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JUDGMENT DEBTS-continued.

v. Morley, 2 K. & J. 71); but a purchaser or mortgagee who has no notice of a judgment, although the same has been registered, and, à fortiori, as already mentioned, if it is either unregistered or not duly reregistered, is not bound thereby, this being the construction of the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5, for it has been held that registration is not notice (Robinson v. Woodward, 4 De G. & Sm. 562), unless, indeed, it can be proved that the party has made an actual search over the period covering the judgment (Proctor v. Cooper, 2 Drew. 1); and no such search is compulsory either upon a purchaser or upon a mortgagee (Lane v. Jackson, 20 Beav. 535), although it is not, therefore, wise to avoid a search (Freer v. Hesse, 4 De G. M. & G. 495). And in case the property is situate in a register county, the registration and reregistration must be made both in the local and in the general registries. Johnson v. Houldsworth, 1 Sim. N.R. 106; Benham v. Keane, supra.

In the case of a judgment which is entered up between a contract for sale and the conveyance of the land, where the judgment is duly perfected as required by the Acts, the judgment creditor could not, by the old law, proceed against the land in the hands of the purchaser (Lodge v. Lyseley, 4 Sim. 70), but would have been restrained by injunction from so doing (Brunton v. Neale, 14 L. J. (Ch.) 8); the judgment creditor might, however, have come against the unpaid purchase-money (Forth v. Norfolk (Duke), 4 Madd. 505); and the present law is to the same effect (Brown v. Perrott, 4 Beav. 585). And by the present law, upon any sale by a mortgagee, the surplus proceeds of sale are charged by any judgments entered up against the mortgagor between the dates of the mortgage and the sale (Robinson v. Hedger, 13 Jur. 846). But under the old law and under the present law a judgment entered up subsequently to a voluntary conveyance, and duly perfected, does not upset the prior voluntary conveyance (Beavan v. Oxford (Earl), 6 De G. M. & G. 507), a judgment creditor not being a purchaser within the meaning of the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4.

A judgment entered up against an annuitant has been held to be a charge on the land out of which the annuity issues (Younghusband v. Gisborne, 1 De G. & Sm. 209); and the like decision was given regarding a judgment entered up against one entitled to a gross sum of money charged on land (Russell v. M'Culloch, 1 K. & J. 313); but now, by the stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 11, where a mortgage is paid off prior to the completion of the purchase, any judgment against the mort

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The extent of the judgment creditor's remedy at Law depends on the 11th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and the extent of his remedy in Equity on the 13th section of that Act. And, accordingly, at Law the judgment creditor may proceed against all legal estates of his debtor, and also against all estates held simply in trust for him, but not against any equity of redemption of his debtor; and in Equity he may proceed against all and every the lands of his debtor, having first taken out an elegit (Smith v. Hurst, 10 Hare, 30), and obtained actual possession of the lands, if possible, or the nearest equivalent to actual possession (Guest v. Cowbridge Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Eq. 619), and he should pray a sale of the lands (as distinguished from a foreclosure) (Tuckley v. Thompson, 1 J. & H. 126), an order for which he may obtain upon petition in a summary way under the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112 (Re Isle of Wight Ferry, 11 Jur. (N.S.) 279). Sometimes both a bill and a petition may, however, be neces sary (Re Cowbridge Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Eq. 413). If neither an elegit nor a fi. fa, can be sued out there is no remedy. Padwick v. Newcastle (Duke), L. R. 8 Eq. 700.

JUDGMENT ROLL. A parchment roll upon which all proceedings in the cause up to the issue, and the award of venire inclusive, together with the judgment which the Court has awarded in the cause are entered. This roll, when thus made up, is deposited in the treasury of the Court, in order that it may be kept with safety and integrity. In practice, the making up and depositing the judgment roll is generally neglected, unless in cases where it becomes absolutely necessary to do so; as when, for instance, it is required to give the proceedings in the cause in evidence in some other action; for in such case the judgment-roll, or an examined copy thereof, is the only evidence of them that will be admitted. Smith's Action at Law, 184.

JUDICIAL WRITS. Such writs as issue under the private seal of the Courts, and not under the great seal of England, and are tested or witnessed not in the king's name, but in the name of the chief judge of the Court out of which they issue, are so called. The word "judicial" is used in contradistinction to original; original writs signifying such as issue out of Chancery under the great seal, and are witnessed in the king's name. Since the Uniformity of Process Act (2 Will. 4, c. 39, s. 31), the distinction has become almost useless.

JUGES D'INSTRUCTION. In French Law, are officers subject to the ProcureurImperial (see that title), who receive in cases of criminal offences the complaints of the parties injured, and who summon and examine witnesses upon oath, and after communication with the procureur-imperial draw up the forms of accusation. They have also the right, subject to the approval of the same superior officer, to admit the accused to bail. They are appointed for three years, but are re-eligible for a further period of office. They are usually chosen from among the regular judges.

JURAT (from the Lat. juratus, sworn by). The clause written at the foot of an affidavit, stating when, where, and before whom such affidavit was sworn, is called the jurat.

JURISDICTION (jurisdictio). The right power, or authority which an individual or a Court has to administer justice. Thus the three superior Courts of Common Lawviz., the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, have jurisdiction over all personal actions throughout England; that is, they have power and authority to hear and determine such actions throughout England,

JURIS UTRUM. A writ that lay for the succeeding incumbent of a benefice, to recover the lands or tenements belonging to the church, which had been aliened by his predecessor. Les Termes de la Ley.

JURORS, IMMUNITY OF. In early times juries were subject to punishment and intimidation for giving and in giving certain verdicts, the chief processes against them being two, namely:

(1.) By writ of attaint; and

(2) By summary fine and imprisonment. First. Attaint was a process which lay partly by the Common Law and partly by statute. The proceeding consisted in impanelling a jury of twenty-four to try the verdict of the twelve. The verdict of the twenty-four was final, and if opposed to that of the twelve, it operated the two following effects, namely:

(1.) It annulled the former verdict; and (2.) It convicted the twelve of perjury

and false verdict.

Thereupon, the convicted jurors were arrested and imprisoned and rendered infamous for ever; their lands and goods were forfeited to the king, their wives and children were turned out of their homes, their houses were thrown down, their trees were rooted up, and their meadows were ploughed. This proceeding was available only in the case of a verdict in civil causes.

Secondly, the summary process by fine and imprisonment, although it was frequently resorted to, was admitted to be illegal, as being against Magna Charta.

JURORS, IMMUNITY OF-continued. The Star Chamber was the Court by which chiefly this summary jurisdiction was exercised; and although in certain cases there may have been good cause for the Star Chamber to intervene (it is alleged, e. g., in the case of Welsh juries), still the jurisdiction and the exercise of it were alike inexcusable. After the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641, the practice of fining and imprisoning jurors for giving false verdicts was not altogether discontinued for in 22 Car. 2, it was again resorted to in the case of Bushell, who was one of the jury who had (notoriously against the truth) found that Penn and Mead had not preached in Gracechurch Street, contrary to the Act of Uniformity, the Five Mile Act, or the Conventicle Act. This man Bushell, having been imprisoned along with his fellow jurors upon the late trial, sued out his writ of habeas corpus; and the cause of his imprisonment being stated in the return made to his writ to be that he had found a verdict in favour of Penn and Mead, contrary to the evidence and also contrary to the direction of the judge in matter of law, after argument upon the sufficiency or legality of that cause of imprisonment, Vaughan, C.J., ordered Bushell to be released, holding in effect, therefore, that jurors could not be fined or imprisoned for an alleged false verdict, and basing that opinion upon the following grounds,

(1.) That the jury were the judges of the evidence and found the same, and their finding was the only evidence, no matter what the alleged evidence adduced might be; and

(2.) That he judge's direction, even in matter of law, was not imperative or absolute, but was hypothetical merely, for he could not direct what the law was without first knowing the fact, and the jury had not as yet found the fact at the time he gave his direction.

This sophism of the chief justice, which even a regard for liberty can scarcely palliate, was effectual in causing the abandonment of the summary procedure against jurors for the future. The other and regular proceeding, that by attaint, fell gradually into disuse by reason of the extreme severity of its consequences, and it was eventually abolished altogether by the County Juries Act, 1825 (6 Geo. 4, c. 50), which substituted a motion for a new trial as the mode, and that is at the present day the only mode, of impugning or, at any rate, reviewing the verdict of a jury. This mode is available, moreover, in civil cases only.

JURY (jurata, from jurare, to swear),

JURY-continued.

A certain number of men (usually twelve) to whose decision the matter in dispute between a plaintiff and defendant is submitted, and who are bound upon their oaths to decide (or give their verdict) according to the evidence which is laid before them on the trial of the cause. Such men, individually, are called jurors. A jury is either a common jury or a special jury. A common jury consists of persons between the ages of twenty-one and sixty, who shall have £10 a year, beyond reprises, in lands and tenements of freehold, copyhold, or customary tenure, or held in ancient demesne, or in rents issuing out of such tenements, in fee simple, fee tail, or for life, or £20 a year in leaseholds held for twenty-one years or any longer term, or any term determinable on a life or lives: or, being a householder, shall be rated to the poor rate, or in Middlesex to the house duty, in a value of not less than £30; or who shall occupy a house containing not less than fifteen windows. These qualifications, however, do not extend to jurors of any liberties, franchises, cities, or boroughs who possess civil or criminal jurisdiction. It is called a common jury, because the matter to be tried by it is only of a common or ordinary nature. A special jury consists of persons of the degree of squire or upwards, or of the quality of banker, or merchant, &c. It is called special, because the matter to be tried by it is usually of a special and important nature, and is supposed to require men of education and intelligence to understand it. See also Jury Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 77.

JURY, TRIAL BY. It is a disputed point whether trial by jury existed in Anglo-Saxon times, but the following may be considered as traces of that mode of trial in those times in its rudest aspect;

(1.) A law of Alfred, requiring a king's thane accused of homicide to purge himself of the charge with twelve king's thanes, and a lesser thane under like accusation to purge himself with eleven of his equals and one king's thane;

(2.) One of the canons of the Northumbrian clergy, requiring a king's thane to purge himself before twelve king's thanes of his own choice, twelve others appointed for him, and twelve British strangers, being thirty-six men altogether, with similar provisions for lesser thanes and ceorls;

(3.) A law of Ethelred II., whereby the sheriff and twelve thanes in every wapentake were constituted a tribunal of justice; and

(4.) The case of the monastery of Ramsey, in which a controversy between the monastery and a certain private individual

JURY, TRIAL BY-continued. having arisen regarding certain lands, and a suit having been instituted about it in the County Court, the matter was referred to a committee of thirty-six thanes for its determination.

Now, it may be said that these bodies were not jurors, but compurgators; but to this it is replied that compurgation was, in Anglo-Saxon times (as in all early ages), a natural mode of evidence, being the oath or oaths of the collective bodies to the effect that they disbelieved the truth of the accusation (see title COMPURGATION), and it being, moreover, a more peculiar characteristic of the Anglo-Saxons that they gave great weight to credit or general character, a species of evidence but little regarded in civilised times, e.g., in the present day. See title CHARACTER, EVI

DENCE AS TO.

This rude mode of taking evidence having been discontinued in Anglo-Norman times, there was introduced in those later times, in lieu of compurgation, an inquest, or inquisition, i.e., inquiry into the particular circumstances or the details of the case, but evidence of character was not even then (as it is not even yet) altogether laid aside.

This inquest was made by sworn recognitors, being twelve or twenty-four in number, as well in civil as in criminal proceedings. In the reign of Henry II., the assize of novel disseisin, called also the magna assiza, or grand assize, was introduced, whereby, in a civil suit, the plaintiff or defendant had his choice either to try the dispute by combat, or to put himself on this assize, which was composed of sixteen sworn recognitors and in the same reign the ancient privilege of compurgation, pure and simple, was abolished.

In the reign of Henry III. trial by ordeal was abolished, and trial by a petty jury in criminal causes was introduced; and with that reign trial by jury, both in civil and in criminal matters, may be regarded as having been for the first time completely established, subject, however, to the following qualification, namely,

The jurymen were originally themselves the witnesses, and their verdict or finding was the result of their own knowledge, unassisted by other testimony; but it was impossible that twelve men should always be acquainted with the circumstances of the matter before them, and the distinction of jurors from witnesses was early felt to be a necessity, and the distinction itself was, in fact, made at some early but unassignable date. It is probable that as the law of evidence became gradually better understood, and the weakness of characterevidence became gradually more apparent,

JURY, TRIAL BY-continued.

so the distinction referred to became gradually more and more perceived to be neces sary and to be taken, until, at the present day, the distinction is become marked and essential. And yet, even at the present day, the jury may assist themselves by their own knowledge as well as by the testimony of the witnesses.

JUS. Right, law, authority, &c.
See the following titles.

JUS ACCRESCENDI is used by our old law writers to signify the right of survivorship amongst joint tenants, &c.

See title SURVIVORSHIP.

JUS AD REM signifies the inchoate or imperfect right to a thing, in contradistinction to jus in re, which signifies the complete and perfect right in the thing.

JUS DUPLICATUM, or DROIT DROIT, signifies the right of possession joined with the right of property.

JUS IN RE: See title JUS AD REM.

JUS POSTLIMINII is a right to restitution after a re-capture as applied in maritime law, a use of the phrase which is derived from the Roman jus postliminii, which restored the citizen of Rome who had been made a slave to his threshold, i.e., to his franchise. The term is therefore metaphorically used in our Admiralty Courts to signify a resumption of an original inherent right to a re-captured British ship in the legal owners. But the phrase is also frequently used with an analogous meaning in other branches of the law.

JUS RECUPERANDI, INTRANDI, &c. is the right of recovering and entering lands. Tomlins; Cowel.

JUS TERTII. This phrase, which signifies literally the right of some third person, is commonly applied in the following manner: a tenant, it is true, cannot dispute the title of his landlord, but he may plead that such title has determined by convey. ance or otherwise; and so also a bailee when sued to re-deliver the goods bailed to him, cannot as a rule deny the right of the bailor (who delivered them to him) to recover the goods; nevertheless he may shew that by transfer, assignment, or otherwise, the bailor's right to have the goods redelivered to him has determined, e.g., a pawnbroker will regard only the holder of the duplicate, and to an action brought by the pawnor, will set up the defence of jus

tertii.

JUSTICES (justiciarii). Officers appointed by the Crown to administer justice.

JUSTICES-continued.

The various sorts of justices will be found under their proper heads in the following titles.

JUSTICES OF ASSIZE, or, as they are sometimes called, justices of nisi prius. The judges of the superior Courts at Westminster, who go circuit into the various counties of England and Wales twice a year, for the purpose of disposing of such causes as are ready for trial at the assizes, are termed justices of assize.

See also title CIRCUITS.

JUSTICES IN EYRE. So called from the old French word eire, i.e., a journey, were those justices who in ancient times were sent by commission into various counties to hear more especially such causes as were termed pleas of the Crown; they differed from justices in oyer and terminer, inasmuch as the latter were sent to one place, and for the purpose of trying only a limited number of special causes; whereas the justices in eyre were sent through the various counties with a more indefinite and general commission; in some respects they resembled our present justices of assize, although their authority and manner of proceeding differed much from them.

JUSTICES OF THE FOREST were officers who had jurisdiction over all offences committed within the forest against vert or venison. The Court wherein these justices sat and determined such causes was called the justice seat of the forest. They were also sometimes called the justices in eyre of the forest.

Those

JUSTICES OF GAOL DELIVERY. justices who are sent with commission to hear and determine all causes appertaining to such persons who for any offence have been cast into gaol. Part of their authority was to punish those who let to mainprise those prisoners who were not bailable by the law, nor by the Statute De finibus; and they seem formerly to have been sent into the country upon this exclusive occasion, but afterwards justices of assize had the same authority given them.

JUSTICES OF THE HUNDRED. A hundredor, lord of the hundred, he who had the jurisdiction of a hundred, and held the Hundred Court.

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JUSTICES OF LABOURERS—continued. frowardness of labouring men, who would not work without having unreasonable wages granted them.

JUSTICES OF NISI PRIUS: See title JUSTICES OF Assize.

JUSTICES OF OYER AND TERMINER. These justices of oyer and terminer are certain persous appointed by the king's commission, among whom are usually two judges of the Courts at Westminster, and who go twice in every year into every county of the kingdom (except London and Middlesex), and at what is usually called the assizes hear and determine all treasons, felonies, and misdemeanors. They are usually those who have before been described under the titles of Justices of Assize, and Justices of Gaol Delivery.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Certain justices appointed by the king's special commission under the great seal jointly and separately, to keep the peace of the country where they dwell. Any two or more of them are empowered by this commission to inquire of and determine felonies and other misdemeanors, in which number some particular justices, or one of them, are directed to be always included. and no business to be done without their presence, the words of the commission running thus: "quorum aliquem vestrum,” A. B. C. D., &c., unum esse volumus; whence the persons so named are usually called justices of the quorum.

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JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, ORIGIN OF. The origin of these magistrates is to be found in the reign of Edward I., who by the stat. 3 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the First) c. 9, and by the statute of Coroners (4 Edw. 1, stat. 2), but chiefly by the statute of Winton, otherwise Winchester (13 Edw. 1), directed that every country and town should be well kept, and that upon any robbery or felony committed therein, hue and cry should be raised upon the felon, and they that kept the town were to follow him with hue and cry from town to town with all the town and the towns near; and failing capture, the hundred was made liable for the damage. In the reign of Edward III., conservators of the peace were appointed, whose duty it was to assist the sheriff, coroner, and constable, and they were empowered to imprison and punish rioters and offenders. These conservators were afterwards designated justices of the peace. By a more recent statute, 27 Eliz. c. 13, the sheriff or constable was required to make the pursuit both with horse and foot; and to the present day, hue and cry in that manner may still be made under that and the

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, ORIGIN OF -continued.

previous statutes, but is seldom if ever in fact made, owing to the equally effective, if not so speedy, remedy which is provided in the ordinary police and criminal processes for the apprehension and punishment of offenders.

JUSTICIES.

A writ directed to the sheriff, empowering him for the sake of dispatch to try an action in his County Court for a larger amount than he has the ordinary power to do. It is so called because it is a commission to the sheriff to

do the party justice. 4 Inst. 266.

JUSTIFICATION. Pleas in justification or excuse are such as shew some justification or excuse of the matter charged in the declaration, the effect of which is to shew that the plaintiff never had any right of action because the act charged was lawful; a plea of son assault demesne is one of this kind of pleas (Stephen on Plead. 224). They are, however, more common in actions for a libel, to which the defendant justifies on the score either of privilege, or of truth and the public advantage.

No

JUSTIFYING BAIL. Is the act of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the persons put in as bail for the defendant in an action are competent and sufficient persons for the purpose. persons are justified in becoming bail for a defendant unless they are householders and possess certain other qualifications with reference to property, &c.; but it frequently happens that persons become, or endeavour to become, bail for a defendant, who are not so qualified, or whom the plaintiff suspects not to be so qualified; in this case the plaintiff objects to such bail (or, as it is termed, excepts to them), who are then called on to justify themselves, and this they do by swearing themselves to be housekeepers, and to possess the other qualifications required of them; and this is termed justifying bail. They frequently justify voluntarily, without being required to do so by the plaintiff. 1 Arch. Prac. 847-57; Tidd. 149.

JUVENILE OFFENDERS: See title REFORMATORIES.

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