CHAPTER IV.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM

TESTIMONY.

I do not know that any one has denied that a mi. racle would be credible, if exhibited to our senses. A man might indeed be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses ; but if he was conscious of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one but a variety of miracles; not only a few times but for years in succession, and if he should find that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say that it would be reasonable to credit . his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice ;-he would be under the necessity of believing what he saw with his eyes, heard with his ears, and handled with his hands. But are there facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which can by no means be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses ? Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of credit. According to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and what others knew to be true.

If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify that they had repeatedly witnessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should concur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this principle it would be unreasonable

to credit them, even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume in his boasted argument against miracles. But it appears to me that every •man previous to examination, must be convinced that it is false ; for it is contrary to common sense and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on testimony. For there may be testimony of such a nature, as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favour of a miracle would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But, notwithstanding, this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphy. sical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many, and he boasts that “it will be useful to overthrow miracles as long as the world endures,” it seems necessary to enter into an examination his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done in a convincing manner, by several men,* eminent for their learning and discrimination, and if their works were read by all who peruse Hume, I should think it unnecessary to add a single word on the subject. But it may not be without use to present a refutation in a condensed form, for the sake of those who will not take the trouble to go through a minute and extended demonstration.

The argument of Mr. Hume will be best exhibited in his own words. “A miracle,” says he,“ sup

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ported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument. No testi. mony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability."-"We establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle and make a just foundation for any system of religion.”—“Our belief or assurance of

any fact from the report of eye witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience ; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our own observation : here is a contest of two opposite experiences of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if, besides the testimony considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very na. ture of the fact is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible even in the lowest degree.” Here we have the substance of Mr. Hume's argument, on which I propose to make some remarks, intended to show, that its whole plausibility depends on the assumption of false principles, and the artful use of equivocal terms.

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1. Some prejudice is created in the minds of the unsuspecting reader, by the definition of a miracle here given. It is called “ a violation of the laws of nature," which carries with it an unfavourable idea, as though some obligation was violated and some in. jury was done. But the simple truth is that the laws of nature are nothing else than the common operations of divine power in the government of the world, which depend entirely, for their existence and contin. uance, on the divine will; and a miracle is nothing else than the exertion of the same power in a way different from that which is common ; or it may be a mere suspension of that power which is commonly observed to operate in the world.

2. Mr. Hume's argument will apply to the evidence of the senses as well as to that derived from testimony, and will prove (if it prove any thing) that it would be impossible to believe in a miracle if we should wit. ness it ever so often. “ The very same principle of experience,” says he “ which gives us a certain de. gree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also in this case another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish, from which contradiction there arises necessarily a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.” The very same counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief must also occur between the assurance derived from the senses, and that derived from experience. The reason why testimony cannot be believed in favour of a miracle, is not, according to Mr. Hume, because it has no force ; for taken by itself, it may be sufficient to produce assurance; but let this assurance be as strong as it may, it cannot be stronger than that derived from universal experience. “ In that case,"

says he, “ there is proof against proof.” Now it is evident that upon these principles the same equilibrium from contradictory evidence must take place, between experience and the senses. If one evidence be stronger than another, “the strongest must prevail, but with a diminution of force in proportion to that of its antagonist. But in the case of the senses, and a firm and unalterable experience, the evidence is perfect on both sides, so that the “ counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief” must occur. According to this metaphysical balance of Mr. Hume, a miracle could not be believed if we witnessed it ever so often; for although there is a great weight of evidence on each side,

yet as there is an equilibrium, neither can have any influence on our assent. Whether Mr. Hume would have objected to this conclusion, does not appear; but it is manifest that it logically follows from his argument, as much as in the case to which he has applied it. And here we see to what pitch of scepticism his reasoning leads.

3. Mr. Hume makes an unnecessary distinction between that which is marvellous, and that which is miraculous ; for although there is a real difference, yet as to his argument there is none. The force of his reasoning does not relate to events as being mira culous, but as being opposite to universal experience. If the conclusion therefore be correct, it will equally prove that no testimony is sufficient to establish a natural event, which has not before been experienced. If ever so many witnesses should aver, that they had seen meteoric stones fall from the clouds, or the gal. vanic fluid melt metals, yet if we have never exper. ienced these things ourselves, we must not believe them.

4. The opposite or contrary experience of Mr.