PERPETUITY-continued.

(1 Cl. & F. 372), which case also established the Rule of Perpetuities in its present form, and which is in these words,

Rule of Perpetuities or of Remoteness.An executory interest cannot be created so as to take effect unless within a life or lives in being, twenty-one years afterwards, and (but only where gestation actually exists (Cadell v. Palmer, supra)) the period of gestation; or (where no life or number of lives is mentioned) within twenty-one years alone and (but only where gestation actually exists) the period of gestation (Palmer v. Holjord, 4 Russ. 403). Moreover, all interests subsequent to and depending upon an executory interest which exceeds the limits of the rule are also void, notwithstanding in themselves they may be within the limits of the rule. Palmer v. Holford, supra; Robinson v. Hardcastle, 2 Bro. C. C. 22.

The rule is applicable to personal as well as to real estate.

In the application of the rule possible and not actual events are to be considered; so that if the executory interest which is given might by possibility exceed the limits of the rule, in other words would not necessarily take effect as a vested interest (if at all) within these limits, and whether as to all or as to one even of the beneficiaries, the interest is void. And not only must the interest vest, but the respective vested interests of the respective takers (where they are more than one) must also be ascertainable,* within the limits of the rule, otherwise the gift is void (Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147); but it is not necessary that the interest having vested should also be in possession (Murray v. Addenbroke, 4 Russ. 407), the possession, if arbitrarily postponed beyond the vesting, being simply accelerated and brought up to the period of vesting.

The following are the chief examples of interests attempted to be created, but void as being against the rule,

(1.) An executory interest to arise after an indefinite failure of issue, unless the prior interest can be construed as an estate tail by implication from the words describing the failure of issue, in which latter case the executory interest over would be good (Doe d. Ellis v. Ellis, 9 East, 383); Grumble v. Jones, Willes, 166, n.), the reason for the validity of the exception being that the gift over may be defeated by the estate tail being barred at any time before the event occurs on which the executory interest is to spring into being.

law.

Mogg v. Mogg, 1 Mer. 654, cannot be considered

PERPETUITY-continued.

Nicolls v. Sheffield, 2 Bro. C. C. 215; Morse v. Lord Ormonde, 5 Madd. 99.

(2.) An executory bequest, after a life estate in A. to the children of A. attaining any age which exceeds twenty-one years (Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363); and in such a case the whole bequest over is void, although some of the children may have attained the prescribed age within twentyone years from the death of A., unless indeed the individual shares of the respective children can be ascertained within the limits of the rule of perpetuities, in which latter case the gift over would be valid as to those children who are within the rule and void only as to the others. Storrs v. Benbow, 2 My. & K. 46.

(3.) A devise to a child (not in esse) of A. who is in esse upon that child attaining some qualification which is not necessarily attainable within the limits of the rule, e.g., succeeding to a barony (Tollemache v. Earl of Coventry, 2 Cl. & F. 611), or being in holy orders. Procter v. Bishop of Bath and Wells, 2 H. Bl. 358.

(4.) A gift of leaseholds to trustees upon trusts corresponding with lands in strict settlement, and expressed as not to vest in any tenant in tail in possession till he shall attain the age of twenty-one years (Ibbetson v. Ibbetson, 5 My. & Cr. 26; Lord Dungannon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 516); but it is otherwise if the gift is expressed not to vest in any tenant in tail by purchase under the settlement till such tenant attain the age of twenty-one years, and this latter is the common limitation.

(5.) The literal exercise of powers of appointment (not being general) in favour of objects who if inserted (as they must be considered as being) in the instrument (whether deed or will) creating the power, would take interests beyond the limits of the rule, as calculated from the date of the operation of the creating instrument (Devonshire (Duke) v. Lord G. Cavendish, 4 T. R. 741); nevertheless such a power is not void in its creation, and the donee of it may, by using discretion, exercise it in a valid manner. Attenborough v. Attenborough, K. & J. 296.

(6.) The creation of powers of sale or management of estates exercisable generally during the minorities of persons entitled to the settled estates (Ferrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 373), such persons not being expressed to be entitled by purchase under the settlement; nevertheless, such powers, if intended for the payment off of incumbrances on the settled estates, would be valid. Briggs v. Oxford (Earl), 1 De G. M. & G. 363.

The rule of perpetuities does not apply to executory trusts, or rather the Court of

PERPETUITY-continued.

Chancery, in moulding such trusts will take care not to exceed the limits of the rule (Humberston v. Humberston, 1 P. Wms. 332); neither does it apply to cases of cyprès, and for the like reason, that the Court coops up the excess within the lawful period of limitation (Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2 W. Bl. 1159). And there are also the following further exceptions to the application of the rule:

(1.) Gifts to charities, e.g., contingent limitations over from one charity to another charity (Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 1 Mac. & G. 460): but not of course a gift or gift over in the like case from a charity to an individual. Hope v. Gloster (Corporation), 7 De G. M. & G. 647.

(2.) Lands whereof the reversion or remainder subsists in the Crown (31 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20), not being put into the Crown in fraud of the rule. Johnson d. Anglesea (Earl) v. Derby (Earl), 2 Show. 101.

(3.) Any provision for the payment of the debts of the settlor (Briggs v. Oxford (Earl), supra), including therein a provision to indemnify a purchaser against an incumbrance. Massey v. O'Dell, 10 Ir. Ch. Rep. 22.

That

See also title ACCUMULATIONS. PERPETUITY OF THE KING. fiction of the law which for certain political purposes ascribes to the king in his political capacity the attribute of immortality: for though the reigning monarch may die, yet by this fiction the king never dies; that is, the office is supposed to be re-occupied for all political purposes immediately on his death.

PER QUE SERVITIA. A judicial writ that issued out upon the note of a fine; and which lay for the conusee of a manor or seigniory to compel the tenant of the land at the time the fine was levied to attorn to him. Les Termes de la Ley.

PERQUISITES. Such advantages and profits as come to a manor by casualty, and not yearly; as escheats, heriots. reliefs, estrays, and such like things. The word "perquisite" is also used by some of our old law writers to signify anything obtained by industry, or purchased with money, in contradistinction to that which descends from an ancestor (Cowel; Les Termes de la Ley.) It is also, at the present day, used of the casual profits of any office.

PER QUOD. When an action is brought by a person for defamation of character, and the offensive words do not apparently and upon the face of them import such

PER QUOD-continued.

defamation as will of course be injurious, it is necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have happened, which is called laying his action with a per quod: as if I say that such a clergyman is a bastard, he cannot for this bring any action against me, unless he can shew some special loss by it; in which case he may bring his action against me for saying he was a bastard, per quod he lost the presentation of such a living. In all actions for slander, other than for slander to a person in his or her profession, trade, or occupation, it is necessary to add this per quod clause in effect, although no longer in form, inasmuch as damage is an essential part of the ground of action.

PERSONAL (personalis). Anything connected with the person, as distinguished from that which is connected with land. Another characteristic of personal property (or personalty, as it is sometimes called) is, that it is usually of a transitory or moveable nature, and capable of being taken away by the owner wherever he pleases to go; whereas real property (or realty, as it is sometimes termed) is of a local and not transitory nature, and does not possess the attribute of mobility, or the capacity of being moved about with the person of the owner; and hence, from its substantial and permanent nature, it is termed real. Having stated thus much, it would be advisable further to illustrate the word by explaining it in conjunction with other words with which it is usually associated.

Personal Actions, for instance, signify such actions as are brought for recovery of some debt, or for damages for some personal injury; in contradistinction to the old real actions, which related to real or landed property, &c.

Personal Estate, property, things, or chattels, &c., signify any moveable things of whatever denomination, whether alive or dead; as furniture, money, horses, and other cattle, &c., for all these things may be transmitted to the owner wherever le thinks proper to go, and may therefore be said to attend his person, according to the maxim Mobilia ossibus inhærent.

See also following titles.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Property of

a personal or moveable nature, as opposed to property of a local or immoveable character, such as land, or houses, and which are termed real property.

See also title PERSONAL.

PERSONALTY. Signifies generally any personal property, in contradistinction to realty, which signifies real property. In

PERSONALTY--continued. our old law, an action was said to be in the personalty when it was brought for damages out of the personal estate of the defendant. But see Cowel under this title.

PETITION IN CHANCERY. During the progress of a suit in Chancery the interference of the Court is frequently required in order to the regular and effectual prosecution or defence of the suit, and in order to the immediate attainment of many objects connected with it. When such interference is required, an order of Court, embodying the particular object, is applied for, and such application is frequently made by what is termed a petition, which is a statement in writing made to the Lord Chancellor, or the Master of the Rolls, shewing the cause which the petitioner has for some order of Court. Petitions to the Court of Chancery are either made in a suit or under a statute, or both; but where no suit is pending and no statute gives the right of proceeding upon petition, then a bill is the only course open to the suitor, unless in certain matters regarding infants, which may be done on petition without either suit or enabling statute.

PETITION OF RIGHT: See title MONSTRANS DE DROIT.

PETITION OF RIGHTS. A Parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people assented to by King Charles I., in 1629. It is to be distinguished from the Bill of Rights, 1689, which was passed into a permanent constitutional statute.

See title BILL OF RIGHTS.

The cre

PETITIONING CREDITOR. ditor at whose instance an adjudication of bankruptcy is made against a bankrupt. The debt of the creditor so petitioning required formerly to amount to £100, but if it amount to £50 that is now sufficient. Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

PETTY BAG OFFICE. Is an office which belongs to the Common Law Courts in Chaucery, and out of which all writs in matters wherein the Crown is interested do issue. Such writs, and the returns to them, were in former times preserved in a little sack or bag (in parvâ baga), whereas other writs, relating to the business of the subject, were originally kept in a hamper (in hanaperio), and thence has arisen the distinction of the Hanaper Office and Petty Bag Office, which both belong to the Common Law side of the Court in Chancery. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103.

PETTY LARCENY: Sec title LARCENY.

PETTY SERJEANTY: See title SER

JEANTY.

PETTY SESSION. A special or petty session is sometimes kept in corporations and counties at large by a few justices, for dispatching smaller business in the neighbourhood between the times of the general sessions; as for licensing ale-houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and so forth.

PETTY TREASON: See title TREASON.

PILOTAGE. The act of steering or guiding a ship by the pilot or helmsman, either during an entire voyage, or on the departure from, or on the approach to, port. The dangerous navigation of the coasts and of the rivers of England has led to the appointment of qualified persons, who receive a licence to act as pilots within a certain district, and who enjoy the monopoly of conducting vessels out of, and up, the various rivers, and to and from the various ports of the country. By different Acts of Parliament the master of every ship engaged in foreign trade must put his ship under the charge of a local pilot so licensed, both in his outward and in his homeward voyage. The power of appointing these "duly licensed pilots" is mainly vested in the corporation of the Trinity House, Deptford, whose jurisdiction extends from Orfordness to London Bridge, from London Bridge to the Downs, from the Downs westward to the Isle of Wight; and all bodies or persons having the power of appointment in other places (as the commissioners of the Cinque Ports, the Trinity Houses of Hull, Newcastle, and Liverpool) are, to some extent, subject to their authority. Where the master is bound by Act of Parliament to place his ship under the command of a licensed pilot, he is relieved from the liability of any damage which is done by it while so under the pilot's command. The rates of charge for pilotage are regulated partly by statute and partly by usage, but also by the corporation of the Trinity House. See Maude and Pollock on Merchant Shipping.

PIN-MONEY. An allowance set apart by a husband for the personal expenses of the wife; i.e., for the dress and pocketmoney of the wife. It is that money which the husband allows the wife for the purpose of decking or attiring her person, or to pay her ordinary personal expenses. It is not a gift from the husband to the wife out and out; it is not to be considered like money set apart for the sole and separate use of the wife during coverture excluding the jus mariti; but is a sum set apart for a specific purpose; it is due to the wife in virtue of a particular arrangement, and is

PIN MONEY-continued. payable by the husband by force of that arrangement only, and for that specific purpose and no other (Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh's Rep. N. R. 269). Consequently, if pin-money should not be duly paid by the husband, and should be found to be in arrear at his death, his wife surviving him can claim only one year's arrears of it (Aston v. Aston, 1 Ves. Sen. 267); also, the husband may find his wife in apparel, instead of paying her this apparel-money, as it may be called. Howard v. Digby, supra.

PISCARY (piscaria vel privilegium piscandi). The right or privilege of fishing. Thus free fishery, which is a royal franchise, is the exclusive right of fishing in a public river. Common of piscary is the right of fishing in another man's water. Several fishery resembles free fishery, only that he who has a several fishery must also be (or at least derive his right from) the owner of the soil, which in a free fishery is not requisite.

See also title FISHERY.

PIX JURY (from Lat. Pyxis, a box made of the box-tree (Pyracantha), used by the ancients for gallipots, and to hold the Host in Catholic churches). A jury consisting of the members of the corporation of the Goldsmiths of the city of London, assembled upon an inquisition of very ancient date, called the trial of the pix. The object of this inquisition is to ascertain whether the coin of the realm, manufactured at Her Majesty's mint, is of the proper or legal standard. This investigation as to the standard of the coin is called pixing it, and hence the jury appointed for the purpose is called a pix jury. The investigation takes place usually once a year, and the Lord High Chancellor presides, and points out to the jury the nature of their duties. They have to ascertain whether the coin produced is of the true standard, or "sterling" metal, of which, by stat. 25 Edw. 3, c. 13, all the coin of the kingdom must be made. This standard has been fixed at various times by statute; for it scemeth that the royal prerogative doth not extend to the debasing or enhancing the value of the coinage below or above the sterling value. 2 Inst. 577.

PLAINT (from the Fr. plainte, complaint). The instrument or process by which actions are commenced in the County Courts. It has been described as a private memorial tendered in open Court to the judge, wherein the party injured sets forth his cause of action.

See title COUNTY COURTS.
PLEA (placitum).

Is used in various

PLEA-continued.

senses. In its usual acceptation it signifies the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's declaration; and when this answer sets forth at large or in detail the subject matter of the defence, it is denominated a special plea, in contradistinction to those direct and concise answers to the declaration termed the general issues. The word is also frequently used to signify suit or action. Thus holding pleas means entertaining or taking cognizance of actions or suits; common pleas signifying actions or suits between man and man, as distinguished from such as are promoted and prosecuted at the suit of the Crown, which are thence denominated pleas of the Crown. The word is used in this sense by Finch in defining an issue: "An issue is when both the parties join upon somewhat that they refer unto a trial, and to make an end of the plea, i.e., suit or action. So the plea side of a Court means that department of a Court which takes cognizance of civil actions, as distinguished from criminal proceedings or matters which peculiarly concern the Crown." See Finch, Law, 396, c. 35; and see titles ABATEMENT, PLEA IN; PEREMPTORY PLEA.

PLEA SIDE. The plea side of a Court means that branch or department of the Court which entertains or takes cognizance of civil actions and suits, as distinguished from its criminal or Crown department. Thus the Court of Queen's Bench is said to have a plea side, and a Crown or criminal side; the one branch or department of it being devoted to the cognizance of civil actions, the other to criminal proceedings, and matters peculiarly concerning the Crown. So the Court of Exchequer is said to have a plea side and a Crown side; the one being appropriated to civil actions, the other to matters of revenue.

PLEAD.

The defendant in an action is said to plead when he delivers his answer to the plaintiff's declaration; because his answer itself is called a plea. Steph. Plead. 52.

PLEADING ISSUABLY. Pleading such a plea as is calculated to raise a material issue either of law or of fact. The defendant in an action is entitled, as a matter of right, to a certain number of days to plead. If he seeks to obtain further time, it is granted to him only by way of indul gence; and the Court in so doing usually annexes to its order the condition that the defendant shall plead issuably, that is, that he shall plead a fair and bona fide plea, as distinguished from one which is calculated only to embarrass the defendant, and to retard the progress of the action. The con

PLEADING ISSUABLY-continued. dition so annexed is in effect, "an agreement by the defendant to speed the cause to its conclusion, and bring it to an issue upon the substantial merits of law or fact, without regard to any formal inaccuracies in the plaintiff's statement." Per Coleridge, J., in Barker v. Gleadon, 5 Dowl. 136.

See also title ISSUABLE PLEA.

PLEADING OVER. Passing over, passing by, omitting to take notice of, &c. Thus, when a defendant in his pleadings passes by or takes no notice of a material allegation in the declaration, he is said to plead over it.

PLEADINGS.

The mutual allegation

or statements which are made by the plaintiff and defendant in a suit or action are so termed. These are now written or printed and delivered between the contending parties, or to the proper officers appointed to receive them; but formerly they were actual viva voce pleadings in open Court. The pleadings in an action are designated according to their nature by the following terms: declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, and surrebutter. The principles on which these pleadings or contending statements are framed, and the manner in which they govern or affect the subsequent course of the cause, form the principal feature in the art or science of pleading, or, as it is popularly called, special pleading. See Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 159, per Buller, J.; Steph. Pl. 24; and the particular titles mentioned in the course of this present title.

PLEDGE: See titles BAILMENT; PAWNBROKER.

PLEDGES. In the ancient law no person could prosecute a civil action without having in the first stage of it two or more persons as pledges of prosecution; and if judgment was given against the plaintiff, or he deserted his suit, both he and his pledges were liable to amercement to the king pro falso clamore. In the course of time, however, these pledges were disused, and the names of fictitious persons substituted for them, two ideal persons, John Doe and Richard Roe having become the common pledges of every suitor; now, however, even these are not used in personal actions. And since the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the use of such pledges has been discontinued even in the action of ejectment; and inasmuch as all the real actions were abolished by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, it would seem that the use of such pledges is now discontinued altogether.

PLENARTY.

Is applied to a benefice being full or occupied, and is directly opposed to vacation, which signifies a benefice being void.

PLENARY CAUSES. In the Ecclesiastical Court causes were divided into plenary and summary. Plenary causes were those in whose proceedings the order and solemnity of the law was required to be exactly observed, so that if there were the least departure from that order, or disregard to that solemnity, the whole proceedings were annulled. Summary causes were those in which it was unnecessary to pursue that order and solemnity. The present distinction between the contentious and the non-contentious jurisdiction of the Court of Probate seems to be very closely analogous to this old distinction between causes as plenary or summary.

PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT. A plea pleaded by an executor or administrator, on an action being brought against him, to the effect that he has fully administered, that is, that he has exhausted the assets before such action was brought. Toller's Exec. 267.

PLIGHT. An old English word, signifying the habit or quality of anything. Thus, to deliver up a thing in the same plight and condition, or to be in the same plight and condition, are phrases analogous to the phrase "assemble and meet together," the latter of the two words explaining the former of them, but being otherwise tautological. This use of the word "plight is the same as that which

occurs of the word "causa" in Just. Inst. iv. 17, 3. The word applies to real and personal property equally, and to any estate, even to a rent-charge or possibility of dower, in land. This seems to be the meaning of Cowel, title Plight.

PLOUGH-BOTE. An allowance of wood which tenants are entitled to, for repairing their implements of husbandry.

PLURIES. A writ of summons or capias was termed a pluries writ, when two other writs had been issued previously, but to no effect; and it was so termed, because the words ran thus: "You are commanded as often you have been commanded" (alluding to the commands contained in the two previous writs) (Smith's Action at Law, 63). But the pluries writ is now abolished, and by s. 11 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the original writ may be renewed at any time before its expiration for six months from the date of such renewal, and so on from time to time during the currency of the renewed writ, this renewal saving the Statute of Limitations as from the date of the original writ.