Of the primitive state, we have examples in the condition of many savage tribes, and for instances of the second class, we need only refer to the maxims and policy of civ. ilized nations. If moral ideas are ever contemplated by people of this class, they will be applied only in estimating the actions of others, but never as a guide to their own conduct. They will even consider another's sacrifice of his personal interest from a conviction of duty as childish folly, which they would be ashamed of in themselves. How can such beings ever arrive at religion? The desire for moral improvement must exist, before they can seek for religious faith as a means of strengthening their convictions of duty, and without seeking for such a faith, they assuredly can never find it. Ideas of what is supernatural may easily be formed by them, for we know that even the most barbarous nations possess these ideas in such number, that they people earth, sea, and air with their attendant spirits and deities. But they are wholly incapable of conceiving a moral governor of the universe, or a moral design in the creation. In an ethical point of view, they generally make their deities worse than themselves.

The two forms of religion which we have already considered, that of Pure Reason, and the Natural system, are founded

the moral law within us. But in the case now presented, the first office of religion is to seek out and develope this law; therefore, the foundation of the faith must be found in some other principle of our nature. The divine attribute of holiness having no power over men who are destitute of moral feeling, their attention must be drawn to His greatness and power, which qualities may excite in them astonishment and awe, through their sensual nature alone. The effect thus produced would not be a moral one, but the authority thus forced upon their attention might subsequently direct them to the only pure source of obligation. Men may be urged to listen to the divine commands, when they are impressed with a sense of His omnipotence ; they can obey these commands only through the capacity, developed afterwards, of recognising and appreciating His holiness. Only in the latter case, does obedience become a ground of moral desert; for if it followed in the former, having its source only in fear of the indignation, or hope of the favor, of an Almighty Being, it would be entirely selfish. Whether the purity of the motive would not be injured by the sensual character of the means through which it is conveyed, whether the fear of punishment or the hope of reward would not have more effect on the obedience produced through a revelation, than reverence for the holiness of the lawgiver, is no question for us to decide. We have only to show that, abstractly speaking, this result is not necessary; and, generally, it ought not to happen, if the religious frame of mind thus produced is pure, and not merely a more refined selfishness. Since it cannot be shown how far, or wherefore, the natural law stands in need of a support from revelation, - since undoubtedly there is a moral impulse within us to respect a rational being the more, according as the idea of absolute right within him has less need of extraneous aid,- and since the aid when obtained is perpetually liable to degenerate, and produce obedience only from a selfish regard to loss or gain in a future life, we cannot deny that it would be far more honorable to men, if their moral strength required no other confirmation, than what is afforded by Natural Religion.

The question now offers itself, in what manner can the authority and influence of moral principle be reëstablished among those men, who have lost all sense of duty incumbent on themselves, and have ceased to respect rectitude of conduct in others. One or more persons may be inspired

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to attempt the moral renovation of such a community, and, in order to obtain a hearing, may assume the character of special messengers from God. But for an audience through moral blindness rendered incapable of inferring the divine origin of a mission from the purity of the doctrine taught, this assumption of special authority must be supported by some startling phenomenon in the outward world, the cause of which, inexplicable on other grounds, must be referred at the time to the direct agency of Om. nipotence. Even their sensual nature would be impelled to listen to a doctrine, which should be offered to them in connexion with such a manifestation of divine power. Their attention being thus gained, the instruction would awaken the latent powers of conscience, and a sense of moral obligation would be established, that would stand in future by its own strength, without need of farther recurrence to the supposed miraculous event.

With regard to the physical occurrence itself, which has thus been used to authenticate a revelation, two suppositions are possible. The Divine Being may, at the time of the creation, have interwoven the cause of this particular event into the plan of the universe, so that, without any change in the physical laws once established, without any alteration of his original purpose, the phenomenon would appear when it was needed, and would produce the desired effect; or, the succession of natural causes and effects being once established, divine power may suspend their operation in a particular case, and cause an event to follow different from what would have happened, but for this special exertion of agency. In the former case, the miracle would only be an apparent one, since it is conceivable, that an ultimate moral purpose was connected with the institution of all physical laws. On the latter supposition only, it would be a real miracle. Here, however, we could

not determine at what link the chain had been broken, whether the cause immediately preceding the event in question, or one placed much further back, had been suspended from its natural operation. If our knowledge of physical laws were sufficient, we might trace back the observed phenomenon through many steps, explaining each event by the physical agency of the one immediately preceding; and wherever we were obliged to stop, the rational conclusion would be, not that supernatural power here began to be exerted, but that our previous experience here ceased to be an adequate guide. Therefore, the certain recognition of a miracle as such, is impossible.

It is enough for the required effect, if men believe at the time, that the event is miraculous. Since the object is only to excite their astonishment and admiration, so that they may be guided afterwards to a development of the moral law within them, should the phenomenon at a future time be shown to be explicable on natural principles, no possible injury could result. Men would lose the evidence of the revelation only when they had ceased to stand in need of the revelation itself, — when conscience, reinstated in its office, either alone, or with the aid of natural religion, could enforce obedience to its own commands. If Columbus, for instance, had made use of his pretended power of darkening the moon to persuade the natives of Hispaniola that he had a mission from God unto them, and had applied the authority thus obtained to develope the moral principle in their own hearts, no subsequent discovery on their part of the physical causes of an eclipse could shake their confidence in the faith thus established.

The result of this inquiry, Fichte maintains, is to silence both the dogmatic defender and the obstinate opponent of a belief in outward events produced by supernatural agency. In reference to any supposed instance, the former cannot

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declare, that it is inexplicable from physical causes, and therefore supernatural, because it may be only his knowledge that is at fault. Nor is the latter entitled to say, that because such a phenomenon may be traced to a natural cause, it cannot be used in attestation of a revealed faith, for it may have been interwoven with a moral purpose into the first plan of creation, and the effect it has produced may have been intended from the beginning.

We have thus far determined only the external characteristics of a revelation, and the circumstances under which, if at all, it must take place. We have seen, that although a rule of conduct announced as coming directly from God must be in every respect consentaneous with the moral law, revelation has still a work to perform ; namely, to develope anew the power of conscience in the hearts of those men, with whom this faculty had lost all its original and rightful dominion. Whatever may be the answer, therefore to the question which follows next in our inquiry, it cannot affect the possibility of a revelation, but will tend merely to regulate our expectations as to the matter to be divulged. This question is, whether we can expect from a revelation any precepts or information, which our natural reason and conscience might not have obtained without any supernatural aid. Can any additional instruction, any enlargement of our knowledge be derived from this source? Fichte answers this question in the negative, and contends that such an increase of knowledge would be destructive to moral principle, is impossible in the nature of things, and contradicts the very idea of a revelation.

It has been shown, that the doctrines of the freedom of the will, the existence of a God, and the immortality of the soul, are necessary postulates of the moral law within us. In regard to the naked fact in these three instances, therefore, we have nothing to learn. Do we desire in each case

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