WASTE-continued. (2.) Where the tenant for life who commits the waste is in collusion with the remainderman in fee to the prejudice of an intervening contingent remainderman (Garth v. Cotton, 1 Ves. 516); and (3.) Where the waste is equitable as opposed to legal. And see titles EQUITABLE WASTE; WATCH. Watching is properly for the apprehending of rogues in the night, as warding is for the day; for default of watch or ward the township may be punished. See also title POLICE. WATERMEN. These are eight overseers elected annually by the Lord Mayor and Court of Aldermen of the City of London to exercise supervision over all wherrymen, watermen, and lightermen upon the River Thames between Gravesend and Windsor. Their duties were latterly regulated by the Consolidation Act (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 75); but the matter is now to some extent regulated by the recent stat. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 113. .WAYS. Ways are of four principal varieties, namely (1.) Iter, i.e., a footway; (2.) Actus, i.e., a horse and footway, called also a packway; (3.) Via, ie, a cartway (including foot and horseway); and (4.) A driftway (probably included in Roman Law under the term actus but being excluded therefrom in English Law), i.e., a way for driving cattle. Ways are either public or private, the former being open to all the king's subjects, the latter being open to the inhabitants of a particular parish, village, or house only; a public way is also commonly called a highway. It is commonly said that every highway is the king's; but this means that the king and his subjects have at all times the right to pass and repass only at their pleasure; for the freehold and all the profits thereof belong to the lord of the soil (2 Inst. 705), being in general the adjoining owner, who therefore may bring trespass for digging in the highway. 1 Burr. 143. WAYS-continued. A public way need not be a thoroughfare; nor is a thoroughfare of necessity a public way. The dedication of a public way is readily presumed from user as such, e.g., from eight or six years' user. But a highway may also exist by virtue of an express grant. It most commonly exists in virtue of some Act of Parliament. With reference to the repair of highways, the whole parish is of common right bound to repair all the roads of the parish, and the whole county all the roads of the county. And this liability continues, although some particular person or persons may be liable in the first instance to make the repairs. Such particular person or persons may be bound to repair a highway either by reason of prescription or by reason of inclosure. The prescriptive duty to repair is often called the liability to repair ratione tenure. The liability by reason of inclosure arises when the owner of unenclosed lands adjoining the highway encloses them, and thereby prevents the public going on the lands enclosed when the road is bad. Anything whereby the public are incommoded in their use of the highway is a nuisance to it, e.g., the foulness of the adjoining ditches, the overhanging of boughs, &c., whence the adjoining owner is bound to scour his ditches, and also to lop his trees adjoining the highway. Every unauthorized obstruction of a highway is an indictable offence. Any one may justify in pulling down or abating a common nuisance, e.g., in demolishing a gate erected in a common highway. The whole law of highways is now principally regulated by statute; see 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 101. With reference to private ways, see title EASEMENTS. WEAR. A great dam made across a river, accommodated for the taking of fish, or to convey a stream to a mill. WEIGHTS. There are two sorts of weight in use, viz., troy weight and avoirdupois, the former containing 12 oz. and the latter 16 oz. to the pound. See title MEASURES. WERGILD. This was the price of homicide, or other atrocious personal offence, paid partly to the king for the loss of a subject, partly to the lord for the loss of a vassal, and partly to the next of kin of the injured person. In the Anglo-Saxon laws the amount of compensation varied with the degree or rank of the party slain. WHIPPING. This is a punishment which may or may not accompany sentences of imprisonment in most cases; as to females, it was abolished by 1 Geo. 4, c. 51. WIDOW: See titles DoWER and NEXT OF KIN. The king's widow was she who, after her husband's death being the king's tenant in capite, could not marry again without the king's consent. WILL, ESTATE AT: See titles ESTATES; TENANCIES. WILLS. For the growth of the power of alienation by devise, see ALIENATION The whole law of wills has been digested in a single Act, viz, the New Wills Act (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26), the short contents of which Act are as follows:I. As to the property devisable or bequeathable: All real estates (whether legal or All contingent, reversionary, and All rights of entry. II. As to the capacity of testators: (1.) Persons under twenty-one years have no such capacity, even for the purpose of exercising a power expressed to be exerciseable during minority, and the subsequent attainment of twenty-one years will not validate the will (Sugd. R. P. Stat. 330); (2.) Married women have a limited capacity, that is to say, to the extent of exercising any power over real or personal estate, or to the extent that their husbands authorize them to dispose of their personal estate, or to the extent of property (real or personal) settled to their separate use. Thomas v. Jones, 2 J. & H. 475. III. As to the formal requisites of wills: (1.) Writing; whether in ink or in pencil (Gregory v. Queen's Proctor, 4 No. Ca. 623; Bateman v. Pennington, 3 Moo. P. C. 227); and whether or not in testamentary form (Thorncroft WILLS-continued. v. Lashman, 2 Sw. & Tr. 479); and the writing of the will may, by reference, incorporate other then existing documents (Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moo. P.C. 427); (2.) Signature by testator, or by some other person by his direction and in his presence, at the foot of the will (15 & 16 Vict. c. 24); the testator's mark is a sufficient signature, whether he can or cannot write, even though his name is not affixed to the mark (Re Bryce, 2 Cur. 325); and even an impressed facsimile is sufficient (Jenkins v. Saisford, 3 Sw: & Tr. 93); and signature by initials is good (Re Wingrove, 15 Jur. 91); a witness may sign the testator's name for him (Re Bailey, 1 Cur. 914); (3.) Presence of two witnesses at one and same time, being time that testator signs personally or by proxy; (4.) Attestation of witnesses in the presence of the testator, although not necessarily in each other's presence, but no form of attestation is required (Bryan v. White, 2 Rob. 315); although the full attestation clause is useful, obviating the necessity of proof of the formalities of execution (Re Diaper, 3 N. R. 215); (5.) Subscription of witnesses in the presence of the testator, although not necessarily in each other's presence; but the witness's mark is a sufficient subscription whether he can or cannot write (Re Amiss, 2 Rob. 116); and a subscription by initials is good (Re Christian, 2 Rob. 110); since the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, s. 33, the execution of the will may be proved by one only of the attesting and subscribing witnesses (Belbin v. Skeats, 1 Sw. & Tr. 148); (6.) In the special case of wills executing powers, if the power is to be exercised by writing under seal, and a will is used for the purpose of executing it, the will must be sealed in addition to the observance of the formalities before mentioned (West v. Ray, Kay, 385); and generally all other extra formalities required by the donor of the power, not being forma WILLS-continued. lities of execution or of attestation, however whimsical, must be complied with, notwithstanding s. 10 of the Wills Act, which relates only to execution and attestation; (7.) No publication of a will is necessary, other than such publication as consists in the observance of the formalities before mentioned, s. 13. IV. As to the capacity of witnesses: (1.) The incompetency of an attesting witness is not to invalidate the will, whether such incompetency existed at the time of the testator's execution of the will or at any time afterwards (s. 14); (2.) A gift, whether by devise or be quest, to a witness, or to the then existing wife or husband of a witness, is not to affect the competency of the devisee or legatee as a witness (s. 15); but the gift is to be void, unless in the case of a creditor (ss. 15, 16); (3.) An executor of the will may be a witness (s. 17). V. As to revocation of will: (1.) In the general case, and also in the case where the will is in exercise of a power of appointment over property which would in default of appointment devolve upon the real or personal representatives of the donee of the power, the marriage of the testator, whether male or female, revokes the will, the marriage being a legal marriage (Re Mette, 7 W. R. 543); (2.) In the case where the will is in exercise of a power of appointment over property which would not in default of appointment devolve upon the real or personal representatives of the donee of the power, the marriage of the testator, whether male or female, does not revoke the will (Hawksley v. Barrow, L. R. 1 P. & M. 147); (3.) Revocation by presumption is abolished (s. 19); (4.) Revocation may also be by sub sequent will or codicil, being well executed, and the testator acting on that assumption (Re R. L., 29 L. T. 26); (5.) Revocation may also be by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the will, with the intention of thereby revoking it (Re Kennett, 2 N. R. 461); WILLS-continued. and such burning, tearing, or other destruction may be either by the testator personally, or by any other person in his presence acting by his direction; such revocation may be in part only (Christmas v. Whinyates, 11 W. R. 371); but if the part cut out or destroyed is the signature of the testator, the revocation is of the whole will (Walker v. Armstrong, 4 W. R. 770); but the mere cancelling of the signature is nothing (Stephens v. Taprell, 2 Cur. 458); the codicil shares the fate of the will, in the absence of an intention that the codicil should operate substantively (Grimwood v. Cozens, 5 Jur. (N.S.) 497); where the will has been destroyed or lost sine animo revocandi, a copy of it will be admitted to probate (Brown v. Brown, 8 El. & Bl. 886); (6.) Revocation may be partially effected by means of interlineations, or by means of obliterations, or by means of other alterations generally, made in the will after execution, provided such interlineations, obliterations, or other alterations are executed as a will (s. 21); (7.) Revocation by alteration of estate is abolished (s. 23); (8.) A revoked will may be revived by the re-execution of the will, or by a codicil duly executed with the intention of reviving it, (s. 22; Marsh v. Marsh, 35 L. T. 523); therefore a will revoked by a revoking instrument would not be revived by the revocation of the latter instrument. Major v. Williams, 3 Cur. 432; Wood v. Wood, L. R. 1 P. & M. 309. VI. As to operation of will: (1.) With reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it, a will operates from the death of the testator (s. 24); but that only in the absence of a contrary intent; (2.) With reference to matters other than the property comprised in it, a will operates from the date of the execution (Re Wollaston, 9 Jur. (N.S.) 727; Bullock v. Bennett, 7 De G. M. & G. 283; Trimmell v. Fell, 16 Beav. 539; Gibbins v. Eyden, L. R. 7 Eq. 371; Noble v. Willock, W. N. 1873, p. 124; 21 W. R. 711); WILLS-continued. (3.) With reference to lapsed and void devises, these are included in the residuary devise (if any) (s. 25) (see LAPSE); (4.) With reference to the distinctions of property in land, as being freehold, leasehold, copyhold, or customaryhold, a devise of lands generally is to include lands of all those four qualities, whether or not the testator has also freehold lands; (5.) With reference to the distinction between ownership and power of appointment, a general devise of real estate is to include real estate over which the testator has a general power of appointment; and it has been decided that a power may be exercised subsequently even to the date of the execution of the will, if the instrument which creates the power comes into operation in the testator's lifetime (Stillman v. Weedon, 16 Sim. 261), but not when it comes into operation after his death (Jones v. Southall, 32 Beav. 31); (6.) In the absence of words of limitation, or of other words indicating a contrary intention, a beneficial devise is to pass the fee simple or other the whole estate of the testator (s. 28); and the same rule is extended to the case of devises to trustees (s.30); and the fee simple estates of trustees are not to be determinable upon the purposes of the trusts being satisfied (s. 31); (7.) An estate tail given to any devisee who predeceases the testator, but leaves inheritable issue who survive the testator, is not to lapse, but to take effect in the predeceasing devisee (s. 32) (see title LAPSE); (8.) A devise or bequest to any child of the testator is to take effect in such child, notwithstanding he may die before the testator, provided any of his issue survive the testator (s. 33) (see title LAPSE); (9.) The phrase "dying without issue," and like phrases, formerly construed to give an estate tail by implication, are deprived of that effect (s. 29); and (10.) The Act is to extend to the wills of all persons executed or re WILLS-continued. published on or after the 1st of January, 1838. The stat. 1 Vict. c. 26, does not extend to aliens (Sugd. R. P. Stats. 331), nor to British subjects not domiciled in England (Bremer v. Freeman, 10 Moo. P. C. 306); but the latter restriction has been partially removed by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, and the former restriction is now altogether removed by the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 14), s. 2, subject to the question of domicile. See also titles DEVISES; LEGACIES. WINDING-UP. This phrase means simply squaring the accounts of a partnership or company with a view to the dissolution of the same. Usually, partnerships and companies are wound up only when they are in insolvent circumstances, and such winding-up is most commonly made under the supervision of the Court of Chancery, which Court acts in the matter of the winding-up of companies under the provisions of the statutes 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89 (the Companies Act, 1862) and 30 & 31 Vict. c. 131 (the Companies Act, 1867). When an order has been made for the compulsory winding-up of a company, and even in the case of a voluntary winding-up, the Court of Chancery will stay actions by creditors against the company (In re Keynsham Company, 33 Beav. 123; In re Life Association of England, 34 L. J. (Ch.) 61). A winding-up is usually carried out by means of a liquidator, who (as the uame denotes) liquidates, i.e., ascertains, the assets and liabilities of the company, with a view to the discharge of the latter by the former, so far as they go. See Buckley on the Companies Acts. WITCHCRAFT. A practice for which in former times persons might have been, and often were, condemned to death, even upon their own confession (see Best on Evidence, Criminal Confessions). The rule of the Mosaic Law was,-"Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live:" and the Civil Law also punished with death sorcerers and witches. By the English Law, witchcraft was at one time (under 33 Hen. 8, c. 8) a felony without benefit of clergy -a severity continued in the Act 1 Jac. 1, c. 12; but at the present day under the stats. 9 Geo. 2, c. 5, and 56 Geo. 3, c. 138, no prosecution for witchcraft is for the future to be carried on; but the PRETENCE of witchcraft is made a misdemeanor punishable with a year's imprisonment and hard labour. WITHERNAM: See title CAPIAS IN WITHERNAM. WITHOUT DAY: See title Sine die. WITNESSES. These are a means or instrument of evidence, and are persons who inform the tribunals regarding matters of fact. Generally, all persons are compellable to give evidence excepting only the Sovereign; but witnesses may object to answer particular questions, being chiefly questions which tend to criminate or to expose to penalties or forfeitures, but not (unless where the judge interposes) questions tending to bring the witness into disgrace or ridicule, or to render him liable to merely civil proceedings. A distinction is taken between the competency and the credibility of witnesses, the former determining absolutely the admission or rejection of their evidence, the latter going to corroborate or to impugn its truthfulness. At the present day, all objections to witnesses (with one exception) go to the credibility of their testimony and not to their competency, the stats. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, and 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, having rendered even the parties to an action of whatever sort competent and also compellable to give their testimony. The one exception referred to, is that in criminal proceedings a husband is not compellable to give evidence against his wife, or the wife against her husband, these twain being one flesh. However, for various reasons a person may not be competent to take an oath, and therefore may never fall under the category of witness at all, so that neither the question of his competency nor that of his credibility may come into question. Thus, from want of understanding, whether innate deficiency (as in the case of idiots) or extreme immaturity (as in the case of children of very tender years), or, semble, atheism, a person is incompetent to take an oath (see title ОATH), and is therefore excepted from the class of witness, excepting that an atheist may now make a solemn affirmation, and a child may on examination on the voir dire (see that title) be found to be conscious of the sanctity of an oath. The principal grounds for suspecting the credibility of a witness (as distinguished from his competency) are pecuniary interest, sexual relationship, social connections, self-regarding sentiments, and the feeling of sympathy with others. Usually the method of dealing with witnesses is for the party on whose behalf they are called to examine them in chief, then for the opposite party to cross-examine them, and finally for the chief examiner to re-examine them. The object of the exami WITNESSES-continued. nation-in-chief is to obtain facts in support of the case of the plaintiff; the object of the cross-examination is to impugn or throw discredit upon that first examination; and the object of the re-examination is to undo the prejudice which may so have been occasioned in the cross-examination. See also titles EVIDENCE; PROOF PER TESTES; SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM ; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, &c. WORKHOUSES: See POOR. WRECK. Such goods as after a shipwreck are cast up by the sea and left there within some county. By the Common Law all wrecks belonged to the Crown; but it was usual to seize wrecks to the king's use only when no owner could be found. The Common Law was modified by statute in the reign of Henry I., who granted that if any person escaped alive out of the ship it should be no wreck; and afterwards by the Statute of Westminster the First (3 Edw. 1) c. 4, if a man or dog or cat escaped alive the goods shall be no wreck, but the sheriff shall keep the same (or, if perishable, their value) for a year and a day, in order to restore them to the rightful owner, or his representatives establishing their claim to them. And by the statute 27 Edw. 3, c. 13, if a ship is lost on the shore and the goods come to land, they are to be at once returned to the owners, they paying a reasonable reward for their salvage (see title SALVAGE). By the stat. 7 & S Geo. 4, c. 29, plundering any vessel in distress or wrecked is made felony punishab'e with death. If for a year and a day no one claims wreck, it still belongs to the king as before. See also titles FLOTSAM and JETSAM. WRIT. This word is from the Saxon writan, to write; it is translated by breve in the Latin forms. In general a writ is the king's precept in writing under scal issuing out of some Court and commanding something to be done touching a suit or action, or giving commission to have it done. Les Termes de la Ley. Writs in civil actions were either original or judicial. Original writs issued out of the Court of Chancery for summoning a defendant to appear, and were granted before the suit was begun, to begin the same, whence the name; judicial writs issued out of the Court where the original was returned after the suit was begun. The original bore date in the name of the king, the judicial in the name of the judge. Another division of writs was into real, personal, and mixed; the real concerning the possession of land, and being either |