felf-love, covetoufnefs, diftruft of the truth and providence of God, keep moft from overflowing charity of building or endowing hofpitals.

2. Therefore there was a compulfory laid upon men for the relief of the poor within their refpective parishes, viz. the ftatute of 43. Eliz. cap. 2. being the firft compulfory law that I remember of that kind: and indeed it now became neceffary to be done by a compulfory means which before that time was left more arbitrary, because the king. dom became then much more populous than in former times, and with it the poor alfo greatly increafed, and befides many of thofe methods of their voluntary relief was then much abated; which ftatute enables the churchwardens and overfeers, &c. to do thefe things:

1. To take order for fetting to work the children of thofe whofe parents are not able to maintain their children.

2. To take order to fet thofe to work as, having no means to maintain themfelves, ufe no ordinary trade. But provides not fufficient compulfories to make them work.

3. To raife weekly by taxation a convenient flock of flax, hemp, &c. to fet the poor on work: but no means at first, before the return of the manufacture, to pay them wages in exprefs words, but is fupplied by the latter general claufeAnd to do and execute all other things, as well for the difpofing of the faid ftock, or otherwife concerning the premises as to them fhall feem convenient.'

4. To raise competent fums of money for the impotent poor not able to work.

5. Alfo for the putting of poor children apprentices, but no compulsory for any to receive them.

Among all thefe provifions, the 4th concerns the relief of the poor by taxation, and contributes to fuch as are impotent, the four other particulars concern their employment, and of fuch as are able to work, which is the far greater number. And although the relief of the impotent poor feems to be a charity of more immeditate exigence, yet the employment of the poor is a charity of greater extent, and of very great and important confequence to the public wealth and peace of the kingdom, as alfo to the benefit and advantage of the poor.

I therefore come to that fecond business relating to the poor, viz. the fetting the poor on work.

The laws that concern that bufinefs of the employment of the poor are of two kinds; viz. that which contains a compulfory means of providing work for the poor, which is

the

the ftatute of 43. Eliz. And fecondly, thofe laws which are in fome kind compulfory to force perfons to work; and these are of two kinds, viz.

1. Those that concern children and the binding of them apprentices, viz. the claufe of the ftatute 43. Eliz. cap. 4. before mentioned, and the ftatute 7 Jac. cap. 1. which makes fair provifion for the raifing of money to bind them, and directs the manner of its employment. But as before is obferved, hath not any fufficient compulfory for perfon to take them, and perchance it might be fit to have some fuch qualifications in that compulfory which might not leave it too arbitrary in the juftices of the peace to compel whom they please to take whom they pleafe: but this is not the bufinefs I drive at, perchance the general provifion which I defign may make this at least not fo frequently neceffary.

2. In reference to rogues, vagabonds and idle and dif orderly perfons, the ftatute 7 Jac. cap. 4. gives power, 1. to the juftices of the peace to fend them to the house of correction, which they are thereby required to cause to be erected. 2. Power to the master of fuch houfe of correction to keep them to work.

But even in this particular there are defects. I. It is not general for all perfons, but at most idle and disorderly perfons. 2. That defcription is very uncertain in reference to fuch perfons, and leaves the juftices either too great or too little power. 3. For want of a convenient ftock to be raised for fuch houfes of correction, and advantageous ways for fuch work, it either leaves fuch as are fent without an employment, or renders their employment ungrateful in respect of the fmalinefs of the wages, and rather makes people hate employment as a hell then to entertain it as a means of comfortable fupport; which though it may be 'well enough as a punishment for diforderly perfons that refufe to work, yet it is not applicable to thofe that are only idle, it may be because they have no work: 4. It is a difficult thing to determine who fhall be faid an idle perfon; it is a reasonable anfwer to that, they are idle for want of fuch work as they are able to do, or for want of fuch wages as might give them reafonable fupport; for there is no power given, nor is it reasonable it should, to compel perfons, to fet them on work, or to set them on work at convenient wages: 5. And lastly, it is not univerfal; many perfons are not within that law which would work if they might: or if they might at reafonable rates, whereby they might live. There is need, therefore, of fome fuch provifion that might be as ample as the

occafion

occafion, and without which indeed all the laws already made are either weak and ineffectual to their ends, and the generality of the poor left deftitute of a convenient fupport and provifion.

CHA P. II.

TOUCHING THE POWER BY THE LAW SETTLED FOR

THE GENERAL PROVISION FOR THE POOR, AND
THEIR DEFECTS.

UPON

PON the confideration of the ftatutes for the poor, the only ftatute that provides univerfally is that of 43 Eliz. which generally makes two provifions.

1. For the impotent poor that are not able to work: and it is true is a good and effectual provifion for fuch, if duly executed. But, as I faid before, the plaifter is not fo large as the fore, there are many poor that are able to work if they had it, and had it at reafonable wages, whereby they might fupport themfelves and their families, which oftentimes are many. Thefe are not within the provifion of the law, and if they come for exhibitions, they are denied, or at least have but very fmall, and fuch as cannot fupport them and their families. And indeed if they fhould have fufficient exhibition for the fupport of them and their families, the parishes where they live were not able to fupply them in a proportion anfwerable to their neceffities, or anfwerable to that fupply which a full employment would afford them; for inftance, a poor man and his wife, though able to work, may have four children, two of them poffibly able to work, two not able: the father and the mother are not able to maintain themselves and their family in meat, drink, clothing and houfe rent under ten fhillings per week, and fo much they might probable get if employed; this amounts to 261. per annum; if there were forty fuch families in a great parish, and they lived upon this exhibition collected by rates, it would arife to above 800l. per annum, which in many parishes exceeds the yearly value of their lands or rents, yet when these perfons are kept on work thus much must be gotten by them, and without a fupply equivalent to this they must live by begging, or ftealing, or ftarve. Therefore the fecond provifion is,

2. For those poor that are able to work, and in reference

to

to them it gives power to raise ftocks by rating the parishioners, and fetting the poor on work.

The defects of this provifion are,

1. In the execution of the law already made; for let any man look over most of the populous parishes in England, indeed there are rates made for the relief of the impotent poor, and it may be the fame relief is alfo given in a narrow meafure unto fome others, that have great families, and upon this they live miserably, and at beft from hand to mouth, and if they cannot get work to make out their livelihood they and their children fet up a trade of begging at beft. But it is rare to fee any provifion of a stock in any parifh for the relief of the poor. And the reafons principally are thefe : 1. The generality of the people that are able are yet unwilling to exceed the prefent neceffary charge, they do choose to live for an hour rather than project for the future; and although poffibly trebling their exhibition in one grofs fum at the beginning of the year, to raife a ftock, might in all probability render their future yearly payments for seven years together lefs by half or two thirds, than what muft be without it, yet they had rather continue on their yearly payments, year after year, though it exhauft them in time, and make the poor nothing the better at the year's end. 2. Because those places, where there are moft poor, confift for the most part of tradefmen, whofe eftates lie principally in their ftocks, which they will not endure to be fearched into to make then contributory to raise any confiderable stock for the poor, nor indeed fo much as to the ordinary contributions: but they lay all the rates to the poor upon the rents of lands and houses, which alone without the help of the stocks are not able to raise a stock for the poor, although it is very plain that stocks are as well by law rateable as lands, both to the relief, and raifing a ftock for the poor. 3. Because the churchwardens and overfeers, to whom this power is given, are inhabitants of the fame parifh, and are either unwilling to charge themselves or difpleafe their neighbours in charging more than they needs muft towards the poor: and although it were to be wifhed and hoped, that the juftices of peace would be forwardly to enforce them if they might, though it may concern them alfo in point of present profit, yet if they would do any thing herein, they are not empowered to compel the churchwardens and overfeers to do it, who most certainly will never go about it to burthen, as they think, themselves, and displease their neighbours,

unlefs

unlefs fome compulfory power were not only lodged by law, but alfo executed in fome that may have a power over them to enforce it, or to do it if they do it not, and to do it effectually, if they do it either partially or too fparingly:. 4. Because people do not confider the inconvenience that will in time grow to themfelves by this neglect, and the benefit that would in a little time accrue to them by putting it in practice if they would have but a little patience, as shall be fhewn hereafter.

2. The fecond defect is in the law itfelf; which are these. 1. No power in the juftices of the peace, or fome superintendent power to compel the raifing of a stock where the churchwardens and overfeers neglect it.

2. The act chargeth every parish apart where it may be 'they are able to do little towards it, neither would it be fo effectual as if three, four, five or more contiguous parishes did contribute towards the raifing of a ftock proportionable to their poor respectively.

3. There is no power for hiring or erecting a common houfe, or place for their common work-houfe, which may be in fome refpects, and upon fome occafions, useful and neceffary, as fhall be fhewn.

I.

CHAP. III.

THE REMEDY PROPOUNDED.

THAT the juftices of the peace at the quarter-feffions do fet out and diftribute the parishes in their feveral counties into feveral divifions, in each of which there may be a work-houfe for the common ufe of the refpective divifions, wherein they are refpectively placed, viz. one, two, three, four, five or fix parithes to a work-house, according to the greatnefs or fmallnefs, and accommodation of the feveral parishes.

2. That at that feffions the churchwardens and overfeers of the poor of the refpective parishes, bring in their feveral rates for the relief of their respective poor upon oath, And that the faid juftices do affefs three, four or five yearly pays to be levied and collected at one or two intire fums within the time prefixed by them for the raising of a stock to fet the poor within thofe precincts on work, and to build or procure