ably to be chofen, and the practice of it to be recommended necef→ farily above all things; and yet they could never clearly and fatiffactorily make out, upon what principles originally, and for what end ultimately, this choice was to be made, and upon what grounds it was univerfally to be fupported. Hence they perpetually * difagreed, opposed, and contradicted one another in all their difputations to fuch a degree, that St. Auftin fomewhere out of Varro reckons up no less than 280 opinions concerning that one question, what was the chief good or final happiness of man. The effect of all which differences could not, without doubt, but be a mighty hindrance to that conviction and general influence which that great truth, in the certainty whereof they all clearly agreed (namely, that the practice of virtue was neceffary and indifpenfable), ought to have had upon the minds and lives of men. This whole matter is excellently fet forth by Lactantius: "The philofophers," faith + he, "take them all together, did indeed discover all the particular "doctrines of true religion; but, because each one endeavoured to "confute what the others afferted, and no one's fingle scheme was in all its parts confiftent, and agreeable to reafon and truth; "and none of them were able to collect into one whole and entire "scheme the several truths difperfed among them all, therefore "they were not able to maintain and defend what they had dif"covered." And again; having fet down a brief fummary of the whole doctrine and defign of true religion, from the original to the confummation of all things; "this entire fcheme," fays he, "because the philofophers were ignorant of, therefore they were "not able to comprehend the truth; notwithstanding that they "faw and discovered fingly almost all the particulars of which the "whole scheme confifts. But this was done by different men and "at different times, and in different manners;" (with various mixtures of different errors, in what every one discovered of truth fingly ;) and without finding the connexion of the causes, and confequences and reasons of things; from the mutual dependencies of which the compleatness and perfection of the whole fcheme arifes. Whereas, had there been any man, who could have collected and put together in order all the feveral truths which were taught fingly and fcatteredly by philofophers of all the different fects, and have "Nec, quid defendere debeant, fcientes; nec quid refutare. Incurfantque paffim fine “ delectu omnia quæ afferunt, quicunque diffentiunt." Lactant. lib. VII. "Totam igitur veritatem, & omne divinæ religionis arcanum philofophi attigerunt. Sed aliis refellentibus, defendere id, quod invenerant, nequiverunt; quia fingulis ratio “non quadravit ; nec ea, quæ vera fenferant, in fummam redigere potuerunt." Lactant. lib. VII. ‡ “Quam fummam, quia philofophi non comprehenderunt; nec veritatem comprehendere potuerunt; quamvis ea ferè, quibus fumma ipfa conftat, & viderint & explicaverint. “Sed diverfi ac diversè illa omnia protulerunt, non annectentes nec caufas rerum, nec con“ fequentias, nec rationes; ut fummam illam, quæ continet univerfa, & compingerent & complerent." Lactant. lib. VII. ❝ Quod fi extitiffet aliquis qui veritatem fparfam per fingulos, per sectasque diffufam, colligeret in unum, ac redigeret in corpus; is profecto non diffentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nifi veri peritus ae fciens, poteft. Verum autem non nifi ejus fcire eft, qui fit doctus a Deo." Id. ibid. made made up out of them one entire confiftent fcheme; truly he would not have differed much from us Chriftians; but this, it was not poffible for any man to do, without having the true fyftem of things firft revealed to him. 5. AND THOSE THINGS WHICH THEY WERE ABLE TO PROVE - AND EXPLAIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY ENOUGH, YET THEY HAD NOT SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IN PRACTICE. Laftly even thofe things, which the philofophers were not only themfelves certain of, but which they have alfo been able to prove and explain to others, with fufficient clearnefs and plainnefs; fuch as are the most obvious and neceffary duties of life; they have not yet had authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon men's minds with fo ftrong an impreffion as to influence and govern the general practice of the world. The truths which they proved by fpeculative reafon * wanted ftill fome more fenfible authority, to back them, and make them of more force and efficacy in practice; and the + precepts which they laid down, however evidently reafonable and fit to be obeyed, feemed ftill to want weight, and to be but the precepts of men. Hence none of the philofophers, even of those who taught the cleareft and certaineft truths, and offered the best and wifeft inftructions, and enforced them with the strongeft motives that could be, were yet ever able to work any remarkable change in the minds and lives of any confiderable part of mankind; as the preaching of Chrift and his apoftles undeniably did. Nor does it appear in hiftory, that § any number of Socrates's or Plato's followers were convinced of the excellency of true virtue, or the certainty of its final reward, in fuch a manner as to be willing to lay down their lives for its fake as innumerable of the difciples of Chrift are known to have done. In fpeculation, indeed, it may perhaps feem poffible, that, notwithstanding it must be con feffed philofophy cannot difcover any complete and fatisfactory remedy for paft mifcarriages, yet the precepts and motives offered by the best philofophers might at leaft be fufficient to amend and reform men's manners for the future. But in experience and prac Platonis documenta, quamvis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum habent fir "mitatis ad probandam & implendam veritatem." Lactant. lib. VII. ተ "Quid ergo? nihilne illi [philofophi] fimile præcipiunt? Imo permulta, & ad verum frequenter accedunt. Sed nihil ponderis habent illa præcepta, quia funt humana; " & auctoritate majori, id eft, divina illa carent. Nemo igitur credit; quia tam fe ho"minem putat effe qui audit, quam eft ille qui præcipit." Lactant. lib. III. † Εἴποιμι δ ̓ ἂν ἀληθεύειν τὰς δυνηθείας διαθεῖναι τῆς ἀκροατὲς τῶν λεγομένων ὅτω βιούλας, τέτων ὅπως ἐχόντων. Διατίθενται Ἰνδαῖοι καὶ Χριςιανοὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καλομίχας μέλλον ο ανε - δεικνύτω ἦν καὶ Κίλσον, ἡ ὁ βελόμενον, τίνες διετέθησαν περὶ αἰωνίων κολάσεων, ὑπὸ τῶν τελείων κα Musalu. Origen, adverf. Celf. lib. VIII. Παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τις Φαίδων, καὶ ἐκ μία εἰ δεύτερῶν. καὶ εἰς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτου και μοχθηροτάτω βία ἐφιλοσόφησαν παρεὶ δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ, οὐ μόνον τότε οι δώδεκα, αλλ' αἰτὶ πολλαπλασίες οἵτινες γενόμενοι σωφρόνων χορός. Idem, lib. 111. "Da mihi virum qui fit iracundus, &c. Numquis hæc philofophorum, &c." Lactant. lib. III. See this paffage cited above, p. 192. § Σωκράτει μὲν γὰρ ἐδεῖς ἐπιςεύθη ὑπερ τούτε το δόγμασι ἀποθνήσκειν. Χρισῷ δὲ τῷ καὶ ἀπὸ Σωκράτης ἀπὸ μέρος γνωσθέντι ο φιλόσοφοι οὐδὲ φιλολόγοι μόνον ἐπείσθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παγίελῶς ἰδιῶται dns posa y Javáty xala‡g:vhoanis. Justin. Apolog. 1. tice it hath on the contrary appeared to be altogether impoffible, for philofophy and bare reafon to reform mankind effectually, without the affiftance of fome higher principle For, though the bare natural poffibility of the thing cannot indeed eafily be denied; yet in this cafe (as Cicero excellently expreffes * it), in like manner as in phyfic, it matters nothing, whether a disease be such as that no man does, or no man can recover from it; fo neither does it make any difference, whether by philofophy no man is, or no man can be made wife and good. So that, without fome greater help and affiftance, mankind is plainly left in a very bad ftate. Indeed, in the original uncorrupted ftate of human nature, before the mind of man was depraved with prejudicate opinions, corrupt affections, and vitipus inclinations, cuftoms and habits; right reafon may justly be fuppofed to have been a fufficient guide, and a principle powerful enough to preferve men in the conftant practice of their duty. But, in the prefent circumstances and condition of mankind, the wifeft and moft fenfible of the philofophers themselves have not been backward to complain, that they found the understandings of men fo dark and cloudy, their wills fo biaffed and inclined to evil, their paffions to outragious and rebelling against reafon, that they looked upon the rules and laws of right reafon as very hardly practicable, and which they had very little hopes of ever being able to perfuade the world to fubmit to. In a word, they confeffed that human nature was ftrangely corrupted; and they acknowledged this corruption to be a disease whereof they knew not the true cause, and could not find out a fufficient remedy. So that the great duties of religion were laid down by them as matters of fpeculation and difpute, rather than as the rules of action; and not fo much urged upon the hearts and lives of men, as propofed to the admiration of those, who thought them hardly poffible to be effectually practifed by the generality of men. To remedy all thefe diforders, and conquer all thefe corruptions, there was plainly wanting fome extraordinary and fupernatural affiftance which was above the reach of bare reafon and philofophy to procure, and yet without which the philofophers themselves were fenfible there could never be any truly great men. VII. For these reafons, there was plainly wanting a divine Revelation, to recover mankind out of their univerfally degenerate eftate, into a ftate fuitable to the original excellency of their nature. Which divine Revelation, both the neceflities of men, and their natural notions of God, gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for; as appears from the acknowledgments which the beft and wifeft of the Heathen philofophers themselves have made, of their fense of the neceffity and want of fuch a revelation; and from their "Nam fi, confenfu omnium philofophorum, fapientiam nemo affequitur; in fummis "malis omnes fumus, quibus vos optimè confultum a Diis immortalibus dicitis. Nam ut "nihil intereft utrum nemo valeat, an nemo poffit valere; fic non intelligo quid interfit, ❝ utrum nemo fit fapiens, an nemo effe poffit." Cic. de Natura Deor. lib. III. "Nemo unquam vir magnus, fine divino afflatu fuit," Cicero. 5 expreffions expreffions of the hopes they had entertained, that God would fome time or other vouchsafe it unto them. 1. A DIVINE REVELATION ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE RECOVERY OF MANKIND. There was plainly wanting a divine Revelation, to recover mankind out of their universal corruption and degeneracy; and without fuch a revelation, it was not poffible that the world fhould ever be effectually reformed. For if (as has been before particularly fhewn) the grofs and ftupid ignorance, the innumerable prejudices and vain opinions, the strong paffions and appetites of fenfe, and the many vitious cuftoms and habits, which the generality of mankind continually labour under, make it undeniably too difficult a work for men of all capacities to difcover every one for himself, by the bare light of nature, all the particular branches of their duty; but moft men, in the present state of things, have manifeftly need of much teaching, and particular inftruction: if thofe who were beft able to difcover the truth and inftruct others therein, namely the wifest and beft of the philofophers, were themselves unavoidably altogether ignorant of fome doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, abfolutely neceffary to the bringing about that great end, the reformation of mankind: if thofe truths, which they were themselves very certain of, they were not yet able to prove and explain clearly enough to vulgar underftandings: if even thofe things which they -proved fufficiently, and explained with all clearnefs, they had not yet authority enough to inforce and inculcate upon men's minds with fo ftrong an impreffion, as to influence and govern the general practice of the world; nor pretended to afford men any fupernatural affiftance, which yet was very neceffary to fo great a work: and if, After all, in the difcovery of fuch matters as are the great motives of religion, men are apt to be more eafily worked upon, and more ftrongly affected, by good teftimony, than by the stricteft abftra&t arguments; fo that, upon the whole, it is plain the philofophers were never by any means well qualified to reform mankind with any confiderable fuccefs: then there was evidently wanting fome particular revelation, which might fupply all thefe defects: there was plainly a neceffity of fome particular revelation, to discover in what manner, and with what kind of external fervice, God might acceptably be worshiped there was a neceffity of some particular revelation to discover what expiation God would accept for fin; by which the authority, honour, and dignity of his laws might be effectually vindicated there was a neceffity of fome particular revelation, to † give men full affurance of the truth of thofe great motives of religion, the rewards and punishments of a future ftate; * Νομοθέτης ὅτις νῶν κίκλα, οπότε μὴ τολμήση καινοτομῶν ἐπὶ θεοσέβειαν, ἥτις μὴ σαφὲς ἔχει τι τρίψαι πόλιν ἑαυτῶν μηδὲν τοπαράπαν εἰδὼς, ὥσπερ εἰὸ ὂν δυνατὸν εἰδέναι τῇ θνητῇ φύσει τῶν τοιύτων wig. Plato in Epinomide. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα [θεῶν θεραπείας] ἔτ ̓ ἐπισάμεθα ἡμεῖς, οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισό μεθα των νοῦν ἔχομεν, οὐδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητή, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ τῷ παλεία Θεώ. Plato de Republ. lib. IV. + Τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὦ ξένε, διαχωρίζεσθαι ταῦτα ὅπως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητώνων, Θεῖ ἰτι. Plato de Legib. lib. 1. which, notwithstanding the strongest arguments of reafon, men could not yet forbear doubting of: in fine, there was a neceffity of fome particular divine revelation, to * make the whole doctrine of religion clear and obvious to all capacities, to add weight and authority to the plaineft precepts, and to furnish men with extraor dinary affiftances to enable them to overcome the corruptions of their nature. And without the affiftance of fuch a revelation, it is manifeft, it was not poffible that the world could ever be effectually reformed. "Ye may even give over," faith Socrates +," all hopes "all "of amending men's manners for the future, unless God be pleased "to fend you fome other perfon to inftruct you." And Plato: "Whatever," faith he ‡,"is fet right and as it fhould be, in the "prefent evil ftate of the world, can be fo only by the particular "interpofition of God." 2. THAT IT WAS AGREEABLE TO THE DICTATES OF NATURE AND RIGHT REASON, TO EXPECT OR HOPE FOR SUCH A DIVINE REVELATION. Since therefore there was plainly and confeffedly wanting a divine revelation, to relieve the neceffities of men in their natural ftate; and fince no man can prefume to fay, that it is inconfiftent with any of the attributes of God, or unbecoming the wisdom of the Creator of all things, to fupply that want; to reveal to his creatures more fully the way to happiness; to make more particular difcoveries of his will to them; to fet before them, in a clearer light, the rewards and punishments of a future ftate; to explain in what manner he will be pleafed to be worshiped; and to declare what fatisfaction he will accept for fin, and upon what conditions he will receive returning finners; nay fince, on the contrary, it feems more fuitable to our natural notions of the goodness and mercy of God, to fuppofe that he fhould do all this, than not: it follows undeniably, that it was most reafonable, and agreeable to the dictates of nature, to expect or hope for fuch a divine revelation. generality of the heathen world, who were far more equal and lefs prejudiced judges in this matter, than modern Deifts, were fo fully perfuaded, that the great rules for the conduct of human life muft receive their authority from heaven, that their chief law-givers thought it not a fufficient recommendation of their laws, that they were agreeable to the light of nature, unless they pretended alfo, that they received them from God. But I have no need, in this argument, to make use of the examples of idolatrous law-givers. The philofophers themselves, the best and wifeft, and the leaft fuperftitious of them, that ever lived, were not afhamed to confefs openly their fenfe of the want of a divine revelation; and to de The Τοῦτο δὴ ἔν τὸ μέρος, φαμεν φύσει κυριώτατον, καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οὖν τε μάλισα καὶ ἄριζα μαλεῖν, διδάσκοι τις ἀλλ' εδ' ἂν διδάξειν, εἰ μὴ Θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο. Plato in Epinomide. † Εἶτὰ τὸν λοιπὸν ζόν ο καθεύδολες στιλεῖς ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὑμῖν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιπέμψειε, κηδία Plato in Apolog. Socratis. † Εὖ γὰρ μὴ εἰδίνει, ὅ,τι περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖς ἐν τοιαύτῃ κατατάσει πολιτειών, Θεα μá ar aïti où a. Plato de Republ. lib. VI. clare |