any fufficient encouragement to fupport men effectually in that choice. Brave indeed and admirable were the things which fome of the philofophers have faid upon this fubject; and which fome very few extraordinary men (of which Regulus is a remarkable inftance) feem to have made good in their practice, even beyond the common abilities of human nature: but it is very plain (as I before intimated) that the general practice of virtue in the world can never be supported upon this foot; it being indeed neither poffible nor truly reasonable that men by adhering to virtue fhould part with their lives, if thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all poffibility of receiving any advantage from that adherence. Virtue, it is true, in its proper feat, and with all its full effects and confequences unhindered, must be confeffed to be the chief good; as being truly the enjoyment as well as the imitation of God. But, as the practice of it is circumftantiated in this prefent world, and in the prefent ftate of things; it is plain it is not itself the chief good, but only the means to it; as running in a race, is not itself the prize, but the way to obtain it. 3. FROM WHENCE THE CERTAINTY OF A FUTURE STATE IS AGAIN CONCLUDED. It is therefore abfolutely impoffible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final defign of God's creating fuch rational beings as men are; endued with fuch noble faculties, and fo neceffarily confcious of the eternal and unchangeable differences of good and evil: it is abfolutely impoffible (I fay) that the whole defign of an infinitely wife and juft and good God, in all this, fhould be nothing more than to keep up eternally a fucceffion of new generations of men; and thofe in fuch a corrupt, confufed, and diforderly ftate of things, as we fee the prefent world is in, without any due and regular obfervation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and moft neceffary differences of things, without any fufficient difcrimination of virtue and vice, by their proper and refpective fruits, and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God, in the proportionable reward of the beft, or punishment of the worft of men. And confequently it is certain and neceffary (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonftrated), that, inftead of the continuing an eternal fucceffion of new generations in the prefent form and state of things, there muft at fome time or other be fuch a revolution and renovation of things, fuch a future ftate of existence of the fame perfons, as that by an exact diftribution. * Οὐκ οἶδε ὅπως μακαρίες υπολάβω τὰς μηθὲν ἀπολαύσα]ας τῆς ὡς τῆς ἀγαθῆν· ἰ αὐτὴν καὶ ταύτην SAV85. Dionyf. Halicarn. +"Porro ipfa virtus, cum fibi bonorum culmen vendicat kumanorum, quid hic agi nifi perperba bella cum vitiis; nec exterioribus, fed interioribus; nec ali nis and plane oftris " & propriis ?-Abfit ergo, ut quamdiu in hoc bello intent to summ jam nos beatitudinem, ad quam vincendo volumus pervenire, adeptos effe circan An of n. de Civitate Dei, lib. XIX. c. 4. quoniam perveniri ad illud fine virtute non potek reft tami boni; of rewards and punishments therein, all the prefent disorders and inequalities may be fet right; and that the whole scheme of providence, which to us who judge of it by only one fmall portion of it, feems now fo inexplicable and much confufed, may appear at its confummation to be a defign worthy of infinite wisdom, juftice, and goodness. Without this, all comes to nothing. If this fcheme be once broken; there is no juftice, no goodness, no order, no reason, nor any thing upon which any argument in moral matters can be founded, left in the world. Nay, even though we fhould fet afide all confideration of the moral attributes of God, and confider only his natural perfections, his infinite knowledge and wisdom, as framer and builder of the world; it would even in that view only appear infinitely improbable, that God fhould have created fuch beings as men are, and indued them with fuch excellent faculties, and placed them on this globe of earth, as the only inhabitants for whofe fake this part at leaft of the creation is manifeftly fitted up and accommodated; and all this without any further de fign, than only for the maintaining a perpetual fucceffion of/such fhort-lived generations of mortals as we at prefent are; to live in the utmost confufion and diforder for a very few years, and then perish eternally into nothing. What I can be imagined more vain and empty? what more abfurd? what more void of all marks of wisdom, than the fabric of the world, and the creation of mankind, upon this fuppofition? But then, take in alfo the confideration of the moral attributes of God; and it amounts (as I have faid) to a complete demonftration, that there must be a future ftate. 6. WHY THE WISDOM OF GOD IS NOT SO CLEARLY AND PLAINLY SEEN IN HIS GOVERNMENT OF THE MORAL, AS IN THE FABRIC OF THE NATURAL WORLD. It may here at first fight feem to be a very strange thing, that through the fyftem of nature in the material, in the inanimate, in the irrational part of the creation, every fingle thing fhould have in itself so many and fo obvious, fo evident and undeniable marks of the infinitely accurate fkill and wifdom of their almighty creator; that from the brighteft ftar in the firmament of heaven, to the meaneft pebble upon the face of the earth, there is no one piece of matter which does not afford fuch inftances of admirable artifice and exact proportion and contrivance, as exceeds all the wit of man (I do not fay to imitate, but even) ever to be able fully to fearch out and comprehend; and yet, that in the management of the rational and moral world, for the fake of which all the reft was created, "Ita fit, ut fi ab illa rerum fumma, quam fuperiùs comprehendimus, aberraveris; omnis "ratio intereat, & ad nihilum omnia revertantur." Lactant. lib. VII. +"Non enim temerè, nec fortuito fati & creati fumus; fed profecto fuit quædam vis, quæ generi confuleret humano; nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum exantlaviffet " omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis malum fempiternum." Cic. Tusc. Quæft. lib 1. Si fine caufa gignimur; fi in hominibus procreandis providentia nulla vertatur; fi cafu "nobifmetipfis ac voluptatis noftræ gratia nafcimur; fi nihil poft mortem fumus: quid poteft effe tam fupervacuum, tam inane, tam vanum, quam humana res eti, quam mundus "ipfe" Lactant, lib. VII, VOL. IV. N and and is preferved only to be fubfervient to it, there should not in many ages be plain evidences enough, either of the, wifdom, or of the juftice and goodnefs of God, or of fo much as the interpofition of his divine Providence at all, to convince mankind clearly and generally of the world's being under his immediate care, infpection, and government. This, I fay, may indeed at firft fight feem very wonderful. But if we confider the matter more closely and attentively, it will appear not to be fo ftrange and astonishing as we are apt to imagine. For as, in a great machine, contrived by the skill of a confummate artificer, fitted up and adjusted with all conceivable accuracy for fome very difficult and deep-projected defign, and polithed and fine-wrought in every part of it with admirable niceness and dexterity; any man who faw and examined one or two wheels thereof, could not fail to obferve in thofe fingle parts of it the art and exact fkill of the work man; and yet the excellency of the end or use for which the whole was contrived, he would not at all be able, even though he was himself also a skilful artificer, to difcover and comprehend, without feeing the whole fitted up and put together fo though in every part of the natural world, confidered even fingle and unconnected, the wifdom of the great Creator fufficiently appears; yet his wifdom and juftice and goodness in the difpofition and government of the moral world, which neceffarily depends on the connexion and iffue of the whole scheme, cannot perhaps be diftinctly and fully comprehended by any finite and created beings, much lefs by frail and weak and fhort-lived mortals, before the period and accomplishment of certain great revolutions. But it is exceedingly reafonable to believe, that as the great difcoveries which by the diligence and fagacity of later ages have been made in aftronomy and natural philofophy, have opened furprizing fcenes of the power and wifdom of the Creator, beyond what men could poffibly have conceived or imagined in former times: fo at the unfolding of the whole fcheme of providence in the conclufion of this prefent ftate, men will be furprized with the amazing manifeftations of juftice and goodnefs, which will then appear to have run through the whole feries of God's government of the moral world. This is the chief and greatest argument, on which the natural proof of a future ftate of rewards and punishments must principally be founded. Yet there are alfo feveral other collateral evidences, which jointly confpire to render the fame thing extremely credible to mere natural reafon. As, 1. OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, AND THE NATURAL PROOFS WE HAVE OF IT. There is very great reafon, even from the bare nature of the thing itself, to believe the foul to be immortal; feparate from all moral arguments drawn from the attributes of God; and without any confideration of the general fyftem of the world, or of the univerfal order and conftitution, connexion and dependencies of things. The immortality of the foul has been commonly believed in all ages and in all places, by the unlearned part of all civilized people, and by the almoft general confent of all the most barbarous nations under heaven; from a tradition fo ancient and fo univerfal, as cannot be conceived to owe its original either to chance or to vain imagination, or to any other caufe than to the Author of Nature himfelf. And the moft learned and thinking part of mankind, at all times and in all countries, where the ftudy of philofophy has been in any measure cultivated, have almoft generally agreed, that it is capable of a juft proof from the abftract confideration of the nature and operations of the foul itfelf. That none of the known qualities of matter can, in any poffible variation, divifion, or compofition, produce fenfe and thought and reafon, is abundantly evident; as has been demonftrated in the former + discourse. That matter confifts of innumerable, divifible, feparable, and for the most part actually disjoined parts, is acknowledged by all philofophers. That, the powers and faculties of the foul being the moft remote and diflant from all the known properties of matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great violence upon our reafon, to imagine them fuperadded by Omnipotence to one and the fame fubftance, cannot eafily be denied. That it is highly unreasonable and abfurd, to fuppofe the foul made up of innumerable consciousneffes, as matter is neceffarily made up of innumerable parts; and, on the contrary, that it is highly reafonable to believe the feat of thought to be a fimple fubftance, fuch as cannot naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is manifeftly fubject to be, muft of neceffity be confeffed. Confequently the foul will not be liable to be diffolved at the diffolution of the body; and therefore it will naturally be immortal. All this feems to follow, at leaft with the highest degree of probability, from the fingle confideration of the foul's being endued with fenfe, thought or consciousness. "I cannot imagine," faith Cyrus (in that fpecch which Xenophon relates he made to his children a little before his death)," that the foul, while it is in this mortal body, lives; and "that when it is feparated from it, then it should die. I cannot "perfuade myself, that the foul, by being feparated from this body "which is devoid of fenfe, fhould thereupon become itfelf like"wife devoid of fenfe: on the contrary, it feems to me more rea"fonable to believe, that, when the mind is feparated from the 66 body, it should then become moft of all fenfible and intelligent:" But then further; if we take alfo into the confideration all the higher and nobler faculties, capacities, and improvements of the foul; the argument will ftill become much ftronger. "I am "Et primum quidem omni antiquitate, &c." Cic. Tafc. Qeft. lib. I. + Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God. See alto a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, with the feveral Anfwers and Replies. * ου τοι ἔγωίε, ὦ παίδες, ἐδὲ τῖτο πώποτε επείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴν ἕως ἐν ἐν θνητώ σώματι το ζ ὅταν δὲ τότε ἀπαλλαγή, τέθνηκεν. ουδί γε ὅπως ἀρρων ἔσαι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπειδὰν τῷ ἀνρνο σώμα είν για γένητα, εδὶ τότε πέπεισμαι. Αλλ' όταν άκρια και κατας ς ἐνῶς ἐκκριση, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον xig auth man. Cyrus apud Xen. N 2 "perfuaded," ". 66 "perfuaded," faith Cicero, "when I confider with what fwiftnefs of thought the foul is endued, with what a wonderful memory of things paft, and fore-caft of things to come; how many "arts, how many fciences, how many wonderful inventions it "has found out; that that nature, which is poffeffor of fuch facul"ties, cannot be mortal." Again; "the memory," faith + he, "which the foul has of things that have been, and its forefight of things that will be, and its large comprehenfion of things that at prefent are, are plainly divine powers: nor can the wit of man ever invent any way, by which these faculties could poffibly come "to be in men, but by immediate communication from God." Again; "though we fee not," faith the," the foul of man, as in"deed neither are we able to fee God; yet, as from the works of "God we are certain of his being; fo from the faculties of the foul, its memory, its invention, its fwiftnefs of thought, its noble "exercife of all virtues, we cannot but be convinced of its divine original and nature." And, fpeaking of the strength and beauty of that argument, which, from the wonderful faculties and capacities of the foul, concludes it to be of an immaterial and immortal nature; "Though all the vulgar and little philofophers in the "world," faith § he, " for fo I cannot but call all fuch, as diffent "from Plato and Socrates and thofe fuperior geniufes, fhould put "their heads together; they will not only never, while they live, "be able to explain any thing fo neatly and elegantly; but even "this argument itfelf, they will never have understanding enough fully to perceive and comprehend, how neat and beautiful and ftrong it is." The chief prejudice against the belief of the foul's exifting thus and living after the death of the body; and the fum of all the objections brought against this doctrine by the Epicurean philofophers of old, who denied the immortality of the foul; and by certain Atheistical perfons of late, who differ very little from them in their manner of reafoning; is this: that they cannot ap 66 * "Quid multa? Sic mihi perfuafi, fic fentio; quum tanta celeritas animorum fit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorum providentia, tot artes, tantæ fcientiæ, tot inventa; 66 non poffe eam naturam, quæ res eas contineat, effe mortalem." Cic. de Senectute. + "Quod & præterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti poffit præfentia; hæc divina "funt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire poffint, nifi a Deo." Idem, Tufc. Quæft. Lib. I. "Mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides; tamen, ut Deum "agnofcis ex operibus ejus, fic ex memoria rerum & inventione & celeritate motus, omni"que pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnofcito." Id. ibid. "Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philofophi (fic enim ii qui a Platone & Socrate & ab illa familia diffident, appellandi videntur): non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter ex"plicabunt, fed ne hoc quidem ipfum quam fubtiliter conclufum fit intelligent." Id. ibid. Si immortalis natura animai eft, "Et fentire poteft fecreta a corpore nottro; "Quinque (ut opinor) eam faciandum eft fenfibes au&am : At neque feorfum oculi, &c." Lucret. Lib. III. "Quod autem corpus animæ per fe? quæ materia? ubi cogitatio illi? quomodo vifus? auditus aut qui tangit? qui ufus ejus? aut quod fine his bonum?" Plin. lib. VII. "Neque aliud eft quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nifi quod Acqueunt qualis fit animus vacans corpore intelligere, & cogitatione comprehendere." Cic., Tufc. Quæft. lib. 1. ་་ prehend |
