1

According to the third view, which constantly gained more adherents, and always came to be more laxly expressed, the saving grace is a product of the Sacrament and of contrite faith, so that the Sacrament in itself merely raises the soul above the point at which it is dead and plants a seed which develops to saving effect only by the co-operation of contrition and faith. Here first the question now came to be of importance as to what the nature was of this contrition and this faith, or as to what the state of soul must be which puts the receiver into the position for letting the sacramental grace attain to its full effect. To begin with it was generally answered here, with Augustine, that the receiver must not "obicem contrariæ cogitationis opponere" (oppose a barrier of adverse thought.) But what is this "obex" or this "impedimentum"? It was replied that the receiver must not receive the Sacrament "cum fictione" (insincerely). But when is he a hypocrite? The earlier theologians required a "bonus motus interior," that is, a really pious spirit that longs for grace, contrition, and faith, and so, since every "bonus motus" is in a certain way meritorious, takes place, however, only through the priestly sacrament). With this view of repentance, as is well known, the Reformation formed a connection. That fides and sacramentum are exclusively essential to each other in the case of all Sacraments was emphasised by Robert Pulleyn and Wessel (the former, Sentent. I., octo P. V., c. 13: "quod fides facit, baptismus ostendit; fides peccata delet, baptismus deleta docet, unde sacramentum dicitur." VI. 61: "Absolutio, quæ peracta confessione super pænitentem a sacerdote fit, sacramentum est, quoniam rei sacræ signum est. Et cujus sacræ rei est signum, nisi remissionis et absolutionis? Nimirum confitentibus a sacerdote facta a peccatis absolutio remissionem peccatorum, quam antea peperit cordis contritio, designat. A peccatis ergo presbyter solvit, non utique quod peccata dimittat, sed quod dimissa sacramento pandat." The latter, de commun. sanct. [edit. Groning, 1614], p. 817: "Effectus sacramentorum sunt secundum dispositionem suscipientis et secundum requisitam illi intentioni dispositionem. . . . Dispositio vero requisita huic sacramento, ut efficax fiat, est fames et sitis hujus vivifici cibi et potus. Unde quanto minus eum esurit et sitit, pro tanto minorem etiam effectum consequitur." 818: "Semper sacramenta fidei sunt instrumenta, tanto semper efficacia, quanto est fides negotiosa"). But in view of these valuable sentences, we must remember, as has been remarked above, that to closer inspection a mysterious gratia is placed behind and above the fides, which lowers the fides to a means.

1 The Greek Scholasticism also knows of the obex. Antonius Melissa quotes in the Loci Comm. (Migne, Bd. 136, col. 823), sermo 16, the saying of a certain Theotimus: ἔοικεν ἡ ἁμαρτία παρακωλύματι, κωλύοντι τὴν εὔνοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι.

2

Yet the later

certain merits. The "barrier" is here therefore the lack of such a positive good disposition. So it was taught by the Lombard, Alexander, Thomas,1 and a large number of theologians, and they further laid it down that, as all merit is rewarded, the reception of the Sacrament results in a twofold grace, namely (1) ex opere operato, (2) but also ex opere operante; the latter is different from the sacramental grace, but is always added to it (ex merito, on account of the disposition, and greater or less, according to the measure of the disposition). Here already, then, merit is introduced in a hazardous way. theologians (among the earlier, Albertus) required only the absence of an undevout disposition; what is held by them as a barrier is simply the presence of a "motus contrarius malus," ie., contempt of the Sacrament, positive unbelief, or an unforgiven mortal sin. They said that the dignity of the New Testament Sacraments consists just in this, that they presuppose no positive disposition, while such disposition is to be presupposed in the case of all other grace. Hence Scotus defines: "for the first reception of grace (the non-sacramental) there is required some kind of merit (aliquis modus meritorius) de congruo; but for the second (the sacramental) nothing is required save a reception of baptism that is voluntary and without insincerity (sine fictione), ie., with the intention of receiving what the Church confers, and without mortal sin in act or will (sine actu vel voluntate peccati mortalis), so that in the first there is required some intrinsic work in some way accepted as meritum de congruo, in the second there is only required an external work (opus exterius), with putting away of inner hindrance (cum amotione interioris impedimenti)." One sees that here the doctrine of the Sacraments is already quite drawn into the (Pelagian) doctrine of justification, and subordinated to it, while apparently the power of the Sacrament is increased, seeing that it is to be held as effectual even where a tabula rasa exists.

1 In Sentent. IV., Dist. 4, Q. 3, Art. 2: Indispositus reputatur et qui non credi et qui indevotus accedit in sacramentis præcipue fides operatur . . . ideo

.

defectus fidei specialius pertinet ad fictionem."

2 Scotus, in Sent. IV., Dist. 1, Q. 6: "Sacramentum ex virtute operis operati confert gratiam, ita quod non requiritur ibi bonus motus interior qui mereatur gratiam, sed sufficit quod suscipiens non ponat obicem."

Yet with the increased power there contrasts the really small saving effect, which passes, rather, into the "acceptance of the merits of man." Between these two views there was still a third, which certainly stands quite near the last mentioned, frequently coalesced with it, and was afterwards to become the predominant one; it is neither satisfied with the absence of the "malus motus," nor does it require the "bonus motus," but it demands that a "certain" sorrow shall precede the reception of the Sacrament, which does not require to spring from the highest motives, but may arise from lower, e.g., from fear of punishment or something similar. This "sorrow" is described as attritio,1 and it is said of it that, if there is earnest striving, the Sacrament can raise it to contritio. But others now went still further and taught that the Sacrament changes attritio into contritio ex opere operato. According to this extremely widely diffused view, the man can be saved who lets himself stand in dread of hell, even though otherwise all inner connection with the Christian religion is wanting to him; he must only assiduously use the Sacrament of Penance, in the opinion that it can protect him against hell. Yet even this "opinion" does not need to be a sure faith; he may only hold the effect of the Sacrament as not impossible; "attrition, when the Sacrament is added, is made sufficient by the power of the keys" (attritio superveniente sacramento virtute clavium efficitur sufficiens)."

A quite magical view of the Sacraments here competes in a pernicious way with that doctrine of "merit," according to

1 Scotus was the first to direct his attention to this very correctly observed character of the commoner type of humanity, and began to use it in the way indicated for the doctrine of salvation; see Hahn, p. 413 f.

2 Or: "Attritus accedit ad confessionem, ex quo ibi fit contritus, unde fugatur fictio. Et sic non habet dubium, quia et sacramentum suscipit et effectum ejus scil. remissionem peccatorum." Numerous passages in Hahn, l.c. From this point of view, indeed, the mere purpose to partake of the Sacrament, or the partaking per se, might come to be regarded as something initially meritorious, and this step was really already taken from the time of the Lombard, the view becoming quite widely prevalent. Nay, as if the conscience and the plain understanding reacted against the sacramental magic, the Lombard declares that the humiliatio before the sensible materials in the Sacrament establishes merit (Sentent. IV., Dist. 1 C.): "propter humiliationem quidem, ut dum homo sensibilibus rebus, quæ natura infra ipsum sunt, ex præcepto creatoris se reverendo subicit, ex hac humilitate et obedientia deo magis placeat et apud eum mereatur."

P

which God of His good pleasure (per acceptationem) takes as complete what is only a beginning, and indeed is not even a beginning, since the motives of those "meritorious" acts may be religiously neutral. In connection with the doctrine of justification we shall return to this worst point, which dominated the whole practical and theoretical system of Catholicism at the beginning of the Reformation period.1 But certainly it is clear here already, that to hush up rather than to give comfort was the effect of a doctrine of the Sacraments having this form and issue. This doctrine was originally framed on the exalted idea of the "participatio divinæ naturæ," and it still continues to betray its basis in the first stages of its construction. But it ends in confirming the man of common spirit in his low-type morality and feeble piety. The earnest Catholic may not apply these final conclusions to himself; he may confine himself to the original thesis, which is not forbidden to him, but for the careless, the Church has prepared a broad road and opened a wide gate. In a relative way it may work much good with this; for its system is derived from listening to life; it gives pedagogic direction on the question as to how one who is not quite thoughtless, who is not perfectly stolid, who is not entirely sunk in earthly enjoyment, can be aided, and introduced into a better society, with better modes of life. But as soon as we consider that it is the Christian religion we have to do with here, that religion of earnest spirit and comforting power, this structure of opus operatum, attritio and meritum is seen to be a mockery of all that is sacred.2

1 Apol. Confess. Aug. 13: "Hic damnamus totum populum scholasticorum doctorum, qui docent, quod sacramenta non ponenti obicem conferant gratiam ex opere operato sine bono motu utentis. Hæc simpliciter judaica opinio est sentire quod per ceremoniam justificemur, sine bono motu cordis, hoc est, sine fide. Et tamen hæc impia et perniciosa opinio magna auctoritate docetur in toto regno pontificio."

2 On Duns Scotus' doctrine of the Sacraments see Werner, Scotus (1881), pp. 462-496; on the doctrine of Post-Scotist Scholasticism see the same author, Die Nachscotistische Scholastik (1883), p. 380 ff. As specially important characteristics of the Scotist doctrine of the Sacraments note the following: (1) the rejection of the inner necessity of the Sacraments, since God can grant the saving grace even without the employment of these outward signs (all the more firmly is the outer necessity maintained, on the ground of the positive divine appointment); (2) the rejection of

The individual Sacraments. (1) Baptism. This Sacrament 2 is the medicine for the consequences of the Fall, and lays the basis of the new life; it has therefore a negative and a positive effect. The former, in which the "grace" already appears as "most perfect, relates to original sin. In so far as this consists in guilt, penalty, and concupiscence, baptism abolishes all these with the entire sin; ie., the guilt (guilt of original sin and of the previously committed sinful deeds without exception) is an influence of a naturally necessary kind in the media of sacramental grace; (3) the strong emphasising of the Sacraments as notæ ecclesiæ; (4) the assertion that since the Fall there have been Sacraments effectual ex opere operato; (5) the rejection of the virtus supernaturalis in the Sacraments; (6) the rejection of the position, that the intellect is the vehicle of the sacramental character; (7) the assertion that only from the positive appointment of God is it to be concluded that baptism cannot be repeated; (8) the assertion, that the reatus culpæ after the act of sin is no reatio realis, i.e., that there remains nothing in the soul of the effect of sin, which would again be sin; for the habitus vitiosus is not sin, seeing that it remains even in the justified; hence there stands nothing that is a link between the sinful act and the obligatio ad pœnam; the latter, therefore, is only a relatio rationis of the divine intellect or will, which has its ground in the "ordering will" of God; in accordance with this the view of the Sacrament of Penance is formed. Occam emptied the Sacraments of every kind of inner and speculative import; they have simply an importance because God has so ordained them; but we do not know why. Here also the position of things was such that as soon as the authority of the Church disappeared, there was necessarily a falling away, not only of the doctrine of the Sacraments in every sense-that was no misfortune--but also of every doctrine of grace; for no one had taken the precaution to secure that the latter should be able to exist independently of the Sacraments.

1 See the detailed exposition in Thomas, P. III., Q. 66-71. Schwane, pp. 605622.

2

According to the general view (something similar already in Ignatius of Antioch) Christ, at His own baptism, imparted to the water consecration and power. Hence the water needs no special consecration, as the material does in the other Sacraments.

3 According to the Scholastic view, which, however, was not shared by all, an abolition of sin is in itself possible without infusion of saving grace (so Thomas).

Gabriel Biel (according to Hahn, p. 334): "Licet gratia baptismalis sit incipientium et ita imperfecta quantum ad habilitandum ad bonum, tamen quantum ad liberandum a malo habet vim gratiæ perfectissimæ . . . restituit perfectam innocentiam."

5 On the other hand: "baptismus non est institutus ad delendum omnia peccata futura, sed tamen præterita et præsentia." Hence the rule: "baptismus delet quidquid invenit." This reluctance to relate the sin-cancelling grace of baptism to the future, had originally sprung from regard for the interests of human freedom and for the serious nature of Christian morality. But in the Scholastic period what is aimed at mainly is to protect the Church Sacrament of Penance.