USUCAPIO. A term of Roman Law used to denote a mode of acquisition by the civil-i.e., old strict, law. It is, however, sometimes used as interchangeable with longi temporis possessio. It corre

sponds very nearly to our term prescription or limitation, which by the stats. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27 (as to corporeal hereditaments), and 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71 (as to incorporeal hereditaments) confers a positive (although merely possessory) title on the holder. But the prescription of Roman Law differed from that of the English Law, not only in its times (which are of less importance), but also in this great and peculiar feature, that no malâ fide possessor (ie., person in possession knowingly of the property of another) could by however long a period acquire title by possession merely, the two never-failing requisites not only to usucapio, but also to longi temporis possessio, being justa causa (i.e., title) and bona fides (ie., ignorance). The term usucapio is sometimes, but erroneously, written usucaptio. In Roman Law, re-acquisition by usucapio was called USURECEPTIO.

USUFRUCT (usufructus).

An usufruct

has been defined to be that real right in another's property which entitles a party to reap all the fruits of the thing, and in general to have the whole use and enjoyment of it, as far as is practicable, without injury to its substance (salvâ rerum substantia). He who is so entitled to enjoy the fruits of another's property is termed the usufructuary, in contradistinction to the actual proprietor of the thing (Just. Inst. ii. 4). The usufructuary was invariably entitled for life, and for no less period; he, therefore, corresponds to our tenant for life.

USUFRUIT. This is, in French Law, the usufruct of English and Roman Law.

USURA MARITIMA: See title FNUS NAUTICUM.

USURIOUS CONTRACT: See title USURY.

An

USURPATION OF ADVOWSON. injury which consists in the absolute ouster or dispossession of the patron, and which happens when a stranger who has no right presents a clerk, and the latter is thereupon admitted and instituted.

USURPATION OF FRANCHISES, or OFFICES. The unjustly claiming or usurping any office, franchise, or liberty.

USURY (usura.) An unlawful contract on the loan of money to receive the same again with exorbitant increase; that is, not only to receive the principal sum again, but also an exorbitant interest by way of compensation for the use of such principal sum. All restrictions upon the rate of

USURY-continued.

interest were, however, abolished by stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90.

UTTER, TO. In law signifies to put in circulation, to offer or tender to another man, and is used in reference to forged instruments or counterfeit coin. Thus, by stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 66, it is enacted that the forging or uttering of any Exchequer bill, Bank of England note, bill of exchange, deed, transfer of stock, &c., &c., knowing it to be forged, and with the intent to defraud, shall be felony; and by 2 Will. 4, c. 34, s. 7, it is provided that "if any person shall tender, utter, or put off any false or counterfeit gold or silver coin, knowing the same to be counterfeit, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be imprisoned for any term not exceeding a year. See Rex v. Jones, 9 C. & P. 761,

UTTER BAR (or Outer Bar) is the bar at which those barristers, usually junior men, practise who have not yet been raised to the dignity of queen's counsel. These junior barristers are said to plead without the bar, while those of the higher rank are admitted to seats within the bar, and address the Court or a jury from a place reserved for them and divided off by a bar. See title UTTER BARRISTERS.

UTTER BARRISTERS. Barristers-atlaw, in general, who plead without the bar. They are called utter barristers, i.e., pleaders without the bar, to distinguish them from the benchers, or those who have been readers, and are sometimes admitted to plead within the bar, the same as king's and queen's counsel are. Cowel.

V.

VACATION. The interval between each term is termed the vacation, that is, between the end of one term and the beginning of the next. These intervals of a cessation of business are retained under the Judicature Act, 1873, but are differently reckoned, the distinction of terms having been abolished by that Act, in name at least.

VADIUM MORTUUM (dead pledge): See next title.

VADIUM VIVUM (a living pledge). When a man borrows a sum of money of another (suppose £200), and grants him an estate, as of £20 per annum, to hold till the rents and profits shall repay the sum so borrowed; in this case the land or pledge is said to be living; it works off, i.e., repays and survives, the debt, and immediately on the discharge of that reverts back to the borrower. It is called a vivum

VAGRANTS: See title VAGABONDS AND VAGRANTS.

VALOR MARITAGII (value of marriage). The meaning of this may be collected from the following passage:-" During the prevalence of the feudal tenures the guardian was at liberty to exercise over his infant ward the right of marriage (maritagium, as contradistinguished from matrimony), which in its feudal sense signifies the power which the lord or guardian in chivalry had of disposing of his infant ward in matrimony. For while the infant was in ward the guardian had the power of tendering him or her a suitable match, without disparagement or inequality; which if the infants refused, they forfeited the value of the marriage (valorem maritagii) to their guardian; that is, so much as a jury would assess, or any one would bona fide give to the guardian for such an alliance; and if the infants married themselves without the guardian's consent they forfeited double the like value, duplicem valorem maritagii." Litt. 110.

The

VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. distinction between a good and a valuable consideration is, that the former consists of considerations of blood, or of natural love and affection; as when a man grants an estate to a near relation from motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty; and the latter consists of such a consideration as money, marriage which is to follow, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent given for the grant. The conveyance by bargain and sale requires to be for valuable consideration, as distinguished from that by a covenant to stand seised, which requires to be for blood or natural affection (see title CONVEYANCES). In the statutes

of Elizabeth against fraud (13 Eliz. c. 5, and 27 Eliz. c. 4), a good consideration means a valuable one.

VARIANCES. It is a general rule that

VARIANCES-continued.

a party must recover secundum allegata et probata; but in matters impertinent or immaterial to the issue, or merely formal or superfluous, a variation between the pleading and the evidence is unimportant, more especially since the powers of amendment conferred by the C. L. P. Act, 1852.

Variances are of the following kinds :— (1.) Variance in the parties to a contract, being either the omission of a plaintiff who ought to be joined (Graham v. Robertson, 2 T. R. 282), or the misjoinder of a plaintiff or defendant, not also the non-joinder of a defendant (1 Wms. Saund. 291-4), which can only be pleaded in abatement. These cases of variance may be amended at nisi prius under the C. L. P. Act, 1852, ss. 35-38. (See title AMENDMENT.)

(2.) Variance in the consideration of a contract, being the omission of any part of the consideration. The variance in such a case is fatal (Dashwood v. Peart, Manning's Index, 308), unless the omitted part is not material. Clarke v. Gray, 6 East, 568.

(3.) Variance in the promise in a contract,-being the omission of any part of the promise. The variance in such a case may or may not be fatal; e.g., the omission of an exception contained in the promise would be fatal (Latham v. Rutley, 2 B. & C. 20), but the omission of an addition or of a defeasance would not be so. Miles v. Sheward, 8 East, 7; Hotham v. E. I. Co. 1 T. R. 640.

VENDORS AND PURCHASERS-contd. Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078; Hopkins v. Grazebrook, 6 B. & C. 31). The duties of such a vendor are now regulated in all material points by the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 78), s. 2, and incidentally also by the other sections of that Act, relative to Abstracts of Title, Sales by Trustees, Protection of Legal Estate, and Tacking. On the other hand, the vendor of personal property (not being chattels real), comes under no such liability, unless he expressly chooses to warrant the title of the thing sold, the general maxim of the Common Law in the case of sales of personal property being caveat emptor (Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Ex. 500). Usually, upon a purchase, the risk of the thing purchased attaches to the purchaser, as from the moment that the sale is complete (Tarling v. Baxter, Tud. L. C. Mer. Law, 596). See title SALE with reference to sales of personal property, and the following titles with reference to sales of real property (including leaseholds or chattels real), viz., ABSTRACT OF TITLE; CONVEYANCE; FRAUD; and for VENDOR'S LIEN-see title TRUSTS.

VENIRE FACIAS. A judicial writ which used to be directed to the sheriff of the county in which a cause was going to be tried, commanding him to cause a jury of twelve men to come from the body of his county to try the issue between the litigating parties. The writ has been abolished by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 104.

See title JURY.

VENIRE DE NOVO. A fresh or new venire, which the Court grants when there has been some impropriety or irregularity in returning the jury, or where the verdict is so imperfect or ambiguous that no judgment can be given on it (2 Arch. Pract. 1549; Smith's Action at Law, 173). In all cases where this trial de novo is grantable, the Court is bound to grant it as of right, and without being shackled with any restrictive or other condition.

VENTER (the belly). Is used in law as designating the maternal parentage of children. Thus, where in ordinary phraseology, we should say that A. was B.'s child by his first wife, he would be described in law as "by the first venter;" similarly, we may say, "A. died seised, leaving two infant daughters by different venters." Doe d. Barnett v. Keen, 7 T. R. 886.

VENUE. The county in which an action is intended to be tried, and from the body of which the jurors are accordingly to be summoned, is so called. This county, or venue, as it is termed, when fixed upon and determined by the plaintiff, is always inserted in the margin of his de

VENUE-continued.

claration, which is termed "laying the venue in such a county; and the action itself is then said to be "laid " or brought "within that county." By the Judicature Act, 1873 (Sched. Rules of Proc. 28), there is to be no local venue for the trial of any action, but when the plaintiff proposes to have the action tried elsewhere than in Middlesex, he is in his statement of claim to name the county or place in which he proposes that the action shall be tried; and the action thereupon shall, unless the judge otherwise orders, be tried in the county or place, so named.

VERDEROR (verdurier). An officer of the king's forest, who is sworn to maintain and keep the assizes of the forest, and to view, receive, and inrol the attachments and presentments of all manner of trespasses of vert and venison in the forest. Manwood, c. 6, s. 5.

See also title VERT.

VERDICT. A verdict is the unanimous judgment or opinion of the jury on the point or issue submitted to them. A verdict is either general or special. It is said to be general when it is delivered in general words with the issue; as if the issue be on a plea of not guilty, then a general verdict would be that the defendant is guilty, or is not guilty, as the case may be. It is said to be special when the jury instead of finding the negative or affirmative of the issue, as in the case of a general verdict, declare that all the facts of the case as disclosed upon the evidence before them, are in their opinion proved, or, in other words, find the special facts of the case, but that they are ignorant in point of law on which side they ought, upon these facts, to find the issue; that if upon the whole matter the Court shall be of opinion that the issue is proved for the plaintiff, they find for the plaintiff accordingly, and assess the damages at such a sum, &c. but if the Court are of an opposite opinion, then vice versa. This special verdict is then, together with the whole proceedings on the trial, entered on record; and the question of law arising on the facts found is argued before the Court in banc, and decided by that Court as in case of demurrer. A verdict is called a privy verdict when the judge has left or adjourned the Court; and the jury being agreed, in order to be delivered from their confinement, obtain leave to give their verdict privily to the judge out of Court, which privy verdict, however, is of no force, unless afterwards affirmed by a public verdict given openly in Court. Boote's Suit at Law, 273; Steph. Pl. 100; Sm. Act. at Law, 159.

VERGE (virga, rod). The Court of the Marshalsea had jurisdiction within the verge of the Court, which, in this respect, extended for twelve miles round the king's place of residence. The word "verge" is also used to signify a rod or stick by which one is admitted tenant to a copy hold estate, by holding it in one's hand and swearing fealty to the lord of the manor. Old Nat.

Brev. 17.

VERIFICATION. Is a certain formula with which all pleadings containing new affirmative matter must conclude. It is in itself an averment that the party pleading is ready to establish the truth of what he has set forth. It is either common or special. The common verification runs in the following form: "And this the plaintitf [or defendant] is ready to verify." A special verification is used only when the matter pleaded is to be tried by record, or by some other method than the ordinary mode of trial by jury; and in the case of a trial by the record would be in the following form: "And this the plaintiff [or defendant] is ready to verify by the said record." When new matter is introduced into a pleading, it must always conclude with a verification. Steph. Pl. 479; Finch's Law, 359.

See also title ET Hoc PARATUS EST
VERIFICARE.

VERT (Fr. green). In general signifies everything that grows and bears green leaf within the forest. There are two sorts of vert in every forest, viz., over vert and neather vert. Over vert, sometimes also called hault-boys, is all manner of great wood, as well such as bear fruit as do not. Old ash and holly trees are accounted over vert. Neather vert, sometimes also called south-boys, comprises all kinds of underwood, bushes, thorns, gorse, and such like. Whether fern and heath are included under the term "neather vert," seems doubtful. Manwood argues that they are not; Fleetwood and Hesket maintain the contrary opinion. The vert which grows in the king's demesne woods is termed special vert. From this word "vert" is derived the word "verderor." See Harewood, c. 6, ss. 2, 4, 5.

VESTED INTEREST. An interest, property, or estate, whether in possession or not, which is not subject to any condition precedent and unperformed. The interest may be either a present and immediate interest, or it may be a future but uncontingent, and therefore transmissible, interest, an interest which is contingent not being transmissible at all. Thus a vested remainder is that description of remainder by the creation of which a present interest passes to the party; and though the re

VESTED INTEREST-continued. mainder itself, ex vi termini, can only be enjoyed in futuro, yet a present, immediate, and disposable interest, as remainderman, is at once conveyed, and therefore the remainder is called a vested remainder. A vested interest is not necessarily an unconditional interest; on the contrary, it is frequently qualified by some condition, being, however, a condition which does not extend to delay the vesting of the interest.

VESTED LEGACY. A legacy is said to be vested when the words of the testator making the bequest convey a transmissible interest, whether present or future, to the legatee in the legacy. Thus a legacy to one, to be paid when he attains the age of twenty-one years, is a vested legacy, because it is given unconditionally and absolutely, and therefore vests an immediate interest in the legatee, of which the enjoyment only is deferred or postponed; and if such legatee die before that age, his representatives shall receive it out of the testator's personal estate at the time that it would have become payable had the legatee himself lived. But if the legacy were given when or if the legatee attain a certain age, it would not be vested, i.e., transmissible, until that age; and if the legatee were to die before that age, the legacy would fail to take effect, and his representatives could make no claim to it. For in this case the bequest is a kind of conditional one, depending upon the happening of a certain event, viz., the legatee's attaining the specified age. See Boraston's Case, Pawlett v. Pawlett, Stapleton v. Cheales, and Hansom v. Graham, Tud. L. C. Conv.

VIAGÈRE, RENTE. In French Law is a rent-charge or annuity payable for the life of the annuitant.

VICAR (vicarius). The priest or parson of every parish is termed a rector, unless the predial tithes be appropriated, and then he is called a vicar, that is, has the part of a vice-rector. The distinction, therefore, between a parson and vicar is this, that the parson has for the most part the whole right to all the ecclesiastical dues in his parish; but a vicar has generally an appropriator over him, entitled to the best part of the profits, and to whom he is in effect perpetual curate, with a standing salary. Cowel; Wms. Real Prop. 330, 8th ed.

VICAR-GENERAL. Is an ecclesiastical officer in each diocese, appointed by, and acting under, the authority of the bishop. He formerly was only occasionally constitu ted during the bishop's absence from his

VICAR-GENERAL-continued. diocese; but now he is the perpetual representative of the bishop in certain matters, such as the granting of licences, &c., where there is nothing of contention or litigation between the parties. He appears to have no criminal jurisdiction, and therefore cannot inquire, in the place of the bishop, into such offences as quarrelling, brawling, or smiting, &c. Roger's Ecc. Law, 143, 144; Gibs. Introd. 23; Thorpe v. Mansel, 1 Hag. Con. 4, in notis.

VICARIAL TITHES. Those tithes to which vicars are entitled, and which are generally called privy or small tithes.

See title TITHES.

words to wit, or, that is to say, so frequently used in pleading, are technically called the videlicet, or scilicet; and when any fact alleged in pleading is preceded by, or accompanied with, these words, such fact is, in the language of the law, said to be laid under a videlicet. The use of the videlicet, or scilicet, is to point out, particularise, or render more specific that which has been previously stated in general language only; also to explain that which is doubtful or obscure. It has been called by Lord Hobart a "handmaiden to another clause." Where the scilicet is contrary to the preceding general statement it may be rejected (Dakin's Case, 2 Wms. Saund. 678). But a videlicet, or scilicet, which is not so contrary, and which is not mere surplusage, cannot be rejected as immaterial, but may be traversed like any other averment. See notes to Dakin's Case, supra.

VIEW. In real actions a defendant might have demanded a view, that is, a sight of the thing, in order to ascertain its identity and other circumstances. As if a real action were brought against a tenant, and such tenant did not exactly know what land it was that the demandant asked, then he might have prayed the view, which was that he might see the land which the demandant claimed (F. N. B. 178). And now generally under the C. L. P. Act, 1854, s. 58, an inspection of real or personal property may be had or made whenever it would be conducive to the right decision of a case.

that lies where two persons contend for a church, and one of them enters into it with a great number of laymen, and keeps out the other vi et armis; then he who is so kept out shall have this writ directed to the sheriff, by virtue of which he shall remove such lay force. But the sheriff must not remove the incumbent out of the church, whether he is rightfully there or not, but only the force, or laymen, that accompanied him. Les Termes de la Ley; Cunningham.

VILL. Seems to bear the same signification in law as a town or tithing, and each of them is said to have had originally a church, and celebration of divine service, sacraments, and burials; though this seems to be rather an ecclesiastical than a civil distinction, and hence it is that the word "vill" has by some writers been described as a parish or a manor. It appears to have some different significations, but its more ordinary meaning was that of a town; and the Statute of Exeter (14 Edw. 1) so uses it in making frequent mention of vills, demi-vills, and hamlets. Henry Spelman conjectures entire vills to have consisted of ten freemen or frankpledges (hence tithing), and demi-vills of five. Co. Litt. 115 b.; stat. 14 Edw. 1; Spel. Gloss. 274; 1 Inst. 115; Bract. lib. 4, c. 31.

Sir

VILLAINS, or VILLEINS. Were a sort of people under the Saxon government in a condition of downright servitude, who were used and employed in the most servile works, and are even said to have belonged to the lord of the soil, like the cattle or stock upon it. They seem to have been those who held what is termed the folk-land, from which they were removeable at the lord's pleasure. These villeins, belonging principally to lords of manors, were either villeins regardant, that is, annexed to the manor or land, or else they were villeins in gross, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord, and transferable by deed from one owner to another, either apart from, or with, the land. The tenure by which villeins held