in a condition entirely hopeless, except from the expiation of his guilt by the sufferings of a different and an innocent being. We believe, that in his punishment are contained the elements, if he will use them, of his restoration; that remorse pursues sin, but repentance overtakes and vanquishes it.

A PUBLICATION on the subject indicated by this title is now happily timed. Important questions on the fundamental points in morals and politics are frequently discussed at the present day in our community, with a warmth and earnestness, which show rather the deep interest the disputants feel in the argument, than their competency to decide the mooted problems aright. The contest is not only of oppusite theories ; the results are not merely speculative. Conclusions are carried into practice with ominous precipitancy, and sometimes it is well, if the decision do not wholly take precedence of the argument, and the debate be instituted only to afford a coloring to preconceived opinions. What are the bounds of the rights of individuals ? How far are they limited and controlled by the establishment of society? What creates the duty of allegiance to human government, and when does this duty cease? How far are legal enactments binding, and when does resistance to constituted authority become a virtue ? What positive duties are created by the mere fact of an individual's birth on one or the other side of a rivulet or chain of mountains, under this or that government ?

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These are grave questions, and it is somewhat late in the day to discuss them now, with any particular reference to conduct. One would suppose, that they were answered long since, practically at least ; for the daily actions of every citizen presuppose a tacit determination of them in his own mind. But the times are changed, and we are changed with them. Novel positions of society beget new relations between individuals, and from these spring new rights and their corresponding obligations. New systems of morals and politics must be contrived, it seems, for each new phasis of government and civilization. We have done with discussing the divine right of kings, and, like good republicans, have now for a long time been determining the divine rights of the people. Nay, from recent events, it would appear that we have passed this point also, and are now to consider the rights of the individual, as opposed to the claims of kings, governments, majorities, and all constituted authorities whatsoever. The great problem to be solved at present is, how to preserve the blessings of civil institutions with the smallest possible infringement of each man's natural right;- how to keep up society, and yet im. pose no restraint on the free action of any of its members. The spirit of the present age is strongly marked by an im. patience of all authority, however long seated and tamely acknowledged by former generations. As the subjectmatter of all discussions in political ethics is thus changed, the old systems have become obsolete, and if any of the conclusions embraced in them are to be retained, they must be supported on wholly different grounds, and thus be assimilated to the other provisions of a renovated code.

The republican tendencies of the age have already been displayed in action ; they have dethroned kings, emancipated colonies, and proclaimed deliverance to the captive and the slave. They are now to be seen in speculation.

Theory is to be carried forward to the same point with practice, and perhaps advanced beyond it, since thought is naturally more free than action. Political science has thus gained a new point of departure, and must rest in future, not on the principles of absolutism and prescription, but on the philosophy of democracy, or the inalienable rights of individual men. The necessity of giving this turn to speculation proceeds from the impulse belonging to human nature, which impels one to seek in every institution for the idea of legitimacy, - to found every claim and action on some principle of natural right. It is not sufficient to enjoy a privilege ; we must prove the rightfulness of the enjoyment, — the legitimacy of the privilege. From this cause, the movement, which has released us from the old political systems, now tends to the establishment of an excessive and licentious freedom. To justify the revolt against ancient institutions, principles have been advanced and a mode of argument adopted, which, as they are carried out by many reasoners, lead to conclusions remote and extravagant beyond all conception. “The right of the people" is a convenient abstraction ; yet, in the apprehension of many, it means nothing, if it be not founded on the right of the individual. But, if each member arrogated to himself all the power, that is exercised by society in the aggregate, total anarchy would ensue. The theory, that government is founded on popular consent, in the literal meaning of the phrase, is a mere fiction. The consent of more than half of the community is never asked under

any circumstances, and under the most liberal form that ever existed, it would be difficult to prove, that, at any period subsequent to its first establishment, it is in the power of any person to withhold his approval, if he sees fit. Besides, he cannot give more than .he possesses ; and if the founders of the State could, by their personal authority, bestow upon it such ex

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tensive rights over themselves, then their successors, having equal endowments from nature, but disposed to make a different use of them, may withhold the gift from the government and exercise it in their own persons. This is a strange conclusion, but we cannot perceive that the argument of many ultra defenders of individual rights leads to any other result.

The state, as it appears to us in an organized form, is an artificial thing, - an arbitrary creation ; yet it claims and exercises the highest prerogatives. It regulates the descent and distribution of property, and, under the name of taxation, even appropriates a portion of the subjects' wealth to itself. It is the arbiter of life as well as fortune, exposing those who live under its dominion to the chances of war, and inflicting death as a punishment for whatever crimes it chooses thus to distinguish. It even dictates to the consciences of those under its control, assuming the power to change the moral character of acts, and to make criminal certain proceedings, which, in a purely ethical point of view, are indifferent. Thus, smuggling is made an offence in morals, unless we adopt the strange conclusion, that a man has a moral right to disobey the law of the land, if willing to suffer the legal penalty when detected. These are all grave prerogatives, and the inquiry into their origin is at once curious and difficult. Every theory, which founds the power of government on a compact, either ex. press or implied, or in any way recognises the consent of the governed as the sole basis of civil authority, necessarily implies, that the subject originally possessed these rights in his own person, and, unless he voluntarily renounces his birthright, he is independent of the law, and may rightfully refuse obedience.

We need, therefore, a more solid foundation for the au. thority of the state, than a mere bargain between it and its