even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, loose, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's usual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the seventh Chapter is-Of Particles;-yet he seems to chuse to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include Verbs in that title, and particularly what he calls "the Marks of the Mind's affirming or denying." And indeed he himself acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that-" Some parts of that Third Book concerning Words, though the thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet cost him more pains to express than all the rest of his Essay; and that therefore he should not much wonder if there were in some parts of it obscurity and doubtfulness." Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to express himself, in a language with which he is well acquainted, let him be persuaded that his thoughts are not clear enough: for, as Swift (I think) has somewhere observed, "When the water is clear you will easily see to the bottom."

The whole of this vague Chapter-Of Particles-(which should have contained an account of every thing but Nouns) is comprised in two pages and a half: and all the rest of the Third Book concerns only, as before, the Force of the names of Ideas. B. How is this to be accounted for? Do you suppose he was unacquainted with the opinions of Grammarians, or that he despised the subject?

H.-No: I am very sure of the contrary. For it is plain he did not despise the subject, since he repeatedly and strongly recommends it to others: and at every step throughout his Essay, I find the most evident marks of the journey he had himself taken through all their works. But it appears that he was by no means satisfied with what he found there concerning Particles: For he complains that "this part of Grammar has been as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated." And says, that "He who would show the right use of Particles, and what significancy and force they have," (that is, according to his own division, the right use, significancy, and force of ALL words except the names of Ideas,) "must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing." For these Particles, he says,—" are all marks of some action or intimation of the Mind; and therefore, to understand them rightly,

the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the Mind, for which we have either none or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles." For himself, he declines the task, however necessary and neglected by all others and that for no better reason than-"I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs." And yet he was (as he professed and thought) writing on the human Understanding; and therefore should not surely have left mankind still in the same darkness in which he found them, concerning these hitherto unnamed and (but by himself) undiscovered operations of the Mind.

In short, this seventh Chapter is, to me, a full confession and proof that he had not settled his own opinion concerning the manner of signification of Words: that it still remained (though he did not chuse to have it so understood) a Desideratum with him, as it did with our great Bacon before him and therefore that he would not decide any thing about it; but confined himself to the prosecution of his original inquiry concerning the first sort of Abbreviations, which is by far the most important to knowledge, and which he supposed to belong to Ideas.

But though he declined the subject, he evidently leaned towards the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger, and Mess. de Port Royal and therefore, without having sufficiently examined their position, he too hastily adopted their notion concerning the pretended Copula-" Is, and Is not." He supposed, with them, that affirming and denying were operations of the Mind; and referred all the other sorts of Words to the same source. Though, if the different sorts of Words had been (as he was willing to believe) to be accounted for by the different operations of the Mind, it was almost impossible they should have escaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

B.-You said some time ago, very truly, that the number of Parts of Speech was variously reckoned: and that it has not to

this moment been settled, what sort of difference in words should entitle them to hold a separate rank by themselves.

By what you have since advanced, this matter seems to be ten times more unsettled than it was before: for you have discarded the differences of Things, and the differences of Ideas, and the different operations of the Mind, as guides to a division of Language. Now I cannot for my life imagine any other principle that you have left to conduct us to the Parts of Speech.

H.-I thought I had laid down in the beginning, the principles upon which we were to proceed in our inquiry into the manner of signification of words.

B.-Which do you mean?

H.—The same which Mr. Locke employs in his inquiry into the Force of words: viz.-The two great purposes of speech. B.—And to what distribution do they lead you?

H.-1. To words necessary for the communication of our Thoughts. And,

2. To Abbreviations, employed for the sake of dispatch. B.-How many of each do you reckon? And which are they?

H.-In what particular language do you mean? For, if you do not confine your question, you might as reasonably expect me (according to the fable) "to make a coat to fit the moon in all her changes."

B.-Why? Are they not the same in all languages?

H.-Those necessary to the communication of our thoughts

are.

B. And are not the others also?

H.-No. Very different.

B.-I thought we were talking of Universal Grammar.

H.—I mean so too. But I cannot answer the whole of your question, unless you confine it to some particular language with which I am acquainted. However, that need not disturb you: for you will find afterwards that the principles will apply universally.

B.-Well. For the present then confine yourself to the necessary Parts: and exemplify in the English.

H.-In English, and in all Languages, there are only two

sorts of words which are necessary for the communication of

our thoughts.

B. And they are?

H.-1. Noun, and

2. Verb.

B. These are the common names, and I suppose you use them according to the common acceptation.

H.-I should not otherwise have chosen them, but because they are commonly employed; and it would not be easy to dispossess them of their prescriptive title: besides, without doing any mischief, it saves time in our discourse. And I use them according to their common acceptation.

B.-But you have not all this while informed me how many Parts of Speech you mean to lay down.

H.-That shall be as you please. Either Two, or Twenty, or more. In the strict sense of the term, no doubt both the necessary Words and the Abbreviations are all of them Parts of Speech; because they are all useful in Language, and each has a different manner of signification. But I think it of great consequence both to knowledge and to Languages, to keep the words employed for the different purposes of speech as distinct as possible. And therefore I am inclined to allow that rank only to the necessary words: and to include all the others (which are not necessary to speech, but merely substitutes of the first sort) under the title of Abbreviations.

B.-Merely Substitutes ! You do not mean that you can discourse as well without as with them?

H.-Not as well. A sledge cannot be drawn along as smoothly, and easily, and swiftly as a carriage with wheels; but it may be dragged.

B. Do you mean then that, without using any other sort of word whatever, and merely by the means of the Noun and Verb alone, you can relate or communicate anything that I can relate or communicate with the help of all the others?

H.-Yes. It is the great proof of all I have advanced. And, upon trial, you will find that you may do the same. But,

"Res necessarias philosophus primo loco statuit: accessorias autem et vicarias, mox."-J. C. Scaliger de Causis L. L. cap. 110.

after the long habit and familiar use of Abbreviations, your first attempts to do without them will seem very awkward to you; and you will stumble as often as a horse, long used to be shod, that has newly cast his shoes. Though indeed (even with those who have not the habit to struggle against) without A breviations, Language can get on but lamely: and therefore they have been introduced, in different plenty, and more or less happily, in all Languages. And upon these two points-Abbreviation of Terms, and Abbreviation in the manner of signification of wordsdepends the respective excellence of every Language. All their other comparative advantages are trifling.

B.—I like your method of proof very well; and will certainly put it to the trial. But before I can do that properly, you must explain your Abbreviations; that I may know what they stand for, and what words to put in their room.

H.-Would you have me then pass over the two necessary Parts of Speech; and proceed immediately to their Abbreviations?

B.-If you will. For I suppose you agree with the common opinion, concerning the words which you have distinguished as necessary to the communication of our thoughts. Those you call necessary, I suppose you allow to be the signs of different sorts of Ideas, or of different operations of the mind.

H.-Indeed I do not. The business of the mind, as far as it concerns Language, appears to me to be very simple. It extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language. A consideration of Ideas, or of the Mind, or of Things (relative to the Parts of Speech), will lead us no further than to Nouns: i. e., the signs of those impressions, or names of ideas. The other Part of Speech, the Verb, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is in fact the communication itself: and therefore well denominated 'Pnua, Dictum. For the Verb is QUOD loquimur;1 the Noun, DE QUO.

B.-Let us proceed then regularly; and hear what you have to say on each of your two necessary Parts of Speech.

"Alterum est quod loquimur; alterum de quo loquimur."Quinctil. lib. 1. cap. 4.