between him and brutes is a difference of kind, and not one merely of degree-he embodying a distinct principle not present in brute animals. A supporter of the monistic hypothesis must maintain that man at his first appearance was literally in the lowest and most brutal stage of his existence, whence he has gradually ascended. to his present condition by a process of progressive development attended with only exceptional and relatively insignificant processes of retrogression and degradation. He will consequently not only maintain that races have existed without articulatespeech, or any equivalent symbolic system, without perceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' and without religious conceptions, but also that the first men were actually so destitute. He may or may not expect to find specimens of this lowest condition of mankind still surviving at the present day, but he will surely anticipate that archæological, historical, and ethnological research must reveal facts pointing plainly towards such an early condition. He will also anticipate that these sciences will bring to our knowledge tribes in an intellectual stage which is less remote from that presumed early condition than from a choice assemblage of men living now-say, the members of our own. 'Royal Society.' A supporter of the dualistic hypothesis must, on the other hand, maintain that man at the very first moment of his existence was at once essentially man, and separated, at his very origin, from the highest brutes by as impassable a gulf as that which anywhere exists between them to-day. He will consequently not only maintain that no race will anywhere be found without: a mode of rational expression, moral perceptions, and religious. conceptions (however rudimentary or atrophied), but also that the first men possessed all these. He will be confident that no scientific researches will bring to our knowledge any human races devoid of reason, or (what is its necessary concomitant in a “rational animal ") the power of expressing internal thoughts, as distinguished from mere feelings, by external sensible signs. He will also expect to find in all races of men indications of religious conceptions and of an apprehension of right and wrong, however curiously or perversely these abstract conceptions may be concretely embodied. Finally, he will be confident that no race will be found less remote intellectually from the highest existing men than from a state of brutal irrationality. The actual first origin of man must for ever remain a problem insoluble by unaided reason—a matter incapable of direct investigation, and, revelation apart, only to be investigated by conjecture and analogy. This being so, we must be content to study existing races. races of men, and thence arrive at the best conclusions we may, with the aid to be derived from history, archæology, and geology. The questions, then, to which attention should be directed with a view to determining whether the balance of evidence favours the monistic or the dualistic hypothesis, are the following; and to answer these, the savage, Homo sylvaticus, must serve as our test. 1. Can any direct evidence be found of races of man, past or present, existing in a brutal or irrational condition? 2. Does available evidence clearly point to the past existence of such a condition? 3. Are races anywhere to be found in a condition which is less remote from mere animal existence than from the highest human development of which we have as yet experience. Should unmistakable evidence of the sort be forthcoming, then the existence of an essential difference, a difference of kind, between human and brutal nature, could no longer be maintained. It would also follow that if other animals have arisen by a merely natural process of development, reason could oppose no barrier to the belief that the origin of man, in the totality of his nature, was also due to such a merely natural process. If, on the other hand, no such direct evidence is forthcoming, and none even pointing clearly in the indicated direction; if, also, no races can be found in a condition nearer to irrational brutality than to the highest refinement; then it must be admitted that we have no scientific ground for asserting that man is of one nature with the brutes, or that it is an à priori probability that his origin was the same as theirs. More than this, in the absence of such evidence it may fairly be inferred that there is an à priori probability against this community of nature and origin. It may be so inferred, because it seems likely that if all men.were once irrational animals, some tribe of the kind would have survived in some remote part of the world to this day, especially as, on the theory of evolution, they must have been well fitted to maintain themselves under the conditions existing in their own region. Man is generally admitted to be, as to antiquity, at the most but a tertiary mammal; but Australia presents us with a fauna in some respects triassic. Some eminent authorities, however, assert that miocene man still exists, and that we behold him in the Esquimaux. It may naturally be a matter of some regret that this cannot be proved, since, if the Esquimaux are indeed miocene men surviving to this day, an investigation of their mental condition would almost suffice to solve the problem decisively one way or the other. It would suffice to solve it since we we might fairly argue from the progress made between the miocene period and to-day, to that which might be supposed to have taken place between the beginning of the tertiary period and the miocene. If, however, ethnology and archæology fail to furnish due evidence, and thus show themselves manifestly incompetent to solve the question, then the cause must be transferred to the tribunal of Philosophy for decisive judgment. In that case, if philosophy (including psychology) shows us, as we are convinced it does, that there is a difference of kind between the lowest races of men and the highest species of brutes, pointing to a difference of essential principle, and, therefore, of origin, then ethnology and archæology (in the case of their supposed failure as to the evidence referred to) become important auxiliaries, and will powerfully aid to reinforce such conclusion. They will, by their eloquent silence, supply us with additional grounds for maintaining that the progress of physical science will but more and more clearly bring out the difference existing between all merely animal natures and that of the rational animal man. The works of the authors whose names head this review are most valuable for our purpose. They are most valuable, in the first place, on account of the industry, patience, ability, and candour with which they have amassed, digested, and laid before their readers all the most important facts which either archæology or ethnology has afforded, tending to throw light upon the lower stages of human existence. Secondly, however, they are of especial value because their authors belong to that school which adopts the monistic view as to man's origin-that is to say, the school of Lamarck, Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. We may, therefore, confidently rely upon any statements or admissions made by Mr. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock which tell against the monistic hypothesis; while we may fairly assume, from the eminent qualities these authors possess, that when they fail to bring forward data favourable to that view it is because no such data in reality exist. We may now proceed to examine their testimony, and we think the following order of subjects may be convenient: 1, Speech; 2, Morals; 3, Religion; 4, Progress; 5, Community of Nature; 6, Results. I. As to Speech, Sir John Lubbock at once admits:* ‘Although it has been at various times stated that certain savages are entirely without language, none of these accounts appear to be well authenticated.' The recklessness with which assertions are made about savage tribes is, as we shall shortly see, so great, * 'Origin of Civilisation,' p. 275. that that no account ought to be fully received without a knowledge of the bias of the relater and a careful criticism of his statements. As to speech,' such is the amount of ambiguity and confusion which commonly accompanies the use of the word that some preliminary explanations and definitions are absolutely requisite. The essence of language is mental-an intellectual activity called the verbum mentale; but actual 'speech' itself is the outward expression of thoughts (rational conceptions) by articulate sounds the verbum oris. Now we may have (1) animal sounds that are neither rational nor articulate; (2) sounds that are articulate but not rational; (3) sounds that are rational but not articulate; (4) sounds that are both rational and articulate; (5) gestures which do not answer to rational conceptions; and (6) gestures which do answer to such conceptions, and are, therefore, external but non-oral manifestations of the verbum mentale. The sounds emitted by brutes, which denote merely emotions and bodily sensations, belong to the first category. Mere articulate sounds, without concomitant intellectual activity, such as those emitted by trained parrots or jackdaws (and which, of course, are not speech"), belong to the second category. The third category comprises inarticulate ejaculations which express assent to or dissent from given propositions. The fourth category is that of true speech. Gestures, which are merely the manifestations of emotions and feelings are not the equivalents of speech, and belong to the fifth category. But gestures without sound may be rational external manifestations of internal thoughts, and, therefore, the real equivalents of words. Such are many of the gestures of deaf-mutes incapable of articulating words which constitute a true gesture-language. All such belong to the sixth category. Thus it is plainly conceivable that a brute might manifest its feelings and emotions not only by gestures, but also by articulate sounds, without for all that possessing even the germ of real language. Similarly a paralysed man might have essentially the power of speech (the verbum mentale), though accidentally hindered from externally manifesting that inner power by means of the verbum oris. Normally the external and internal powers exist inseparably. Once that the intellectual activity exists, it seeks external expression by symbols, verbal, manual or what not-the voice or gesture-language. Some form of symbolic expression is, therefore, the necessary consequence of the possession by an animal of the faculty of reason. On the other hand, it is impossible * Mr. Tylor (Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 68) says that though deaf-mutes prove that man may have thought without speech, yet not impossible that rational speech can for a moment exist without the co-existence with it of that internal, intellectual activity of which it is the outward expression. Few recent intellectual phenomena are more astounding than the ignorance of these elementary yet fundamental distinctions and principles, exhibited by conspicuous advocates of the monistic hypothesis. Mr. Darwin, for example, does not exhibit the faintest indication of having grasped them, yet a clear perception of them, and a direct and detailed examination of his facts with regard to them, was a sine quâ non for attempting, with a chance of success, the solution of the mystery as to the descent of man. We actually heard Professor Vogt at Norwich (at the British Association Meeting of 1868), in discussing certain cases of aphasia, declare before the whole physiological section, Je ne comprends pas la parole dans un homme qui ne parle pas'-a declaration which manifestly showed that he was not qualified to form, still less so to express, any opinion whatever on the subject. Again, Professor Oscar Schmidt, in trying to account for the natural origin of man, quotes,* with approbation, Geiger's words: Die Sprache hat die Vernunft geschaffen: vor ihr war der Mensch vernunftlos'-not seeing that he might as well attempt to account for the convexities' of a sigmoid line by its concavities.' The 'concavities' could as easily exist before the convexities' as the existence of the verbum oris could antedate that of the verbum mentale.† It is almost enough to make one despair of progress when one finds such real nonsense' solemnly propounded to a learned audience, and when such amazing ignorance shows itself in men who are looked up to as teachers! 6 6 It is then rational language-the external manifestation, whether by sound or gesture, of general conceptions-which has to be considered. It has to be ascertained whether or not its existence is, as far as the evidence goes, universal amongst mankind; also whether the lowest forms of speech discoverable are so much below the highest forms as to appear transitional steps from irrational cries, and, consequently, whether there is any positive evidence for the origin of speech by any process of not without any physical expression,' rather the reverse.' But no sound philosopher ever dreamed of maintaining the absurdity Mr. Tylor here opposes. Die Anwendung der Descendenzlehre auf den Menschen,' Leipzig, 1873, p. 30. It is, we suppose, to an obscure, not-thought-out perception of this inseparability, that we must attribute the singular contradiction given to himself by Mr. Darwin in his Descent of Man.' In one place (vol. i. p. 54) he attributes the faculty of speech in man to his having acquired a higher intellectual nature, While in another place (vol. ii. p. 391) he ascribes man's intellectual nature to his having acquired the faculty of speech. evolution. |