ideas. The method of divine revelation often lies in the absorption of some popular belief which is afterwards purified and spiritualized by a process of co-ordination.'

DISSERTATION II

P. 112. It should be noticed that Tertullian, following Irenaeus, speaks of a real growth of knowledge in the Christ. See de Pudicit. I 'Nemo proficiens erubescit. Habet et in Christo scientia aetates suas per quas devolutus est et apostolus' See Dr. Hoffman, Gospel of Youth (New

(1 Cor. xiii. 11). York, 1895).

The

P. 127, note 1. Cf. also St. Basil, Ep. i. 8. 6. P. 138. contrast between Augustine and Origen cannot be better explained than by setting side by side their comments on St. Matt. xix. 5 'A man shall leave his father and mother.' Both fathers, in view of St. Paul, Eph. v. 22-32, are interpreting these words of Christ's incarnation. Origen writes thus (in Matt. tom. xv. 17) kai καταλέλοιπέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κύριος ὁ ἀνὴρ πατέρα ὃν ἑώρα ὅτε ἐν μορφῇ beοû væĥрxev. Augustine writes (see Prosper, Sententt. lib. 330: P. L. li. p. 478) 'Reliquit Christus Patrem. . . . non quia deseruit et recessit a Patre, sed quia non in ea forma apparuit hominibus in qua aequalis est Patri.'

P. 175. On the subject of Nihilianism I should also wish to refer to the learned work of Mr. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895), i. p. 54, note 1. P. 177, note 2. add-St. Thomas himself on the whole, and in deference to authority, deprecates the phrase see p. 283 and cf. Summa, p. iii. qu. ii. art. 6.

P. 197. It should be noted that Andrewes' reference to St. Leo seems to be mistaken. Leo on the whole treats the cry of Christ My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? as not being the expression of His own real feeling. See Serm. lxvii. 7 (P. L. liv. p. 372) 'Vox ista, dilectissimi, doctrina est non querela.'

DISSERTATION III

P. 233, note I (2). The idea that St. Augustine distinguished between the 'flesh' or the 'body' of Christ is borne out by an Augustinian Sentence of Prosper quoted in Abelard's Sic et non 117 (P. L. clxxviii. p. 1524): 'Sicut ergo caelestis panis qui vere Christi caro est suo modo vocatur Christi corpus cum revera sit sacramentum corporis Christi, illius videlicet quod in cruce est positum, vocatur ipsa carnis immolatio quae sacerdotis manibus fit Christi passio, mors, crucifixio, non rei veritate sed significante mysterio; sic sacramentum fidei quod baptismus intelligitur, fides est.'

P. 247. It should have been noticed that St. Peter Damian's Expositio Canonis Missae (P. L. cxlv. pp. 879 ff.), which was certainly written before the Berengarian controversy, is a good example of the current eucharistic doctrine of the early part of the eleventh century. Transubstantiation is firmly held and the verb transubstantiare, which does not appear to occur again till Stephen of Autun, is twice used in capp. 14 and 16 (see p. 268, n. 3, which needs correction accordingly)'. The process of the transmutation of the elements is regarded as a physical miracle which 'overcomes nature' and is compared to such physical transmutation as the change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt; and the continual consumption in the sacra ment of the Christ, who yet remains entire, is paralleled by the miracle in the case of the widow of Sarepta's meal and oil (cc. 3, 4, 5). The questions which arise in connexion with the fraction of the consecrated hosts and their consumption by fire or animals and their digestion are met by various suggestions which are not reconciled-that the presence is withdrawn and the sacramental elements revert to their original nature ('sicut miraculose convertitur substantia [eorum] in corpus

1 The word transubstantiatio is also used about contemporaneously by Hildebert of Tours (P. L. clxxi. p. 776—a reference which I owe to a reviewer in the Speaker). I should add that the ascription of the tract in question above to this particular Stephen is insecure.

dominicum et incipit esse sub sacramento, sic quodammodo miraculose revertitur cum ipsum ibi desinit esse'), or that we must not inquire into a miracle which transcends nature, or that these incidents concern only the species not the reality ('ea quae notant corruptionem ad formam panis referentes, ea quae notant acceptionem ad corpus Christi'), or that their digestion and its results are in appearance only not in reality (cc. 5, 6).

Many questions about the mode of transition are declined— 'novit ille qui facit,' 'tale dedit quale voluit' (cc. 4, 6). But it is affirmed that the whole Christ is in either species: 'sub utraque specie scilicet panis et vini utrumque, id est corpus et sanguis, consecratur' (c. 7; see p. 266 n. 3, and correct accordingly).

It is interesting to notice, in view of the argument on p. 282, that this writer, who first uses the term transubstantiare, and thus strengthens the idea that the supernatural substance in the sacrament annihilates the natural, also appears to affirm that the humanity of the incarnate Christ is the accident of the divine substance. 'In natura Dei non est accidens in substantia nec substantia sub accidente: in hypostasi Filii est accidens in substantia et substantia sub accidente.' But if so, he is not consistent with himself; for he has just spoken of three substances, deity, soul and body, in the person of Christ (c. 5).

P. 266, note 1. add-In the Sentences of Peter Lombard, however (c. 1145-50), the seven sacraments are enumerated according to the later custom.

P. 275, note 3. add-The 'sentence' from Augustine is quoted in a fuller form by Abelard, Sic et non 117 (P. L. clxxviii. p. 1524): 'Hoc est quod dicimus, quod modis omnibus approbare contendimus, sacrificium ecclesiae duobus confici, duobus constare, visibili elementorum specie et invisibili domini nostri Iesu Christi carne et sanguine, sacramento et re sacramenti, id est corpore Christi, sicut Christi persona constat et conficitur Deo et homine, cum ipse Christus verus sit Deus et

verus homo, quia omnis res illarum rerum naturam et veritatem in se continet ex quibus conficitur. Est ergo sacramentum et res sacramenti, id est corpus Christi.'

NOTE ON DISSERTATION II

What has been mainly criticized in these essays is the attempt to deal with the limitation of our Lord's human consciousness. I regret to have to explain that Dr. Bright, while allowing that my interpretation of his language on p. 201 is a tenable one, informs me that it is not the interpretation intended by him. I must admit to being a good deal disappointed in regard to this Dissertation. I thought I had understood, after the publication of my Bampton Lectures, that I should meet the objections of some of those for whose opinion I had the deepest regard, if I made it plainer that the self-limitation postulated within the sphere of the Incarnation might, in my judgement, best be conceived as due to a continuous act of the will of the eternal Son, and as not affecting His divine and cosmic functions. I was at pains-in entire accordance with my own convictions -to make these points plain (see pp. 91 ff., 98, 206 f., 208 f.); but I have not had reason to believe that it has helped towards agreement. Now I am told by one whose advice has the greatest weight, that I should remove the objections of some of the best and most thoughtful among us, if I could alter my language so far as to affirm that what the eternal Son abandoned during His mortal human life was, not certain divine prerogatives or attributes, but the exercise of these prerogatives or attributes. I am indeed well aware of the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently exact expressions on such a subject as this. I have altered the one passage in which the idea of 'abandoning divine attributes' was implied (p. 206, contrarily to p. 220), and one in which the word 'nature' was ambiguously used (p. 97). I wish also to call attention to the fact that on pp. 90, 94 the phrase 'cease from the exercise of divine prerogatives' (or 'functions and powers') is used, as well as the phrase 'refraining

from the divine mode of consciousness' (p. 97), and 'withdraw the omniscience from operation' (p. 215). But I somewhat shrink from the exclusive use of the word 'exercise,' as I fear it would be treated as equivalent to 'exhibition' or 'manifestation' (cf. Dr. Bright's language, p. 201). I cannot, however, acknowledge material disagreement with any who, while denying an absolute kenosis (see p. 91), are prepared to admit that within the sphere and limit of the mortal life which He assumed, the eternal Son was voluntarily but personally submitting to the limitations necessary for a proper human experience, and therefore voluntarily but personally limited in knowledge. All that I want is to guard this position.

C. G.

Ash Wednesday, 1896.