does not at all concern himself in the government of the world, not "Nam privata dolore omni, privata perîclis, Lucret. lib. I. Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαξον, ὅτε αὐτὸ πράγματα έχει, ότε ἄλλῳ παρέχει ὥσε ετε εργαῖς, ότε χάρισε ourt. Laert. in vita Epicuri. Nor is the doctrine of thofe modern philofophers much different, who afcribe every thing to matter and motion, exclufive of final caufes, and fpeak of God as an "intelligentia fupramundana;" which is the very cant of Epicurus and Lucretius. intelligent intelligent caufe; but moreover that it depends every moment on fome fuperior being, for the prefervation of its frame; and that all the great motions in it are caused by fome immaterial power, not having originally impreffed a certain quantity of motion upon matter, but perpetually and actually exerting itfelf every moment in every part of the world. Which preferving and governing power, whether it be immediately the power and action of the fame fupreme. caufe that created the world, of him "without whom not a fparrow "falls to the ground, and with whom the very hairs of our head are "all numbered;" or whether it be the action of fome fubordinate: inftruments appointed by him to direct and prefide refpectively over certain parts thereof; does either way equally give us a very noble idea of providence. Thofe men indeed, who, merely through a certain vanity of philofophizing, have been tempted to embrace that other opinion, of all things being produced and continued only by a certain quantity of motion, originally impreffed on matter without any determinate defign or direction, and left to itself to form a world at adventures; thofe men, I fay, who, merely through a vanity of philofophizing, have been tempted to embrace that opinion, without attending whither it would lead them, ought not, indeed, to be directly charged with all the confequences of it. But it is certain, that many under that cover have really been Atheists; and the opinion itfelf (as I before faid) leads neceffarily and by unavoidable confequence to plain Atheim. For if God be an all-powerful, omniprefent, intelligent, wife, and free being (as it hath been before demonftrated that he neceffarily is), he cannot poffibly but know, at all times and in all places, every thing that is; and foreknow what at all times and in all places it is fitteft and wifeft fhould be; and have perfect power, without the leaft labour, difficulty, or oppofition, to order and bring to pass what he fo judges fit to be accomplished: and confequently it is impoffible but he muft actually direct and appoint every particular thing and circumftance that is in the world, or ever thall be, excepting only what by his own pleasure he puts under the power and choice of fubordinate free agents. If therefore God does not concern himself in the government of the world, nor has any regard to what is done therein; it will follow that he is not an omniprefent, all-powerful, intelligent, and wife being; and confequently, that he is not at all. Wherefore the opinion of this fort of Deifts ftands not upon any certain confiftent principles, but leads unavoidably to downright Atheism; and, however in words they may confefs a God, yet in reality and in truth they deny him t. HUMAN AFFAIRS NOT BENEATH THE REGARD OF PRO VIDENCE. If, to avoid this, they will own God's government and providence over the greater and more confiderable parts of the world, but deny " Quo confeffo, confitendum eft eorum confilio mu-dum adminidrari." C. De Nat. Deor. lib. 11. Epicurum verbis reliquiffe Deos, re fuftuliffe." Cic. De nat. Deor. lib. II. I 3 his his infpection and regard to human affairs here upon earth, as being too minute and fmall for the fupreme governor of all things to concern himself in *; this ftill amounts to the fame. For if God be omniprefent, all-knowing, and all-powerful; he cannot but equally know, and with equal ease be able to direct and govern, † all things as any, and the ‡ minutest things as the greateft. So that if he has no regard nor concern, for thefe things; his attributes muft, as before, be denied; and confequently his being. But, befides: human affairs are by no means the minuteft and most inconfiderable part of the creation. For (not to confider now, that excellency of human nature which Christianity difcovers to us), let a Deist fuppofe the universe as large as the wideft hypothefis of aftronomy will give him leave to imagine; or let him fuppofe it as immenfe as he himfelf pleafes, and filled with as great numbers of rational creatures as his own fancy can fuggeft; yet the fyftem wherein we are placed will, at leaft for aught he can reafonably fuppofe, be as confiderable as any other fingle fyftem; and the earth whereon we dwell, as confiderable as moft of the other planets in this fyftem; and mankind manifeftly the only confiderable inhabitants on this globe of earth. Man therefore has manifeftly a better claim to the particular regard and concern of providence, than any thing elfe in this globe of ours; and this our globe of earth, as juft a pretence to it, as moft other planets in the fyftem; and this fyftem, as juft an one, as far as we can judge, as any fyftem in the univerfe. If therefore there be any providence at all, and God has any concern for any part of the world; Mankind, even feparate from the confideration of that excellency of human nature which the Chriftian doctrine difcovers to us, may as reasonably be fuppofed to be under its particular care and government, as any other part of the univerfe. 2. OF THE SECOND SORT OF DEISTS, Some others there are, that call themfelves Deifts, because they believe, not only the being, but alfo the providence of God; that is, that every natural thing that is done in the world is produced by the power, appointed by the wifdom, and directed by the government of God; though, not allowing any difference between moral good and evil, they fuppofe that God takes no notice of the morally good or evil actions of men; these things depending, as they imagine, merely on the arbitrary conftitution of human laws. But how handfomely foever thefe men may feem to fpeak of the natural attributes of God, of his knowledge, wisdom, and power ; о * Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὰ θεῖα, καὶ τοιαῦτα διόπερ ὁ λόγΘ αὐτὰ ἐξέφηνεν, αγαθά, δι' καιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀκροβάτην, καὶ γνῶσιν τὴν τελειοπάτην τῶν μέντοι ἀνθρωπίνων καλαμονεῖν, ὡς μικρών και εὐτελῶν ὅλων, και αναξίων τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελείας. Simplic. in Epidet. + "Deorum providentia mundus adminiftratur; iidemque confulunt rebus humanis; neque folum univerfis, verum etiam fingulis." Cic. de Divinat. lib. I. † ̓Αλλ ̓ ἐδεν τάχ ̓ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ τύγε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσι θεοί, εκ ἧσίον ἡ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. Lib. Χ. Εἰ δὲ τῷ ὅλο κόσμο ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιμελῖται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτῷ προνοεῖν ; ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ τέχναι ποιήσι. Καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς τοῦ ὅλο συνελῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι προθέμενον, ἐκ ἂν ἀμελήσειε τῶν μερῶν δὲ σραηγός, κδ' οἰκονόμΘ', ἡ πολιτικός έτος τῶν γὰρ μερῶν ἀμελημένων, ἀνάγκη χειρόνως τὸ ὅλον διατές 5. Simplic. in Epictet. yet yet neither can this opinion be fettled on any certain principles, nor defended by any confiftent reafoning; nor can the natural attributes of God be fo feparated from the moral, but that he who denies the latter may be reduced to a neceffity of denying the former likewise. For fince (as I have formerly proved) there cannot but be eternal and neceffary differences of different things one from another; and from thefe neceffary differences of things there cannot but arise a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; and infinite knowledge can no more fail to know, or infinite wifdom to choose, or infinite power to act according to thefe eternal reasons and proportions of things, than knowledge can be ignorance, wisdom be folly, or power weakness; and confequently the juftice and goodness of God are as certain and neceffary, as his wifdom and power: it follows unavoidably, that he who denies the justice or goodness of God, or, which is all one, denies his exercife of thefe attributes in infpecting and regarding the moral actions of men, muft alfo deny, either his wisdom, or his power, or both; and confequently muft needs be driven into abfolute Atheism. For though, in some moral matters, men are not indeed to be judged of by the confequences of their opinions, but by their profeffion and practice; yet in the prefent cafe it matters not at all what men affirm, or how honourably they may feem to fpeak of fome particular attributes of God; but what, notwithstanding fuch profeffion, muft needs in all reafon be fuppofed to be their true opinion; and their practice generally appears anfwerable to it. PROFANE AND DEBAUCHED DEISTS, NOT CAPABLE OF BEING ARGUED WITH. For, concerning these two forts of Deifts, it is obfervable, that as their opinions can terminate confiftently in nothing but downright Atheism; fo their practice and behaviour is generally agreeable to that of the moft openly profeffed Atheifts. They not only oppofe the revelation of Chriftianity, and reject all the moral obligations. of natural religion, as fuch; but generally they defpife alfo the wifdom of all human conftitutions made for the order and benefit of mankind, and are as much contemners of common decency as they are of religion. They endeavour to ridicule and banter all human as well as divine accomplishments; all virtue and government of man's felf, all learning and knowledge, all wifdom and honour, and every thing for which a man can juftly be commended or be efteemed more excellent than a beaft. They pretend commonly, in their discourse and writings, to expofe the abufes and corruptions of religion; but (as is too manifeft in fome of their modern books, as well as in their talk) they aim really against all virtue in general, and all good manners, and against whatsoever is truly valuable and commendable in men. They pretend to ridicule certain vices and follies of ignorant or fuperftitious men; but the many * “ Quafi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget: illud quæro, quid ei confentaneum fit dicere, qui &c." Cic. de Finib. lib. II. 1 4 very very profane and very lewd images, with which they induftrioufly affect to dress up their discourse, show plainly that they really do not fo much intend to expofe and deride any vice or folly, as on the contrary to foment and please the debauched and vitious inclinations of others as void of flame as themfelves. They difcover clearly, that they have no fenfe at all of the dignity of human nature, nor of the fuperiority and excellency of their reafon above even the meaneft of the brutes. They will fometimes in words feem to magnify the wisdom, and other natural attributes of God; but in reality, by ridiculing whatever bears any refemblance to it in men, they fhow undeniably that they do not indeed believe there is any real difference in things, or any true excellency in one thing more than in another. By turning every thing alike, and without exception, into ridicule and mockery; they declare plainly, that they do not believe any thing to be wife, any thing decent, any thing comely or praife-worthy at all. They feem not to have any efteem or value for thofe diftinguifhing powers and faculties, by induing them wherewith God has " taught them more than the beafts of the "field, and made them wifer than the fowls of heaven." Job XXXV. II. In a word: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honeft, whatsoever things are juft, whatfoever things "are pure, whatfoever things are lovely, whatfoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praife;" thefe things they make the conftant fubject of their mockery and abuse, ridicule and raillery. On the contrary; whatfoever things are profane, impure, filthy, difhonourable, and abfurd; thefe things they make it their bufinefs to reprefent as harmlefs and indifferent, and to laugh men out of their natural fhame and abhorrence of them, nay, even to recommend them with their utmoft wit. Such men as thefe are not to be argued with, till they can be perfuaded to ufe arguments inftead of drollery. For banter is not capable of being anfwered by reafon; not because it has any ftrength in it; but because it runs out of all the bounds of reafon and good fenfe, by extravagantly joining together fuch images, as have not in themfelves any manner of fimilitude or connexion; by which means all things are alike eafy to be rendered ridiculous, by being represented only in an abfurd dress. These men therefore are first to be convinced of the true principles of reafon, before they can be difputed with and then they muft of neceffity either retreat into downright Atheism, or be led by undeniable reafoning to acknowledge and fubmit to the obligations of morality, and heartily repent of their profane abuse of God and religion. 3. OF THE THIRD SORT OF DEISTS. Another fort of Deifts there are, who, having right apprehenfions concerning the natural attributes of God, and his all-governing providence, feem alio to have fome notion of his moral perfections alfo. That is; as they believe him to be a being infinitely knowing, powerful, and wife; fo they believe him to be alfo in fome fenfe a being of infinite juftice, goodnefs, and truth; and that he governs |