and reasoning, which has brought a reproach on the very name of philosophy, and, through the mournful perversion of terms which it has occasioned, has given too good cause for regarding a system of philosophical radicalism as a mere cover for an attack on all the principles of government and social order, and for considering a philosophical religion as atheism itself. Under such circumstances, we can hardly wonder, that many reflecting persons have conceived a distrust of the consequences of such free inquiry, and do not suppress either alarm or contempt at the bare mention of German metaphysics.

6*

III.

FICHTE'S EXPOSITION OF KANT:

PHILOSOPHY APPLIED TO THEOLOGY.*

WE

propose, in this essay, to give some account of the system of theology, which, in Germany, has been derived from the principles of what is there called the Critical Philosophy, but which is better known among us by the name of Transcendentalism We mean the system which is founded directly and entirely on the basis of that philosophy, paying no regard at present to the modifications it has undergone in the hands of subsequent inquirers, or to the partial influence, which the same speculative theory has had upon other systems, which were chiefly drawn from different sources. The prodigious impulse, that the writings of Kant gave to the speculative genius of his country. men, is visible enough in every walk of literature and science, but nowhere are its effects so widely and strongly marked as in the province of the theologian. It was natural that it should be so. Philosophy and theology are sister sciences, so closely allied, that it is often difficult to determine the boundaries between them. Every person must hold some opinions relative to each, and these opinions form two mutually dependent creeds, that are in a greater or less degree peculiar to himself, and of which the action and reaction are so nearly equal, that it is often difficult to determine which is the parent of the other. Every theory respecting the origin and first principles of human knowl.

a

edge must bear a close relation to that subject, on which of all others knowledge is the most important, — the doctrine

, of God, duty, and immortality. The religion of the Greeks and Romans, so far as it existed in a definite and consistent form, that is, as it was conceived by enlightened and thinking men among them, was wholly drawn from their philosophical tenets, or more properly speaking, it was identical with those tenets. And so it has been in modern times. (Skepticism in philosophy and in religion, if not the same thing, at least, always go together. The metaphy

, sics of Calvinism are as much a component part of its creed, as the “five points” themselves. This intimate connexion between two great branches of human inquiry supplies an additional means of estimating the truth and value of the results obtained in investigating either. Unsound conclusions in the one must be drawn from false premises in the other.

Kant perceived at once, that his system of metaphysics led to many important results respecting the great truths of religion, and he occupied himself at an early period in tracing out and establishing those points in a separate treatise. His work, entitled “ Religion within the Limits of mere Reason," appeared in 1793, twelve years after the publication of the “Critique of Pure Reason.” But he had been anticipated by a zealous young disciple, whose ardor in philosophical pursuits, at first exerted only in carrying out and defending the principles of his master, was destined soon to receive a different direction, and to establish a rival system, the reputation of which triumphed for a time over that of its predecessor. Fichte's first work, “ A Critique of all Revelation," was published anonymously in 1792, and, being avowedly established on the basis of the Critical Philosophy, the principles of which it merely developed and applied to another subject, it was at first universally

as an

attributed to Kant himself. Fichte claimed it in the second edition, though the first conception of his own philosophical system was probably even then floating in his mind ; and as this differed widely from the philosophy of Kant, it is not likely, that, at any subsequent period of his life, he would have defended this early theory of revelation. Still, he never expressly disavowed it, and, as at the time of its publication he was in every sense a scholar at the feet of Gamaliel,

- a thorough Kantist in word and opinion, the work may fairly be considered as a right application of Transcendental principles to the subject of which it treats, authentic development of the Critical Philosophy by one of its ablest disciples. Compared with other works of the same class, it has the highest merit in point of execution. Of course, it bristles all over with the formidable ter. minology of its school, but the writer uses this strange dialect with the ease and strength of a master, while the superior method, precision, and succinctness of his manner render the book less tiresome than any of Kant's own treatises. We shall follow it as a guide in the sketch proposed, rather than the work already mentioned by Kant him. self, because it is more complete, and the results are more definite, and more directly traced to their source. The two treatises differ widely in plan, but, as might be expected, the writers arrive at precisely the same conclusion.

In order to show clearly the starting point of the inquiry, a few words must be premised respecting some points previously established in the “Critique of Pure Reason," and which are taken for granted in the work before us. ACcording to the Transcendental Philosophy, then, what is properly termed knowledge is entirely confined within the region of experience. We know nothing, and can know nothing, of any object, that may not be conceived to exist in

space and time, — which may not be assumed under the

Categories, or laws of thought. relative to the understanding. The Reason does, indeed, form to itself

pure ideas, which go beyond the limits of sense and experience.' But, as we know no object to which these are applicable, they remain as mere ideas, wholly incognizable. Such are our notions of God, of moral freedom, and of immortality, which wholly transcend the limits of our merely intellectual nature. It is of no use to argue about them, because the proof and the refutation will be found to have the same cogency, - to be equally true and equally false. These great subjects are for ever removed from the sphere of dis. putation, because they are placed beyond the cognizance of that faculty, by which alone any reasoning process can be conducted. In regard to the mere“ Speculative Reason," that is, to the intellect, they are banished into a limbo of cloudlike forms and unreal fancies. But in treating of the “ Practical Reason,” that is, of our moral nature, these ideas again appear, and assume more the appearance of realities. The moral law within us requires something besides itself to carry out its own principles,

to aid it in performing its self-imposed functions. Realities corresponding to the abovementioned ideas are necessary to the existence of that state of things, which is not merely contemplated, but absolutely required, by this law. The categorical and imperative nature of all the dictates of this principle is sufficient to annul all obstacles to their fulfil. ment, since otherwise there would be entire contradiction between two principles of our nature, which is impossible. This is easily seen in the case of the freedom of the will, since the necessitarian doctrine destroys all the obligations of morality, by rendering compliance with them impossible. The skeptic can only oppose this conclusion by arguments drawn from the Speculative Reason, which, like all other considerations derived from the same source in relation to