CONSTITUTION, CHARACTER OF ENGLISH-continued. dination and resistance, which were natural to feudalism. At the same time there is some justification for Hume's opinion, in the frequent interferences of the King's Privy Council in matters affecting the liberties and properties of the subject; also in the fact that the constable and the marshal exercised a large jurisdiction, which was most arbitrary; also in the circumstance that the feudal rights of the Crown, namely, wardships, escheats, and forfeitures were exercised unsparingly; also, lastly, in the circumstance that the forest jurisdictions, although nominally abridged by the Charta di Foresta, were still extensive and encroaching. It may, therefore, be concluded that Fortescue's opinion is more flattering than true, and that Hume's opinion is slightly overdrawn the other in taxation; (b.) The Commons' right to participate in legislation; and (c.) The Commons' right to inquire into public abuses, and to impeach public ministers; (3.) The reigns of Henry IV., V., and VI. (Lancastrian line), in which seven points were established, namely (a.) The Commons' exclusive right in matters of taxation; (b.) The Commons' right to appropriate the supplies; (c.) The Commons' right to make grants of supplies conditional upon redress of grievances; (d.) The Commons' right to participate in legislation; (e.) The Commons' right to control the administration; (f.) The Commons' right to impeach public ministers; and (g.) The Commons' rights of privilege, namely (aa.) Freedom of speech in Parlia ment; CONSTITUTION, GROWTH OF-contd. (bb.) Freedom from arrest during Parliament; (cc.) Right of decision upon election returns. CONSUL. This is an officer of a commercial character, appointed by the different states to watch over the mercantile interests of the appointing state, and of its subjects in foreign countries. There are usually a number of consuls in every maritime country, and they are usually subject to a chief consul, who is called the consulgeneral. A consul is not a public minister, nor entitled to the immunities of such ; but in the absence of an ambassador or chargé d'affaires, a consul-general may act as temporary minister, and as such, semble, he is entitled for the time to these immunities, and to that position. Tuson on Consuls. CONSULTATION (consultatio). When a party to a suit in one of the inferior Courts. has obtained a writ of prohibition from one of the superior Courts from proceeding further in the matter, and if such superior Court shall finally, after demurrer and argument, be of opinion that there was no competent ground for having so restrained such inferior jurisdiction, then judgment shall be given against him who applied for the prohibition in the superior Court, and a writ of consultation shall be awarded; so called because, upon consultation and deliberation had, the judges find the prohibition to be ill founded, and therefore by this writ they return the cause to its original jurisdiction to be there determined in the inferior Court. CONTEMPT OF COURT. This consists in any refusal to obey an order or process of the Court, or in offending against particular statutes, the contravention of which is thereby declared to be a contempt of Court; or in interfering with and violating the known and well-ascertained rules of the Court, e.g., of the Court of Chancery, regarding the custody or marriage of its wards; and also in certain offences of a vague kind, but which are generally calculated to prejudice the Court in its trial of the action, or in the regard of the people for it. See the true nature of the offence stated in the Queen v. Castro (L. R. 9 Q. B. 219). Every Court has, subject to the control of the Court of Queen's Bench, inherent power to punish for a contempt of Court, by whomsoever committed, and the offender may be committed without warrant. In re Wilson, 7 Q. B. 984. CONTENEMENT. This word will be better understood by giving an example of its use, than by attempting to define it, 66 CONTENEMENT-continued. especially as writers are not agreed upon the meaning of the word. "No man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him than his circumstances or personal estate will bear: saving to the landholder his contenement, or land; to the trader his merchandize, and to the countryman his wainage, or team, and instruments of husbandry." It would appear from the above that the word contenement signifies means of support, i.e., the lands, tenements, and appurtenances are the same to the landholder as the merchandize is to the merchant, or his wainage to the waggoner. Blount; Spelm. Anciently the parties to an action, or their attorneys for them, used to appear in open Court; the plaintiff's advocate stated his cause of complaint vivá voce; the defendant's advocate his ground of defence; plaintiff's advocate replied; and the altercation continued till the two parties came to contradict one another, or, as it was termed, to an issue. If this issue was upon a point of law, the judges decided it if upon a point of fact, it was tried by a jury, or by one of the other modes which prevailed at that period. While this was going on the officers of the Court, who sat at the feet of the judges, took a written minute of the proceedings on a parchment roll, which was called the record, and was preserved as the official history of the suit, and that alone, the correctness of which could be afterwards recognised and depended on, was the only evidence of the matters stated there, and the Court would not allow it to be contradicted. As the proceedings generally occupied more days than one, the Court used to adjourn them from time to time; if these adjournments, which were called continuances, were not made, the suit was at an end, since there was no period at which either party had a right again to call the Court's attention to it; and if the continuance, though made, were not entered on the record, the suit was equally at an end, since the record was the only evidence the Court would admit of the fact of the continuance In such a case the action was said to be dis-continued. And latterly when a cause was put down (2.) They have the effect of an estoppel; (3.) They require no consideration; and, (4.) They used to bind the land of the judgment debtor, but since 1864 they do not. II. Specialty contracts, which are really only agreements by deed, possess the following characteristics :-- (1.) They merge all simple contracts or other grounds of action; (2.) They have the effect of an estoppel; (3.) They require no consideration; and (4.) They may be made to bind the land by binding the heir. Specialty contracts, although they estop the parties, may be avoided on the ground of fraud or illegality: thus in Collins v. Blantern (2 Wils. 341) the defendant had covenanted by deed to pay the plaintiff £700, and having refused to do so the plaintiff sued him upon the covenant; the defendant pleaded that the bond was given G CONTRACTS-continued. as part of a scheme for stifling a criminal prosecution; this plea was held to be a good defence. Specialty contracts may be discharged in two ways (1.) By performance; (2.) By another specialty substituted for them, but not by any mere simple contract. Thus if a man has covenanted to repair or to build a house he can only be discharged by doing the thing, or else by another deed releasing him. This rule is without exception where the covenant has not yet been broken (ie., before breach of covenant), but after breach there is one exception, and that is where an uncertain sum of money is to be got as damages for the breach. Blake's Case, 6 Rep. 43 b. III. Simple contracts. To every simple contract there are the three following general or abstract requisites: (1.) Certainty in the terms of the contract; (2.) Assent of both parties to it (assensus ad idem); and (3.) Mutuality of obligation. To every simple contract there are also the three following particular requisites :— (1.) Request; (2.) Consideration; and (3.) Promise. Whence the ollowing distinction, viz. : I. Where the consideration is executory, i.e., in the case of executory contracts, the request and also the promise are implied by law, although, of course, both or either of them may be express. II. Where the consideration is executed, i.e., in the case of executed contracts,There are two classes of cases, viz. :(1.) The acceptance of an executed consideration which was not moved by a previous request; and (2.) A consideration executed on request. As to the former of these two subdivisions, the former is invariably obligatory (see title RATIFICATION); but as to the second subdivision, the following varieties present themselves, viz. :— (a.) Where the plaintiff has been legally paid what the defendant was CONTRACTS-continued. the £50 to B. for him, then A. promises to repay C. Here the request to pay is implied in law, but the promise is not; and (c.) When the plaintiff has voluntarily paid what the defendant was morally, but not legally compellable to pay, eg., A. owes B. £50 on an immoral debt, and C., to oblige A., pays it; then A. afterwards promises to repay C. Here the request to pay is not implied, and the promise to repay is without a legal consideration. In every contract privity is an essential requisite to any one suing on it; in other words, no person can take advantage of the consideration in a contract excepting the party from whom the consideration has moved, which means that no person can sue on a contract excepting the parties to it; and this is what is understood by privity. An example of the absence of privity is the following:-A. gives £50 to his servant to pay a tradesman's debt: the tradesman knowing of it sues the servant for money had and received to the tradesman's use (Baron v. Husband, 4 B. & Ad. 611); in this case the tradesman lost his action for want of privity between him and the servant. CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. All such contracts as a general rule are void, because they are against public policy (Mitchel v. Reynolds 1 Sm. L. C. 356). But such contracts are allowed to be good where the restraint is limited to a particular time, or to a particular locality, and when a valuable consideration has been given for them. The requisites to a valid contract in restraint of trade are two, viz. :— (1.) That the restraint be limited either in time or in locality, or in both; and (2.) That a valuable consideration should have been paid for the restraint. What shall be reasonable in point of time or locality varies with the nature of the business. And generally, the restraint is only allowed so far as is necessary to protect the trader. CONTRAT-continued. posed to be an equivalent for what (5.) Contrat de bienfaisance, where the CONTRIBUTION. It is a rule of law, that all persons in the nature of co-sureties for the debt of another shall directly (as in Roman Law) or indirectly (as in English Law) bear their proper share of the liability, so far as regards the mutual relief of each other, and depend for their individual reimbursement upon their action against the principal debtor. The remedy of a cosurety against his co-surety is said to be for Contribution; that against the principal debtor is said to be for Re-coupment (see title SURETY). It is likewise a rule of law, that there is no contribution between wrongdoers. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186. CONVENTICLE ACT: See title STATUTES ECCLESIASTICAL. CONVENTION. The most general name for agreement. CONVENTION PARLIAMENT, ACTS OF. The matters to be provided for by this parliament (which assembled in 1660) were the following: (1.) An indemnity for the past; With reference to the first of these four matters, Charles II., by his declaration from Breda, had offered an indemnity to all persons who had been concerned in the late irregular proceedings, with the excep tion only of his father's regicides; and this promised indemnity was endeavoured to be secured by "The Act of Indemnity and Oblivion," which Act excepted, however, not only those who had signed the death-warrant against Charles I., but also all those who had sat when sentence was pronounced against that king, together with several others. With reference to the second of these four matters, Episcopalianism was restored as the national religion, and with it the bishops were reinstated in the House of Lords. The lands, also, of the church, which had been confiscated, and some of them even sold to purchasers from the state, were also restored to the church, and CONVENTION PARLIAMENT, ACTS OF -continued. no compensation given to the purchasers who were deprived of them. The dispossessed clergy who survived at the Restoration were restored to their former livings or to fresh benefices, so far as such restoration could be carried out without dispossession of the then existing incumbents, who were allowed to remain in possession if willing to conform. With reference to the third of these four matters, military tenures were abolished, and with them the revenue derived by the Crown from aids, wardships, &c.; and, in lieu thereof the excise was given to the crown With reference to the fourth of these four matters, the militia was replaced under the sole command of the king; the Triennial Act of 1641 was repealed; and the following Acts of an ecclesiastical character were passed:-The Corporation Act, the Act of Uniformity, the Act against Conventicles, and the Five Mile Act. CONVENTUAL CHURCH. A church consisting of regular clerks professing some order of religion, or of a dean and chapter, or other such society of ecclesiastics. Cowel. CONVERSION. This word has two significations in law. (1.) In the action of trover, in which it is the gist of that action, it denotes the appropriating by the defendant to his own use of the goods of the plaintiff, in a manner short of criminal; the appropriation consisting substantially in the negative act of withholding them from the plaintiff, upon his demand; (2.) In Equity it denotes the notional alteration of land into money, or of money into land. in accordance with a direction to that effect of a testator or settlor, and in pursuance of the equitable doctrine that what is agreed or imperatively directed to be done is already done, or as good as done. As a consequence of this doctrine, it has been held (1.) That lands directed to be converted into money for certain purposes, some of which fail, descend, in the case of the direction being contained in a will, to the heir-at-law of the testator (Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. C. C. 503); and, in case of his death, to his next of kin (Smith v. Claxton, 4 Maddox, 492); but that, in the case of the direction being contained in a deed, the rule is just the reverse; and (2.) That money directed to be converted into land for certain purposes, some of which fail, goes, in the case of the direction being contained in a will, to the executor of the testator (Cogan v. Stevens, 1 Beav. 492, n.); and, in the case of his death, to his executor (Reynolds v. Godlee, CONVERSION-continued. 1 Johns. 536); but that, in the case of the direction being contained in a deed, the rule is just the reverse. Where the purposes for which the conversion was to take place totally fail, the property is regarded as being what it actually is, and the doctrine of conversion is in that case excluded. See also title RECONVERSION. CONVEYANCES. These, which anciently were called Assurances, are instruments under seal, whereby lands are conveyed or assured from the vendor to the vendee, so as to vest in the latter such an estate as the vendor has in himself to convey or assure, and as the words of limitation in the deed limit or mark out. Conveyances arrange themselves under two great classes, viz., I. Conveyances at the Common Law, and hereunder, (1.) Feoffments; (2.) Gifts; (3.) Grants; (4.) Bargains and sales; (5.) Leases; (6.) Exchanges; (7.) Partitions; (8.) Releases; (9.) Confirmations; (10.) Surrenders; II. Statutory Conveyances, and hereunder, A. Conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses, and hereunder,(1.) Covenants to stand seised; (2.) Deeds of lease and release; (3.) Deeds leading or declaring the uses; (4.) Deeds of revocation of uses; (6.) Any Common Law conveyance B. Conveyances under statutes other than the Statute of Uses, and hereunder, (1.) Release under 4 Vict. c. 21; Again, of deeds which operate under the Statute of Uses, there is this further division, namely, CONVEYANCES-continued. I. Deeds operating without transmutation of possession, and hereunder,— (1.) Bargain and sale; (2) Covenant to stand seised, &c., the statute itself effecting the alteration in the legal seisin; and II. Deeds operating with transmutation of possession, and hereunder, (1.) Deeds leading or declaring the uses; (2.) Feoffment to uses, &c., the legal seisin being first transferred by a Common Law assurance before the statute operates to effect a second transfer. I. Conveyances at Common Law, and hereunder the following, (1.) Feoffment. This was the most ancient form of conveyance applicable to corporeal hereditaments. It consisted of two parts, viz.,— (a.) The limitation of the estate intended for the feoffee; and (b.) The livery of seisin. First. The limitation of the estate. This consisted in defining by the customary words of limitation the estate which was intended to be given to the feoffee. Originally, it sufficed to pronounce these solemn words orally in the presence and hearing of witnesses and of the feoffee; and although a deed or writing may have been (as in fact it was) occasionally used for that purpose, the same was unnecessary. However, by the stat. 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Statute of Frauds), s. 1, it was enacted that all leases, estates, interests of freehold or term of years, or any uncertain interest in messuages, manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, made or created by livery of seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized in writing, should have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only, and no greater force and effect; the only exception being that leases for a term not exceeding three years from the making thereof were to be good, although made by parol without writing, provided they reserved a rent of two-thirds at least of the full improved value. And now, by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, it is enacted that no feoffment other than a feoffment made under a custom by an infant, shall be valid unless made by deed. So powerful was the efficacy of the feoffment that it frequently operated by wrong, whence also it was called a tortious conveyance, passing to the feoffee the full estate marked out by the words of limitation, although that should be in excess of the estate which the feoffor had in himself to grant. But by the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, the feoffment was deprived of this tortious effect, and was reduced to the |