Obrazy na stronie

assistance was defeated by the Roman consul Lutatins Catulus, B.C. 241, and the Carthaginians were obliged to sue for peace. This was granted by the Romans; and Hamilcar led his troops from Eryx to Lilybaeum, whence they were conveyed to Africa. But a new danger awaited Carthage. The Carthaginian treasury was exhausted; and it was proposed to the troops that they should relinquish a part of the pay which was due to them. The soldiers rejected the proposal, appointed two of their number, Spendius and Matho, commanders, and proceeded to enforce their demands. Being joined by many of the native tribes of Africa, they defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian general sent against them, and brought Carthage to the brink of ruin. In these desperate circumstances Hamilcar was appointed to the command, and at length succeeded in subduing them after the war had lasted three years and four months... After the end of this war Hamilcar was sent into Spain, B.C. 238. He remained in Spain nearly nine years, during which time he extended the dominion of Carthage over the southern and eastern parts of that country. He fell in a battle against the natives, B.C. 229. The abilities of Hamilcar were of the highest order; and he directed all the energies of his mind to diminish the power of Rome. Polybius states his belief (lib. 3), that his administration would soon have produced another war with the Romans, if he had not been prevented by the disorders in which his country was involved through the war of the mer. cenaries. Hamilcar was succeeded in his command in Spain by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who must not be confounded with Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal. He carried on the conquests of Hamilcar, and reduced almost the whole of the country south of the Iberus, which river was fixed by a treaty between the Carthaginians and the Romans, B.C. 226, as the frontier of the Carthaginian dominions. Hasdrubal was murdered in his tent by a Gaul, B.C. 221, after holding the command eight years. (Polyb., 1,2–Corn. Nep., wit. Hamilc., c. 3.--Encycl. Useful Knowl., vol. 12, p. 25.)—VI. A Carthaginian general, son of Bomilcar, conquered by the Scipios (B.C. 215) when be. sieging Ilitingis, in Hispania Baetica, along with Hasdrubal and Mago. He is supposed by some to be the same with the Hamilcar who, fifteen years after, at the head of a body of Gauls, took and sacked Placentia, and was defeated and slain before Cremona. Others affirm, that he was taken prisoner three years later in a battle fought near the Mincius, and served to adorn the victory of the conqueror. (Liv., 23, 49Id, 31, 10.-Id., 32, 23.—Plin., 3, 1.)—The name Hamilcar was equivalent in Punic to “(quem) dona: pit Milcar.” The true orthography is with the initial aspirate. Consult Heins., ad Sil, Ital., 1,39–Drakenh., ad Liv., 21, 1.-Gesenius, Phaen. Mon., p. 407. —The interpretation given by Hamaker (diatr. 47) to the name Hamilcar is rejected by Gesenius (l. c.). HANNibal (equivalent in Punic to “gratia Baalis”), son of Hamilcar Barcas (vid. Hamilcar V.), was born B.C. 247. At the age of nine he accompanied his father to Spain, who, previous to his departure, took his son to the altar, and, placing his hand on the victim, made him swear that he would never be a friend to the Romans. It does not appear how long Hannibal remained in Spain, but he was at a very early age associated with Hasdrubal, who succeeded his father in the command of the Carthaginian army in that country. On the death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221, he obtained the undivided command of the army, and quickly conquered the Olcades,Vaccalans, Carpesians, and the other Spanish tribes that had not been subdued by Hasdrubal. The inhabitants of Saguntum, alarmed at his success, sent messengers to Rome to inform the Romans of their danger; A Roman embassy was accordingly sent to Hannibal, who was passing the winter at New Carthage, to announce to him that the in

dependence of Saguntum was guarantied by a treaty between the Carthaginians oRomans (concluded B.C. 226), and that they should consider any injury done to the Saguntines as a declaration of war against themselves. annibal, however, paid no regard to this remonstrance. More than twenty years had elapsed since the termination of the first Punic war, during which period the Carthaginians had recovered their strength, and had obtained possession of the greater part of Spain; and the favourable opportunity had arrived for renewing the war with the Romans, In B.C. 219, Hannibal took Saguntum, after a siege of eight months, and employed the winter in making preparations for the invasion of Italy. . He first provided for the security of Africa and Spain by leaving an army of about 16,000 men in each country; the army in Africa consisted principally of Spanish troops, and that in Spain of Africans, under the command of his brother Hasdrubal. He had already received promise of support from the Gauls who inhabited the north of Italy, and who were anxious to deliver themselves from the Roman dominion. Having thus made every necessary preparation, he set out from New Carthage late in the spring of B.C. 218, with an army of 80,000 foot and 12,000 horse. In his march from the Iberus to the Pyrenees he was opposed by a great number of the native tribes, but they were quickly defeated, though with loss. Before crossing the Pyrenees, he left Hanno to secure his recent conquests with a detachment from his own army of 11,000 men. He sent back the same number of Spanish troops to their own cities, and with an army now reduced to 50,000 foot and 9000 horse, he advanced to the Rhone. Meantime, two Roman armies had been levied ; one, commanded by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, was intended to oppose Hannibal in Spain; and a second, under the consul T. Sempronius, was designed for the invasion of Africa. The departure of Scipio was delayed by a revolt of the Boian and Insubrian Gauls, against whom the army was sent which had been intended for the invasion of Spain, under the command of one of the praetors. Scipio was therefore obliged to remain in Rome till a new army could be raised. When the forces were ready, he sailed with them to the Rhone, and anchored in the eastern mouth of the river; being persuaded that Hannibal must still be at a considerable distance from him, as the country through which he had to march was difficult, and inhabited by many warlike tribes. Hannibal, however, quickly surmounted all these obstacles, crossed the Rhone, though not without some opposition from the Gauls, and continued his march up the left bank of the river. Scipio did not arrive at the place where the Carthaginians had crossed the river till three days afterward; and, despairing of overtaking them, he sailed back to Italy with the intention of meeting Hannibal when he should descend srom the Alps. Scipio sent his brother Cnteus into Spain, with the greater part of the troops, to oppose Hasdrubal. Hannibal continued his march up the Rhone till he came to the Isara. Marching along that river, he crossed the Alps, descended into the valley of the Dora Baltea, and followed the course of the river till he arrived in the territories of the Insubrian Gauls. (The particular route will be given at the close of this article.)—Hannibal completed his march from New Carthage to Italy in five months, during which he lost a great number of men, especially in his passage over the Alps. According to a statement engraved by his order on a column at Lacinium, in the country of the Brutii, which Polybius saw, his army was reduced to 12,000 Africans, 8000 Spaniards, and 6000 cavalry when he arrived in the territories of the Insubrian Gauls. After remaining some time in the territories of the Insubrians to recruit his army, he marched southward, and encountered P. Cornelius Scipio on the right bank of the river Ticinus. In the battle which ensued the Romans were defeated, and Scipio, with the remainder of the army, retreating along the left bank of the Po, crossed the river before Hannibal could overtake him, and encamped near Placentia. He afterward retreated more to the south, and intrenched himself strongly on the right bank of the Trebia, where he waited for the arrival of the army under the other consul T. Sempronius. Sempronius had already crossed over into Sicily with the intention of sailing to Africa, when he was recalled to join his colleague. After the union of the two armies, Sempronius determined, against the advice of Scipio, to risk another battle. The skill and fortune of Hannibal again prevailed; the Romans were entirely defeated, and the troops which survived took refuge in the fortified cities. In consequence of these victories, the whole of Cisalpine Gaul fell into the hands of Hannibal; and the Gauls, who, on his first arrival, were prevented from joining him by the presence of Scipio's army in their country, now eagerly assisted him with men and supplies. In the following year, B.C. 217, the Romans made great preparations to oppose their formidable enemy. Two new armies were levied; one was posted at Arretium, under the command of the consul Flaminius, and the other at Ariminum, under the consul Servilius. Hannibal determined to attack Flaminius first. In his march southward through the swamps of the basin of the Arnus, his army suf. fered greatly, and he himself lost the sight of one eye. After resting his troops for a short time in the neighbourhood of Faesulae, he marched past Arretium, ravaging the country as he went, with the view of drawing out Flaminius to a battle. Flaminius, who appears to have been a rash, headstrong man, hastily followed Hannibal; and, being attacked in the basin of the Lake Trasimenus, was completely defeated by the Carthaginians, who were posted on the mountains which encircled the valley. Three or four days after Hannibal cut off a detachment of Roman cavalry, amounting to 4000 men, which had been sent by Servilius to assist his colleague. Hannibal appears to have entertained hopes of overthrowing the Roman dominion, and to have expected that the other states of Italy would take up arms against Rome, in order to recover their independence. To conciliate the affections of the Italians, he dismissed without ransom all the prisoners whom he took in battle; and, to give them an opportunity of joining his army, he marched slowly along the eastern side of the peninsula, through Umbria and Picenum, into Apulia; but he did not meet with that co-operation which he appears to have ex

ected. After the defeat of Flaminius, Q. Fabius Mou. was appointed dictator, and a defensive system of warfare was adopted by the Romans till the end of the year. In the following year, B.C. 216, the Romans resolved upon another battle. An army of 80,000 foot and 6000 horse was raised, which was commanded by the consuls L. Afmilius Paulus and C. Terentius Varro. The Carthaginian army now amounted to 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. The armies were encamped in the neighbourhood of Cannae in Apulia. In the battle which was fought near this place, the Romans were defeated with dreadful carnage, and with a loss which, as stated by Polybius, is quite incredible; the whole of the infantry engaged in battle, amounting to 70,000, was destroyed, with the exception of 3000 men, who escaped to the neighbouring cities, and also all the cavalry, with the exception of 300 belonging to the allies, and 70 that escaped with Varro. A detachment of 10,000 foot, which had been sent to surprise the Carthaginian camp, was obliged to surrender as prisoners. The consul L. AEmilius, and the two consuls of the former year, Servilius and Attilius, were also among the slain. Hannibal lost only 4000 Gauls, 1500 Africans and Spaniards, and 200 horse. This victory placed

the whole of Lower Italy in the power of Hannibal, but it was not followed by such important results as might have been expected. Capua and most of the cities of Campania espoused his cause, but the majority of the Italian states continued firm to Rome. The defensive system was now strictly adopted by the Romans, and Hannibal was unable to make any active exertions for the farther conquest of Italy till he received a reinforcement of troops. He was in hopes of obtaining support from Philip of Macedon and from the Syracusans, with both of whom he formed an alliance; but the Romans found means to keep Philip employed in Greece, and Syracuse was besieged and taken by Marcellus, B.C. 214-12. In addition to this, Capua was taken by the Romans, B.C. 211. Hannibal was therefore obliged to depend upon the Carthaginians for help, and Hasdrubal was accordingly ordered to march from Spain to his assistance. Cnaeus Scipio, as already observed, was left in Spain to oppose Hannibal. He was afterward joined by P. Cornelius Scipio, and the war was carried on with various success for many years, till at length the Roman army was entirely defeated by Hasdrubal, B.C. 212. Both the Scipios fell in the battle. Hasdrubal was now preparing to join his brother, but was prevented by the arrival of young P. Cornelius Scipio in Spain, B.C. 210, who quickly recovered what the Romans had lost. In B.C. 210 he took New Carthage; and it was not till B.C. 207, when the Carthaginians had lost almost all their dominions in Spain, that Hasdrubal set out to join his brother in Italy. He crossed the Alps without meeting with any opposition from the Gauls, and arrived at Placentia before the Romans were aware that he had entered Italy. After besieging this town without success, he continued his march southward; but, before he could effect a junction with Hannibal, he was attacked by the consuls C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius, on the banks of the Metaurus in Umbria; his army was cut to pieces, and he himself fell in the battle. This misfortune obliged Hannibal to act on the defensive; and from this time till his departure from Italy, B.C. 203, he was confined to Brutium; but, by his superior military skill, he maintained his army in a hostile country without any assistance from his government at home. . After effecting the conquest of Spain, Scipio passed over into Africa to carry the war into the enemy's country, B.C. 204. With the assistance of Masinissa, a Numidian prince, he gained two victories over the Carthaginians, who hastily recalled their great commander from Italy to defend his native state. Hannibal landed at Septis, and advanced near Zama, five days’ journey from Carthage towards the west. Here he was entirely defeated by Scipio, B.C. 202; 20,000 Carthaginians fell in the battle, and an equal number were taken prisoners. The Carthaginians were obliged to sue for peace, and thus ended the second Punic war, B.C. 201. After the conclusion of the war, Hannibal vigorously applied himself to correct the abuses which existed in the Carthaginian government. He reduced the power of the perpetual judges (as Livy, 23, 46, calls them), and provided for the proper collection of the public revenue, which had been embezzled. He was supported by the people in these reforms; but he incurred the enmity of many powerful men, who represented to the Romans that he was endeavouring to persuade his countrymen to join Antiochus, king of Syria, in a war against them. A Roman embassy was consequently sent to Carthage, to demand the punishment of Hannibal as a disturber of the public peace; but Hannibal, aware that he should not be able to resist his enemies supported by the Roman power, escaped from the city and sailed to Tyre. From Tyre he went to Ephesus to join Antiochus, B.C. 196, and contributed to fix him in his determination to make war against the Romans. If Humbo',* as to the conduct of the war had been followed, the result of the contest might have been different; but he was only employed in a subordinate command, and had no opportunity for the exertion of his great military talents. At the conclusion of this war Hannibal was obliged to seek refuge at the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia, where he remained about five years, and on one occasion obtained a victory over Eumenes, king of Pergamus. But the Romans appear to have been uneasy as long as their once formidable enemy was alive. An embassy was sent to demand him of Prusias, who, being afraid of offending the Romans, agreed to give him up. To avoid falling into the hands of his ungenerous enemies, Hannibal destroyed himself by poison at Nicomedia in Bithynia, B.C. 183, in the sixty-fifth year of his age. The personal character of Hannibal is only known to us from the events of his public life, and even these have not been commemorated by any historian of his own country ; but we cannot read the history of these campaigns, of which we have here presented a mere outline, even in the narrative of his enemies, without admiring his great abilities and courage. Polybius remarks (lib. xi.), “How wonderful is it, that in a course of sixteen years, during which he maintained the war in Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from the field, and yet be able, like a good governor, to keep in subjection so great a multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they never mutinied against him nor quarrelled among themsevles. Though his army was composed of people of various countries, of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, Italians, and Greeks —men who had different laws, different customs, and different language, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common—yet, so dexterous was his management, that, notwithstanding this great diversity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this, too, he effected in the midst of very various fortune. How high as well as just an opinion must these things convey to us of his ability in war. It may be affirmed with confidence, that if he had first tried his strength in the other parts of the world, and had come last to attack the Romans, he could scarcely have failed in any part of his design.” (Polyb., 3.--Ib., 7, 8, 9.-lb., 14, 16–Liry, 21–39–Nepos, Vit. Hannib.—Encycl. Us. Knowl., vol. 12, p. 40, seq.) The passage of the Alps by Hannibal has already been alluded to in the course of the present article. Before concluding the biography of the Carthaginian general, it may not be amiss to direct the student's attention more particularly to this point. “This wonderful undertaking,” observes a recent writer, “would naturally have attracted great notice, if considered only with reference to its general consequences, and to its particular effects on the great contest carried on between Rome and Carthage; for this march, which carried the war from a distant province to the very gates of the former, totally changed the character of the struggle, and compelled the Romans to fight for existence instead of territory. These events, however, are not the only causes which have thrown so much interest on the passage of the Alps by Hannibal; for the doubt and uncertainty which have existed, even from very remote times, as to the road by which the passage was effected; the numerous and distinguished writers who have declared themselves on different sides of the question; the variation between the two great historians of the transactions of those times, Polybius and Livy; all these things united have involved the subject in difficulties which have increased its importance, and which have long exercised many able writers in vain attempts to elucidate them. The relation of Polybius, who lived very soon after the transactions which he describes, and who had himself examined the country for the purpose of writing his history, would

naturally appear the most authentic, on account of its early date, as well as of the internal evidence which it bears of the truth. Unfortunately, Polybius was writing to Greeks, and was therefore, as he himself tells them, not anxious to introduce into his narrative names of places and of countries in which they were little interested, and which, if inserted, would rather have injured than assisted the unity of his story. In consequence of this, although he has been remarkably careful in giving us the distances performed by the Carthaginian army in their march from the Pyrenees to the plains of Italy, as well as the time in which they were completed, he has been generally sparing of his proper names, and he has not positively stated in terms the name of that passage of the Alps through which Hannibal marched. Now, though the distances (which are positive), and the general description of the country, and the names of the nations (when these latter are mentioned) which the army passed through, afford sufficient data to prove beyond all doubt that Hannibal passed by the Alpis Graia, or Little St. Bernard; yet, as this is not expressly stated, Livy, who, without acknowledgment, |. borrowed the greater part of his own narrative from Polybius, has asserted that he went over the Alpis Cottia, or Mont Genevre; and as Livy is much more read than Polybius, his account has obtained much more credit than it deserves, and has been considered as almost decisive of the question. It has been particularly adopted by almost all the French writers upon the subject, and though they differ from each other as to the road which the army took to arrive at that passage, and, farther, though the account itself is absolutely inconsistent in many parts, yet the authority of so great a name has almost set criticism at defiance, and his commentators have endeavoured to reconcile his contradictions as well as they were able. It was evident, however, to those who were in the habit of looking a little deeper than the surface, that Livy's account, which, even when taken by itself, was far from satisfactory, was, when compared with that of Polybius, with which it had been generally supposed to agree, very different in its conclusion; and this variation between them was so decided, that it was quite impossible that both could be right. Gibbon was so much struck with this variation, as well as with the respective characters of the two authors as historians, that he would have given up Livy at once, had he not been unable, from his ignorance of the passage alluded to by Polybius, to decide the question in favour of the latter. The opinion of Gibbon appears also to have been very much influenced by that of D'Anville, an authority to be respected above all others for wonderful accuracy and depth of research in matters relating to ancient topography. , D'Anville, however, is guided in his opinion by the idea that the guides of Hannibal were Taurini, a mistake which is the more extraordinary as Livy himself (21, 29) states them to be Boii. Mr. Holdsworth, who had devoted much of his time and attention to subjects of this nature (Spence's Anecdotes of Men and Books), appears to have detected Livy's inconsistencies as well as Gibbon, and to have been of opinion that the army crossed the Alps to the north of the Mont Genevre; but as he was, as well as Gibbon, unacquainted with the passage of the Little St. Bernard, he was unable to fix upon the exact spot. It is to General Melville that the literary world has been indebted, in later times, for the suggestion of this latter pass; and it is by this sug: gestion that a question so long doubtful has received a most satisfactory explanation. This gentleman, on his return from the West Indies, where he had held a high military command, turned his whole attention to the investigation of the military antiquities of the Romans, and for this purpose spent some years in travel: ling over France, Italy, and Germany, and examined with great attention the countries which had been the scenes of the most celebrated battles and events recorded in Roman history. From his thorough knowledge of Polybius, he was early struck with the great authority that his narrative carried with it, and he determined, if possible, to set at rest the much agitated question of the passage of the Alps by Hannibal. As he perceived that no perusal of the historian, however close and attentive, no critical sagacity and discernment, could alone enable him to arrive at the truth, unless he verified the observations of his author on the same ground, and compared his descriptions with the same scenes as those which that author had himself visited and examined, the general surveyed attentively all the known passages of the Alps, and more particularly those which were best known to the ancients. The result of all these observations was a firm conviction that the passage of the Little St. Bernard was that by which Hannibal had crossed over into Italy, both as being most probable in itself, and also as agreeing beyond all comparison more closely than any other with the description given by Polybius. The general must be looked upon as the first who has solved the problem in history. It is not, indeed, meant that he was absclutely the first who made the Carthaginian army penetrate by that pass into Italy, since the oldest authority on this point, that of Coelius Antipater, represents it as having taken that route; but it is affirmed that he was the first to revive an opinion concerning that passage, which, although existing in full force in the traditions of the country itself, appears to have been long laid aside as forgotten, and to have rested that opinion on arguments the most solid and plausible. General Melville never published any account of his observations, and they would most probably have been lost to the world, had he not found in M. De Luc, of Geneva, nephew of the late distinguished philosopher of that name, a person eminently qualified to undertake the task which he himself declined, and even materially to improve upon his labours. The very able and learned work which that gentleman published at Geneva in 1818, entitled Histoire du Passage des Alpes par Annibal, contains a very full and clear report of the observations of General Melville, supported by arguments and by evidence entirely original, and which must be admitted by every candid and judicious inquirer to be clear and conclusive. A second edition of this work was published in 1825, considerably augmented.” (Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps, by Wickham and Cramer, pref., p. xi., seqq.) In the work here quoted, the route which Hannibal is conceived to have taken is stated as follows: after crossing the Pyrenees at Bellegarde, he went to Nismes, through Perpignan, Narbonne, Beziers, and Montpellier, as nearly as possible in the exact track of the great Roman road. From Nismes he marched to the Rhone, which he crossed at Roquemaure, and then went up the river to Vienne, or possibly a little higher. From thence, marching across the flat country of Dauphiny in order to avoid the angle which the river makes at Lyons, he rejoined it at St. Genis d'Aouste. He then crossed the Mont du Chat to Chambery, joined the Isere at Montureillan, ascended it as far as Scez, crossed the Little St. Bernard, and descended upon Aosta and Ivrea by the banks of the Doria Baltea. After halting for some time at Ivrea, he marched upon Turin, which he took, and then prepared himself for ulterior operations against the Romans (pref., p. xxii., seq.). The Alpis Graia, or Little St. Bernard, forms, it should be remembered, the communication between the valley of the Isere and that of Aosta. It is situated a little to the south of Mont Blanc, and is the most northerly of the passages of that division of the Alps which runs from north to south. In corroboration of the theory which assigns the Little St. Bernard as the route of Hannibal, may be cited a very able article on the subject, which appeared in the Edinburgh

Review for November, 1825. This theory, however, has been attacked in a recent publication (Hannibal's Passage of the Alps, by a Member of the University of Cambridge), the author of which contends for the passage over Monte Viso, where the Maritime Alps terminate. His arguments are far from conclusive. The passage by Mont Cenis has also found many advocates, the most distinguished of whom is Mannert. This learned scholar, in the introductory chapter to his Geography of Ancient Italy, in which he gives an account of the Alps and the various passes by which they were formerly traversed, expresses his belief that Hannibal crossed the great chain by the route of Mont Cenis. In forming his opinion, he appears to have been solely guided, and no doubt most judiciously, by the narrative of Polybius; and he professes to have found the distances, as given in the best modern maps, accurately agreeing with the statement of the Greek historian. This fact is open to dispute; for, although the route of the Mont Cenis deviates at first very little from that on which the theory respecting the Little St. Bernard is founded, yet the immediate descent upon Turin shortens the total distance very considerably, and it will be impossible to make up 150 miles from the first ascent of the Alps to the descent at Susa, without very much overrating the actual distances. Moreover, it cannot be conceded to the learned professor, that the plains of Italy can be seen from the summit of Mont Cenis, and from thence only. It is most certain that he has been misinformed on this point, though it has also been maintained by others. Even De Saussure, who ascended the Roche Michel far above the Hospice of the Grande Croix, could not perceive the plains from that elevated summit. The Roche Melon is the only point in this vicinity from which it is possible to have a view of Piedmont; but it is not accessible from the Grande Croix, or any point in the road of Mont Cenis. (Wickham and Cramer, p. 173, seqq., 2d ed.)—It remains to say a few words on the opinion of Napoleon on this subject, as stated in his “ Notes sur l'ouvrage intifulé Considerations sur l'Art de la Guerre,” in the second volume of his Melanges Historiques. In these notes he gives a very concise account of the road which he conceives Hannibal to have taken, and which is as follows: he crossed the Rhone a little below Orange, and in four days reached either the confluence of the Rhone and Isere, or that of the Drac and Isere, settled the affairs of the two brothers, and then, after six days' march, arrived, on the former supposition, at Montureillan, and from thence, in nine days, at Susa, by the passage of Mont Cenis; or, in the latter case, if he arrived at Grenoble at the end of the four days, he would reach St. Jean de Maurienne in six days, and Susa in nine days more ; from Susa he marched upon Turin, and, after the capture of the city, he advanced to Milan. The reasoning by which Napoleon supports his hypothesis, is principally founded on what the French call “la raison de la guerre,” that is, Hannibal did this because, as a military man, he ought to have done it; and, if we were discussing prospective operations, there is no doubt that the opinion of so great a general as Napoleon would be almost conclusive; but, in reasoning upon the past, the elements of the discussion are as open to civil as to military writers, and the former are quite as capable of conducting an argument logically as the latter. Napoleon has been guilty of several inaccuracies in his statement, and his argument is conducted in that decided manner which bears down all opposition, and which supposes that whatever he says must be right. He asserts. that both Polybius and Livy state the army to have arrived, in the first instance, at Turin, and he loses sight altogether of the detailed narration of Polybius. The author upon whose work he is commenting adopts the passage of the Little St. Bernard, ". Napoleon refuses to believe, because Hannibal must have been early acquainted with the retreat of the Romans towards their fleet, and would not, in that case, have marched to the north. The explanation of all this may be found in Napoleon's own words: “La marche d'Annibal depuis Collioure jusqu'a Turin a été toute simple; elle a €té celle d'un voyageur; il a pris la route la plus courte.” Hardly so, since the road by Mont Genevre was shorter than that by Mont Cenis, as he himself allows, a few pages before. In a word, if we had no historical details to guide us, Napoleon would probably be right; but as we profess to be guided by those details, and as, from his omitting to notice the greater part of them, he appears either to have been ignorant of them, or to have been unable to make them agree with his hypothesis, we must come to the conclusion, that what he says rests upon no proof, and is to be merely considered as the opinion of a great general upon an hypothetical case. (Wickham and Cramer, p. 188, seqq.) HANNo (meaning in Punic “merciful” or “mild”), I., a commander sent by the Carthaginians on a voyage of colonization and discovery along the Atlantic coast of Africa. This expedition is generally supposed to have taken place about 570 ; Gail, however, places it between 633 and 530 B.C. (Geogr. Gr. Mun., vol. 1, p. 82.) On his return to Carthage, Hanno deposited an account of his voyage in the temple of Saturn. A translation of this account from the Punic into the Greek tongue, has come down to us; and its authenticity, attacked by Dodwell, has been defended by Bougainville (Mem. Acad. des Inscr., &c., vol. 26, 26), Falconer, and others. Gail also declares in its favour, though he admits that the narrative may, and probably does, contain many wilful deviations from the truth, in accordance with the jealous policy of the Carthaginians in misleading other nations by erroneous statements. The title of the Greek work is as follows: "Avvovor, Kapamóovíov Bagužičac, IIepitãovg rāv itép Taç Hpakasovo arīAao Atóvköv Tijo yī; uepāv, Öv kai dvěthrev Šv to roi, Kpovov reuévet. “The Voyage of Hanno, commander of the Carthaginians, round the parts of Libya beyond the Pillars of Hercules, which he deposited in the temple of Saturn.” With regard to the extent of coast actually explored by this expedition, some remarks have been offered in another article (vid. Africa, col. 2, p. 80); it remains but to give an English version of the Periplus itself. —“It was j by the Carthaginians,” begins the narrative, “that Hanno should undertake a voyage beyond the Pillars of Hercules, and found Libyphoenician cities. He sailed accordingly with sixty ships of fifty oars each, and a body of men and women to the number of thirty thousand, and provisions and other necessaries. When we had passed the Pillars on our voyage, and had sailed beyond them for two days, we founded the first city, which we named Thymiaterium. Below it lay an extensive plain. Proceeding thence towards the west, we came to Soloeis, a promontory of Libya, a place thickly covered with trees, where we erected a temple to Neptune ; and again proceeded for the space of half a day towards the coast, until we arrived at a lake lying not far from the sea, and filled with abundance of large reeds. Here elephants, and a great number of other wild beasts were feeding. Having passed the lake about a day's sail, we founded cities near the sea, called Cariconticos, and Gytte, and Acra, and Melitta, and Arambys. Thence we came to the great river Lixus, which flows from Libya. On its banks the Lixita, a shepherd tribe, were feeding flocks, among whom we continued some time on friendly terms. Beyond the Lixita dwell the inhospit table Ethiopians, who pasture a wild country intersected by large mountains, from which they say the river Lixus flows. In the neighbourhood of the mountains lived the Troglodytae, men of various appearances,

whom the Lixita described as swifter in running than horses. Having procured interpreters from them, we coasted along a desert country towards the south two days. Thence we proceeded towards the east the course of a day. Here we found, in a recess of a certain bay, a small island, containing a circle of five stadia, where we settled a colony, and called it Cerne. We judged from our voyage that this place lay in a direct line with Carthage; for the o of our voyage from Carthage to the Pillars was equal to that from the Pillars to Cerne. We then came to a lake, which we reached by sailing up a large river called Chretes. This lake had three islands, larger than Cerne; from which, proceeding a day's sail, we came to the extremity of the lake, that was overhung by large mountains, inhabited by savage men, clothed in skins of wild beasts, who drove us away by throwing stones, and hindered us from landing. o thence, we came to another river, that was large and broad, and full of crocodiles and river horses; whence returning back we came again to Cerne. Thence we sailed towards the south twelve days, coasting the shore, the whole of which is inhabited by Ethiopians, who would not wait our approach, but fled from us. Their language was not intelligible even to the Lixitae who were with us. Towards the last day we approached some large mountains covered with trees, the wood of which was sweetscented and variegated. Having sailed by these mountains for two days, we came to an immense opening of the sea; on each side of which, towards the continent, was a plain; from which we saw by night fire arising at intervals in all directions, either more or less. Having taken in water there, we sailed forward five days near the land, until we came to a large bay, which our interpreters informed us was called the Western Horn. In this was a large island, and in the island a salt-water lake, and in this another island, where, when we had landed, we could discover nothing in the daytime except trees; but in the night we saw many fires burning, and heard the sound of pipes, cymbals, drums, and confused shouts. We were then afraid, and our diviners ordered us to abandon the island. Sailing quickly away thence, we passed a country burning with fires and perfumes, and streams of fire supplied from it fell into the sea. The country was impassable on account of the heat. We sailed quickly thence, being much terrified; and passing on for four days, we discovered at night a country full of fire. In the middle was a losty fire, larger than the rest, which seemed to touch the stars. When day came, we discovered it to be a large hill called the Chariot of the Gods. On the third day after our departure thence, having sailed by those streams of fire, we arrived at a bay called the Southern Horn; at the bottom of which lay an island like the former, having a lake, and in this lake another island, full of savage people, the greater part of whom were women, whose bodies were hairy, and whom our interpreters called Gorillae. Though we pursued the men, we could not seize any of them ; but all fled from us, escaping over the precipices, and defending themselves with stones. Three women were however taken; but they attacked their conductors with their teeth and hands, and could not be prevailed upon to accompany us. Having killed them, we flayed them, and brought their skins with us to Carthage. We did not sail farther on, our provisions having failed us.”The streams of fire alluded to by Hanno are conjectured to have been nothing more than the burning of the dry herbage; a practice which takes place, more or less, in every country situated in the warm climates, and where vegetation is also rank. Its taking the appearance of a river of fire, running into the sea, is accounted for from the more abundant herbage of the valleys or ravines; which, as Bruce observes, are shaded by their depth, and remain green the longest. Consequently, being the last burned, the fire

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