investigating or reconciling contradictory testimony, in order to come to a decision upon it; but he perhaps acts on the conviction, that such labour does not form any part of his duty; and thinking it will be done best in a court of law, he at once directs an inquiry, a case to be sent to the Judges, or an issue to be sent to a jury. The first stage of the cause is thus quickly dispatched, but the labour necessary to the dispatch is neither tedious nor of long duration.

"The Lord Chancellor acts on the belief, that what he may be enabled to decide by patient hearing or reading, and calm and deliberate consideration, he is bound to decide, in the honest discharge of the duty attached to his high office, without reference to any other jurisdiction. He considers that he is not justified in exposing parties to the enormous additional expense of a trial or hearing in another Court, unless where the ends of justice cannot be attained by any other means; and, influenced by this opinion, he does not often refer to courts of law or to juries.". He never does so if he can bring his powerful mind to a right decision, by laborious consideration of the evidence before him, whether that evidence comes before him on motion, on petition, or on a hearing. Those hours of retirement, which other men devote to pleasing and interesting pursuits, he devotes to the wearisome consideration of common-place and contradictory facts facts which perplex and weary the mind, without ever affording to it any pleasure or information worthy remembrance. He never suffers himself to be hurried into error; and this care, unjustly called delay, is a blessing to the suitors and the country. He is a Judge who appears to have read Lord Bacon's hints on judicature with approbation and profit; for it cannot be denied that he has acquired that essential part of justice- PATIENCE AND GRAVITY OF HEARING. He considers it no grace to a judge first to find that which he might have heard in due time from the bar, or to shew quickness of conceit in cutting

off evidence or counsel too short. No man can accuse him of MEETING THE CAUSE HALF WAY, OR GIVING OCCASION TO THE PARTY TO SAY HIS COUNSEL OR PROOFS WERE NOT HEARD.'†

"It is one thing to arrive at the truth by the comparison of contradictory evidence; and another, to send its contradictions to be reconciled before another tribunal. To decide on it may occupy a judge many hours, while, to refer it for decision to another court, would not occupy him many seconds; and frequently it consumes more time to weigh and consider the evidence, and to deduce accurately the facts in one single cause, than is consumed by directing issues, inquiries, and special cases, on the hearing of one hundred.

"The Vice-Chancellor has credit for deciding a cause or petition, when he directs an issue to be tried, or refers a case to a court of law; and he often takes this course as soon as he discovers by reference to the affidavits or the deposi tions, that there is a plain and indisputable contradiction in the evidence not to be reconciled, without either requiring additional testimony, or bestowing great labour in examining minutely its worth, its competency, and its credibility. As soon as the issue is determined, he has credit for deciding another cause, when he directs a decree to be drawn up consistent with the finding of the court, whose verdict or opinion has been obtained. This course of proceeding saves his honour the tediousness of hearing or reading dull and uninteresting depositions and affidavits, in some cases covering up. wards of one hundred brief sheets; but these issues, and these cases, which others are required to determine, increase the parties' expenses at the rate of from L. 100 to L.300, or even from L.500 to L.700 in each cause; and sometimes an inquiry or an issue is not directed with sufficient precision to be useful, and a second inquiry or issue becomes necessary.

"The same parties, on similar occa

"Bacon on Judicature.

sions, when before the Lord Chancellor, whether on motion, petition, or at the hearing of the cause, if he decides their case, (as he commonly does, without any appeal to a court of law,) get his judgment at a cost of a few pounds.

"I am engaged in the harmless drudgery of collecting facts to make out the case I have in hand, and I do not presume to decide which course is best; but I trust I may, without offence, contrast, and attempt to ascertain the relative advantages and disadvantages of these different modes of conducting Chancery causes. Most men will be disposed to believe, that a Judge of the Lord Chancellor's experience and attainments can, by patient hearing and reading, value evidence as correctly, and penetrate into all its bearings and tendencies with as much acuteness, as any Judge or Jury to whom it could be referred; and the known caution and care which guide him in his decisions, is a satisfactory pledge that he will not come to any conclusion on insufficient premises, or decide on testimony, if the contradictory parts of it cannot be explained or reconciled. If some particular part is in doubt which an affidavit can explain, I have observed that the Lord Chancellor requires one to be made, and it perhaps tends to remove all doubts in his mind, and enables him to decide properly, at a saving of expense to the parties of many hundred pounds. For such benefits can any suitors regret a little delay ?"

"To do these things requires time, and perhaps the Lord Chancellor may not, in particular and difficult cases, give his judgment for several months; but are the parties injured by this delay, more than they are by having their cause suspended for six or ten months, that the facts or points of law on which it depends, may be referred, at a great cost, to a jury, or a court of law? How stands this great and important question? Let those who abuse the Lord Chancellor answer. is very evident which course is the least expensive to the parties.

It

"The Parliamentary Return only states the number of appeals entered after causes have been heard. It does not enumerate the appeals upon motions; but the Vice-Chancellor has credit in all cases of motions for accuracy of judgment,whe

ther the judgment was confirmed or overruled. I have not the means of ascertaining, nor indeed do the proceedings of the court enable me to ascertain, in how many cases appeals are made to the Lord Chancellor, from the decisions of the ViceChancellor upon motions; but they are commonly made and decided in a day or two after they have been first heard in the inferior court; and sometimes it happens that the questions which do not occupy the mind of the Vice-Chancellor for five minutes, are such as necessarily occupy the Lord Chancellor for a long time. The suitors are so desirous of having important matters heard by the Lord Chancelior, that the very weighty and time-consuming motions and causes come before him for decision; and some of these cases occupy his lordship during the sitting of a week; such were Waters v. Taylor; Agar and The Regent's Canal Company; Lloyd v. St Paul; Sandford v. Gibbon. On these motions, sometimes the right to several hundred thousand pounds is determined; and can any rational man suppose that the parties, or the ends of justice, require precipitate decision? In one of these cases, a solicitor lately proceeded with so much dispatch, that in a few months his labours produced a bill of upwards of L. 1300; and in the course of these proceedings he had prematurely apportioned the funds in court, consisting of many thousand pounds, chiefly belonging to infants whose interests he had to protect; and as soon as the Master's report was obtained, he petitioned for the application of this fund, and obtained an order to dispose of it, by placing several thousand pounds to the account of parties indebted to the estate; and of the sums ordered to be paid or carried over, scarcely any were ordered to be paid or carried over correctly to the proper party, though the costs incident to this useless and mischievous proceeding alone amounted (I speak from conjecture) to upwards of seven hundred pounds. This order, after it had been made and passed, was accidentally discovered to be erroneous; and the judge who made it, was informed of the fact by letter from a solicitor of the court, and the officers were instantly forbidden to act on the order; its propriety was, at the next sitting of the court, discussed; and it was quashed, after em

ploying in the discussion five or six successive nights, from the sitting to the rising of the court, to the delay of other suits. These proceedings afterwards occupied, on a single motion, several days before the Lord Chancellor. I quote these facts as an example and consequence of premature dispatch in a solicitor, leaving my reader to infer what may be the consequence of premature dispatch in a judge, whose error in judgment may not only ruin the suitors before him, but, by standing as a precedent for other judges, may ruin other suitors for ages to come.

"It may, in these days of knowledge, be objected, that this is an instance of the defects in the system of Chancery practice; and this objection would be just as well founded, as one made to the principles of our law of evidence would be, because an ignorant solicitor, having to prove in London half a dozen baptismal registers from Westmoreland, put his client to the unnecessary cost of bringing to London, for that purpose, half a dozen Westmoreland parish-clerks, instead of obtaining the admission of such indisputable facts, or proving them from extracts made by a single witness.

"Mr Denman, it seems, discovered that, in the course of more than a twenty years' judicial life, the Lord Chancellor. had given wrong judgments, as he supposed, in two cases; it is, however, not worth while to discuss this subject in order to expose the folly and the fallacy of his arguments; for I do not believe any lawyer can condemn the Lord High Chan

cellor of England, because he does not always concur in his judgment with the City Common Sergeant; and it would be a most lamentable thing if this could reasonably be done; for no sensible man, who forms his opinion of the intellects and attainments of these gentlemen from what has proceeded out of their own mouths, and been submitted to the public in print, can suppose that, in point of judgment, they possess many sentiments common to each other.* It is the general opinion of the profession, that the judgments of the present Lord Chancellor will, above all others, in aftertimes be looked for by his successors to guide their judicial decisions, and those judgments will stand for ages unshaken and undisturbed by the attacks of puny politicians. They are delivered with so much consideration and caution, that they will receive that spontaneous reverence, which Justinian directed to be paid to his Digest of the Civil Law.t

"His judgments are, indeed, a commentary on our laws; and when he decides an important case which involves in it legal principles, he examines all the authorities, both in his own days and in the old times before him; and these judgments are useful to the student, not only as decisions, but as commentaries on the law itself. When I turn my eyes to the thirty-five bulky and closely-printed volumes of Reports in which these judgments are recorded, and reflect, that not one of his decisions out of one hundred is reported, I am astonished by the

ed their exclusion.'

VOL. XIV.

extent of his labours; and I cannot turn to the parliamentary debates on which I am commenting, without feelings of surprize."

I wish the author had adopted some distinct arrangement in this able pamphlet. So far as I can follow him, he answers the cavils about delay in Chancery suits by saying,

1st, That, of the causes which appear on the books of that Court, a very great proportion are, in fact, no causes at all-that the parties have died, or that the solicitors, from some technical reasons, advised them not to have the case erased from the list- or that the affair has been simply neglected-but that, in short, the Chancellor cannot decide on nonentities.

2dly, That of the real causes which appear on the rolls of the Court of Chancery, not above one-fifth are in general ready to be heard. The evidence has not been taken-the preliiminary steps (over which the Court has no control) have not been gone through. The fault is with the solicitors, the barristers, or the clients, but cannot be with the Court.

3dly, Whatever delay takes place in the subsequent stages, over which the Court has control, are-considering the quantity of causes the Chancellor has to decide-astonishingly, and, indeed, incredibly small.

The first and the third of these have been pretty well illustrated already. The following passage will throw very considerable light on the second-and on the third also:

"Solicitors frequently leave cases with Counsel for opinions, which they cannot get answered for six, or even twelve months, after they are left; and in the Court of Chancery, gentlemen in great practice detain papers which require great labour or great consideration for a similar length of time. It would be invidious, or I could name several instances in support of the truth of this observation. Common cases and common drafts may be obtained from King's counsel or equity draftsmen with dispatch, but those papers which require many hours' attention remain for months untouched, because to begin them and not to finish would be destruction to the time of a gentleman much employed in court, and it is seldom that such counsel can devote a day or two exclusively to one subject. This is an inconvenience severely felt by suitors and solicitors; but they are too wise, though they greatly lament it, to take their pa

pers into the chambers of inexperienced men for the sake of dispatch; and they submit to this delay, to reap the advantage of the superior knowledge to be derived from the experience of men of great professional attainments, rather than trust men whose chief recommendation might be the dispatch with which they transact their business. This fact, which frequently occurs, proves how willingly a suitor submits to delay, when it is likely to produce accurate and judicious proceedings; and, indeed, this delay, to which he voluntarily submits on account of his counsel's various employments, is not at an end when he has got his papers from him, but he must, in country causes, submit to great delay in arranging with his commissioners, who perhaps cannot attend for several months after they are applied to. Whenever men submit to such delay

by choice, rather than incur the risk of imperfect or injudicious proceedings, can hasty judgments at the risk of their acit be expected that they would wish for curacy; or can we justly censure a judge, because, in very difficult cases, he fears to do wrong, and takes time to consider till he can devote as many hours as may be necessary to a full and fair examination of the facts before him, and to read and reconcile the various authorities that apply to or illustrate them?

"It is matter of regret to a Judge, that decisions cannot be promptly made; but it would be sinful to make them without due examination, and without conviction that, when made, they are made consistent with the law that the Judge who makes them is sworn to administer. The Lord Chancellor of England cannot exercise too much care and caution in making his decisions; and it is better that now and then an individual should sustain great inconvenience, than that an unjust precedent should become established. It is not the Reports alone to which lawyers refer for authorities, but to the orders and decrees of the Court, which, from having connected with them all the facts of the case, are authorities at all times to be found in, and cited from the Register's books, and they are entitled to the highest respect. No equity Judge can foresee the mischief that may arise from a bad judgment, to his own reputation, or to the future suitors of his Court. It is better never to decide, than to decide rashly."

The more minute changes made or insinuated by these prating barristers, against the chief living ornament of their profession, are all disposed of by this writer in a most clear and satis

factory style. One of them was, that in a certain case, (Ware v. Harewood) the Chancellor had sent for one of the solicitors in the cause to his private room. And what then?

"The solicitor, on such occasions, attends only to answer questions, and produce papers, and he cannot, by such an attendance, in the slightest degree affect the judgment of the Lord Chancellor, which is founded, not on the arguments adduced to him, but on the facts and law relating to the cause. Can any man suppose the Chancellor's mind is so imbecile or so corrupt, as to be influenced, in the slightest degree, by any verbal communication, either from counsel or solicitors, when the papers in the cause, and the evidence, are before him-to produce which, the solicitor is sometimes ordered to attend? If, instead of taking this course, for which the suitors cannot be charged anything, (the attendance being paid for by the fee on settling minutes,) the Lord Chancellor desired the parties to attend in open court, the etiquette of the profession would require that the counsel, who could not give him the necessary information, should receive fees, and the suitors would be put to many pounds expense.

"These interviews are had for no other purpose, than to obtain, with little trouble, information as to the former proceedings, which the solicitor, being better acquainted with than any other officer, can more readily refer to and produce; and solicitors attend instead of other officers, because, by their assistance, the Lord Chancellor can readily satisfy his own mind about particular proceedings or petty facts, and thereby, without costs to the parties, be enabled himself to pronounce a proper decree, with a great saving of labour and time."

But the great story of all was, the case of Ware and Harewood. Mr Denman or Mr Williams (for the Morning Chronicle and Times are at variance as to this mighty question,) had said in the House of Commons what amounted, most unintentionally I cannot doubt, to the repetition of a gross falsehood (it might not have been a designed, but certainly it was a gross one) told by one of the solicitors. This came in a letter to the Chancellor, viz. that the person on whose benefit the suit was originally instituted, had died two years and a half ago, ere judgment was pronounced, "of a broken heart, occasioned by the distressed condition of his affairs;" and, in particular, by the delay of the Chancellor's judgment. Now

hear the facts. Nothing can be more admirable than the conduct of the gentleman who writes the pamphlet on this occasion.

"This assertion appeared to my mind so improbable, that, being a man unencumbered by any profession or employment, I determined to search into its truth; and I applied to a professional friend, who is generally and deservedly esteemed in the parish where the infant died, to make similar inquiries. The result of our inquiries was the same; and we learnt from the infant's friends, AND THE MEDICAL GENTLEMAN WHO ATTENDED HIM ON HIS DEATH-BED, that there was not any reason to suppose his death was occasioned by a Chancery suit, or anything connected with one ; and I shall prove he had not any cause to grieve about it. Before his death he used often to lament that there could be no salvation, no grace, for such a sinner as himself; but he did not make any unkind allusion to the Court of Chancery, or to the noble Lord, or other Judges who preside there. I am in possession, through the information of those who knew him, of the particulars of the offence that grieved him, and greatly depressed his spirits, which he refused to disclose to his doctor; but delicacy forbids my entering into the detail. This sentimental suitor, represented to have died of a broken heart, occasioned by a Chancery suit, was a labouring gardener, and he lived with a person at Peckham. He was buried at Linfield, in the twenty-third year of his age, in July 1816; and during his infancy there had been spent for his maintenance and education L.466, which was paid to his uncle Charles, he having been allowed that sum by the report of a Master in Chancery, dated the 1st day of July, 1822. The infant, in his will, disposes of what, "if anything," should come to him from the Chancery suit relating to his father's affairs; and the sum of L. 10,000, ingeniously made use of in the letter, seems

to have been, as regarded this infant suitor, (exclusive of what was due to his uncle for maintenance,) about L. 134. From searching at Doctors' Commons, I find that his uncle Charles, who was adminis.

trator to his father, administered to this infant's estate, sworn not to exceed L. 600; and out of this L.600, L.466 was due to this uncle, which had been expended upon the infant during his minority, he never having received, or been in a situation to receive, anything out of Court in his lifetime; and therefore L. 134 was all the infant's interest in the suit, unless we can suppose his uncle Charles to have sworn