inspiration not only for councils, ep. 114, 2, 145, 1, but also for emperors and imperial decretals, ep. 162, 3. ep. 148, 84, 1, even for himself, ep. 16, and serm. 25. Comp. Griesbach, Opusc. i. p. 21. Concerning the somewhat different opinions of Gregory of Nazianzum, (ep. ad Procop. 55), on the one hand, and of Augustine (de bapt. contra Don. ii. c. 3), and Facundus of Hermiane (defensio trium capitul, c. 7), on the other, see Neander, Kirchengesch. ii. 1, p. 374-79. In accordance with his views on the relation of the Septuagint to the original Hebrew (§ 121), Augustine supposes that the decisions of earlier councils were completed by those of later ones, without denying the inspiration of the former, since "the decision of councils only gives public sanction to that result which the development of the church had reached." Inspiration accommodates itself to the wants of the time. Respecting this "economy," and its abuses, see Münscher, 1. c. p. 156, ss.

3 Commonitorium, or Tractatus pro catholicæ fidei antiquitate et universitate (composed in the year 433). Vincentius assumes a twofold source of knowledge, 1. divinæ legis auctoritas, 2. ecclesiæ catholicæ traditio. The latter is necessary on account of the different interpretations given to Scripture. The sensus ecclesiasticus is the only right one. Vincentius, like Augustine, also supposes that tradition may in a certain sense advance, so that any opinion, respecting which the church has not as yet pronounced a decision, is not to be considered heretical, but may be condemned as such, if it be contrary to the more fully developed faith of the church. Thus many of the opinions of the earlier Fathers might be reconciled with the decisions of later councils.

2. The Doctrine Concerning God.

§ 123.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The prevailing tendency to didactic demonstration induced men to attempt the establishment of a philosophical proof of the existence of God, in which Christians had

hitherto believed as an axiom.1 In the writings of some of the Fathers, both of the preceding and present periods, e. g. Athanasius and Gregory of Nazanzium, we meet with what might be called the physico-theological argument, if we understand by it an argument drawn from the beauty and wisdom displayed in nature, which is always calculated to promote practical piety. But both the writers before mentioned mistrusted a merely objective proof, and showed that a pure and pious mind would best find and know God.2 The cosmological proof propounded by Diodorus of Tarsus, and the ontological argument of Augustine and Boëthius, lay claim to a higher degree of logical precision and philosophical certainty. The former argument was based upon the principle that there must be a sufficient ground for everything. Augustine and Boëthius inferred the existence of God from the existence of general ideas-a proof which was more fully developed in the next period by Anselm, and still later by Cartesius, on which account it has often been named after either of them.

1 Even Arnobius considered this belief to be an axiom, and thought it quite as dangerous to attempt to prove the existence of God, as to deny it; adv. gent. i. c. 33: Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum principis notione diem nativitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsis pæne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse regem ac dominum, cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem ?

2 Athan. adv. gent. i. p. 3, ss. (like Theophilus of Antioch, comp. § 35, note 1), starts with the idea, that none but a pure and sinless soul can see God (Matt. v. 8). He too compares the heart of man to a mirror. But as it became sullied by sin, God revealed himself by means of his creation, and when this proved no longer sufficient, by the prophets, and, lastly, by the Logos. Gregory of Nazianzum argues in a similar way; he infers the existence of the Creator from his works, as the sight of a lyre reminds us both of him who made it, and of him who plays it, Orat. xxviii. 6, p. 499. Comp. Orat. xxviii. 16, p. 507, 508. Orat. xiv. 33,

p. 281. He too appeals to Matth. v. 8. "Rise from thy low condition by thy conversation, by purity of heart unite thyself to the pure. Wilt thou become a divine, and worthy of the Godhead? Then keep God's commandments, and walk according to his precepts, for action is the first step to knowledge." Ullmann, p. 317.—Augustine also propounds in an eloquent manner, and in the form of a prayer, what is commonly called the physicotheological argument (Conf. x. 6): Sed et coelum et terra et omnia, quæ in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt, ut te amem, nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles, etc. Ambrose, Basil the Great, Chrysostom, and others, express themselves in much the same manner.

3 Diodorus Karà eiμapμévns in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 223, p. 209, b. The world is subject to change. But this change presupposes something constant at its foundation, the variety of creatures points to a creative unity; for change itself is a condition which has had a commencement: Εἰ δέ τις ἀγένητον λέγοι αὐτῶν τὴν τροπὴν, τὸ πάντων ἀδυνατώτερον εισάγει· τροπὴ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἀρχόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τροπὴν ἄναρχον· καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν ζώων τε καὶ σωμάτων ἡ πάνσοφος τροπὴ, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἡ ποικίλη διαφορὰ μόνον οὐχὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησι μήτε ἀγέννητον μήτε αὐτόματον νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, μήτ' αὖ ἀπρονόητον, θεὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρασχόμενον σαφῶς εἰδέναι καὶ ἀδιστάκτως ἐπίστασθαι.

4

August. de lib. arbitr. lib. ii. c. 3, 15. [He asserts that man is composed of existence, life, and thinking, and shows that the last is the most excellent; hence he infers that that by which thinking is regulated, and which, therefore, must be superior to thinking itself, is the summum bonum. He finds this summum bonum in those general laws which every thinking person must acknowledge, and according to which he must form his opinion respecting thinking itself. The sum total of these laws or rules is called truth or wisdom (veritas sapientia). The absolute is, therefore, equal to truth itself. God is truth. God is truth. Illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulcritudo, tantum adsit perpetua voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipate secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat locis, nec nocte intercipitur, nec umbrâ intercluditur, nec sensibus corporis subjacet. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam omnibus proxima est, omnibus sem

piterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonit, inter docet; cerenentes se commutat omnes in melias, a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene. Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiant singulæ sapientes, et non de ipsa, sed per ipsam de ceteris judices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem. Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse negare non poteris.]—Boëthius expresses himself still more definitively, de consol. phil. v. Prosa 10; he shows that empirical observation and the perception of the imperfect lead necessarily to the idea of perfection and its reality in God: Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibitur. Quo sit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema atque effoeta dilabetur. Quod si......est quædam boni fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari......Deum rerum omnium principum bonum esse, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil Deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est, bonum esse quis dubitet? ita vero bonum esse Deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse convincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit......Quare ne in infinitum ratio procedat, confitendum esse summum Deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Compare Schleiermacher Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 166: 'Augustine is said to have given the first proof of the existence of God. But we are not to understand by this, that he demonstrated it in an objectionable manner, i. e. objectively; he only desires to show, that the idea of God is at the foundation of all human speculation."

§ 124.

THE NATURE OF GOD.

The definitions of orthodox theologians respecting the Trinity were, on the one hand, based on the supposition that God may be known by means of his revelation, and, on the other, implied that the contents of that same revelation are a mystery. These theologians, therefore, took no offence at the contradiction involved in such definitions, but thought it quite proper that reason should submit to revelation. The Arians, on the contrary, in accordance with their more rationalistic system, which was principally carried out in all its logical consequences by. Eunomius, asserted the possibility of a perfect knowledge of God.1 Though the ideas concerning the Divine Being, and the doctrinal definitions of the church, were still mixed up with much that savoured of anthropomorphism,2 yet the speculative tendency of the most eminent theologians of the present period led them carefully to avoid all gross representations of the Godhead. Thus Athanasius taught that God is above all existence; Augustine doubted whether it would be proper to call God a substance.3 Gregory of Nazianzum, on the other hand, showed that it is not sufficient merely to deny the sensuous. The gross and carnal notions of the Audians concerning God met with little approbation,5 while the Monophysites, by blending the Divine and the human, promoted anthropomorphism under the mask of Christian orthodoxy."

1 According to Socrat. iv. 7, Eunomius maintained that we know quite as much of the nature of God, as the Creator himself. It does not follow, because the mind of some is impaired with sin, that the same is true in reference to all. The natural man indeed does not possess the knowledge in question; but what is the use of a revelation which reveals nothing? Christ has opened unto