following of the commands, so that here in a pre-eminent way it holds good, that God gives eternal life to man, not merely in grace, but also by virtue of His righteousness. '

2

I

Thomas's doctrine of grace, when judged of from the standpoint of religion, presents two faces. On the one hand it looks back to Augustine, on the other hand it looks forward to the dissolution which Augustinianism was to undergo in the fourteenth century. Whoever examines Thomism carefully, will find that its author makes an earnest endeavour, by means of a strictly religious mode of view, to assert the sole efficacy of divine grace; but on the other hand he will be compelled to note, that at almost all decisive points the line of statement takes ultimately a different direction, the reason being that the effect of grace itself is seen in a contemplated end that has a character partly hyperphysical, partly moral (“participation in the divine nature," and "love," conjoined by the thought that love merits eternal life). But as compared with what was presented by Halesius, Bonaventura and others, or, with what was taught at the time, Thomism was already a religious reaction; for those theologians yielded to a much more decided tendency to render

1 See the voluminous exposition in S. II., 2 Q. 184-189, "de statu perfectionis" (bishops and monks), where in Q. 184, Art. 2, the triplex perfectio is described, and it is said of that which is possible here on earth, that it is not indeed attainable that one “in actu semper feratur in deum,” but it is attainable that “ab affectu hominis excluditur non solum illud quod est caritati contrarium, sed etiam omne illud quod impedit ne affectus mentis totaliter dirigatur ad deum"; the whole idea of the consilia in particular of virginitas already in Pseudo-Cyprian (= Novatian) de bono pud. 7: "Virginitas quid aliud est quam futuræ vitæ gloriosa meditatio?”

2 It may also be traced back to Augustine that from Thomas, as has been already remarked, the specific nature of grace propter Christum and per Christum never receives clear expression in the whole doctrine of grace. The connection is simply now and again asserted, but is not distinctly demonstrated, while the whole doctrine of grace is treated completely prior to the doctrine of the person of Christ. Is that accidental? No, certainly not! It comes out here again, that in the West, because the Mystic-Cyrillian theory was not maintained (Soterology and Soteriology as identical), there had come to be-in spite of Anselm-entire uncertainty as to how really Christology was to be dogmatically utilised. The only possible solution was not found, namely in adhering, without theoretic speculation, to the impression produced by the person who awakens spirit and life, certainty and blessedness.

3 Therefore faith also, and forgiveness of sins play, in spite of all that is said of them, an insignificant part. Faith is either fides informis, that is, not yet faith, or fides formata, that is, no longer faith. Faith as inward fiducia is a transitional stage.

the doctrine of grace less effectual by means of the doctrine of merit. By the appearing of Thomas, a development was checked, which, apart from him, would have asserted itself much more rapidly, but which in the end, nevertheless (from the middle of the fourteenth century), gained, through the victorious conflicts of the Scotists against the Thomists, the ascendency in the Church, thereby calling forth a new reaction, which seems to have slowly gathered force from the close of the fourteenth century.1

At all points, from the doctrines as to the nature of man and as to the primitive state, on to the doctrine of final perfection, there are apparent the dissolving tendencies of the later scholasticism, led by Halesius, Bonaventura and Scotus.

I. Halesius, who was also the first to introduce into dogmatics the expression "supernatural good" as having a technical sense, taught that the justitia originalis belongs to the nature of man itself as its completion, but that there is to be distinguished from this the gratia gratum faciens, which man already possessed in the primitive state as a supernatural good, though this was imparted to him, not in creation, but only after creation, while Adam moreover earned it for himself meritoriously by good works ex congruo. So merit was to begin so early! Thomas knows nothing of this; but Bonaventura repeated this doctrine; it is also to be found in Albertus, and the Scotists adhered to it.5 The advantage which this doctrine offered, namely the possibility of reckoning to the perfection of human nature itself the justitia originalis, which was distinguished from the gratia gratum faciens, was greatly counterbalanced by the

3

1 Just in the doctrines of grace and sin did the Scotists gain more and more the upper hand; as regards the other doctrines, their dialectico-sceptical investigations were crowned with a smaller measure of success.

2 Schwane, l.c., p. 379 f., S. II., Q. 96, membr. 1: "Alii ponunt, ipsum (Adam) fuisse conditum solummodo in naturalibus, non in gratuitis gratum facientibus et hoc magis sustinendum est et magis est rationi consonum Sic noluit deus gratiam

dare nisi præambulo merito congrui per bonum usum naturæ."

3 See Schwane, p. 383.

4 See Schwane, p. 384.

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5 L. c., p. 391. Werner, Scotus, p. 410 ff. Scotus himself says: Adam conditus fuit sine omni peccato et sine gratia gratum faciente" (Report, Par. III. D. 13, Q. 2,

n. 3).

injury involved in introducing the meritum de congruo into paradise itself, and thus placing merit from the beginning side by side with the "sole efficacy" of grace. The meritum de congruo is thus earlier than the meritum de condigno; for the latter could only be implanted, and was meant only to be implanted, in Adam after reception of the gratia gratum faciens, in order that he might merit for himself eternal life.

2. There already appear in Thomas (see above p. 297) approaches towards the breaking up of the Augustinian doctrines of sin and original sin, in so far as he no longer broadly grants the proposition, “naturalia bona corrupta sunt" (natural goodness is corrupt), in so far as he defines concupiscence, which is in itself not evil, as only "languor et fomes" (tinder), emphasizes the negative side of sin more strongly than Augustine, and assumes, on the ground of the ratio remaining, an abiding inclination towards goodness (inclinatio ad bonum). Yet he certainly taught a stricter doctrine than Anselm, who really only accentuated the negative side, and began to waver even in regard to its character as guilt. To him Duns attached himself, in so far as he at bottom separated the question about concupiscence from the question about original sin; the former is for him no more the formal in the latter, but simply the material. Thus there remains for original sin merely the being deprived of the supernatural good, from which there then resulted certainly a disturbing effect upon the nature of man, while however nothing was really lost of the natural goodness.2

I

1 De conceptu virg. 27: "Hoc peccatum, quod originale dico, aliud intellegere nequeo in infantibus nisi ipsam, factam per inobedientiam Adæ, justitiæ debitæ nuditatem, per quam omnes filii sunt iræ: quoniam et naturam accusat spontanea quam fecit in Adam justitiæ desertio, nec personas excusat recuperandi impotentia. Quam comitatur beatitudinis quoque nuditas, ut sicut sunt sine omni justitia, ita sint absque omni beatitudine." C. 22: Peccatum Adæ ita in infantes descendere, ut sic puniri pro eo debeant ac si ipsi singuli illud fecissent personaliter sicut Adam, non puto." Hence also the idea of the limbus infantium now came always more prominently in view. But the rejection of the damnation of infants overturns the whole of Augustinianism.

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2 Comm. in Sent. II., Dist. 30 Q. 2: Original sin cannot be concupiscence; for the latter is (1) natural, (2) tum quia non est actualis, quia tunc illa concupiscentia esset actualis, non habitualis, quia habitus derelictus in anima ex peccato mortali non est peccatum mortale, manet enim talis habitus dimisso peccato per pænitentiam ; nec etiam ignorantia est, quia parvulus baptizatus ita ignorat sicut non

3. According to Thomas the magnitude of the first sin (and therefore also of inherited sin) is infinite, according to Scotus it is finite.

4. The Lombard had already taught that inherited sin is propagated simply through the flesh, and that the soul created baptizatus." One is now eager to hear what original sin then is, and the answer is received (D. 32, with an appeal to Anselm): “carentia justitiæ debita." "Et si obicitur, quod aliqui sancti videntur dicere concupiscentiam esse peccatum originale, respondeo: concupiscentia potest accipi vel prout est actus vel habitus vel pronitas in appetitu sensitivo et nullum istorum est formaliter peccatum, quia non est peccatum in parte sensitiva secundum Anselmum. Vel potest accipi, prout est pronitas in appetitu rationali, i.e., in voluntate ad concupiscendum delectabilia immoderate, quæ nata est condelectari appetitui sensitivo, cui conjungitur. Et hoc modo concupiscentia est materiale peccati originalis, quia per carentiam justitiæ originalis, quæ erat sicut frenum cohibens ipsam ab immoderata delectatione, ipsa non positive, sed per privationem, fit prona ad concupiscendum immoderate delectabilia.” Very loose also is Dun's conception of the first sin of man (of Adam) as distinguished from the sin of the angels; it did not arise from uncontrolled self-love, but had its root in uncontrolled love for the partner associated with him (Werner, p. 412); this uncontrolled conjugal love, however, was (1) not libidinous, for in the primitive state there was no bad libido; (2) the act to which Adam allowed himself to be led was not în its nature an immoral act, but only transgression of a command imposed for the purpose of testing. Adam accordingly sinned only indirectly against the command to love God, and at the same time transgressed the law of neighbourly love by overpassing, through his pliancy, the proper limit. That is a comparatively slight fault, and is not equal in its gravity to the smallest violation of a natural rule of morality. Compare with this empiristic view Augustine's or Anselm's description of the greatness of the first sin! In order to see clearly the Pelagianism of Scotus, it must still be added that he disputed the doctrine of Thomas, that in the state of justitia originalis even the smallest venial sin was unthinkable. According to him only mortal sins were impossible; on the other hand, as man in his original state was just man, such sins were quite well possible as do not entail directly the loss of righteousness, but only occasion a delay in arriving at the final goal. How small according to this view, in spite of all assertions to the contrary, is the significance of the first sin and of original sin! In a disguised way Duns taught, as did Julian of Eklanum, that on the one hand there belongs to the natural will the quality that leads it to turn to the good without effort, while on the other hand, because it is the will of man, the possibility of "small sins" was given even in the original state! Occam draws here again the ultimate conclusions (v. Werner II., pp. 318 f.). As everything is arbitrary, he asserts on the one hand that we must not dispute that it is in God's power to remit to the sinner the guilt of sin, and bestow upon him saving grace without repentance and contrition; on the other hand, he denies all inner ideal necessary connection between moral guilt and penalty or expiation. "In this way," Werner justly remarks, "theological Scholasticism arrived at the opposite extreme to the idea expressed in the Anselmic theory of satisfaction of the inviolability of a holy order, whose absolute law of righteousness implies, that God can only remit the reatus pœnæ æternæ at the cost of a supreme atonement, the making of which transcends all the powers of a mere creature."

But

He held, therefore, as many

for the latter is thereby defiled.1 others did, that inherited sin is inherited sin, in so far as it must propagate itself as a contagion (contagium) from Adam onwards. At the same time he also touches, on the other hand, on the thought of Augustine: "all these had been the one man, i.e., were in him materially" (omnes illi unus homo fuerant, i.e., in eo materialiter erant), though the emphasis lies on the materialiter, so that the matter is to be understood, not mystically but realistically. Now, although Thomas, with the view of giving expression to guilt, and at the same time placing the accent on the will (not merely on the flesh), affirmed, in opposition to this, an imputation on a mystical basis, yet the former idea continued to be the ruling one. Now, if in spite of this the guilt of the inherited sin is greatly reduced even in Thomas, it appears in

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it was not from laxity that Occam destroyed the principles of Augustinianism; there met in combination in him rather two clearly recognisable factors, the absolute lack of an ideal understanding of the world" (or let us say more correctly, his philosophic empiricism), and the greatest interest in determining the necessity of the saving grace of Christ simply from revelation itself. But-vestigia terrent ; we can learn by studying the historical consequences of Occamism, that thinking humanity will not continue to be satisfied, if religion is set before it simply as revelation, and all links are severed which bind this revelation with an understanding of the world. From Occam it either goes back again to Thomas (Bradwardine and his spiritual descendants, cf. also the Platonism of the fifteenth century) or passes on to Socinianism. But should it not be possible that the history of religion should henceforward render to thoughtful reflection the service that has hitherto been rendered to it by Plato's and Augustine's and Thomas's understanding of the world? We shall not be able certainly to dispense with an absolute, but it will be grasped as an experience. The Nominalism that sought to deliver the Christian religion from the "science" that perverted it made a disastrous failure in carrying on this rightly chosen task, because it understood by religion subjection to an enormous mass of material, which, having arisen in history, admits of no isolation.

1 Sent. II., Dist. 31, A. B.: "caro sola ex traduce est." With Augustine the propagation of inherited sin is derived from the pleasure in the act of generation "unde caro ipsa, quæ concipitur in vitiosa concupiscentia polluitur et corrumpitur : ex cujus contactu anima, cum infunditur, maculam trahit, qua polluitur et fit rea, ¿.e., vitium concupiscentiæ, quod est originale peccatum.”

2 So, I think, must Anselm also be understood, de conc. virg. 23.

3 Adam's sinful will (as the will of the primus movens in humanity) is the expression of the universal will; see II., I, Q. 81, Art. I: "Inordinatio quæ est in isto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex ejus origine derivantur.” Hence inherited sin is not personal sin, but peccatum naturæ, the effect of which really is that its significance and gravity are greatly lessened.