French imperial power. It gives the strongest illustration of the colossal means of France and Napoleon. It was made with 400,000 men.

"The space of four hundred leagues between the Rhine and the Borysthenes was occupied by friends and allies. From the Rhine to the Elbe by the Saxons; thence to the Niemen by the Poles; thence to the Borysthenes by the Lithuanians. The army had four lines of fortresses; those of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Vistula, and the Niemen. From Smolensko to Moscow, there were a hundred leagues of hostile country, Muscovy. Between the Vistula and the Borysthenes, 240,000 men were left; 160,000 only passed the bridge of Smolensko. Of those, 40,000 remained to guard depots on the way; 100,000 entered Moscow, 20,000 had been killed in the march and the battle of Borodino. The march from Smolensko to Moscow was founded on the idea, that, in order to save that capital, the enemy would fight a battle; that he would be defeated; that Moscow would be taken; that Alexander, to preserve or deliver his capital, would make peace; or that, if he should refuse it, the immense stores of that great city, and the 40,000 free and wealthy burghers who inhabited it, would furnish the means of forming a national Noyau, for raising an insurrection of all the slaves in Russia, and striking a fatal blow to the empire. The idea of burning a city almost as extensive as Paris, containing 300,000 souls, was not regarded as a possibility."

Treaties.

"Austria was to have declared herself against France in May 1813. The victories of Lutzen and Wurtzen on the 2d and 21st of May made her proceed more circumspectly. Metternich demanded the Illyrian provinces, and a frontier on the kingdom of Italy, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and Napoleon's renunciation of the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the Mediatorship of the Swiss Confederacy, of the Thirty-second Military Division, (Hamburgh, &c.) and Holland. An armistice had been agreed on. The Duke of Vicenza was sent to Prague. Napoleon then sent Count Bubna to the Emperor of Austria at Dresden, to offer the Illyrian provinces, divided from Italy by the Isonzo, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the Mediatorship of the Swiss Confederacy. Holland and the Hanse Towns were to be retained till peace; and as a means

of compensation, to obtain from England the restoration of the French colonies. When Count Bubna arrived at Prague, the term limited for the armistice had exOn this pired several hours before. ground Austria declared her adhesion to to the coalition, and the war recommenced."

The military maxims of this preeminent master of his art are worth remarking.

"The front of a battalion in line should be sixty toises, which requires 800 men under arms; 160 more are to be allowed for drivers-fourth rank," &c.

"There never can be more than one kind of infantry, because the firelock is the best weapon for war, that ever was invented by man."

"In an army in Flanders or Germany, the cavalry ought to be equal to a fourth of the infantry; on the Pyrenees or the Alps, to a twentieth; in Italy or Spain, to a sixth."

"Four pieces of artillery to every thousand of infantry and cavalry. The better the infantry, the more care ought to be taken of it by supporting it with good batteries."

"Armies of 120,000 men have sometimes marched in a single column, and been drawn up in line in the course of six hours."

"The only fire practicable before the enemy, is that at discretion, commencing by the right and left of each company."

"The art of fixing a camp in a posi tion, is merely the art of taking up a line of battle on that position."

"Field fortifications are never inju rious, but always useful, when skilfully planned. This part of the art of war is susceptible of great improvement."

"Discipline fixes the troops to their colours. They are not to be rendered brave by harangues, when the firing begins. The old soldiers scarely listen to them; the young forget them on the first discharge of cannon. A gesture by a beloved general is as good as the finest harangue in the world."

"When the Emperor Napeleon used to say, as he rode through the ranks amidst the fire, Unfurl those colours, the moment is at length arrived," his gesture and manner filled the French soldiers with ardour and impatience."

"There should be only one army, for unity of command is of the first necessity in war. The army must be kept in junction. The greatest possible number of

The Great Captains.

"Alexander conducted eight campaigns-in Asia and India; Hannibal, seventeen-one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one in Africa; Cæsar, thirteen-eight against the Gauls, and five against Pompey's legions; Gustavus Adolphus, three -one in Livonia against the Russians, and two in Germany against the House of Austria; Turenne, eighteen-nine in France, and nine in Germany; Prince Eugene, thirteen-two against the Turks, five in Italy against France, and six on the Rhine, or in Flanders; Frederic, eleven -in Silesia, Bohemia, and on the Elbe.The history of these 88 campaigns would be a complete treatise on the art of war."

In this enumeration of the "thunderbolts of the field," he omits Mithridates, Pompey, and Sylla, among the Ancients. Among the great names of later times, Marlborough is omitted, probably from pique, though his campaigns were made a text-book in the Ecole Militaire. Wellington it would of course be vain to look for in Napoleon's enumeration. Napoleon himself made fourteen campaigns-two in Italy, five in Germany, two in Africa and Asia, two in Poland and Russia, one in Spain, and two in France. His first was in 1796, when he crossed the Alps from Savona.

The study of the "88 campaigns" was not gratuitously advised by Napoleon. French education is not deeply classic, and Turenne, and the war minister of the day, occupy a larger space in the French military mind than the whole stately genius of antiquity. But Napoleon's soul was war, and all the traces that survive of his thoughts and studies, give the impression of a vivid and absorbing passion for all that made the art of supreme soldiership. Arrian, Cæsar, and Polybius, were among his perpetual investigations;

and he distinctly gives us to understand, that, upon the system of the great captains of antiquity, he formed that new and brilliant tactique which overwhelmed Europe. His coup-d'œil of the campaigns of Alexander, Cæsar, &c. is rapid, but striking, and might form, in the hands of some of our military scholars, the nucleus of a work of

remarkable interest and instruction.

"Alexander crossed the Dardanelles in the year 334 before the Christian era, with an army of 40,000 men, of which an eighth part was cavalry. He forced the passage of the Granicus, which was defended by an army under Memnon, a Greek, who commanded on the coast of Asia for Darius; after which he employed the whole of the year 333 in establishing his power in Asia Minor. He was supported by the Greek colonies on the shores of the Black Sea and Mediterranean-Sardis, Ephesus, Tarsus, Miletus, &c. The Kings of Persia allowed the provinces and cities to govern themselves by their peculiar laws. Their empire was an union of confederate states; it did not form a single nation; and this circumstance facilitated its conquest. As Alexander aimed only at the throne of the Persian monarch, he easily appropriated the rights of sovereignty to himself, because he respected the usages, manners, and laws of the people, who suffered no change of condition.

"In the year 332 he encountered Darius, who, at the head of 600,000 men, occupied a position near Tarsus, on the banks of the Issus, in the straits of Cilicia; defeated him, entered Syria, took Damascus, where the great King's treasures were deposited, and laid siege to Tyre. That proud metropolis of the commerce of the world stopped him for nine months. He took Gaza, after a two

months' siege, crossed the desert in seven days, entered Pelusium and Memphis, and founded Alexandria. He met with no obstacle, because Syria and Egypt were always connected by interest with the Greeks; because the Arabian nations detested the Persians, and their hatred was founded on religion; and, finally, because the Grecian troops of the Satraps joined the Macedonians. In less than two years, after two battles, and four or five sieges, the coasts of the Black Sea, from the Phasis to Byzantium, and those of the Mediterranean as far as Alexandria, all Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, were subdued by his arms.

"In 331 he repassed the desert, encamped at Tyre, crossed Cælesyria, en

tered Damascus, passed the Euphrates and Tigris, and defeated Darius in the plains of Arbella, as that prince was advancing against him at the head of a still more numerous army than that of the Issus. Babylon opened its gates to him. In 330, he forced the pass of Suza, took that town, Persepolis, and Pasagarda, where was the tomb of Cyrus. In 329 he turned towards the North, and entered Ecbatana, extended his conquests to the Caspian Sea, punished Bessus, the vile assassin of Darius, penetrated into Scythia, and defeated the Scythians. It was in this campaign that he disgraced so many trophies by the murder of Parmenio. In 328 he forced the passage of the Oxus, received 16,000 recruits from Macedon, and subjected the neighbouring nations. It was in this year that he killed Clitus with his own hand, and required the Macedonians to worship him, which they refused to do. In 327 he passed the Indus, defeated Porus in a pitched battle, took him prisoner, and treated him as a king. He intended to pass the Ganges, but his army refused. He sailed on the Indus in 326, with 800 ships. On reaching the ocean, he sent Nearchus, with a fleet, to coast the Indian Sea as far as the Euphrates. In 325 he spent sixty days in crossing the Desert of Gedrosia, entered Kermann, returned to Pasagarda, Persepolis, and Suza, and married Statira, the daughter of Darius. In 324 he again marched towards the north, passed to Ecbatana, and ended his career at Babylon, where he was poisoned.

"His mode of warfare was methodical; it merits the highest praise; none of his convoys were intercepted; his armies constantly kept increasing; the moment when they were weakest, was when he commenced operations at the Granicus. By the time he arrived at the Indus, his numbers were tripled, without reckoning the corps commanded by the governors of the conquered provinces, which were composed of invalided or wearied Macedonians, recruits sent from Greece, or drawn from the Greek troops in the service of the Satraps, or, finally, of foreigners raised among the natives in the country. Alexander merits the glory he has enjoyed for so many ages among all nations.

But

suppose he had been defeated on the Issus, where the army of Darius was drawn up in order of battle on his line of retreat,with its left to the mountains, and its right to the sea; whilst the Macedonians had their right towards the mountains, their left towards the sea, and the pass of Cilicia behind them. Or suppose he had been beaten at Arbella, with the Tigris, the Euphrates, VOL. XIV.

and the deserts in his rear, without fortresses, and at a distance of nine hundred leagues from Macedon! Or suppose he had been vanquished by Porus when driven from the Indus !"

It will be observed, that, mingled with the general lesson of those dazzling and romantic triumphs, there is the particular defence of the commentator. Napoleon had been charged with rashness as a principle. He here labours to prove that this rashness is but another name for rapidity, for the command of circumstances, for the sure seizure of that success which always escapes the tardy, the timid, and the cold. His review of Hannibal's career is urged by the same intention.

"In the year 218, before the Christian era, Hannibal left Carthage, passed the Ebro and the Pyrenees, which mountains were previously unknown to the Carthaginian arms; crossed the Rhone and the farther Alps, and, in his first campaign, established himself in the midst of the Cisalpine Gauls, who, constantly hostile to the Roman people, sometimes victors over them, but more frequently vanquished, had never been subjected to their sway. In this march of four hundred leagues he spent five months; he left no garrison nor depots in his rear; kept up no communication with Spain or Carthage, with which latter place he had no intercourse until after the battle of Thrasymene, when he communicated by the Adriatic. A more vast, comprehensive scheme, was never executed by man. Alexander's expedition was much less daring and difficult, and had a much greater chance of success. This offensive war was nevertheless methodical-the Cisalpine people of Milan and Boulogne became Carthaginians to Hannibal. Had he left fortresses or depôts in his rear, he must have weakened his army, and hazarded the success of his operations; he would have been vulnerable at all points. In 217 he passed the Appenines, beat the Roman army in the plains of Thrasymene, converged about Rome, and occupied the lower coasts of the Adriatic, whence he communicated with Carthage. In the year 216, eighty thousand Romans attacked him, and he defeated them at the field of Canna. Had he marched six days afterwards, he would have entered Rome, and Carthage would have been the mistress of the world! The effect of this great victory was, however, immense. Capua opened its gates; all the Greek colonies, and a great number of towns of Lower Italy, espoused the victorious side,

The Ro

During the winter of 52, the whole population rose; even the faithful people of Autun took part in the wars. man yoke was odious to the people of Gaul. Cæsar was advised to return into the Roman province, or to repass the Alps; he adopted neither of these plans. He then had ten legions; he passed the Loire and besieged Bourges, in the depth of winter, took that city, in the sight of the army of Vercingetorix, and laid siege to Clermont; he failed, lost his hostages, magazines, and horses; these were at Nevers, the place of his depot, of which the people of Autun took possession, Nothing could appear more critical than his situation. Labienus, his lieutenant, was kept in alarm by the people of Paris; Cæsar ordered him to join him, and, with his whole army in junction, laid siege to Alesia, in which town the Gallic army had enclosed itself. He occupied fifty days in fortifying his lines of countervallation and circumvallation. Gaul raised a new army, more numerous than that which she had just lost; the people of Rheims alone remained faithful to Rome. The Gauls arrived to compel him to raise the siege; the garrison united its efforts with theirs, during three days, in order to destroy the Romans in their lines. Cæsar triumphed over all obstacles; Alesia fell, and the Gauls were subdued.

"During this great contest, the whole of Caesar's army was in his camp; he left no point vulnerable. He availed himself of his victory to regain the affections of the people of Autun, amongst whom he passed the winter, although he made successive expeditions, at a hundred leagues distant from each other, with different troops. At length, in the year 51, he laid siege to Cahors, where the last of the Gallic army perished. The Gauls became Roman provinces, the tribute from which added to the wealth of Rome eight millions of money annually.

"In Cæsar's campaigns of the civil war, he conquered, by following the same method and the same principles, but he ran much greater risks. He passed the Rubicon with a single legion; at Corfinium, he took thirty colorts; and, in three months, drove Pompey out of Italy. What rapidity! what promptitude! what boldness! Whilst the ships necessary for passing the Adriatic, and following his rival into Greece, were preparing, he passed the Alps and Pyrenees, crossed Catalonia at the head of 900 horse-a foree scarcely sufficient for his escortarrived before Lerida, and, in forty days, subdued Pompey's legions commanded by Afranius. He then rapidly traversed

the space between the Ebro and the Sierra Morena, established peace in Andalusia, and returned to make his entry into Marseilles, which city his troops had just taken; he then proceeded to Rome, exercised the dictatorship there for ten days, and departed once more to put him. self at the head of twelve legions, which Antony had assembled at Brindisi.

"In the year 48, he crossed the Adriatic with 25,000 men, held all Pompey's forces in check for several months, until, being joined by Antony, who had crossed the sea in defiance of the fleets of the enemy, they marched in junction on Dyrrachium, Pompey's place of depot, which they invested. Pompey encamped a few miles from that place, near the sea. Upon this, Cæsar, not content with having invested Dyracchium, invested the enemy's camp also. He availed himself of the summits of the surrounding hills, occupied them with twenty-four forts, which he raised, and thus established a countervallation of six leagues. Pompey, hemmed in on the shore, received provisions and reinforcements by sea, by means of his fleet, which commanded the Adriatic. He took advantage of his central position, attacked and defeated Cæsar, who lost thirty standards, and thirty thousand soldiers, the best of his veteran troops. His fortunes appeared to totter; he could expect no reinforcements; the sea was closed against him; Pompey had every advantage. But Cæsar made a march of fifty leagues, carried the war into Thessaly, and defeated Pompey's army in the plains of Pharsalia. Pompey, almost alone, though master of the sea, fled, and presented himself as a suppliant on the coast of Egypt, where he fell by the hand of a base assassin.

"A few days after, Cæsar went in pursuit of him to Alexandria, where he was besieged in the palace and amphitheatre by the populace of that great city, and the army of Achillas. At length, after nine months of danger and continual battles, the loss of any one of which would have been fatal to him, he triumphed over the Egyptians.

"In the meantime, Scipio, Labienus, and King Juba, ruled in Africa, with fourteen legions, the remains of Pompey's party; they had numerous squadrons, and scoured the sea. At Utica, Cato breathed the hatred he felt into every bosom. Cæsar embarked with a few troops, reached Adrumetum, sustained reverses in several engagements, but being at length joined by his whole army, defeated Scipio, Labienus, and King Juba on the plains of Thapsus. Cato, Scipio, and Ju