Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations

Przednia okładka
Princeton University Press, 27 gru 2011 - 344

Why law is critical to innovation and economic growth

Sustained growth depends on innovation, whether it's cutting-edge software from Silicon Valley, an improved assembly line in Sichuan, or a new export market for Swaziland's leather. Developing a new idea requires money, which poses a problem of trust. The innovator must trust the investor with his idea and the investor must trust the innovator with her money. Robert Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schäfer call this the "double trust dilemma of development." Nowhere is this problem more acute than in poorer nations, where the failure to solve it results in stagnant economies.

In Solomon's Knot, Cooter and Schäfer propose a legal theory of economic growth that details how effective property, contract, and business laws help to unite capital and ideas. They also demonstrate why ineffective private and business laws are the root cause of the poverty of nations in today's world. Without the legal institutions that allow innovation and entrepreneurship to thrive, other attempts to spur economic growth are destined to fail.

 

Spis treści

Chapter 1 Its about the Economy
1
Chapter 2 The Economic Future of the World
13
Chapter 3 The Double Trust Dilemma of Development
27
Chapter 4 Make or Take
39
Chapter 5 The Property Principle for Innovation
50
Chapter 6 Keeping What You MakeProperty Law
64
Chapter 7 Doing What You SayContracts
82
Chapter 8 Giving Credit to CreditFinance and Banking
101
Chapter 11 Termites in the FoundationCorruption
159
Chapter 12 Poverty Is DangerousAccidents and Liability
179
Chapter 13 Academic Scribblers and Defunct Economists
193
Chapter 14 How the Many Overcome the Few
211
Chapter 15 Legalize FreedomConclusion
223
Notes
229
Bibliography
299
Index
313

Chapter 9 Financing SecretsCorporations
123
Chapter 10 Hold or FoldFinancial Distress
142

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Informacje o autorze (2011)

Robert D. Cooter is the Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. His books include The Strategic Constitution (Princeton). Hans-Bernd Schäfer is professor of law and economics at the Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany, and professor emeritus at the University of Hamburg. His books include The Economic Analysis of Civil Law.

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