R.A. by noting the clock, and in declination by reading the circle. The instrument should then be turned half round in R.A., and the operation repeated. By combining both sets, as good a place of the comet will be deduced as the division of the declination circle will allow. The stars of com parison are taken above and below, so that the mean of the instrumental errors at the stars may be pretty nearly equal to that at the comet, and as the effect in R.A. of an error of collimation or inclination is changed in sign by reversion, it is therefore eliminated from the mean. The instrument must on no account be moved in R.A. between the observation of the comet and the stars of comparison. In this way Halley's comet was observed at Greenwich and Cambridge on its late appearance, the stars of comparison were subsequently observed with the meridian instruments, and the apparent places of the comet finally settled. The details will be found in the observations of the respective observatories for the year 1835. If the utmost accuracy be not required, it is sufficient, after careful adjustment, to note the transit of the comet over the vertical wires, and to read off the declination and hour circle, and then turning the instrument upon one or more neigntouring stars, to observe them in like manner. | The nearer the stars of comparison are to the comet, the greater probability there is that there is no change, or only a slight change of instrumental error in moving from one to the other. This mode of observation however is only to be tolerated in cases of necessity, when, either from haste or uncertain weather, the observer cannot wait for stars coming to the same meridian with the comet. Suppose the following observations to have been made of Arcturus and an unknown star or comet, after correcting each for refraction. Time by clock. North Polar Dist. meridian be known, it is a simpler plan to adjust the instrument as an altitude and azimuth circle, which it becomes when the polar axis is vertical, and then by inclining the polar axis to the latitude of the place, it becomes an equatorial. There is no provision in the instrument itself for moving the polar axis in azimuth. The whole must be turned bodily, and for this purpose some preparation should be made in the stand on which the foot-screws rest. The following references will be useful to the reader. A clock for carrying an equatorial, constructed by Messrs. Troughton and Simms, and now in the possession of Charles Holford, Esq., of Hampstead, is described in the Abstracts of the Proceedings of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. iii., No. 6, with a wood-cut. This would probably To determine the index errors of both circles by Arc- act somewhat more steadily with a horizontal fly-wheel 69 54 46 h. m. 8. Hour Circle. h. m. 8. Arcturus Comet 17 17 9.9 3 10 15.5 17 27 11.5 2 50 38.1 69 54 46 62 11 1 turus, we have . 69 57 37 upon the vertical axis, but its performance is very good. An account of the slipping piece and the wire micrometer to be applied to the equatorial for observing double stars, with directions for their use, is given in the appendix to the Companion to the Maps of the Stars published by the Society, 1836. For the mode of 2 51 using an equatorial as a measuring circle, see the Cam bridge and Greenwich Observations for 1835 and 1836 of Halley's Comet, of the Solar Eclipse, and of the elongation of Jupiter's fourth Satellite; and for the corrections for refraction and parallax, the Introduction to the Greenwich Observations, 1836, to which the reader should look if he Applying these corrections to the observations of the wishes to know the best methods of making and reducing comet, we have The star of comparison is, in this case, much too distant both in R.A. and N.P.D.; and the index error ought to be determined by stars above and below the comet, and preceding and succeeding it. Also, after the observations have been made in one position of the instrument, it ought to be turned half round and the observations repeated; but the mode of ascertaining and applying the corrections is the same, and needs no further explanation. The accompanying figure represents the portable universal equatorial as constructed by Troughton: (a drawing and description of a similar instrument, under the title of Fayrer's Equatorial, will be found in Rees's Cyclopædia, article Equatorial). The lower part or stand rests on three foot-screws, and needs no description. The upper part is moveable on a cross axis, A A, on which it is balanced; and when the polar axis is set at the proper inclination by the latitude semicircle B, the clamp C retains it there. The polar axis consists of an outer tube, DD, forming one piece with the horizontal axis above-mentioned, and of an interior axis which turns freely within the tube as in a socket. This latter axis carries the hour circle, E E, the verniers, FF, being fixed to the tube. The clamp and tangent screw of the hour-circle are partially seen at G G. The upper plate H is fixed on the inner axis, and revolves with it. Two pieces, I I, rise from this plate, and carry the collars within which the cross or transit axis, KK, works. The declination circle, LL, and telescope, M M, are fixed to the extremities of the transit axis, the telescope being outside the collar. The declination clamp and tangent screw are seen at NN; the verniers are on the other side. These are attached to the support which rises from the plate H. Two levels are fixed on the lower part of the stand at OO, but they are only to be used for approximate adjustment. A delicate swing level, P, is hung from the transit axis, and a second level, Q, is fixed to the declination circle. The telescope has a micrometer, R, carrying wires for measuring small differences of declination. It is evident to those who know Fraunhofer's construction, that it is identical with the upper part of this universal equatorial. The suspension and motion of the polar axis and hour circle are the same as in the equatorial made by Troughton for the University of Coimbra. The position of the telescope is that of Megnié and Nairne. The rules we have already given will enable any one to adjust the universal equatorial; but if the direction of the astronomical observations in general. Sir George Shuckburgh's Memoir already referred to contains a valuable history of the instrument, though, on consulting the authorities, we have been led occasionally to differ from him. A description of Ramsden's refraction piece will be found at page 19 of Shuckburgh's paper, along with a collection of tables for computing the effects of refraction and parallax in R.A. and N.P.D. from the data which this ingenious appendage affords. Pearson's Practical Astronomy, vol. ii. p. 517; Littrow, Memoirs of the Astronomical Society, vol. ii. p. 45; Kriel, Mem. Ast. Society, vol. iv. p. 495. We have committed an oversight by relying on Vince. Graham's astronomical sector is supported as Hooke's quadrant and Flamsteed's sextant: see Smith's Optics, 885, book 3, chap. 9; but in explaining_the instrument, Smith uses a figure for illustration, which Vince has copied as the actual instrument. It is now in the transit-room of the Royal Observatory. EQUERRIES (from the French écurie, a stable), the name given to certain officers of the royal household in the department of the master of the horse, the first of whom is styled chief equerry and clerk-marshal. Their duties fall in rotation. When the king or queen ride abroad in state, an equerry goes in the leading coach. They formerly rode on horseback by the coach-side. Officers of the same denomination form a part of the established households of the royal dukes, &c. EQUIANGULAR, EQUILATERAL, EQUI-CRURAL, EQUI-TANGENTIAL, &c. &c., a class of words beginning with EQUI, which, in composition forms an adjective expressive of the equality of two things spoken of. Thus equiangular means having equal angles, and so on. There is a certain liability to confusion, arising from mistaking between the application of such terms to different parts of the same figure and to different figures. Thus 'an equilateral triangle' must mean a triangle which has three sides all equal. But two triangles which are equilateral' may mean two triangles in which every side of the first has its equal among those of the second: the two not being separately equilateral. To avoid this, it is sometimes said that two triangles, such as have just been mentioned, are mutually equilateral. EQUILIBRIUM (@qua libra), a state of rest produced by the mutual counteraction of two or more forces. The science of equilibrium is STATICS. EQUIMULTIPLES, multiples in which equal numbers of times are taken. Thus seven times A and seven times B are equi-multiples of A and B: a league and a yard are equimultiples of a mile and a foot. The student of the fifth book of Euclid should remember that this word has no singu- . lar number: 7 A and 7 B are equimultiples, but 7 A is not therefore to be called an equimultiple but one of the equi multiples. And the same of the word equal, whether separately or in composition: A and Paul lines, but A is not an equal line. Equality implies comparison of at EQUISETA CEAE are imperfectly formed plants whose real affinity is uncertain, and the nature of whose parts of fructification is not yet understood. By Linnæus and almost all botanists they are referred to the Cryptogamic class; by a modern English botanist they are regarded as a low rudimentary form of Gymnosperms. Only one genus is known, the stems of which are employed in the shops under the name of Dutch rushes. They are hollow-stemmed leafless plants, with a cuticle composed of pure silex, which gives them the hard surface that makes them useful for the poisher's purpose. In lieu of leaves they have toothed sheaths, each of which has as many series of imperfect spiral vessels passing into fistula of the stem as there are toothings. Their fructification grows in terminal cones, consisting of stalked peltate scales, having on their lower side small cases wherein re lodged minute oval or round green bodies, surrounded by bur elastic hygrometrical yellowish grey granulated clavate threads. By all botanists the central green body is admitted to be a seed or spore. The nature of the clavate threads is disputed; they are usually called elaters, and are compared to the elastic spiral threads bearing that name in Jungermanniaceæ; but there is no proof of such being their nature, and there is an opinion that they are rudimentary stamens. Be this as it may, the remarkable resemblance between Equisetacea and Casuarina, an undoubted flowering plant, the marked similarity of their cones of fructification to those of Cycadacea and Coniferæ, and the absence of such an evident correspondence between them and any existing or extinct forms of Cryptogamic plants, strongly inclines us to adopt the view of their being a low form of Phænogamous vegetation, bearing the same relation to Cycadaceae as Lemna to palms and Ceratophyllum to arbores cent nettles. Equisetacea are in English called horsetails, and are reckoned a sure sign of wet, stiff, springy soil. EQUISE TIC ACID, an acid discovered by Bracconot in the equisetum fluviatile, in which it exists combined with magnesia. This acid may be obtained in small colourless radiating crystals; its taste is sharp, and somewhat analogous to that of tartaric acid: it is unalterable in the air. When heated, it decomposes without subliming, and yields an oily uncrystallizable acid product. It dissolves readily both in alcohol and in water: the solution gives no precipitate either with lime or barytes water, but with acetate of lead and protonitrate of mercury it gives white curdy precipitates: it precipitates the persalts, but not the protosalts of iron. With potash and soda it yields deliquescent uncrystallizable salts; with ammonia, a crystallizable salt. With oxide of zinc, with lime, and magnesia, it forms uncrystallizable transparent compounds, which are unalterable in the air. E'QUITES (horsemen), the name of an order in the Roman state. Their origin, according to the old tradition, was this:-Romulus having divided his subjects into three tribes, chose from each one hundred young men whom he destined to serve on horseback and act as his body-guard; this body of cavalry was called the celeres, and afterwards the equites. (Dionys., ii. 13.) Niebuhr supposes (Hist. of Rome, i. p. 325, transl.) that whereas patres and patricii were titles of honour for individuals, celeres was the name of the whole class as distinguished from the rest of the nation. The three centuries of the celeres were called by the same names as the three tribes of the patricians, namely, Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres. Their tribunes are spoken of as a college of priests (Dionys., ii. 64), and it appears that the tribes of the patricians had also tribunes (Dionys., ii. 7). Moreover, when it is said that Tarquinius Priscus made three new centuries, which he added to the former three, and that the whole went under the name of the Sex Suffragia, or the six equestrian centuries, we cannot doubt that the alteration which he introduced was a constitutional and not merely a military one; that in fact the centuries which he formed were, like the original three, tribes of houses; that his innovation was nothing but an extension of the political division of the inhabitants of Rome under Romulus. (Niebuhr, Hist. of Rome, i. p. 391.) When Servius Tullius established the comitia of the centuries, he received the sex suffragia, which included all the patricians, into his first class; and to them he added twelve other equestrian centuries, made up of the richest of the plebeian order. (Niebuhr, i. p. 427.) The antient writers appear to have laboured under some great confusion with regard to this arrangement. Livy (i. 43) makes a proper distinction between the twelve equestrian centuries created by Servius and the six which existed before; but when he states (i. 36) that the cavalry in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus amounted to 1800, he appears to be antedating the origin of the eighteen equestrian centuries which formed part of the constitution of Servius. To the establishment of the comitia centuriata the creation of a body of equites, as a distinct order, seems to be due. The plan of Servius was, to a certain extent, identical with that of Solon. The object of both legislators was to break down the limits to which the old aristocracy was confined, and to set up an order of wealth by the side of the order of birth: not, however, that when a person could produce his 400,000 sesterces, he became ipso facto a knight, as was the case in after times. (Hor. Ep. i. 1, 57.) According to the Servian constitution, good birth or the sanction of the censors was necessary for gaining a place in the equestrian order. (Polyb., vi. 20: Zonaras, vii. 19.) When Cicero says (De Republica, ii. 20) that Tarquinius established the equestrian order on the same footing as that on which it stood in his own time, and also attributes to the same king the assigning of money to the equites for the purchase and keep of their horses, he is evidently inconsistent. In Tarquin's time, that is, before there was any plebeian order, it was natural enough that the poorer patricians, who were obliged to serve on horseback. (just as the 'ITйs at Athens were a poorer class than the Pentakosiomedimnoi, Plut., Sol. c. 18.) should be furnished with the means for doing so. But the case was different with the equites after the establishment of an order of wealth. A man might then be of equestrian rank, and yet have no horse assigned to him; thus, on the one hand, we find at the time of the siege of Veii a number of equites 5, two of the cases very much magnified; 6, an ovule with the four supposed serving on horseback at their own expense (Liv., v. 7); A sterile branch of Equisetum fluviatile; 2, a fertile branch of the same I fructification; 3, one of the peltate scales; 4, the same viewed from below: and, on the contrary, L. Tarquitius, who was a patrician, was obliged to serve on foot from his poverty. (Liv., iii. 27.) From this it appears probable that a certain sum was fixed which it was not necessary for every eques to have, but the possessor of which was obliged to serve on horseback at his own expense if no horse could be given him by the public, and that those whose fortune fell short of this were obliged to serve in the infantry under the same circumstances. The lieutenant of the dictator was called the chief of the equites' (Magister Equitum); and although in later times he was appointed to this office by the dictator himself, it is probable, as Niebuhr conjectures (i., p. 559), that he was originally elected by the 12 centuries of Plebeian equites, just as the dictator, or Magister Populi, was by the Sex Suffragia, in other words, by the Populus or Patricians. With regard to the functions of the equites, besides their military duties, they had to act as judices or jurymen under the Sempronian law: under the Servilian law the judices were chosen from the senate as well as from the equites: by the Glaucian law the equites alone performed the office, and so on by alternate changes till the law of Aurelius Cotta (B.C. 70), by which the judices were chosen from the senators, equites, and tribuni ærarii. The equites also farmed the public revenues. Those who were engaged in this business were called the Publicani; and though Cicero, who was himself of the equestrian order, speaks of these farmers as the flower of the Roman equites, the ornament of the state, the safeguard of the republic' (Pro Plancio, 9), it appears that they were a set of detestable oppressors, who made themselves odious in all the provinces by their avarice and rapacity. The equites, as it may be inferred from what has been already said, gradually lost the marks of their distinctive origin, and became, as they were in the time of Cicero for instance, an ordo or class of persons as distinguished from the senate and the plebs. They had particular seats assigned to them in the circus and the theatre. The insignia of their rank, in addition to the horse, were, a golden ring and the angustus clavus, or narrow band, on their dress, as distinguished from the latus clavus or broad band of the senators: the two last insignia seem to have remained after the former ceased to possess its original and distinctive character. EQUITY, according to the definition given by Aristotle, is the rectification of the law, when, by reason of its universality, it is deficient; for this is the reason that all things are not determined by law, because it is impossible that a law should be enacted concerning some things; so that there is need of a decree or decision; for of the indefinite the rule also is indefinite: as among Lesbian builders the rule is leaden, for the rule is altered to suit the figure of the stone, and is not fixed, and so is a decree or decision to suit the circumstances.' (Ethics, b. v. c. x. Oxford trans.) 'Equity,' says Blackstone, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law; positive law is construed and rational law is made by it. In this respect, equity is synonymous with justice; in that, to the true and sound interpretation of the rule.' According to Grotius, equity is the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its generality, is deficient. Until jurisprudence has become really a science based on settled principles, some such jurisdiction as our earlier law writers have attributed to the courts of equity is necessary to the due administration of justice; and it is probable that in England it deserved the humorous description given by Selden in his Table Talk:' Equity in law is the same that spirit is in religion, what every one pleases to make it; sometimes they go according to conscience, sometimes according to law, sometimes according to the rule of court. Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. It is all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot a chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be! One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: it is the same thing in the chancellor's conscience.' This uncertainty has however long ceased in that branch of our law which is expressed by the term Equity, and, from successive decisions, rules as strict and principles as fixed have been framed and established in our courts of equity as in our courts of law New cases, it is true, may and do arise, but they are decided upon these ascertained rules and principles, and not from the notions of the judge as to what may be reasonable or just in the particular case before him. Nothing in fact is more common than to hear the chancellor say, that whatever may be his own opinion, he is bound by the authorities, that is, by the decisions of his predecessors in office and those of the other judges in equity; that he will not shake any settled rule concerning property, &c., it being for the common good that these should be certain and known, however ill-founded the first resolution may have been. In its enlarged sense, equity answers precisely to the definition of justice, or natural law (as it is called), as given in the Pandects' (lib. i. tit. 1, 1. 10, 11); and it is remarkable that subsequent writers on this so-called natural law, and also the authors of modern treatises on the doctrine of equity, as administered in the English courts, have, with scarcely any exception, cited the above passage from Aristotle as a definition of equity in our peculiar sense of a separate jurisdiction. But according to this general definition every court is a court of equity, of which a familiar instance occurs in the construction of statutes, which the judges of the courts of common law constantly interpret according to the spirit, or, as it is called, the equity, not the strict letter. It is hardly possible to define equity as now administered in this country, or to make it intelligible otherwise than by a minute enumeration of the matters cognizable in the courts in which it is administered in its restrained and qualified sense. It is no longer,' says Sir James Mackintosh u his life of Sir Thomas More, in the acceptation in which the word is used in English jurisprudence, to be confounded with that moral equity which generally corrects the unjust operation of law, and with which it seems to have been synonymous in the days of Selden and Bacon. It is a part of laws formed from usages and determinations which sometimes differ from what is called common law in its subjects, but chiefly varies from it in its mode of proof, of trial, and of relief.' In this country the remedies for the redress of wrongs and for the enforcement of rights are distinguished into two classes, those which are administered in courts of law, and those which are administered in courts of equity; the former are called legal rights and wrongs, the latter equitable. Equity jurisdiction may therefore properly be defined as that portion of remedial justice which is administered by a court of equity as distinguished from a court of law, from which a court of equity differs mainly in the subject matters of which it takes cognizance and in its mode of procedure and remedies. Courts of common law in this country proceed by certain prescribed forms of action alone, and give relief only according to the particular exigency of such actions, by a general and unqualified judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant. There are many cases however in which a simple judgment for either party, without qualifications or conditions, or peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice. Some modifications of the rights of both parties may be required; some restraints on one side, or the other, or perhaps on both; some qualifications or conditions present or future, temporary or permanent, to be annexed to the exercise of rights, or the redress of injuries. To accomplish such objects the courts of law in this country have no machinery: according to their present constitution they can only adjudicate by a simple judgment between the parties. Such prescribed forms of actions are not confined to our own system of laws; they were known in the civil law, and the party could apply them only to their original purposes. In other cases he had a special remedy. Courts of equity however are not so restrained; they adjudicate by decree pronounced upon a statement of his case by the plaintiff, and the answer of the defendant given in upon oath, and the evidence of witnesses, together, if necessary, with the evidence of all parties, also given upon oath. These decrees are so adjusted as to meet all the exigencies of the particular case, and they vary, qualify, restrain, and model the remedy so as to suit it to mutual and adverse claims, and the real and substantial rights of all the parties so far as such rights are acknowledged by the established rules of equity The courts of equity bring before them all the parties interested in the subject matter of the suit, and adjust the rights of all however numerous; whereas courts of law in this country are compelled by their constitution to limit their inquiry to the litigating parties, although other persons may be interested, that is, they give a complete romedy in damages or otherwise for the particular wrong in question as betwen the parties to the action, though such remedy is obviously in many cases an incomplete adjudication upon the general rights of the parties to the action, and fails altogether as to other persons, not parties to the action, who yet may be interested in the result or in the subject matter in dispute. Mucn discussion nas taken place and various opinions have been expressed upon the question whether it would or would not be best to administer the whole of remedial justice in one court or in one class of courts without any separation or distinction of suits, or of the forms or modes of procedure and relief. Lord Bacon, upon more than one occasion, has expressed his decided opinion that a separation of Perhaps the most general as well as the most precise de- the administration of equity from that of the common law sription of a court of equity is the outline given by Mr. is wise and convenient. All nations,' says he, ‘have Justice Story in the Encyclopædia Americana,' which equity, but some have law and equity mixed in the same he has filled up in his recent Treatise on Equity. It is court, which is worse, and some have it distinguished in this-that a court of equity has jurisdiction in cases where several courts, which is better;' and again, ‘In some states, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in the that jurisdiction which decrees according to equity and common law courts. The remedy must be plain, for if it be moral right, and that which decrees according to strict doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. right, is committed to the same court; in others, they are It must be adequate, for if at law it fall short of what the party committed to different courts. We entirely opine for the is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity; and it separation of the courts; for the distinction of the cases will must be complete, that is, it must attain the full end and not long be attended to if the jurisdictions meet in the same justice of the case, it must reach the whole mischief and person; and the will of the judge will then master the law.' secure the whole right of the party present and future, other- Lord Hardwicke held the same opinion. Lord Manswise equity will interpose and give relief. The jurisdiction field, it is to be presumed, thought otherwise, for he endeaof a court of equity is sometimes concurrent with the juris-voured to introduce equitable doctrines into the courts of diction of the courts of law; sometimes assistant to it; and law. The old strictness has however been restored. His sometimes exclusive. It exercises concurrent jurisdiction successor, Lord Kenyon, made use of these expressions: in cases where the rights are purely of a legal nature, but 'If it had fallen to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, where other and more efficient aid is required than a court whether or not I should have thought it advisable to estaof law can afford. In some of these cases courts of law blish different courts, with different jurisdictions, and goformerly refused all redress, but now will grant it. For verned by different rules, it is not necessary to say; but strict law comprehending established rules, and the juris- influenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become diction of equity being called into action when the pur- inveterate with those who comply with the systems they poses of justice rendered an exception to those rules neces- find established, I find that in these courts, proceeding by sary, successive exceptions on the same grounds became different rules, a certain combined system of jurisprudence the foundation of a general principle, and could no longer has been framed most beneficial to the people of this be considered as a singular interposition. Thus law and country, and which I hope I may be indulged in supposing equity are in continual progression, and the former is con- has never yet been equalled in any other country on earth. stantly gaining ground upon the latter. Every new and Our courts of law only consider legal rights; our courts of extraordinary interposition is by length of time converted equity have other rules, by which they sometimes superinto an old rule; a great part of what is now strict law was sede strict legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneformerly considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of ficially for the subject.' In this country the principle this age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of of separating jurisdictions has been largely acted upon. the next. (Prof. Millar's View of the Eng. Govt.) But the We have our courts of equity and law; our bankrupt and jurisdiction having been once justly acquired at a time insolvent courts, and courts of ecclesiastical and admiralty when there was no such redress at law, it is not now relin- jurisdiction; indeed until lately our several courts of law quished by the courts of equity. had, in principle, jurisdiction only over certain specified classes of suits. In countries governed by the civil law, the practice has in general been the other way. But whether the one opinion or the other be most correct in theory, the system adopted by every nation has been mainly influenced by the peculiarities of its own institutions, habits, and circumstances, and the forms of its remedial justice. In all such cases the separation or union of the equitable and legal jurisdiction must be a mixed question of public policy and private convenience. The most common exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction is in cases of account, accident, dower, fraud, mistake, partnership, and partition.. In many cases which fall under these heads, and especially in some cases of fraud, mistake, and accident, courts of law cannot and do not afford any redress: in others they do, but not in so complete a manner as a court of equity. A court of equity is also assistant to the jurisdiction of the courts of law in cases where the latter have no like authority. It will remove legal impediments to the fair decision of a question depending at law, as by restraining a party from improperly setting up, at a trial, some title or claim which would prevent the fair decision of the question in dispute; by compelling him to discover, upon his own oath, facts which are material to the right of the other party, but which a court of law cannot compel him to disclose; by perpetuating, that is, by taking and keeping in its custody, the testimony of witnesses, which is in danger of being lost before the matter can be tried; and by providing for the safety of property in dispute pending litigation. It wili also counteract and controul fraudulent judgments, by estraining the parties from insisting upon them. In some of the American states, the administration of law and equity is perfectly distinct; in others the administration of equity is only partially committed to distinct courts; in a third class the two jurisdictions are vested in one and the same tribunal; and in a fourth there are no courts exercising an equitable jurisdiction. In most of our colonies the governor is invested with the jurisdiction of chancellor; but in some of the greatest importance where a judicial establishment of some magnitude is maintained, the chief or supreme court is invested with the chancery jurisdiction. This attempt at the exposition of the general principles of what in this country is called equity seems to the The exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity is chiefly writer of this article to be better suited to a work of this exercised in cases of merely equitable rights, that is, such nature than a full description of the practice of, that is, rights as are not recognised in courts of law. Most cases the course of proceeding in a suit in, a court of equity. of trust and confidence fall under this head. This exclu- The practice or procedure of any court can hardly be sive jurisdiction is exercised in granting injunctions to pre-made intelligible to any person but one who knows somevent waste or irreparable injury; to secure a settled right, or to prevent vexatious litigation; in appointing receivers of property, which is in danger of being misapplied; in compelling the surrender of securities improperly obtained; in preventing a party from leaving the country in order to avoid a suit; in restraining any undue exercise of a legal right; in enforcing specific performance of contracts; in supplying the defective execution of instruments, and reforming, that is, correcting and altering them according to the real intention of the parties, when such intention can be satisfactorily proved; and in granting relief in cases where deeds and securities have been lost. thing of it by experience; and any technical description of it is useless unless it is minutely and circumstantially exact. It is desirable, however, that in addition to some knowledge of the subjects which belong to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, all persons should have some clear notion of the way in which the matters in dispute between parties to a suit in equity are brought before the court, and by what kind of proof or evidence they are established. It may also be useful that persons should have a general, and so far as it goes, a correct knowledge of the different modes in which such questions of fact are put in issue, and proved m our courts of law and equity. The following short outline |