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than that he rigidly adhered to his purpose. His book was the first in modern times to give an ample collection of facts, derived from observation, relating to the history of the human mind, and forming a broad basis, on which to erect a system of experimental philosophy. He was directly concerned only with the “discerning faculties”; therefore the imagination and the moral powers are spoken of only incidentally, and, it must be admitted, with frequent mistakes. But to censure this omission is to blame Locke for leaving undone what he never proposed to accomplish. The leading proposition of his first book, which, owing to his inaccurate and unguarded use of language, has been so frequently assailed, is still one, which, couched in one form or another, expressed with greater or less caution, no phi. losopher since his time has ever thought of denying. Those who question the possibility of experience, who deny the reality and value of any scheme of experimental philosophy, certainly will not accept his conclusions. But do not let them assume the exclusive propriety of their own method, and then censure Locke for adopting a different

He has chosen to reason from observation and facts; they from “anticipated cognitions a priori." He limited his task, gave up the consideration of problems which he believed to be insoluble, and aimed only at plain and literal truth. Do not let them charge his philosophy with a sensualizing and degrading influence, merely because they have proposed to themselves a different and, it may be, a higher purpose. The results of his inquiries are expressed in a plain and homely garb, while they have caused poetry and eloquence to contribute to the embellish. ment of philosophy. Before they arrogate to themselves the superiority in this respect, let them consider the observasion of Hume: “Nothing is more dangerous to reason, than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been

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the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers. Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared to those angels, whom the Scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings."

Originality has become the cant of the day, - the magic sign, whose worshippers would fain persuade themselves of the worthlessness of every thing, save that which is too strange, too wild, and fantastical, to have entered human thought before.

In such a doctrine as this we have no share. There is that in Truth, which prevents the labors of the humblest of her admirers from becoming degrading or useless to himself or mankind. It is a maxim, which men are ever ready to acknowledge as true, but never to act upon, that the faithful instructer in virtue stands as high as the successful searcher after truth. He who lends one incitement to the cultivation of a single branch of knowledge, though that branch be as old as the creation, does as much good to society, as much honor to himself, as if he had been the author of any novel hypothesis, that has been framed since the time of Aristotle. If those who are most enthusiastic with regard to the progress of knowledge, would have their own dreams realized, they must learn to place a higher value upon humility as a philosophical virtue. There are mysteries in nature, which human power cannot penetrate; there are problems which the philosopher cannot solve. He may form theories, but his theories will be mere dreams, — the futile attempts of human intellect to scan the designs of that Being, “ whose judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.” Even in that field of discovery, which is open to the philosopher, he must seek to gratify his thirst for further knowledge only by persevering labor and humble trust. That eager

self-confidence, which would fain grasp at conclusions, without first examining the premises, which would reach the pinnacle without the previous toil of ascending the steps, must be restrained. Truth would lose its proper estimation, if it were a pearl that could be obtained without price. It can be purchased only by patient observation, by deep and thorough reflection. In the words of Bacon, Homo, natura minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observave. rit; nil amplius scit aut potest."

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II.

KANT AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.*

We cannot believe, that it is possible to translate the writings of Kant, in a way that will make them intelligible to the English reader, however conversant he may be with ordinary metaphysical speculations, and little apt to be discouraged by the first sight of abstruse doctrine and uncouth phraseology. A compend, or general exposition of his system, may be attempted with some chance of success ; but a literal version would probably be ten times more enig. matical than the original. The fact is, that Kant needs to be translated before he can be understood by the vast majority of his own countrymen; and though the eminent thinkers, who have stooped to this repulsive task in Germany, have succeeded in disentangling the main points of his system, and presenting to the popular view something like a connected whole, yet in the subsidiary portions, the filling up of the theory, a comparison of their respective works displays a mass of various and irreconcilable opinions. Kant aspired to invent a new science, and a new nomenclature for it, at the same time. Each is explicable only through the other; and the student is, consequently, presented at the outset with an alternative of difficulties. The system can be comprehended only by one who is acquainted with its technical vocabulary, and a knowledge of

* From the North American Reviero, for July, 1839.

Critick of Pure Reason ; translated from the Original of Immanuel Kant. London: William Pickering. 1838. 8vo. pp. 655.

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the terms employed can be derived only from a previous familiarity with the principal doctrines and divisions of the theory itself. The case, therefore, is very nearly as bad as that of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, - the unknown writing of an unknown tongue.

Other obstacles to the easy comprehension of Kantian metaphysics arise from defects of style, and the writer's inability, acknowledged by himself, to facilitate the study of his opinions by the clearness of their expression. The rambling and involved sentences, running on from page to page, and stuffed with repetitions and parenthetical matter, would frighten away any but the most determined student, very

threshold of his endeavor. Kant was an acute logician, a systematic, profound, and original thinker ; but his power of argument and conception wholly outran his command over the resources of language, and he was reduced to the use of words as symbols, in which his opinions were rather darkly implied, than openly enunciated. The very extent of his innovations in the vocabulary of science showed his inability to make a proper use of the ancient stores of his native tongue. The coining of new terms is the unfailing expedient of those, who cannot make a right application of old ones. The difficulties thus thrown in the student's way, are still further enhanced by the absolute dryness of the speculations, and the want of any relief from ingenious illustrations, or excursions into the flowery regions of eloquence and imagination. His genius never unbends. The flowers, with which other philosophers have strewed the path of their inquiries, were either beyond his reach, or he disdained to employ them; and his writings accordingly appear an arid waste of abstract discussions, from which the taste instinctively recoils. Not one oasis blooms, not a single floweret springs, beside the path of the traveller through this African desert of metaphysics. In this respect,

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