or adjournment. However, about 1690, when the High Church party attained to distinction and power, the attempt was made to revive Convocation as an active ecclesiastical body, and this attempt was successful during the reign of Anne (1702-1714). But in the succeeding reign of George I., Convocation carried its debates in the Bangorian controversy with Bishop Hoadley of Bangor to such a degree of in CONVOCATION-continued. tolerance, it is said, that that king was compelled in 1717 to prorogue it, and from that date till the beginning of the present reign it never sat again; but in the beginning of the present reign, when the High Church party re-acquired repute under Dr. Pusey and others of that school, Convocation was re-summoned for the despatch of matters purely ecclesiastical, and accordingly, but for the despatch only of these matters, it meets regularly at the present day with every fresh session of Parliament. CONVOY. In times of war, it is frequently desired by a neutral country to protect its own merchant vessels from visit and search by either of the belligerents, and this object it usually endeavours to accomplish by sending one or more of its own ships of war to protect and escort, i.e., convoy, the merchant vessels. But Sir Wm. Scott, in The Maria (1 Rob. 340), decided in effect that a neutral convoy cannot resist the right of visit and search, and that the resistance presented in that case was a reason for condemning the vessels. And it is now generally admitted that the protection of a convoying fleet does not extend to exclude the belligerent right of search; nor is the word of the commander of the squadron to be accepted as conclusive evidence of the neutrality of the vessels convoyed or of the goods that are stowed therein. See also title VISIT AND SEARCH. These are co-tenants CO-PARCENERS. entitled by descent, and by no other title. They become so either by the Common Law of England, as in the case of females that are co-heiresses: or by particular custom, as in the case of lands in Kent, which are of gavelkind tenure. Co-parcenery extends even to collaterals; and the husband of a deceased co-parcener, if entitled as tenant by the curtesy, holds as a coparcener with the surviving sisters of his wife, as does also the heir-at-law of his deceased wife upon his own death. Coparceners might always effect compulsory partition of the lands held together. COPYHOLDS. These are lands held by copy of Court roll (as the name partly denotes) and according to the custom of the manor. It appears that in the reign of Edward I. copyholders were still in the purest state of villenage, cultivating the demesne lands of the lord as serfs merely, and having no certainty of tenure; but that in the reign of Edward III. they enjoyed a comparative certainty of tenure, so long as they performed the accustomed services; and that, finally, in the reign of Edward IV. they might have an action against their lord for trespass or wrongful ejection. But to the present day copyholds retain some traces of their frail original. Thus, the copyholder is still for some purposes a mere tenant at will of his lands, the freehold therein remaining in his lord, who, therefore, is owner of all the mines and minerals under the land, and also of the timber upon it; and the copyholder cannot, without a forfeiture, lease the lands for a longer term than one year, or commit any waste of the land. Nevertheless, the copyholder when admitted (as to which see title ADMITTANCE) is possessed of a quasi seisin of his lands; in other words he is seised of them as against all the world other than his lord. There may be every variety of estates in copyhold lands, whether for life, pur autre vie, in tail, or in fee simple; but with reference to the estate tail in copyholds, a distinction is taken, some manors admitting, and some not admitting the estate tail. See title ESTATE TAIL IN COPYHOLDS. Copyholds were first made liable for the debts of the owner in 1833 after his decease (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 114), and in 1838 during his life (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110). They are also liable in bankruptcy to the same extent as freeholds. They are devisable, and (since Preston's Act, 1815, 55 Geo. 3, c. 192) without any previous surrender to the use of the will; but in case the owner dies intestate, they descend to his customary heir. Upon the death of a tenant his lord is entitled to seize his best beast, and he is also entitled to many other fines and perquisites on different occasions. But by the Act 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, provision has been made for the voluntary enfranchisement, and by the Acts of 1852 and 1858 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, and 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94) for the compulsory enfranchisement, of copyholds, such enfranchisement having the effect of converting them into freeholds, upon payment either of a fixed annual sum, or of a lump sum, by way of commutation or composition for the lord's fines, perquisites, and heriots. COPYRIGHT. Is the sole and exclusive COPYRIGHT-continued. liberty of multiplying copies of an original work or composition (Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 920). It is a species of property founded on industrial occupancy, to wit, labour and invention bestowed on materials. The earliest evidence of a recognition of copyright is to be found in the charter of the Stationers' Company granted by Philip and Mary, and in the decrees of the Court of Star Chamber; and the first statute in the matter was the 8 Anne, c. 19, which professes to be passed for the encouragement and protection of learned men. This Act was repealed by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, which, with some Acts amending same, now regulates the law of copyright. By the 3rd section of the principal Act it is enacted that the copyright in every book which shall be published in the lifetime of the author shall endure for the natural life of such author, and for the further term of seven years from his death, and shall be the property of such author and his assigns; but if the said seven years shall expire before the end of forty-two years from the first publication of such book, then the copyright shall in that case endure for the full period of forty-two years; and the copyright of every book which shall be first published after the death of its author shall endure for the term of forty-two years from the first publication thereof. But the right of property in copyright must be registered in the registry of the Stationers' Company; and after such registry it is assignable by a mere entry of the transfer in the same registry in the manner prescribed by the Act. International copyright is provided for by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 12; but the provisions of that statute only go to secure to the authors of books published abroad the right of copyright when the same are republished in Her Majesty's dominions, and do not of course oblige foreign countries to extend to British authors the like protection. In addition to copyright in books there may also be copyright in music, engraving, sculpture, painting, photography, and generally in ornamental and useful designs. For a full treatment of the whole law of copyright, see Copinger on the Law of Copyright, 1870. CORAM NON JUDICE (before one who is not the judge). When the judge of any Court of Law exceeds his jurisdiction, the subject matter with regard to which he has exercised such excess of jurisdiction is said to be coram non judice. Thus, in Coles's Case (Sir W. Jones, 170), it was held, by the whole Court, that if a justice does not pursue the form prescribed by the CORNAGE (cornagium, from the Latin cornu, a horn). Tenure by cornage was tenure by the service of blowing a horn when the Scots or other enemies entered the land, in order to warn the King's subjects, and was, like other services of the same nature, a species of grand serjeanty: see that title. CORNWALL, DUCHY OF. The revenues of this duchy belong to the Prince of Wales for the time being. The Nullum Tempus Act (9 Geo. 3, c. 16) was extended by the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 53, as between the duke and persons claiming or holding real property within the duchy. The tenure of lands within the duchy was originally a holding from seven years to seven years; but in modern times it is become a holding to the tenant in fee simple, subject to a fine at the end of every seven years, and to forfeiture for non-payment thereof. Usticke v. Peters, 4 K. & J. 437. CORODY. Corodies are a right of sustenance, or to receive certain allotments of victual and provision for one's maintenance. In lieu of which (especially when due from ecclesiastical persons) a pension or sum of money is sometimes substituted. And these may be reckoned a species of incorporeal hereditaments, though not chargeable on or issuing out of any corporeal inheritance, but only charged on the person of the owner in respect of such his inheritance. CORONATION OATH. Is the oath which is taken by the sovereigns of England on their coronation, promising "to govern the people of this kingdom, and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the realm." CORONER. An ancient officer of the Common Law, who has principally to do with pleas of the Crown (corona) or such wherein the king is more immediately concerned. He is chosen by the freeholders at the county court, and ought to have an estate sufficient to maintain the dignity of his office and to answer any fines that may be set upon him for his misbehaviour, &c. The office and power of a coroner are also, like those of the sheriff, either judicial or ministerial but principally judicial. This is in a great measure ascertained by statute 4 Edw. 1, de officio coronatoris, and consists, CORONER-continued. first, in inquiring when any person is slain, or dies suddenly, or in prison, concerning the manner of his death. And this must be super visum corporis, for if the body be not found the coroner cannot sit. He must also sit at the very place where the death happened; and his inquiry is made by a jury from four, five, or six of the neighbouring towns, over whom he is to preside. If any be found guilty by this inquest, of murder or other homicide, the coroner is to Commit them to prison to await further trial, and is also to inquire concerning their lands, goods, and chattels, which are forfeited thereby; but whether it be homicide or not, he must inquire whether any deodand has accrued to the King, or the lord of the franchise, by the death; and must certify the whole of this inquisition under his own seal and the seals of the jurors, together with the evidence thereon, to the Court of King's Bench, or the next assizes. Another branch of his office is to inquire concerning shipwrecks, and certify whether wreck or not, and who is in possession of the goods. Concerning treasure trove he is also to inquire who were the finders, and where it is, and whether any one be suspected of having found and concealed a treasure. See 1 Fish. Dig. 1902-1915. HOUSE CORONER OF THE KING'S (usually called coroner of the verge). An officer appointed by the lord steward, or lord great master of the King's house for the time being. His office resembles that of a coroner of a county, only that his duties are limited to such matters as occur within the verge or within the precincts of the King's palace. 1 Chitty's Bl. 137, note 20. CORPORATION. Is a body created by Act of Parliament, or by charter, or by letters patent. It may be created either for trading or for other general purposes. It must have a common seal; and all its contracts originally required to be under that seal. But numerous relaxations of this rule have been latterly admitted; and the general state of the law now is, that for contracts of an ordinary every day occurrence a seal is not necessary, and that if such contracts have been executed, and the corporation has had the benefit of them, then the corporation is liable to be sued for the price (Clarke v. Cuckfield Union, 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 349); but that upon executory contracts of that, sort, the corporation, semble, is not liable unless the contract is under seal. And the old law requiring the seal is still in force with regard to all contracts of an extraordinary kind. not within the usual business of the corporation, so that upon these latter kinds of CORPORATION-continued. contract the corporation cannot be sued, notwithstanding the contract is executed, and the corporation has had the benefit of it (Arnold v. Mayor of Poole, 4 Man. & G. 860), and à fortiori, if the contract in such case is executory. But the above rules do not apply to a corporation sole (e.g., a bishop or other parson of the Church), but only to a corporation aggregate. Moreover, where a corporation aggregate is constituted by Act of Parliament, the Act commonly defines the mode by which, and the purposes for which it may contract: and if such a corporation exceeds the purposes so defined, it cannot, even by affixing its common seal, make a valid contract, inasmuch as that would be ultra vires. A corporation is of course liable for torts. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Penhallow, L. R. 1 H. L. 53. CORPOREAL. The division of things into corporeal and incorporeal is coincident with the division of the Roman Law into tangible (quæ tangi possunt) and intangible (quæ tangi non possunt). The nomenclature of the Roman division is derived from the sense of touch, which was the most important of the senses in the opinions of the ancient Democritean School, or School of Natural Philosophy; the nomenclature of the English division is derived from the equally natural distinction of what is sensible to the body (or bodily senses) generally. In itself, the distinction, as resting in nature, is necessarily permanent; in its consequences, it was chiefly remarkable in the diversity which it occasioned in the mode of the transfer of property, for things which were corporeal were capable of manual or bodily transfer, e.g., by feoffment with livery, but things which were incorporeal were not capable of such a mode of transfer, and required for their transfer a deed of grant. Since the year 1845, and in consequence of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2, the last-mentioned diversity has been mitigated, although not yet entirely removed, inasmuch as things corporeal are now capable of transfer by deed of grant, but things incorporeal are still (and must necessarily continue always to be) incapable of transfer by feoffment with livery. See titles CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL CORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. This phrase comprises all hereditaments which may be touched, quæ tangi possunt, e.g., lands, houses, &c. It is used in contradistinction to incorporeal hereditaments; as to which, see that title. CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS: See title BRIBERY. CORRUPTION OF BLOOD. The immediate consequences of attainder used to be corruption of blood, both upwards and downwards; so that an attainted person could neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestor, nor retain those he already had, nor transmit them by descent to any heir, because his blood was considered in law to be corrupted. But by the Act for the Amendment of the Law of Descents (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106), s. 10, the doctrine of the corruption of blood has been abolished as to all descents happening after the 1st of January, 1834. COSENAGE, or COSINAGE (Fr. cousinage). A writ that lay where the tresail (ie., the father of the besail or great-grandfather) was seised of lands, &c., in fee on the day of his death, and afterwards a stranger entered and abated, and so kept out the heir. F. N. B. 221; Cowel. COSTS. The expenses which are incurred either in the prosecuting or in the defending of an action are called the costs. Costs between solicitor or attorney and client are those which the client always pays his solicitor or attorney, whether such client is successful or not, and over and above what the attorney gets from the opposing party in case of such party having lost the action. Costs between party and party are those which the defeated party pays to the successful one as a matter of course. The plaintiff's right to party and party costs depends on the Statute of Gloucester, that of the defendant to the same costs on the stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 15; and under these statutes the amount recovered in the action is immaterial (Beaumont v. Greathead, 3 C. B. 494). But under more recent statutes, where the damages recovered are trivial, the judge must in general certify for costs, e.g., in an action of tort, when the damages are under 40s. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 21, s. 11. COSTS OF THE DAY. Whenever one of the parties in an action (i.e., the plaintiff or defendant) gives notice of his intention to proceed to trial at a specified time, and after having given such notice, neglects to do so, or to countermand the notice within due time, he is liable to pay to the other party such costs or expenses as the latter has been put to by reason of such notice, which costs are commonly called costs of the day, i.e., the costs or expenses which have been incurred on the day fixed (by such notice) for the trial. These costs usually consist of the expenses incurred by witnesses and others in coming to the place of trial, and such other expenses as have necessarily called also the Aula Regis, otherwise Curia Regis, was the parent of the Courts of Exchequer, Common Pleas, and Queen's Bench; but after the severance from it of those three Courts, it still retained a large original jurisdiction; and, as being in early times interchangeable with the House of Lords, it possessed also an appellate jurisdiction from the subordinate Courts. It possessed therefore (I.) judicial authority. It possessed also (II.) legislative authority, in conjunction with the King, and apart from the Commons. Thus, in early times, the King and his council, sometimes upon the suggestion of the House of Commons, but more often without such suggestion, and in both cases without the concurrence of the Commons, enacted laws which appear in the statute book; 2 Ric. 2 is an instance of a law so made. But in 13 Ric. 2, the Commons petitioned the King that his council might not after the close of Parliament make any ordinance against the Common Law. But the chief functions of the council were (III.) executive, the council forming (as it did) a body of assistance to the King in his administration. This appears from the list of the official members composing it, namely, (1.) The Chancellor, (6) The Keeper of the Privy Seal, The Chamberlain of the Household. (8.) The Treasurer of the Household, (9.) The Controllor of the Household, (10.) The Chancellor of the Exchequer, and (11.) The Master of the Wardrobe, With a number of other assistant members of a subordinate character. COUNSEL. A term frequently used to indicate Barrister-at-Law, which title see. COUNSEL'S OPINION. Is in general a protection to an attorney acting upon it, against alleged negligence on his part. Kemp v. Burt, 4 B. & Ad. 424. COUNSEL'S SIGNATURE. In former times the appearance of the parties to an action was actual and personal in open Court, and the pleadings consisted of an oral altercation in presence of the judges. But this could be carried on by none but |