logic and the necessary laws, to which, in an ontological point of view, all the objects of our perceptions appear to be subjected.) Might not the similarity of appearance be founded on the radical identity of the two classes ? Every act of reasoning, considered abstractly, takes place under certain forms or laws, which have undoubted authority, and the number and reality of which may be determined with the utmost precision. Might not these forms be identical with the laws, which we fancy are drawn from the observation of nature, but which, on this hypothesis, must be considered as imposed on nature by our own intellectual activity ? Kant answers this question in the affirmative, and, having remodelled and completed to his own satisfaction the table of categories, claims to have resolved by their means the problem respecting the possibility of a priori knowledge in the department of physics. To every conception or judgment that forms a part of our knowledge are applied at least four categories, taken respectively from the four classes into which these forms of thought have been divided. In other words, we must think of the object, in the first place, as being either one, many, or all ; secondly, as positive, negative, or limited; thirdly, as substance or accident, cause or effect, or as placed in reciprocity with some. thing else by the law of action and reaction; finally, as possible or impossible, existent or nonexistent, necessary or contingent.

The categories are necessary conditions of thinking upon any object, but in themselves they do not enable us to know the object. To accomplish this purpose, real intuitions must be given, to which the categories may be referred; and, since all intuitions come from sense, the office of the understanding extends only to sensible things. Beyond the operations of the senses, or the territory of experience, nothing is cognizable. This remark applies even to our own na

ture, Pure consciousness gives us assurance,

that we exist; but, since there is no intuition of this fact, and it is thought upon only by the spontaneity of the understanding, so our own being cannot be known in itself, but only the manner of that being. Empirical consciousness of changes in our internal condition must be distinguished from pure consciousness of self-existence. Universally, therefore, the functions of the understanding are empirical, and not transcendental ; they refer to objects as phenomena, and not as things in themselves.

Notwithstanding this necessary limitation of our capacities to a knowledge of objects within the domain of experience, the mind constantly strives to rise above the sphere of the senses, and, as in the metaphysical systems of the | older philosophy, fashions for itself a science of things in themselves, which are supersensual and unconditioned. An analysis of our intellectual faculties is incomplete, if it does not account for this effort,- if it does not develope some deep-seated cause, which constantly impels us to a search after what is absolute and unlimited, and gives to the supposed knowledge of it a deceptive appearance of validity. Kant finds such a cause in the third cognitive faculty of man, denominated par excellence the Reason, - spontaneity raised to the highest degree, — the chief function of which is to support this unceasing, but vain endeavor. As the power of sense has its forms, and the understanding its categories, so the reason has its ideas, created by adding to conceptions elaborated by the next lower faculty a notion of the infinite and the absolute. They are three in number; the idea of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, which is the aim of rational psychology; the idea of the absolute totality of phenomena, the universe, which forms the purpose of rational cosmology ; finally, the idea of ab

solute reality, the highest condition of all things, the first cause, which is the object of rational theology. In other words, by a necessary impulse of our nature we must assume the unity of the soul, the existence of the universe, and the reality of a first cause. But these ideas enter not the field of positive knowledge. They constitute the possi: bility of metaphysics as an idea, but not as actual science. No proof of their objective validity can be furnished, for it is their essence not to be referred to corresponding objects cognizable through sense ; they are derived subjectively from the reason. Yet they are not wholly without use, as they answer at least a regulative purpose. They urge our empirical inquiries onward to higher and nobler ends, than would otherwise be pursued; and, though the objects themselves are unattainable, the effort serves to give greater comparative unity and completeness to our system of knowledge.

The result of the theory may be given in Kant's own words. “ All knowledge of things derived solely from the pure understanding, or from pure reason, is nothing but empty show; and truth is to be found only through experi

v

He expressly denies the validity of the a priori argument for the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of a God; and rebukes the arrogance of the schools for assuming to themselves higher grounds of conviction than are open to the vulgar. His aim is, not merely to show the futility of the proofs already advanced in support of these great doctrines, but to demonstrate the absolute impracticability of the attempt to establish them under any circumstances. The reason may and will exhaust itself by perpetual efforts to transcend the limits of possible inquiry, - erecting systems and, almost in the same breath, pulling them down again ; because urged on by an irresistible impulse, that prevents it from being

ence.

tems;

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taught wisdom by repeated failures, and from acknowledge ing that it has overtasked its powers and mistaken its prerogatives. The arguments relating to these sublime doctrines are summed up on either side, and found to be equally irrefutable, and therefore equally false. Then it is vain to argue either for or against them; the supporter and the assailant alike are silenced.

Such a result of metaphysical inquiry as this, reminds one of Madame de Staël's remark on former skeptical sys

that “they changed the light of knowledge into a devouring flame; and Philosophy, like an enraged magician, fired the palace on which she had lavished all the prodigies of her skill." It should be observed, however, that Kant himself, alarmed by the sweeping skepticism of these conclusions, in his “Critique of Practical Reason," subsequently published, labors to do away with his own work, and to find in our moral nature what the speculative reason cannot afford, foundation for the belief in things unseen and eternal. The attempt forms a virtual acknowledgment of the necessity of those doctrines, which he had previously refused to legitimate ; they are introduced into the field of ethics as postulates, without which moral phenomena remain inexplicable.

Our outline of this celebrated system is necessarily very imperfect, but it may serve to correct some unfounded notions of its character and tendency. The authority of Kant as a teacher of opinions, even in his native country, has passed away; and the result has come far short of justifying his boast, that he had given a new and sure basis to mental science, and fixed the principles and method of its progress. Speculation has broken the trammels, with which he would have limited its aberrations, and has pursued a course more erratic than ever. Opinions have varied as widely in the mass, and fluctuated as rapidly in the in

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dividual, as if he bad never determined the only possible method ” of avoiding hesitancy and confusion, and placing metaphysics on the same stable foundation with the other abstract sciences. But the indirect influences of his writ. ings may be distinctly traced in the works of nearly all the speculatists, who have succeeded him, not only in Germany, but in France and England. While his innovations in the nomenclature have changed the whole garb of philosophy, and rendered the study of systems more abstruse, fatiguing, and repulsive, it must be confessed, that they have also removed some causes of ambiguity and mistake, and have pointed out the path for effecting a more systematic and beneficial reform. His example has also given a fresher impulse to the spirit of inquiry, increased the eagerness for the formation of new systems, and carried bold. ness of theorizing on all topics far beyond its ancient limits. His great demerit consists, in having effectually, though perhaps not intentionally, served the cause of 'infi. delity, while professing to repair and extend the defences of belief. Had the real character of his doctrines been evident at a glance, their influence, whether for good or evil, could not have reached so far. But his disciples groped about in the intricacies of a system, which they could not fully master, and embraced opinions, of the nature and tendency of which they had but a blind conception. Thus, they were fairly enlisted on the side of skepticism, before they had thought of quitting the banners of faith. Once engaged in the work, they felt only the desire of surpassing their instructer in dogmatism of manner, rashness in form. ing novel hypotheses, and general license of speculation on the most sacred subjects. As his theory extended over the whole territory of knowledge, almost every science has in turn been infected with the wild and crude imaginings of his followers. It is this general effervescence of thought