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STAR-CHAMBER-continued. crimes capital or heinous not actually committed or perpetrated."

The utility of the Star-Chamber, in the reigns of Henry VII. and subsequent monarchs consisted in two principal functions, viz.

(1.) In its repression of the turbulence of the nobility and gentry in the provinces; and

(2.) In its supplying a Court of jurisdiction for matters which, as being of novel origin, were unprovided for by the existing tribunals, e.g., in the case of offences against proclamations in ecclesiastical matters. The effect of the Court was to enhance the royal authority, which it did by supplying the executive with a speedy and effective machinery. Cardinal Wolsey has the credit of having improved and extended the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

But the very nature of the jurisdiction of the Court of Star-Chamber rendered its process liable to great abuses; and Wolsey's connection with it was one of the principal causes of his unpopularity. The increase of those abuses was the ultimate cause of its abolition by the Long Parliament in 1640.

STATE OF FACTS. Formerly, when a Master in Chancery was directed by the Court of Chancery to make an inquiry or investigation into any matter arising out of a suit, and which could not conveniently be brought before the Court itself, each party in the suit carried in before the Master a statement shewing how the party bringing it in represented the matter in question to be; and this statement was technically termed a state of facts, and formed the ground upon which the evidence was received; the evidence being, in fact, brought by one party or the other to prove his own or disprove his opponent's state of facts (Gray's Ch. Prac, 109, 110). And so now, a state of facts means the statement made by any one of his version of the facts.

STATING PART OF A BILL IN CHANCERY: See title BILL IN EQUITY.

STATUTE. The statutes are the written laws of the kingdom, made by the king's majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled. They are either general or special, public or private. A general or public Act is a universal rule that regards the whole community; and of this the Courts of Law are bound to take notice judicially and ex officio, without the statute being specially pleaded or formally set forth by the party who claims advantage

STATUTE-continued.

of it. Special or private Acts are rather exceptions than rules; being those which only operate upon particular persons and private concerns: such as the Romans entitled privilegia (in the favourable sense of that word), or senatûs decreta, in contradistinction to the senatus consulta, which regarded the whole community; and of these (which are not promulgated with the same notoriety as the former) the judges are not bound to take notice, unless they be formally shewn and pleaded. Thus, for instance, the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, to prevent spiritual persons from making leases for longer terms than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public Act; it being a rule prescribed to the whole body of spiritual persons in the nation. But an Act to enable the Bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years, is an exception to this rule; it concerns only the parties and the bishop's successors, and is therefore a private Act.

Various rules have been made regarding the construction or interpretation of statutes; the short substance of which is as follows:

I. Where the words of the statute are unambiguous, then by the words alone it is proper to abide, unless, perhaps, in the case only of manifest absurdity (Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 118 a):

II. Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, then the following subsidiary rules are to be applied :

(1.) Inquire the Common Law before
the making of the statute;
(2.) The mischief against which it did
not provide;

(3.) The remedy which Parliament
thought to apply; and

(4.) The true reason (i.e., true essence, or gist) of the remedy. Heydon's

Case, 3 Rep. 7.

It used also to be a general rule, that penal statutes were to be construed restrictively, and beneficial statutes liberally; but as to the propriety of such a rule, there may well be considerable doubt. Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence.

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STATUTES-continued.

20 Hen. 3 (Statute of Merton).
52 Hen. 3 (Statute of Marlbridge).

3 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the First).

6 Edw. 1 (Statute of Gloucester). 7 Edw. 1 (Statute de Religiosis Viris). 11 Edw. 1 (Statute of Acton-Burnell). 13 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the Second).

13 Edw. 1 (Statute of Merchants). 13 Edw. 1 (Statute of Circumspectè agatis).

18 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the Third.)

25 Edw. 1 (Statute of Confirmatio Chartarum).

25 Edw. 1 (Statute de Tallagio non Concedendo).

28 Edw. 1 (Statute of Articuli super Chartas).

9 Edw. 2 (Statute of Articuli Cleri). 17 Edw. 2 (Statute of Prærogativa Regis). 25 Edw. 3, st. 4 (Statute of Provisors). 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 4 (Statute of Treasons). 15 Rich. 2, c. (Statute of Mortmain). 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (Statute of Præmunire). 2 Hen. 4. c. 15 (Statute de Hæretico Comburendo).

4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (Statute of Fines). 11 Hen. 7, c. 1 (Statute concerning Allegiance to a Sovereign de facto).

II. ECCLESIASTICAL :—

10 Hen. 2 (Constitutions of Clarendon). 7 Edw. 1 (Statutum de Religiosis Viris). 9 Edw. 2, st. 1 (Articuli Cleri).

25 Edw. 3, st. 6 27 Edw. 3, st. 1 15 Ric. 2, c. 5 (Statute of Præmunire). 24 & 25 Hen 8 (Appeals to Rome taken away).

(Statutes of Provisors).

25 & 26 Hen. 8 (The King declared Su

preme Head of the Church of England, and the Archbishop of Canterbury empowered to grant licences and dispensations in lieu of the Pope).

1 Eliz. c. 1 (Act of Supremacy). 1 Eliz. c. 2 (Act of Uniformity). 16 Car. 1 (Abolition of Court of High Commission).

6 Car. 2 (Establishment of Presbyterianism in England).

12 Car. 2 (Restoration of Episcopalianism in England).

13 Car. 2 (Corporation Act).
13 Car. 2 (Act of Uniformity).
16 Car. 2 (Act against Conventicles).
17 Car. 2, c. 2 (Five Mile Act).
25 Car. 2, c. 2 (Test Act).

1 W. & M. c. 8 (Tolerat on Act).
11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 4 (Act of Settlement).
13 Will. 3, c. 6 (Oath of Abjuration).
21 & 22 Vict. c. 48 (Oath of Allegiance).

STATUTES AT LARGE. Are an authentic collection of the various statutes which have been passed by the British Parliament from very early times up to the present day. The oldest of these now extant, and printed in our statute book, is the famous Magna Charta, as confirmed in Parliament 9 Hen. 3, though doubtless there were many Acts before that time, the records of which are now lost, and whose provisions are perhaps in the present day currently received for the maxims of the old Common Law, or customs of the realm. The statutes from Magna Charta down to the end of the reign of Edward II. (including also some which, because it is doubtful to which of the three reigns of Henry III., Edward I., or Edward II., to assign them, are termed incerti temporis), compose what have been called the vetera statuta; on the other hand, those from the beginning of the reign of Edward III. are contradistinguished by the appellation of the nova statuta. Dwarris on Stat. 626.

STATUTE-MERCHANT.

A writing in the nature of a bond, which was introduced in the reign of Edward I., for the purpose of allowing lands to be charged with the payment of debts contracted in trade, which was contrary to all feudal principles. It is called statute-merchant, because usually made between merchants, and according to the forms expressly provided by statute, which direct both before what persons, and in what manner, it ought to be male. It is somewhat in the nature of what is termed a vivum radium, or living pledge, by which a man borrows a sum of money of another, and giants him an estate to hold till the rents and profits shall repay the sum so borrowed. A statutemerchant may, therefore, be said to be a security for a debt acknowledged to be due, and by which not only the body of the debtor may be imprisoned, and his goods seized in satisfaction of the debt, but also his lands may be delivered to the creditor till out of the rents and profits of them the debt may be satisfied; and during such time as the creditor so holds his lands he is called a tenant by statute merchant, and such creditor's estate or interest in the lands during that period is termed an estate by statute-merchant.

STATUTE-STAPLE. A security for a debt acknowledged to be due before the mayor of the staple, that is, the grand mart for the principal commodities or manufactures of the kingdom, formerly held by Act of Parliament in certain trading towns. It is called "statutestaple," because entered into before the mayor of such staple, and made according to certain forms prescribed by statute.

STATUTE-STAPLE-continued.

This security, which is in the nature of a bond given by the debtor to the creditor, is very similar to a statute-merchant, and was originally permitted only among traders for the benefit of commerce. By it, not only the body of the debtor may be imprisoned, and his goods seized in satisfaction of the debt, but also his lands may be delivered to the creditor till out of the profits and rents of them the debts may be satisfied; and during such time as the creditor so holds the lands he is called "tenant by statute-staple," and his estate or interest in the lands during that period is called an "estate by statute-staple."

STATUTE OF JEOFAILS: See titles AMENDMENT; JEOFAILE.

STEALING: See title LARCENY.

STEALING AN HEIRESS: See title ABDUCTION.

STET PROCESSUS. Is an entry on the roll in the nature of a judgment, of a direction that all further proceedings shall be stayed (ie., that the process may stand), and it is one of the ways by which a suit may be put an end to by an act of the party, as distinguished from a termination of it by judgment, which is the act of the Court.

STEWARD. This word signifies a man appointed in the place or stead of another, and generally denotes a principal officer within his jurisdiction. The greatest, however, of these was the Lord High Steward of England, whose functions were of a very important nature, having, next under the king, the supervision and regulating the administration of justice, and most other affairs of the realm, both of a civil and military nature. There is also an important officer, called a "steward of a manor," who has the general management of all forensic matters connected with the manor of which he is steward. He stands in much the same relation to the lord of the manor as an under-sheriff does to the sheriff. Cowel.

STEWARTRY. In the Scotch Law seems to be synonymous with the English word "county." Thus, "any shire or stewartry in Scotland," is used in the 12th section of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35 (the Income and Property Tax Act); and by 1 Vict. c. 39, it is enacted that the word "county occurring in any future or existing Act shall comprehend and apply "to any stewartry in Scotland, excepting where otherwise specially provided, or where there is anything in the subject or context repugnant to such meaning or application." See Bell's Sc. Law Dict. tit. "County."

STINT, COMMON WITHOUT. Common without stint is the right of commoning or feeding an unlimited number of cattle on the common, and that throughout the year, without limitation of time. The notion, however, of this species of common is said to be exploded, as a right of common without stint cannot exist in law. 2 Chit. Bl. 31, n. (32).

See further title COMMON.

STIRPES. Taking property by representation is called "succession per stirpes,” in opposition to taking in one's own right, or as a principal, which is termed per capita. It is called succession per stirpes, because according to the roots; that is, all the branches inherit the same share that their root, whom they represent, would have done.

See also title CAPITA, DISTRIBUTION

PER.

STOCK. This is the general name for the public funds, but is applicable generally to the like funds of corporate bodies. It is a chose in action, and cannot be sued for as money (Nightingale v. Derisme, 2 W. Bl. 684). It carries interest, which has been defined to be a right to receive a perpetual annuity subject to redemption (Wildman v. Wildman, 9 Ves. 177), The Bank of England is the depositary of the public funds, and liable only as such (Humberstone v. Chase, 2 Y. & C. 209). The interest or dividends have by a recent Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 104, the Dividends and Stock Act, 1869), been made payable upon warrants sent through the post.

See also next title.

STOCK EXCHANGE. This is a society or club, prescribing rules which bind its members, and its customs bind all persons, whether members or not, having dealings upon it. The persons transacting business professionally on the Exchange are either brokers or jobbers; the former being agents merely for their customers, the latter (especially since the stat. 23 Vict. c. 28, repealing Sir John Barnard's Act, 7 Geo. 2, c. 8) dealing for themselves while at the same time making purchases and sales for their customers, chiefly by means of what are called "time-bargains." See Coles v. Bristowe, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 3; Grissell v. Bristowe, L. R. 4 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 36; and Maxted v. Paine, L. R. 4 Ex. 81.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. This is the right of the unpaid vendor of goods to stop them in certain cases before they have reached the actual or constructive possession of the vendee, and to resume the possession, so as to put himself in the same position as if he had not parted with it. The first case in which the principle

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STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-continued. was acted on is Wiseman v. Vandeputt (2 Vern. 203; Tudor's Merc. C. 631). The right arises properly only in cases in which the vendee or consignee has become bankrupt or insolvent; but a general inability to pay, evidenced by stoppage of payment, is sufficient to satisfy the rule (Sm. M. L., Sth ed., p. 544). Moreover, the right, or an analogous one, may exist by special Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 2 Man.

contract.

& G. 792.

The right determines when the goods have reached their destination, whether or not they are yet in the actual possession of the vendee. Usually, the carrier of the goods is a mere neutral agent between the vendor and the vendee; and in ordinary cases, therefore, the transit is regarded as continuing as long as the goods are in the carrier's possession. But if the carrier enters into any new relation with the vendee, becoming, e.g., custodian as well as carrier, that determines the transit, although the goods may not yet have reached their destination (Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 534). So, also, the exercise by the vendee of acts of ownership over the goods, will in general determine the transit; for example, if the vendee take samples of the goods with the intention of taking a constructive possession, and the carrier retaining possession of the goods has expressly or impliedly assented to keep the goods as agent for the vendee (Whitehead V. Anderson, supra). And if the goods are delivered on board the vendee's own ship, that determines the transit (Schotsmans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. App. 332), unless, indeed, the vendors in such a case procure (as they ought to procure) the master's bill of lading, making them deliverable to their order or assigns, for in this way they reserve to themselves the jus disponendi (Turner v. Trustees of Liverpool Docks, 6 Ex. 543) and may re-take possession, or transfer the property by indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading (Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 4 Q. B. 196, 493). And where goods sold in London free on board (f. o. b.), to be paid for on delivery on board by bill or cash at a certain discount, were shipped on a vessel selected by the vendee, and the vendor elected to take a bill, and it appeared that by the custom of the port the expression "f. o. b." indicated that the vendee was considered as the shipper, although the vendor was to pay the expenses of shipment, it was held that the transit was determined by the delivery on board, and the receipt of the bill. Cowasjee v. Thompson, 5 Moo. P. C. C. 165.

Where goods are in a warehouse and not

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-continued. on carriage, it is a general rule that the right of stoppage in transitu determines so soon as a delivery order is given by the vendor to the vendee, and the warehouseman assents thereto; but this is only so where no acts remain to be done, such as weighing, measuring, or separating, to ascertain the quantity, value, or identity of the goods (Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614; Tud. M. C. 600). The mere giving of a delivery order does not operate as constructive delivery of the goods (M'Ewan v. Smith, 2 H. L. C. 209); and the transfer of a delivery order has no such effect as the indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading (Akerman v. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516). Moreover, the warehouseman's assent to hold the goods for the vendees may, in certain cases, estop him personally from denying their right to the possession of the goods, while it leaves the right of the vendors to stop in transitu unaffected. Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 344.

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Where there would be a right to stop if the transitus had begun, there is, à fortiori, a right to refuse to allow the transit even to begin. Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313.

The right of stoppage is not determined by part payment or part delivery, unless in the latter case the vendee take possession of the part in name of the whole; although even then the vendor is entitled under certain circumstances to hold the remainder of the goods until the price for the whole is paid (Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436). Neither is the right of stoppage determined by a resale of the goods by the vendee, in the absence of course of a previous delivery thereof to him. Craven v. Ryder, 6 Taunt. 433.

The right to stop in transitu is personal to the vendor or consignors; it does not belong to a surety for the price of the goods (Siffken v. Wray, 6 East, 371). The vendor may, however, at any time before the transit is ended, ratify and thereby make good the act of a stranger who stops the goods. Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786.

Under the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, and the C. L. P. Act, 1860, s. 12, the master of a vessel, or warehouseman, having the goods in his possession, may obtain an order of interpleader upon the adverse claimants, and that whether or not the two claims have a common origin.

The following is a summary of the rules regarding stoppage in transitu:

(1.) The right of stoppage in transitu is not a rescission of the contract, but at the most a re-vesting of the possession in the vendor. Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 451;

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-continued. (2.) The right is personal to the consignor, and does not extend, e.g., to a surety for the price of the goods. Siffken v. Wray, 6 East, 371;

(3.) The right only endures during the Transit, and the transit is taken to have ended so soon as the goods come into the actual or constructive possession of the vendee. Edwards v. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375;

(4.) The termination of the transit as to part is not the termination of it as to the rest (Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28); unless the contract was entire (Hammond v. Anderson, 1 N. R. 69);

(5.) The termination of the transit may be accelerated by the vendee (Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 518); but may not be prolonged by the carrier. Bird v. Brown, 4 Ex. 786;

(6.) The right to stop in transitu is defeated by the consignee's negotiating the bill of lading to a bona fide transferee for value (Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Sm. L. C. 699); secus, if to a malá fide transferee. Cumming v. Brown, 9 East, 514;

(7.) But the indorsee, even since 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111, takes subject to the equities attaching upon his indorser. Gurney v. Behrend, 2 E. & B. 622.

STRANGERS. These are third persons generally. Thus, the persons bound by a fine are parties, privies, and strangers. The parties are either the cognizors or cognizees; the privies are such as are in any way related to those who levy the fine, and claim under them by any right of blood, or other right of representation; the strangers are all other persons in the world, except only the parties and privies. In its general legal signification it is opposed to the word "privy." Those who are in no way parties to a covenant, nor bound by it, are also said to be strangers to the covenant.

STRIKING A JURY. Is the act of selecting or nominating a jury of twelve men out of the whole number returned as jurors on the panel. This, in common jury cases, is usually done by the associate of the Court at the trial putting all their names in a box, and then drawing out twelve promiscuously. The phrase, however, seems more commonly used with regard to a special jury, in which the mode of proceeding is somewhat varied. The proper officer of the Court appoints a time and place for "striking the special jury," at which the under-sheriff, or his agent, and the parties attend. The number from the jurors' list are then put into a box, and the forty-eight names corre

STRIKING A JURY-continued. sponding with the forty-eight numbers drawn by each party alternately, and this number is afterwards reduced, and constitutes the special jury. Lush's Pr. 471, 477; stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, ss.. 30, 32, 34, 37; Juries Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 77).

STRONG HAND. The words "with strong hand" imply a degree of criminal force, and much more than is meant by the words "with force and arms" (vi et armis). The statutes relating to forcible entries use these words, "with a strong hand," as describing that degree of force which makes an entry or detainer of lands criminal, and entitles the prosecutor, under circumstances, to restitution and damages; whereas the words "vi et armis," with force and arms, are mere formal words in the action of trespass, and if issue were taken upon them, the plaintiff would not be bound to prove any force. Rez v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 362, 363; per Lawrence, J., Lowe v. King, 1 Saund. 81; Harvey v. Brydges, 14 M. & W. 440, per Parke, B.

STUFF GOWN. Is the professional robe worn by barristers of the outer bar, viz., those who have not been admitted to the rank of Queen's counsel.

See title SILK GOWN.

SUBINFEUDATION. The system which the feudal tenants introduced of granting smaller estates out of those which they held of their lord, to be held of themselves as inferior lords; and as the system was proceeding downwards ad infinitum, and deprived the lords of their feudal profits of wardships, marriages, and escheats, which fell into the hands of these mesne, or middle, lords, who were the immediate superiors of him who occupied the land, a provision was made in the thirty-second chapter of Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, prohibiting any man either to give or sell his land without reserving sufficient to answer the demand of his lord. Ultimately, by the stat. Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the Third), c. 1, subinfeudation was entirely suppressed, and instead of it alienation in the modern sense was introduced, so that thenceforth the alience held of the same chief lord and by the same services that his alienor before him held.

See title ALIENATION.

SUBMISSION: See next title.

SUBMISSION BOND: See next title.

SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION. The submitting matters in difference between parties to the award or decision of an arbi

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