and I cannot help thinking it a capital objection to the essay above-mentioned on Mr. POPE's writings, &c. that the effayift frequently only felects detached paffages, as the foundation of his encomium or cenfure, without attempting to connect the sense. Unlefs we recollect the writer's general scope of reafoning, we cannot always fully relish the beauties of particular parts, more especially in Mr. POPE, who has the particular skill to employ poetical ornament in aid of his arguments. Add to this, that when parts are thus taken detached, we may fometimes impute faults to the writer, which are fo only from the partial view we have given of his work *.

The poem confifts of one book, which is divided into three principal parts, or members. The first of them giving rules for the fudy of the art of criticism; the fecond exposing the caufes of wrong judgment; and the third, marking out the morals of the critic.

Though this piece is intitled fimply an Effay on Criticism, yet it contains feveral precepts, equally relative to the good writing, as to the true judging of a poem; which is fo far from violating the unity of the fubject, that it preferves and compleats it.

To this effect, fays our Poet, in the following lines:

"The critic eye, that microfcope of wit,
"Sees hairs and pores, examines bit by bit:
"How parts relate to parts, or they to whole,
"The body's harmony, the beaming foul,

"Are things which Kufler, Burman, Waffe fhall fee, "When man's whole frame is obvious to a fica."

The

The poet having in the opening, fhewn the use and feasonableness of the fubject, he proceeds to inquire into the proper qualities of a true critic.

"'Tis with our judgments as our watches, none "Go juft alike, yet each believes his own. "In Poets, as true genius is but rare, "True tafte as feldom is the Critic's fhare; "Both muft alike from Heav'n derive their light, "These born to judge, as well as those to write.'

The reasoning in these lines, as the learned commentator obferves, is conclufive; and the fimilitude extremely just.

It may be neceffary, however, to confider this paffage refpecting the human faculties, fomewhat more critically; as it will be of use hereafter, in the attempt to afcertain the nature and extent of our author's genius.

It has been faid that "judgment, when it goes "alone, is generally regulated, or at leaft much "influenced, by custom, fashion or habit; and

never certain and conftant, but when founded 66 upon TASTE; which is the fame in the critic, 66 as GENIUS in the poet. That, in fact, genius "and taste are but one and the fame faculty dif'ferently exerting itfelf under different names, "in the two profeffions of poetry and criticism: "for that the art of poetry confifts in felecting

out of all thofe images which present them"felves to the fancy, fuch of them as are truly "beautiful: And the art of criticifm in difcerning, "and fully relishing, what it finds fo felected."

F 3

"

Though

Though it may be allowed, that judgment is never certain, but when ripened into tafte: nevertheless we must be cautious how we fall into an error, which has been adopted by many writers, who have confidered judgment and tafte as things totally diftin&t: for they appear to be the fame faculty, and to differ only in the degree and extent of their application. Tafte is nothing but judgment matured and refined. The faculty of judgment, is born with us; tafte is, in a great measure, acquired. Judgment, is the faculty of comparing and feparating our ideas: tafte, is the fame faculty of comparifon improved, and applied to works of imagination and elegance.

The man of taste seems at one glance, by a kind of intuition, to difcern what is beautiful and elegant; and this has mifled many to imagine that tafte is a faculty diftinct from judgment. But, in truth, we cannot difcover what is beautiful, but by comparison: and to compare, as has been faid, is the office of judgment. Tafte, therefore, is the refult of repeated, tho' perhaps imperceptible operations of the judgment, by which, we at length acquire that quick difcern ment of, and habitual relish for, the beautiful.

The excellence of tafte, depends on an extenfive knowledge in the fubjects of the fine arts; and on that habit of comparifon, which alone can enable us to difcern and relish what is truly beautiful. For inftance, fhould a man of good natural judgment who had never feen a picture, behold two portraits of the human figure, daubed upon a fign, of which the one was manifeftly a better imitation of nature than the

other,

other, he would not fail to be delighted with that which had the preference, and to pronounce it beautiful. But fhould he afterward become. converfant with the works of a Vandyke or a Reynolds, he would difcover the uncertainty of his former judgment, and what pleased him before as beautiful, he would then defpife as defective. In this fenfe, we may be allowed to fay, that judgment in the fine arts is never certain, but when matured and refined to tafte.

At the fame time it may be doubted, whether genius and tafte can be ftrictly confidered as the fame faculty, differently exerting itself under different names. Genius, as the derivative sense of the word implies, denotes the faculty of inventing, or of forming new affociations of ideas; but the bufinefs of felecting fuch images as are truly beautiful, feems to be the province of tafte; which, as the term imports, is the faculty of difcerning, or in its etymological fenfe, of feeling what is beautiful.

It is as ufual, and perhaps as proper, to say a writer of tafte, as a critic of tafte: and it feems easy to conceive a writer of genius, that is, of ftrong creative powers, without tafte to jelect fuch images as are truly beautiful, from the group which throng before him. This defect is fometimes, perhaps ofteneft, obfervable in writers of the greatest genius; and feems to arife from too quick a fenfibility, which caufes the novelty of various images, to make fuch a

powerful impreffion on their minds, as to prevent the timely interpofition of judgment, to diffipate the charm which misleads them in their choice. But though tafte is spoiled by too exquifite a fenfibility, yet without a certain degree of it, neither tafte nor genius can exift. They fpring from the fame common stock; fenfibility is the root of both: and though both may be improved and refined by exercise, yet the feeds of each are fown by nature.

The poet himself, indeed, feems to have had the diftinctions in view which I would endeavour to point out. He fays;

"Authors are partial to their wit, 'tis true, "But are not Critics to their judgment too?

"Yet if we look more clofely, we shall find "Moft have the feeds of judgment in their. "mind:

"Nature affords at leaft a glimm'ring light; "The lines, tho' touch'd but faintly, are "drawn right."

Taking these lines, and those before quoted together, it should feem from the context, that the poet ufes judgment and tafte, as two words denoting degrees of the fame faculty, and that he confiders genius as fomething diftinct from both.

Among the caufes which prevent the due culture of the feeds of judgment, our Author reckons