ject of mercy and if he had not then received mercy, the infliction had been too severe and unjust; since the covenant was beyond the measures of man, after it began to multiply into particular laws, and man by accident was lessened in his strengths. 11. From hence the corollaries are plain, 1. God was not unjust for beginning his intercourse with mankind by the covenant of works, for these reasons. I. Because man had strengths enough to do it, until he lessened his own abilities. II. The covenant of works was, at first, instanced but in a small commandment: in abstaining from the fruit of one tree, when he had by him very many others for his use and pleasure. III. It was necessary that the covenant of works should begin for the covenant of faith and repentance could not be at first; there was no need of it, no opportunity for it, it must suppose a defailance, or an infirmity, as physic supposes sickness and mortality. IV. God never exacted the obedience of man by strict measures, by the severity of the first covenant after Adam's fall; but men were saved then as now; they were admitted to repentance, and justified by faith and the works of faith. And therefore the Jews say that three things were before the world, the law,—the name of the Messias, and repentance; that is, as St. Paul better expresses it, This repentance through faith in the Messias is "the hidden wisdom of God, ordained before the world unto our glory." So that, at first, it was not impossible; and when it was, it was not exacted in the impossible measure; but it was kept in pretence and overture for ends of piety, wisdom, and mercy, of which I have given account ; it was σοφία ἀποκεκρυμμένη, α wise dispensation,' but it was 'hidden.' 12. For since it is essential to a law, that it be in a matter that is possible, it cannot be supposed that God would judge man by an impossible commandment". A good man would not do it, much less the righteous and merciful judge of men and angels. But God, by holding over the world m 1 Cor. ii. 7. n Plato, lib. 5. de leg. Demosth. contra Timocratem. Plutar, in Solon. Curius; Fortunatianus Rhet. Nemo obligatur ad impossibile. the covenant of works, "non fecit prævaricatores sed humiles;" "did not make us sinners" by not observing the akpíßeα, the minutes and tittles of the law, "but made us humble," needing mercy, begging grace, longing for a Saviour, relying upon a better covenant, waiting for better promises, praying for the Spirit of grace, repenting of our sins, deploring our infirmities, and justified by faith in the promises of God. 13. II. This, then, is the great introduction and necessity of repentance. We neither could have lived without it, nor have understood the way of the divine justice, nor have felt any thing of his most glorious attribute. But the admission of us to repentance is the great verification of his justice, and the most excellent expression of his mercy: this is the mercy of God in Jesus Christ, springing from the fountains of grace, purchased by the blood of the holy Lamb, the eternal sacrifice, promised from the beginning, always ministered to man's need in the secret economy of God, but proclaimed to all the world at the revelation of God incarnate, the first day of our Lord Jesus. 14. But what are we eased now under the Gospel, which is a law of greater holiness and more commandments, and a sublimer purity, in which we are tied to more severity than ever man was bound to, under any institution and covenant? If the law was an impossible commandment, who can say he hath strictly and punctually performed the injunctions of the Gospel? Is not the little finger of the Son, heavier than the Father's loins? Here therefore it is to be inquired, Whether the commandments of Jesus Christ be as impossible to be kept as the law of Moses? If we by Christ be tied to more holiness, than the sons of Israel were by Moses's law, then because that could not be kept, then neither can this. But if we be not tied to more than they, how is the law of Christ a more perfect institution? and how can we now be justified by a law no better than that, by which we could not be justified? But then, if this should be as impossible as ever, why is it anew imposed? why is it held over us, when the ends for which it was held over us, now are served? And at last, how can it be agreeable to God's wisdom and justice, to exact of us a law which we cannot perform, or to impose a law which cannot justly be exacted? The answering and expli cating this difficulty, will serve many propositions in the doc trine of repentance. SECTION II. Of the Possibility or Impossibility of keeping the Precepts of the Gospel. 15. Ir were strange that it should be possible for all men to keep the commandments, and required and exacted of all men with the intermination or threatening of horrid pains, and yet that no man should ever do it. St. Jerome brings in Atticus thus arguing: "Da exemplum, aut confitere imbecillitatem tuam°;" and the same also was the argument of Orosius; and the reasonableness of it is a great prejudice against the contrary affirmation of St. Austin, Alipius et Evodias, Aurelius et Possidius, who, because it is no good consequence to argue a non esse ad non posse,' and though it is not done, yet possibly it might; conclude, that it is possible to keep the commandments; though as yet no man ever did, but he that did it for us all. But as Marcellinus said well, It is hard to say, that by a man a thing can be done, of which although there was a great necessity and a severe commandment, yet there never was any example.'-Because in men there is such infinite variety of tempers, dispositions, apprehensions, designs, fears and hopes, purposes and interests, that it were next to a miracle that not one of all mankind should do what he can, and what so highly concerns him. But because this, although it be a high probability, yet is no certain demonstration; that which St. Paul taught is certainly to be relied upon, "that the law could not do it for us," that is, could not bring us justification, "in that it was weak through the flesh;" meaning, that because we were so weak we could not fulfil the righteousness of the law, therefore we could not be justified by that covenant. "Mosi manus graves, facies cornuta, impedita lingua, lapideæ tabulæ:""Moses's hands were heavy, his face bright, his tongue stammering, and the tables were of stone;" by which is meant, that the imposition and the burden were great, but the shoul Lib. 1. Dial. ady. Pelag. P Rom. viii. der is weak and crushed, and therefore was not able to bear it; and therefore much less can it stand under a bigger load, if the holy precepts of the Gospel should prove so, and we be assisted by no firmer supporters. 16. For the nature and constitution of man are such, that he cannot perpetually attend to any state of things: "Voluntas per momenta variatur, quia solus Deus immutabilis ";" Variety and change, inconstancy and repentance, are in his very nature. If he be negligent, he is soon tempted. If he be watchful, he is soon wearied. If he be not instructed, he is exposed to every abuse. If he be, yet he is ignorant of more than he knows, and may be cozened by very many things; and in what he knows or seems to know, he is sometimes confident, sometimes capricious, curious and impertinent, proud and contemptuous. The commandments are instanced in things against our natural inclinations, and are restraints upon our appetite; and although a man may do it in single instances, yet to act a part of perpetual violence and preternatural contentions, is too hard and severe an expectation, and the often-unavoidable failings of men will shew how impossible it is. It is, as St. Jerome's expression is, as if a man should hale a boat against the stream; if ever he slacken his hand, the vessel falls back: and if ever we give way to our appetite in any of the forbidden instances, we descend naturally and easily. Some vices are proportionable to a man's temper, and there he falls pleasantly and with desire ; Ἡδὺ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, said Aristotle ; "That which is natural is sweet, but that which is violent is troublesome:" to others he is indifferent, but to them he is turned by every bias. If a man be morose, he is apt to offend with sullenness and angry pretensions: but if he be compliant and gentle, he is easily cozened with fair entreaties. If he be alone, he is sad and fantastic, and woe to him that is alone if he be in company, it will be very hard for him to go with them to the utmost limits of permission, and not to step beyond it. No man's leisure is great enough to attend the inquiry after all the actions and particulars, for which he is to be judged; and he does many things, which he considers not whether they be sins or no; and when he does consider, he often judges wrong. For some things there are r Rhet. lib. 1. Holwell. p. 50. 1 St. Jerom. lib. 2. in Gal, c. 3. no certain measures; and there are very many constituent or intervening things and circumstances of things, by which it is made impossible to give a certain judgment of the whole. Oftentimes a man is surprised and cannot deliberate for want of time; sometimes he is amazed, and wants order and distinction to his thoughts, and cannot deliberate for want of powers. Sometimes the case is such, that if a man determines it against his temporal interest, he determines falsely, and yet he thinks he does it safest: and if he judges in compliance with his temporal regards, he cannot be confident but that he was moved, not by the prevailing reason, but by prevailing passion. If the dispute be concerning degrees, there is no certain measure to weigh them by: and yet sometimes a degree does diversify the kind, and virtue and vice are but differing degrees of the same instance: and the ways of sinning upon the stock of ignorance are as many as there are ignorances, and degrees, and parts, and vicious causes, and instances of it. 17. Concerning our infirmities, they are so many that we can no more account concerning the ways of error coming upon that stock, than it can be reckoned in how many places a lame man may stumble, that goes a long journey in difficult and uneven ways. We have beginning infant-strengths, 'which are therefore imperfect because they can grow:' "Crescere posse imperfectæ rei signum est";" and when they are most confirmed and full grown, they are imperfect still. When we can reckon all the things of chance, then we have summed up the dangers and aptnesses of man to sin upon that one principle; but so as they can, they are summed up in the words of Epiphanius'; Οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίαν, εἰδότες τὸ κήρυγμα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν ἔλεον τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ τὸ συγγνωστὸν τῆς φύσεως, τὸ εὐριπιστὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς σαρκὸς, τὸ πολύβλυστον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων αισθήσεως. “The condition of our nature, the inconstancy of our spirits, the infirmity of our flesh, the distraction of our senses, are an argument to make us with confidence expect pardon and mercy from the loving-kindness of the Lord, according to the preaching of truth, the Gospel of Christ." ΤΟ 18. But besides all this, the numbers of sin are not easily |