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law. A too hasty decision of this question, against all claim on the part of the desire, leads directly to a system of Stoicism in morals, to the principle of entire self-suffi. ciency, and even,

if followed out to its remotest consequences, — to a denial of the existence of a God, and of the immortality of the soul. When a regard for our own happiness, considered as a motive, has once acknowledged the limitations imposed on it by morality, it acquires a sanction, and, where the law is silent, it becomes a legitimate principle of action. In such case, the action contemplated, when considered in an ethical point of view, is merely negative, - not contrary to Right; and being then referred to the natural desire for our own well-being, it becomes positively a right. I am entitled to every thing, which I can obtain without a violation of moral principle.

From the justification of this natural impulse arises the idea of desert, a conception of the highest importance in Ethics. Guided by this idea, we necessarily approve the law of requital in kind, — the jus talionis we are gratified, when the external condition of any one corresponds to the dispositions he has manifested. This feeling in its full force requires an entire agreement between the fortunes of an individual and his moral conduct. That, in the world we live in, such agreement in many cases does not exist, is a fact, for the explanation of which we pass over

from the territory of Ethics, into that of Natural Theology.

Our good or ill fortune depends in a great measure on the course of natural events, since we live under physical laws, and the demand of our moral nature, that happiness should be parcelled out in direct proportion to the merits of individuals, stands in perpetual conflict with these laws. [Now the moral law must secure to us the enjoyment of

those rights, which it has itself bestowed, or it contradicts itself, and ceases to be a law. To obtain this end, reference must be had to an ideal being, who is the author of Nature, and with whom, consequently, physical necessity is merged in moral freedom. This being we call God, whose existence is just as certain as that of the moral law itself. His attributes are easily inferred from the mere fact of his existence, and from the necessary assumption, that he must carry into effect all the requisitions of that law, which exists

in Him without limit or control. C Thus far, we have a Theology, or a doctrine of God, but

as yet we have obtained no Religion. The former is a mere lifeless science, that can have no practical influence ; but the latter, according to its etymology, must bind us to something, - must impose obligations, which would not exist, if there were no religion. To explain the origin of religious ideas, properly so called, the argument must be developed more fully. >

If the idea of Right were given to us as a mere theoretical conception, without any reference to its power over the Will, it would be to us a mere object of reflection, a means of considering certain things in Nature under an additional aspect, of viewing them not only as they are, but as they ought to be. But even in this case, we should not be wholly indifferent to the result. The perception of an agreement between this idea and the course of outward events would excite in us a feeling of pleasure. So it is in reality. The joy with which we witness the failure of malicious attempts, or the detection and punishment of the wicked, or the success of virtuous endeavor, or the recompense of the righteous for the evils they have suffered and the sacrifices they have made on the road of virtue, is founded on the inmost principles of our nature and is the never-failing source of (the interest we take in poetry and fiction, Still, it would be a mere indolent gratification, unaccompanied with desire,

like that which attends the sight of a beautiful painting or landscape.

But universal experience assures us, that the application of moral ideas to real events is accompanied with strong desire. In the world of tragedy and romance, we are not satisfied, till the honor of the innocent is rescued and the unjust persecutor is unmasked and punished, however contrary such an issue may be to the usual course of events in the actual world. And we may remark in passing, that the very fact of our requiring in fiction a different allotment of good and evil fortune from that which obtains in the natural world, proves that we are not to refer such things as the actions of moral agents to any standard founded on actual events, but that we necessarily compare them with our own conception of Right. On the stage, when virtue is represented as oppressed and vice as triumphant, we console ourselves with the reflection, that the piece is not ended. And just so in real life, when we see the wicked crowned with prosperity and honor, while the virtuous are persecuted, banished, and dying under a thousand torments, we cannot be content to believe that all is over, and the spectacle is for ever closed. But we go still farther. The pleasure we experience in

( beholding the ends of justice answered in the natural course of human affairs, even when accompanied with a strong desire that such may continue to be the case, would not justify us in inferring the existence of a Being, who, by his omnipotent power, should conduct all cases whatever to the same result. The desire for what is pleasant to us, is, in many instances, merely an idle wish, as, after a long continuance of stormy weather, every one desires the return of a sunny day. From a mere wish, however universal and strong, it would be presumptuous to infer the reality

We must seek then for a more authoritative

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of its object.

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principle on which to build up this important article of faith. And such a principle we find in the moral law, the dictates of which, far from being placed on a level with mere desire, are accompanied with such a consciousness of rightful dominion, that we are justified in attributing to them actual power

of causation. In our own nature, the idea of Right demands constant and absolute submission to its laws, and when we fail to render this obedience, we do not experience mere regret, the feeling which accompanies the nonfulfillment of an idle wish2 — nor even are we merely dissatisfied with ourselves, as when through our own fault, as by imprudence or neglect, we have failed to accomplish some desired end, but we are overwhelmed with remorse and self-humiliation. In the world without us, this law speaks with the same authority, and demands that the natural course of events, so far as moral beings are interested in them, should be conformed to its own standard. But here the power of finite beings is at an end, and we are compelled to refer the fulfillment of the moral requisition to a Being, over whom physical laws have no power, but who governs nature by his will. CA science of theology obtained in this manner becomes at once a religion, for it places us in close connexion with a God. We are compelled to look up to him, as the Being who knows the moral worth of every purpose of our hearts, and who will allot to us that measure of happiness, which is conformed to our deserts. Here, then, is religion, founded on the idea of God as the governor of nature with a moral purpose, and in us on the wish for happiness, which does not indeed increase the obligations of duty, but which enlarges and strengthens our desire to conform to them.)

But an important and difficult point still remains to be decided. Since it is only to satisfy the demands of our moral nature, that we have been obliged to assume the existence

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of a God as a moral governor of the world, his will must coincide entirely with the dictates of the moral law. He can demand nothing more of us than what is already required by the law in our own hearts, without ceasing to be that ideal Being, whose existence is the only one, for which we have discovered any rational ground of belief. Practically, therefore, it is indifferent whether our duty be performed because it is his will, or because Conscience requires it; for the duty in both cases will be the same. Theoretically, we have to inquire, of what use is it to add the force of his command to a law, which by itself creates a perfect obligation, and the contents of which cannot be enlarged by his will, because already shown to be in every point identical with that will. Is there any obligation to obey the will of God as such, and if so, on what grounds does it rest ?

Guided only by pure reason, independent of all experience, we are bound to answer the former part of this question in the negative. Conscience speaks only to command, and if it did not possess original and absolute authority, we should have no power of assuming the existence of a God, and no means of ascertaining his will. The moral law is categorical and imperative, requiring obedience because it is a law, and not by any reference to a lawgiver. To go behind the moral faculty, in search of an authority on which to establish it, would be to take away

its distinctive character, and to deprive it of all power for those who could not find, or would not admit, the assumed basis. But, reasoning a posteriori (from experience), cases may be found in which an additional sanction for the law would be useful in strengthening its power over the Will. We may *know to a certainty what our duty is, and still, in a particular instance, resolve to break through the general rule ;we may determine this once to do wrong, since no one is answerable for the fault but ourselves, and since it is our