in order to its development and recovery. God, the Son of God, must be conceived to exist not only according to His own natural mode of being, but also really and personally under the limitations of manhood. From this point of view the Incarnation might seem to be the supreme and intensified example of that general divine sympathy, by which God lives not only in His own life but also in the life of His creatures, and (in a sense) might fall in with a general doctrine of the divine immanence. Such an idea of divine sympathy and love is to be found in Christian theology even where we should least expect it, as in the PseudoDionysius1 where he describes God as carried out of Himself by His love for His creatures, and it is akin to Old Testament language about God. For in the Old Testament, if God is represented as wholly and personally distinct from His creatures, yet He is constantly represented also as following along with the fortunes of His people, collectively and individually, with an active and vigorous sympathy; or in other words He is conceived of morally rather than metaphysically.

1 de Div. Nom. iv. 13 (P. G. iii. p. 712) ἔστιν καὶ ἐκστατικὸς ὁ θεῖος ἔρως, οὐκ ἐῶν ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐραστάς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων ... τολμητέον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πάντων αἴτιος τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ τῶν πάντων ἔρωτι δι ̓ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ γινέται, ταῖς εἰς τὰ ὄντα πάντα προνοίαις καὶ οἷον ἀγαθότητι καὶ ἀγαπήσει καὶ ἔρωτι θέλγεται.

Cf. the later (fourteenth century) mystic Nicolas Cabasilas de Vita in Christo 6 (P. G. cl. p. 644) καθάπερ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐξίστησι τὸ φίλτρον, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ καὶ κρεῖσσον γένηται τῶν δεξαμένων, τὸν ἴσον τρόπον ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔρως τὸν θεὸν ἐκένωσεν. I feel gratitude to Dorner (Person of Christ, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 240 ff.), for calling attention to this interesting author. But I cannot but think he overstates his doctrine in this respect.

On the other hand Greek philosophy was primarily concerned to conceive of God metaphysically. He was the One in opposition to the many objects of sense, and the Absolute and Unchangeable in opposition to the relative and mutable. In particular the divine immutability had a meaning assigned to it very different from that which belongs to it in the Bible, a meaning determined by contrast, not to the changeableness of human purpose, but to the very idea of 'motion' which, as belonging to the material, was also supposed to be of the nature of the evil. There is no doubt that this Greek metaphysical conception of God influenced Christian theology largely and not only for good1. In particular, through the medium of Neo-Platonism, it deeply coloured the thought of that remarkable and anonymous author who, writing about A.D. 500, passed himself off, probably without any intention to deceive, as Dionysius the Areopagite, the convert of St. Paul. With him the metaphysical conceptions of the transcendence, incomprehensibility, absolute unity and immutability of God are a master passion 2. In his general philosophy the result of his zeal for the One is to lead him to ascribe to the manifold life of the universe only a precarious reality. In his view of the Incarnation it produces at least a monophysite tendency.

Jesus, even by His human name, is regarded as imparting illumination according to His super-essential Godhead 3, or He is spoken of as by His Incarnation

See Hatch's Hibbert Lectures 1888 (Williams & Norgate) pp. 239 ff. 2 See esp. de Div. Nom. c. xiii, and cf. Dr. Westcott's Religious Thought in the West (Macmillan, 1891) pp. 182-5.

s de Cael. Hier. i. 2.

bringing us back into the unity of the divine life1. But Dionysius markedly shrinks from asserting a really human activity of the Incarnate; and, while accepting the real Incarnation as delivered in tradition, he is at pains to assert that not only did the Godhead suffer no alteration and confusion in this unutterable self-humiliation, but also that in respect of His humanity Jesus was still supernatural and supersubstantial2; He performed human acts in a superhuman manner; it is hardly safe to say that he existed or acted as man, but He must be described as exhibiting in our manhood a new mode of 'theandric' activity. On the whole we feel that the humanity of Jesus is, in the Areopagite, little but the veil for that divine self-disclosure which is at the same time a self-concealment. The Incarnation becomes a partial theophany.

Now the influence of this writer-presumed to be of almost apostolic authority-became exceedingly great in the west when he first appeared in the translation by Scotus Erigena". Erigena himself was profoundly

1 de Eccl. Hier. iii. 13, iv. 10.

2 de Div. Nom. ii. 10. Here however he is quoting Hierotheus.

3

Ep. ad Caium Monach. 4. This word leavdpi) èvépyeia became the motto of the Monothelites. Cf. de Div. Nom. ii. 9, where Christ's human acts are said to belong to a 'supernatural physiology.'

4 Ep. ad Caium, 3.

For his influence on Thomas Aquinas see the remark of his editor, Corderius, Obs. xii. (P. G. iii. pp. 90 ff.), 'Facile patet,' he concludes, 'angelicum doctorem totam fere doctrinam theologicam ex purissimis Dionysii fontibus hausisse, cum vix ulla sit periodus e qua non ipse tanquam apis argumentosa theologicum succum extraxerit et in Summam, veluti quoddam alveare, pluribus quaestionibus articulisque, ceu cellulis, theologico melle [? melli] servando distinctum, redegerit.'

affected by him 1, and he in turn diffused in a later age the influence he had received 2. Thus early scholastic philosophy is largely dominated by a neo-platonic rather than Christian idea of the Incarnation,—that the incomprehensible God partially manifests Himself under a human veil: the manhood is but the temporary or permanent robe3 of Godhead. In an extreme form this idea came to be known as Nihilianism.

The eternal Son, it was said, became, in becoming incarnate, nothing He was not before. The humanity is no addition to His person: it is but the robe of Godhead, and the robe is no addition to the wearer's person, but simply gives appropriateness to His appearance. This view is stated, among others, by Peter Lombard 4.

'Sunt etiam alii qui in incarnatione Verbi non solum personam ex naturis compositam negant, verum etiam hominem aliquem sive etiam aliquam substantiam ibi ex anima et carne compositam vel factam diffitentur. Sed sic illa duo, scilicet animam et carnem, Verbi personae vel naturae unita esse aiunt, ut non ex illis duobus vel ex his tribus aliqua natura vel persona fieret sive componeretur, sed illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur ut mortalium oculis congruenter

1 His view of the Incarnation is best seen in de Div. Nat. v. 25-27: and see further, pp. 240 n. 2, 281.

2 Not to any great extent at once or in his own lifetime. The influence of Scotus and Dionysius becomes more apparent in the twelfth century.

3 Apparently the phraseology of the 'robe' was first brought into prominence in the school of Apollinarius of Laodicea. His moderate disciple Jovius spoke of the flesh of Christ as the στολὴ καὶ περιβόλαιον καὶ πрокáλνμμа μνσтnpíov kpvπtoμévov (in Leontius Byz. P.G. lxxxvi. pp. 1956 b, 1960 a).

4 Sentt. lib. iii. dist. 6 f. Cf. dist. 10.

appareret. . . . Ipsa persona Verbi quae prius erat sine indumento, assumptione indumenti non est divisa vel mutata, sed una eademque immutata permansit.' Among the authorities for this position St. Augustine is quoted, commenting on the Latin version of Philippians ii. 7 habitu inventus est ut homo1. Habitus, Augustine says, always means something which is an unessential accident or appendage of something else: 'manifestum est in ea re dici habitum quae accidit vel accedit alicui, ita ut eam possit etiam non habere.' But different sorts of habitus may be distinguished according as the accession of the habitus produces or does not produce a change in the possessor of it, or in the habitus itself. The humanity of Christ, he decides, belongs to the class of habitus which do not change their possessors but are themselves changed, as for example is the case with a robe. And he continues, Deus enim filius semetipsum exinanivit, non formam suam mutans, sed formam servi accipiens... verum hominem suscipiendo habitu inventus est ut homo, id est habendo hominem inventus est ut homo, non sibi, sed eis quibus in homine apparuit.'

Peter Lombard does not in this passage decide in favour of this view, but in fact he appears to have held it as his opinion, without positively asserting it2. This

1 de div. quaest. lxxxiii. qu. 73.

2

...

John of Cornwall (c. 1170), Peter Lombard's pupil and in this respect opponent, is explicit on this point. See Eulogium ad Alex. iii. in P. L. cxcix. pp. 1052-3 'Quod vero a magistro Petro Abaelardo hanc opinionem suam magister Petrus Lombardus accepit, eo magis suspicatus sum, quia librum illum frequenter prae manibus habebat . . . Opinionem suam dixi. Quod enim fuerit haec eius opinio certum est. Quod vero non fuerit eius assertio haec, ipse testatur in capitulo suo. . . . I Praeterea, paulo antequam electus esset in episcopum parisiensem, mihi et omnibus auditoribus eius qui tunc aderant protestatus est, quod haec non esset assertio sua, sed opinio sola quam a magistro acceperat. Haec enim verba subiecit :