in the seclusion of his monastery, spoke a new language of adoration, preached flight from the world, and called to the Pope that he sat in Peter's chair to serve and not to rule-as this man at the same time continued fettered by all the hierarchical prejudices of his age, and himself guided the policy of the world-ruling Church, even the pious in the Church in the twelfth century had not yet felt the contrast between Church and Christianity. The attachment of monachism to the Church was still of a naïve kind; the contradiction between the actual form of the world-ruling Church and the gospel which it preached was felt, indeed, but always suppressed again.1 That great mendicant monk had not yet come on the scene whose appearing was to work the crisis in the fluctuating struggle between renunciation of the world and lordship over it. But already the Church was beset all around by the wrathful curses of the "heretics," who saw in the Church's powerful exercise of her dominion and in the alienation of her gifts of grace the features of the ancient Babylon.

I.2, p. 117): "It is an erroneous view that the Latin Catholicism of the Middle Ages was summed up in the cultivation of legal righteousness and meritoriousness." It has as its correlate the mysticism that sacrifices the personal ego, to which at one time a theologico-acosmistic, at another time a christologico-lyrical character is given. But the simple trust in God, who reveals His grace in Christ, with the confession : "Sufficit mihi ad omnem justitiam solum habere propitium, cui soli peccavi" (Bernh. serm. in cant. xxiii. 15), was certainly not wanting in individual cases. Here and there, but above all in view of death, it triumphed, both over the calculations of legal righteousness and over the vagueness of mysticism. Flacius and Chemnitz were right in seeking and collecting testimonies for the evangelical doctrine of justification from the Middle Ages, and as Augustine in his day could justly assert that his doctrine of grace had its tradition in the prayers of the Church, so Chemnitz also was entitled to affirm that the cardinal evangelical doctrine could produce evidence for itself from earlier times, "Non in declamatoriis rhetoricationibus nec in otiosis disputationibus, sed in seriis exercitiis pænitentiæ et fidei, quando conscientia in tentationibus cum sua indignitate vel coram ipso judicio dei vel in agone mortis luctatur. Hoc enim solo modo rectissime intelligi potest doctrina de justificatione, sicut in scriptura traditur."

1 The "eternal gospel" of Joachim of Fiore belongs to the close of our period, and for a time remained latent; see Reuter, l.c. II., p. 198 ff.

2. The Development of Ecclesiastical Law.1

Let us notice at least in a few words the increased activity in ecclesiastical law in the period under review, which was not without its influence on the mode of conceiving of dogma, and on the history of dogma.

First, it is a fact of importance that from the middle of the second half of the ninth century, Church law was framed more and more on a Pseudoisidorian basis. Second, the preponderating attention given to law in general, and the growing subjection of all ecclesiastical questions to legal conceptions are characteristics of the period. As to the first point, it is well known that the Popes always continued to take more to do with the administration of the dioceses,2 that the old metropolitan constitution lost its importance, and that the old constitutional state of things in general-during the first half of our period-fell into decay and ceased to exist. The Episcopal power, it is true, strengthened itself in many places by assuming a civil character, and on the other hand, the Emperors, from Otto I. to Henry III. after having reformed the enfeebled papacy, brought it for a time into dependence on the imperial crown. But as they also deprived all laymen, who were not princes, of all share in the direction of ecclesiastical affairs, and as they suppressed the independence of the local ecclesiastical bodies (the congregations), in the interests of imperialism and of "piety," only the Emperor (who called. himself rector ecclesiæ and vicarius Christi), the Pope, and the bishops remained as independent powers. It was about the property of the bishops, and on the question as to who was the true ruler of the divine state and the vicar of Christ, that the great battle was really waged between the empire and the reformed papacy. In this struggle the latter, acting on the

1 For the earliest period see Maassen, Gesch. der Quellen und Litt. des Kanonischen Rechts I. vol. (till Pseudoisidore) 1870. For the later period see v. Schulte, Gesch. der Quellen und Lit. des Kanonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf Gregor IX., 1875. See the introductions to von Friedberg's edition of the corp. jur. can.

2 Nicholas I., Leo IX., Alexander II., Alexander III. represent the stages prior to Innocent III. But Gregory VII. was the soul of the great movement in the eleventh century.

impulse given by Gregory VII., developed itself into the autocratic power in the Church, and accordingly after having freed itself in Rome from the last remnants of older constitutional conditions, framed its legislation by means of numerous decretals. At the "œcumenical" Lateran Synods of 1123 and 1139, the papacy left no doubt as to this new position which it meant to assert.1 The Popes after

1 The numbering of the Ecumenical Councils, which has now become a sententia communis among the curialist theologians, has been established on the authority of Bellarmin (see Döllinger and Reusch, Die Selbstbiographie des Cardinals Bellarmin, 1887, p. 226 ff. That previous to him Antonius Augustinus [ob. 1586] counted them in the same way, has been pointed out by Buschball: “Die Professiones fidei der Päpste," separately printed from the Röm. Quartalschr. 10 Bd., 1896, p. 62). In the sixteenth century there still prevailed the greatest diversity in the enumeration: indeed the majority did not regard those Councils in which the Greek Church did not take part as œcumenical at all. There was likewise conflict of opinion as to whether the Councils of Bâsle, Florence (and Constance), were to be reckoned in. Antonius Augustinus and Bellarmin (in the Roman edition of the Concilia generalia of 1608 f.), included the Lateran Councils of 1123 and 1139 (and left out the Council of Bâsle). “The question, it is true, was of subordinate importance for Bellarmin, in as much as he places on the same level with the decrees of the General Councils those of the 'Particular' Councils held under the presidency of the Pope, or sanctioned by him; but having in view those who held, not that the Pope, but that the General Council was infallible, it was certainly necessary for him to discuss the question as to what Councils are to be regarded as general." But in thus determining the question, he naturally allowed himself to be influenced by his strong curialistic standpoint, that is, he set aside the Council of Constance and Bâsle, and placed among the Ecumenical Councils that of Florence, the fourth and fifth Lateran Councils, the first of Lyons, and that of Vienna, on the ground that these favoured the papacy. He thus arrived at the number of eighteen approved General Councils (eight from the first ten centuries, the Lateran Councils of 1123, 1139, 1179, 1215, those of Lyons in 1245 and 1274, that of Vienna in 1311, that of Florence, the fifth Lateran Council, and that of Trent). But here also, as everywhere in Catholic dogmatics, there are "half" authorities, and half genuine coin, in spite of the Holy Ghost who guides into all truth. That is to say, several Councils are partly ratified, partly rejected," those of Constance and Bâsle being among them, and the Council of Pisa in 1409 is "neither manifestly ratified nor manifestly rejected." Since the year 1870, the question about the number of the Councils has completely lost all real interest for Catholics. But reactionary Protestantism has every reason to feel interested in it. Buschball (1.c. pp. 60, 74, 79), holds that in the Middle Ages a distinction in principle was not made between the view taken of the Councils of the first thousand years and that taken of those that were later. But he adduces no proof that prior to the Council of Constance the later Councils were placed quite on a level with the earlier, and even by what he adduces for the time subsequent uncertainty is suggested. How could the Medieval Councils be regarded even before the Council of Trent as quite of equal standing with those of the first ten centuries, when, up to the time of this Council, the general

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wards, till the time of Innocent III., defended and strengthened their autocratic position in the Church amid severe but victorious struggles. No doubt, they had to hear many an anxious word from their most faithful sons; but the rise of the papacy to despotic power in the Church, and thereby to dominion over the world, was promoted by the piety and by all the ideal forces of the period. Not in opposition to the spirit of the times -how would that have been possible?—but in union with it, the papacy ascended the throne of the world's history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its opponents, so far as they possessed religion, were its secret allies, or contended with doubtful consciences, or, at least, were unable to show that the benefits for which they fought (national churchism, etc.) were the highest and the holiest. Under such circumstances the papal decretals obtained an ever-increasing authority. They took their place

opinion was certainly to the effect that dogma was contained in fundamental and final form in the twelve articles, and in the interpretation relating to them which they had received from the older Councils! The process of equalising was probably begun by the Councils of Florence and Bâsle, with their high degree of self-consciousness. That Councils at all could be pointed to in the long period between the ninth and the fifteenth centuries, was necessarily of more importance than the taking account of what was decided at these Councils, of how they were constituted, and of the authority that guided them. We may very well venture to say therefore in the fifteenth century the equalising had begun with some hesitation, the Council of Trent favoured it by its weight, and it then became established.

1 On the development of the primacy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see Döllinger, Janus, p. 107 ff. (Schwane, Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters, p. 530 ff.). How much stronger was the Gregorian party in the eleventh century than the Pseudoisidorian in the ninth, and how much more revolutionary and aware of his aim was Gregory VII. than Nicolas I.! "He was the first who, with full, clear consciousness, was determined to introduce a new condition of things into the Church by new means. He regarded himself not merely as the reformer of the Church, but as the divinely chosen founder of an order of things such as had never before existed.” His chief means were Synods held by the Pope (this was begun by Leo IX.) and new ecclesiastical law-books. The nephew of Pope Alexander II., Anselm of Lucca, became the founder of the new Gregorian Church law, this being effected by him partly by making apt use of that of Pseudoisidore, and partly by a new set of fictions (e.g., that the episcopacy everywhere originated from Peter) and forgeries. He was followed by Deusdedit, Bonizo, and Cardinal Gregorius. Deusdedit formulated the new principle, that contradictions in the traditional Church law must always be harmonised by letting, not the older, but the greater authority, that is, the dictum of the Pope cancel the opposite view. In this way the autocracy of the Popes was established. On the series of new fictions and falsifications of the old tradition, see

beside the old canons,1 nay even beside the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Yet, strictly speaking, the measure of their authority remained still quite uncertain, and prior to Innocent III. dogmatic questions were not treated in them, or treated only very seldom, while the Popes in general, in the period of 150 years from the Synod of Sutri till 1198, had their hands fully occupied with establishing the Roman autocratic and monastic Church order. 2

In developing itself as the supreme court of jurisdiction, the papacy could never have obtained in the Church, which assuredly is fellowship in faith and worship, monarchical rule as regards faith and morals, had not the amalgamation of dogma and law become perfect in this period. It was not the Popes who brought about this fusion; they merely turned to account a mode of view which prevailed everywhere, and from which scarcely an individual dissented. In what has been represented from the beginning of Book II. of our Second Part, it has been shown that the legal view of religion was an old inheritance of the Latin Church; religion is lex dei, lex Christi. In principle, it is true, this view had been radically corrected by Augustinianism; but Augustine himself allowed the legal schemes to remain in many important particulars. Then there followed the mission of the Western Church among the foreign nations, pagan and Arian. With these it came into contact, not merely as an institution

Janus, p. 12 ff. Specially important is the way in which history was induced to furnish testimony in proof of the infallibility of the papal decretals, and in which even Augustine was pronounced an authority for this new doctrine (p. 119 ff.). A sentence of his was so manipulated that it came to mean that the papal letters stood on a level with canonical Scripture. Since then the defenders of the infallibility of the Pope, to which Gregory VII. already made a distinct claim, and, indeed, treated it as concessum (p. 124 ff.), have always appealed to Augustine. Indeed, Gregory VII., following an earlier precedent, ciaimed for the Popes a complete personal holinessfor they have all that Peter had-and the Pope's holiness, in addition to his infallibility, was so boldly taught by the Gregorians (imputation of the merit of Peter) that anything stronger in the way of claim became impossible.

1 Alexander II. wrote to King Philip of France, requesting him to rank the papal decrees along with the canons; see Jaffé, Regesta, 2 Edit., Nr. 4525.

2 The Lateran Synods of 1123, 1139, 1179, contain nothing whatever of a dogmatic character (excepting the twenty-seventh canon of the Council of 1179, which urges the extermination of the Cathari, but says nothing of their doctrine); see Mansi XXI., XXII., Hefele V.2, pp. 378 ff., 438 ff., 710 ff.