certainly mistaken: for Socrates undoubtedly fpake this in mockery of Æfculapius; looking upon death as his trueft deliverance. Plato, after having delivered very noble and almost divine truths concerning the nature and attributes of the fupreme God, * weakly advises men to worship likewife inferior gods, dæmons, and fpirits; and dared not to condemn the worshiping even of statues alfo and images, dedicated according to the laws of their country; as if the honour they paid to lifeless idols, could procure the favour and good-will of fuperior intelligences. And fo the cor rupted and spoiled the best phifofophy in the world, by adding idolatry to that worship, which he had wifely and bravely before proved to be due to the Creator of all things. After him, Cicero, the greateft and best philofopher that Rome or perhaps any other nation ever produced, allowed § men to continue the idolatry of their anceftors; advised them to conform themselves to the fuperftitious religion of their country, in offering fuch facrifices to different gods, as were by law established; and ** disapproves and finds fault with the Perfian magi, for burning the temples of the Grecian gods, and afferting that the whole univerfe was God's temple. In all which, he fondly contradicts himself, by ++ inexcufably complying with the practices of thofe men, whom in many of his writings he largely and excellently proves to be extremely foolish upon account of thofe very practices. And to mention no more (for indeed thofe of a lower rank, the Minuter philofophers, as Tully calls them, are not worth the mentioning); that admirable, moralift Epictetus, who, for a true fenfe of virtue, feems to have had no fuperior in the heathen world; even he also ‡‡ advises men to offer libations and facrifices to the gods, every one according to the religion and custom of his country. AND IN WHAT METHOD GOD WOULD BE RECONCILED TO RETURNING SINNERS. But ftill more particularly that which of all other things, these best and wifeft of the philofophers were most abfolutely and una * Πρῶτον μὲν, φαμέν, τιμῶς τὰς μετ' ὀλυμπίας τε καὶ τὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχονίας θεος, τοῖς χθονίας ὧν τις θεοῖς ἄρια καὶ δεύτερα νὰ ἀριστερὰ νέμων, ὀρθόταλα τὰ τῆς ἐνσιβείας σκοπού τυγχάνει Μιὰ θεῖς δὲ τέσδε, καὶ τοῖς δεύμασιν ἐγ' έμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' αν- --Επακολυθεί δ' αὐτοῖς ἱδρύματα ἴδια παλαίων Τιῶν κατά νόμον ὀργιαζόμενα. Plato de Legib. lib. IV. † Τὰς μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ὁρῶνίες σαφῶς, τιμῶμεν. τῶν δὲ εἰκόνας ἀγάλματα ἱδρυτάμενοι, ὡς ὑμῖν ἀγάλλεσι, καίπερ ἀψύχους ὅλας, ἐκείνους ἡγόμεθα τὸς ἐμψύχους θεὸς πολλὴν διὰ τους εὔνοιας κα Xov xv. Plato de Legib. lib. XI. † τὰ πλάτωνι οὐκ ἐπιθάνως μὲν εἰρήμενα, εἰ μὴν καὶ διέθεντο τὸν φιλόσοφον ἀξίως κἂν αὐτῷ ἀνας ρα φῆναι ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων ευσεβείᾳ, ἣν ἐχρῶν μὴ νοθεύειν, μηδὲ μάτιν τῇ εἰδωλολαιρεία. Orig. adverf. Celf. lib. VI. "A patribus acceptos Deos placet coli." Cic. de Legib. lib. II. "Item illud ex inftitatis pontificum & arufpicum non mutandum cft, quibus hoftiis "immolandum cuique Deo." Id. ibid. **Nec fequor magos Perfarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammaffe templa Græciæ "dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quorum hic mundus omnis templum effet & "domus. Melius Græci atque noftri, qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, eafdem illos, "quas nos, urbes incolere voluerunt." Id. ibid. ++" Video te, Cicero, terrena & manufacta venerari. Vana effe intelligis, & tamen "eadem facis, quæ faciunt ipfi, quos ipfe fultiffimos confiteris.-Si libenter errant etiam ii, qui errare fe fentiunt, quanto magis vulgus indoctum ?” Lactant. lib. II. † Σπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν, καὶ ἀπάρχεσθαι καλὰ τὰ πάτρια ἑκάστῳ προσήκει. Epictet. cap. 38. voidably voidably ignorant of, and yet which of all other things was of the greatest importance for finful men to know, was the method by which fuch as have erred from the right way, and have offended God, may yet again restore themselves to the favour of God, and to the hopes of happinefs. From the confideration of the goodnefs and mercifulness of God, the philofophers did indeed very reafonably hope, that God would fhew himself placable to finners, and might be fome way reconciled; but when we come to enquire more particularly, what propitiation he will accept, and in what manner this reconciliation must be made, here nature ftops, and expects with impatience the aid of fome particular revelation. I hat God will receive returning finners, and accept of repentance instead of perfect obedience, they cannot certainly know, to whom he has not declared that he will do fo. For though this be the most probable and only means of reconciliation that nature fuggefts; yet whether this will be alone fufficient, or whether God will not require fomething further, for the vindication of his juftice, and of the honour and dignity of his laws and government, and for the expreffing more effectually his indignation against fin, before he will restore men to the privileges they have forfeited, they cannot be fatisfactoTily affured. For it cannot pofitively be proved from any of God's attributes, that he is abfolutely obliged to pardon all creatures all their fins at all times barely and immediately upon their repenting. There arifes therefore from nature no fufficient comfort to finners, but anxious and endless folicitude about the means of appeafing the Deity. Hence thofe divers ways of facrificing, and numberlefs fuperftitions, which over-fpread the face of the heathen world, but were fo little fatisfactory to the wifer part of mankind, even in those times of darkness, that the more confidering philofophers could not forbear frequently declaring, that they thought those rights could avail little or nothing towards appeafing the wrath of a provoked God, or making their prayers acceptable in his fight; but that fomething ftill feemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what. * 3. AND OTHER DOCTRINES ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN OR DER TO REFORM MANKIND, THE BEST PHILOSOPHERS WERE VERY DOUBTFUL AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT. Some other doctrines abfolutely neceffary likewife to the bringing about this great end of the reformation of mankind; though there was indeed fo much proof and evidence of the truth of them to be drawn from reafon, as that the best philofophers could not by any means be entirely ignorant of them; yet fo much doubtfulness, uncertainty, and unfteadinefs, was there in the thoughts and affertions of these philofophers concerning them, as could not but very much diminish their proper effect and influence upon the hearts and lives of men. I inftance in the immortality of the foul, the * See Plato's Alcibiades 2, throughout. "Præterea nihil apud eos certi eft, nihil quod à fcientia ven`at ;—& nemo paret, quia nemo vult ad incertum laborare." Lactant. lib. III. certainty of a future ftate, and the rewards and punishments to be diftributed in a life to come. The arguments, which may be drawn. from reason and from the nature of things, for the proof of these great truths, feem really (as I have before fhewn) to come very little fhort of ftrict demonftration; and accordingly the wifeft philofophers (as has likewife been fhewn before) did indeed fometimes feem to have reasoned themselves into a firm belief of them, and to have been fully convinced of their certainty and reality, even so far as to apply them to excellent purposes and ufes of life. But then, on the other hand, a man cannot, without fome pity and concern of mind, obferve how ftrangely at other times the weight of the fame arguments feems to have flipt (as it were) out of their minds; and with what wonderful diffidence, wavering, and unsteadiness, they difcourfe about the fame things.. I do not here think it of any very great moment, that there were indeed fome whole fects of philofophers, who abfolutely denied the immortality of the foul, and peremptorily rejected all kind of expectation of a life to come (though, to be fure, this could not but in fome measure fhock the common people, and make them entertain fome fufpicion about the ftrength of the arguments used on the other fide of the queftion by wifer men; yet) I fay, it cannot be thought of any very great moment, that fome whole fects of philofophers did indeed absolutely deny the immortality of the foul; because these men were weak reafoners in other matters alfo, and plainly low and contemptible philofophers, in comparison of thofe greater geniufes we are now fpeaking of. But that which I now obferve, and which I fay cannot be observed without fome pity and concern of mind, is this, that even those great philofophers themselves, the very best and wisest, and moft confiderate of them that ever lived, notwithstanding the undeniable strength of the arguments which fometimes convinced them of the certainty of a future ftate, did yet at other times express themselves with fo much hefitancy and unfteadinefs concerning it, as, without doubt, could not but extremely hinder the proper effe&t and influence which that most important confideration ought to have upon the hearts and lives of men. "I am now," faid Socrates, a little before his death *, "about to leave this world; and ye are ftill to continue in it: which of us have the better part "allotted us, God only knows :"+feeming to express fome doubtfulness, whether he fhould have any exiftence after death, or not. And again, at the end of his moft admirable difcourfe concerning the immortality of the foul; "I would have you to know," faid he to his friends who came to pay him their laft vifit ‡, "that I "have great hopes I am now going into the company of good men ; yet I would not be too peremptory and confident concerning it. 66 * Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανωμένω, ὑμῖν βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον warti wa T. Plato in Apolog. Socr. + Qod præter Deos negat fcire quenquam, fcit ipfe, utrum melius fit; nam dixit "ante. Sed fuum illud, nihil ut affirmet, tenet ad extremum." Cic. Tufc. Qu. lib. I. 1 Νῦν δὲ 5 ἔσε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀμίξεσθαι ἀγαθὸς ἢ τότο μὲν ἐκ ὢν πάνω διίσχυρι sai. Plato in Phæd. "But “But if death be only as it were a tranfmigration from hence "into another place, and thofe things, which are told us, be in deed true, that those who are dead to us do all live there; then, " &c." So likewife Cicero, fpeaking of the fame fubject: "I will ❝ endeavour," faith the," to explain what you defire; yet I would "not have you depend upon what I fhall fay as certain and in"fallible; but I may guess, as other men do, at what fhall feem "most probable; and further than this, I cannot pretend to go." Again which of thofe two opinions," faith ‡ he, that the foul is mortal, or that it is immortal], "be true, God only knows ; which of them is: moft probable, is a very great question." And again, in the fame difcourfe, having brought all thofe excellent arguments before-mentioned in proof of the immortality of the foul; "Yet we ought not," faith § he, " to be over-confident of it :''for "it often happens that we are strongly affected at first with an "acute argument; and yet, a little while after, ftagger in our judge"ment and alter our opinion, even in clearer matters than these ; for these things must be confefled to have fome obfcurity in "them." And again: "I know not how," faith he , "when I "read the arguments in proof of the foul's immortality, methinks, "I am fully convinced; and yet, after I have laid afide the book, “and come to think and confider of the matter alone by myself, "prefently I find myfelf fallen again infenfibly into my old doubts." From all which it appears, that, notwithstanding all the bright arguments and acute conclufions, and brave fayings of the best philofophers; yet life and immortality were not fully and fatiffactorily brought to light by bare natural reafon; but men still plainly ftood in need of fome farther and more compleat difcovery. 4. AND THOSE THINGS WHICH THEY WERE INDEED CERTAIN OF, YET THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVE AND EXPLAIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY ENOUGH. Thofe things which the philofophers were indeed the most fully certain of, and did in good meafure underftand; fuch as the obligations of virtue, and the will of God in matters of morality; yet they were never able to prove and explain clearly and diftin&tly * Εἰ δ ̓ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι ἐσιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς aça in dou zárkis él tilviūtis, &c. Plato in Apolog. Socrat. +"Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo ; nec tamen quah Pythius Apollo, certa ut fint "& fixa quæ dixero; fed ut homunculus unus e multis, probabilia conjectura fequens. "Ultra enim quo progrediar, quam ut verifimilia videam, non habeo." Cic. Tufc. Quæft. lib. I. "Harum fententiarum quæ vera fit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ verifimillima, magna "quæft o eft." Id. ibid. "Etfi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movémur enim fæpe aliquo acutè conclufo: la"bamus mutamufque fententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his eft enim aliqua ob"fcuritas." Id. ibid. "Nefcio quomodo, dum lego, affentior; cum pofui librum, & mecum ipfc de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, affenfio omnis illa elabitur? Id. ibid. **" Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratifimam [animæ immor talitatem] promittentium magis quam probantium." Senec. epift. 1026/ "Adeo omnis illa tunc fapientia Socratis, de induftria venerat confultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis." Tertullian. de Anima. 04 enough, enough, to persons of all capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation. First, because most of their difcourfes upon thefe fubjects have been rather fpeculative and learned, nice and fubtle difputes, than practical and univerfally useful inftructions. They proved, by ftrict and nice argumentation, that the practice of virtue is wife and reafonable and fit to be chofen; ra ther than that it is of plain, neceffary, and indifpenfable obligation; and were able to deduce the will of God only by fuch abftract and fubtle reasonings as the generality of men had by no means either abilities or opportunities to underftand or be duly affected by. Their very profeffion and manner of life led them to make their philofophy rather an entertainment of leifure time, a trial of wit and parts, an exercife of eloquence, and of the art and fkill of good fpeaking; than an endeavour to reform the manners of men, by fhewing them their plain and neceffary duty. And accordingly the ftudy of it was, as Cicero + himself obferves, unavoidably confined to a few, and by no means fitted for the bulk and common fort of mankind, who, as they cannot judge of the true ftrength of nice and abstract arguments, fo they will always be fufpicious of fome fallacy in them. None ‡ but men of parts and learning, of ftudy and liberal education, have been able to profit by the fublime doctrine of Plato, or by the subtle difputations of other philofophers; whereas the doctrine of morality, which is the rule of life and manners, ought to be plain, easy, and familiar, and fuited fully to the capacities of all men. Secondly, another reason why the philofophers were never able to proye and explain clearly and diftinctly enough, even thofe things of which they were the moft certain, to perfons of all capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation, was because they never were able to frame to themselves any complete, regular, and confiftent fyftem or fcheme of things; but the truths which they taught, were § fingle and scattered, accidental as it were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any knowledge of the whole true ftate of things; and confequently lefs univerfally convictive. Nothing could be more certain (as they all well knew), than that virtue was unquestion * "Profeco omnis iftorum difputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis & fcientiæ contineat, tamen collata cum horum [qui rempublicam gubernant] actis perfectifque "rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attuliffe negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum "oble&ationem quandam otii." Cic. de Repub, fragm. "Eft, inquit Cicero, philofophia papcis contenta judicibus, multitudinem confulto ipfa fugiens.-Maximum itaque argumentum eft, philofophiam neque ad fapientiam tendere, neque ipfam effe fapientiam; quod myfterium ejus, barba tantum celebratur & "pallio." Lactant. lib. III. † Ὀλίγες μὲν ὠνησεν ἡ περικαλλὴς καὶ ἐπιτηδευμένη Πλάτωνῷ λέξις πλείονας δὲ ἡ τῶν εὐτελέσερον μα και πραγματικῶς καὶ ἐςοχασμένως τῶν πολλῶν διδαξάνων και γραψάντων· ἔςι γῶν ἰδῶν, τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ἐν χερσὶ τῶν δικώντων εἶναι ψιλολόγων μήναν. Orig. adverf. Cell. lib. VI. Αγροικότερον εἰπὼν ὁ Ἰησᾶς, τῷ θέλοντι τὸν χιτῶνε σε λαβεῖν, ἄφες ἡ τὸ ἱμάτιον, βιωφελέςερον κεκίνηκεν τὸν λόγον καὶ παρέςησεν ὕτως εἰπων, ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Κρίτων. Πλάτων, ὦ μην ̓ ἀκύειν ἰδιῶται δύνανται, ἀλλὰ μόγις οἱ τὰ ἐγκύκλιὰ πρὸς τῆς σεμνής Ελλήνων φιλοσοφίας μεμαθηκότες. Id. lib. VII. § Ουκ ὅτι ἀλλότριά ότι τα Πλάτωνος διδάγματα τα Χρισῦ ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι ἐκ ἔςι πάντη ὅμοια, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἕνας γὰρ τίς, ἀπὸ μέρος το σπερματικά θεία λόγω τὸ συγγινὲς ὁρῶν, καλάς ἐφθέγξαλ. Οἱ δὲ τἀναντία αὐτοῖς ἐν κυρικτέροις εἰρηκότες, εκ ἐπισήμην τὴν ἀποπίαν καὶ γνῶσιν τὴν ἀγές Meglov pairsja loxnxivat. Justin. Apolog. 1. ably |