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own affair, whether we act rationally or not. Such a want of respect for the law is founded, indeed, on a want of selfrespect, and the individual must be degraded in his own eyes. But if the duty here in question should appear as a divine command, or, what is the same thing, if it should appear to the agent as part of that law, which also in all its applications is the law of God, then it would no longer depend on one's own pleasure, whether or not he would respect it in this instance. (A failure in one case would constitute not merely an exception to the rule, but a sin against the whole law, and against the authority which sup

The agent would be answerable for a want of reverence to that Being, the mere thought of whom must excite in us the deepest awe.

Such reflections could not increase the authority of the moral law as a whole, but might heighten our respect for its decisions in particular cases, where strong temptations were arrayed against it. It should be remarked, however, that this reference to the divine will must be founded only on the agreement of that will with the moral law, that is, on the holiness of God, for then only would the determination be morally pure and right. If, on the contrary, it proceeded from a wish to propitiate his favor, or from a fear of his justice, our obedience would rest not on reverence for the Divine Being, but on selfishness.)

That inclinations conflicting with duty should be found in all finite beings, is credible enough, for such is our conception of what is finite in morals, - that, namely, which is governed by other laws, as well as by the law of conscience. It cannot be determined how far or how surely this contest between duty and inclination weakens the former, so as to make the idea of divine authority necessary for its support. But we cannot refrain from feeling a far higher respect for the being, whose reverence for duty

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needs no such aid, than for one who is .obliged to prop his failing conscience with such adventitious means. On the other hand, it must be allowed, we cannot determine whether finite beings in this life are capable of a degree of virtue, which could wholly dispense with such assistance. (It has been already shown, that the law of conscience agrees in every particular with the divine will. It remains to be determined, whether God should be considered as the author of that law; that is, whether in following the dictates of conscience we by so doing render an act of obedience to the divine command. Or the problem may be expressed as follows ; - have we any reason to assume, that the moral law in us is dependent on the moral law in God.) The question relates wholly to the origin of the law, and not to its contents ; since the supposition that He is its

i author, when taken to mean, that his power might have altered its dictates, would be to make right subject to arbitrary will, or in other words, to deny that absolute right had any existence. ] Technically expressed, the question relates to the form, not the contents, of the law. [Religion consists in obedience to the moral law, because it is the divine command.) The answer to the question above stated must, therefore, contain the foundation of religious faith, or, in the language of Transcendentalism, it must show how such a thing as religion is possible. Since the moral law itself tells us nothing of its own origin, it can only be rendered certain through an announcement from God himself, that obedience to this law is his command. Such an announcement can take place either through our own consciousness, or through some fact in the external world. In the former case, we shall obtain a Natural Religion, in the latter, a Revealed. But owing to the silence of the moral law itself on the subject, the announcement in the

former case can be made only indirectly, while on the second supposition, it must be in every sense direct.) C Everywhere in the external world we perceive order and the adaptation of means to ends. But amidst this variety of ends, reason compels us to assume that there is a principal one, to which all the others are subservient, — that there is one final cause of the existence of the universe. Our moral nature declares, that this one end can be nothing else than the promotion of the highest moral good, which is the only principle within the sphere of our knowl. edge, that is absolute and unconditioned. This great purpose can relate then to nothing but moral beings, since these alone are capable of the greatest good. We are ourselves, therefore, as moral beings, the final cause of the creation of all things. ( Moreover, this great purpose can only be entertained by a being whose whole practical power is determined by the moral law; therefore God is the author of nature, the creator of the world.) We are ourselves a part of nature, and are therefore His work, at least so far as our constitution depends on physical and organic lawsll That portion of our mental constitution, the doctrine of which constitutes the science of psychology, is merely physical, or a part of nature, and, consequently, God is its author. Consciousness belongs to this part of our constitution, and it is only through this faculty, that we become aware of the existence of a moral law within us. But, if ignorant of its existence, we should be in the same state as if it did not exist at all; therefore, He is to be regarded as the author of the law, through whose means alone it was disclosed to us. That is, God is the founder of the moral law within us, which is the point that was sought to be proved.

The argument has been presented with extreme conciseness, but in such a manner, we hope, as to be intelligible.

Our readers may perceive, that Fichte's scheme of Natural Religion is exceedingly simple. It may all be summed up as follows. (God is a lawgiver ; the dictates of conscience are his law, and the whole of that law; therefore, perfect obedience to them must satisfy all his demands. The divine announcement explained above is said to take place through consciousness, because, although reference is had in the argument to the external world, yet the idea of one final cause of the creation is given to us by pure reason, and because the moral faculty itself constitutes the only point, to which the annunciation is directed.

We now come to the second mode, in which the proposed problem may be solved; that is, the supposition, that the Deity may announce through some fact in the external world, that He is the author of the moral law within us. Such an announcement would constitute a REVELATION, properly so called, and the system of religion founded upon it may be far more comprehensive than the natural scheme already explained, since it is at least conceivable, that through the same external fact may be communicated to us, not merely the primal truth respecting the origin of the moral law, but a multitude of others, relating both to doctrine and practice. It may be necessary to remark again, that the principles to be laid down are not meant to be applied specially to Christianity, or to any other revelation in particular, but to all possible revelations.

To reveal is to make known. By the very idea of a revelation, therefore, it is supposed, that something is to be made known to us which we did not know before. Now, all knowledge that exists a priori, -in other words, all knowledge obtained without the aid of experience, - such as the theorems of the geometer and the original dictates of conscience,- is derived, or pointed out; it cannot be revealed. All propositions, the truth of which, depending

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on the very constitution of our minds, may be demon. strated, rest on the evidence of that demonstration, and can in no proper sense be said to be made known to us. Only historical knowledge, or facts perceived by sense, can be made known, since the evidenee here rests upon authority ; that is, upon our confidence in the veracity and the means of observation of the individual who discloses them to us. And farther, it is not the perception itself that is revealed, but the fact that another has experienced that perception, If, for instance, another person gives me a rose to smell of, he does not reveal to me the truth that the rose smells sweet; I find that out myself. But if there be no means of getting the flower in question, and he assures me from his previous experience that the odor is pleasant, then the fact is revealed to me, since I receive it on his authority, Such an assurance may be handed from one person to another in long succession, and the fact revealed is then said to rest upon tradition.

Again, the idea of a revelation presupposes some one who is the author of it, - who makes known, and another to whom it is addressed. The fact, also, must be inten. tionally communicated, the design being to cause another person to know some particular truth, and not merely to enable him to gather what knowledge he may from observing the conduct and hearing the words of him who reveals. Hence, the author of a revelation must be an intelligent being, his purpose in informing and the information that is received being related to each other as moral cause and consequence.

Besides the criteria mentioned above, when we speak generally of a revelation, we mean one that is addressed, mediately at least, to all mankind, and of which the Infinite Being is the author. To such a one the remarks that fol. low will be restricted. Of the physical possibility of a