ESSAYS.

I.

LOCKE AND THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS. *

It is remarkable, that we have yet no well-written biography of Locke. The volumes by Lord King add little to our knowledge of his private life and character. They are made up chiefly of the sweepings of his writing-desk,fragments of a correspondence, which he maintained with distinguished literary contemporaries, and imperfect drafts and abstracts of works, which were either subsequently published in a completed form, or were left by a change of purpose, or a want of time, among a heap of unexecuted projects. Yet they are not devoid of interest. We like to be admitted to the workshop of genius, and by inspection of the fragments scattered around, to gain some idea of the successive steps by which great works are evolved. Such disjecta membra not only throw light on the history of the individual mind, but afford valuable hints to the general inquirer into the phenomena of thought and opinion. Ta. ken in connexion with the incidents in the life of a philosopher, they show the reciprocal workings of thought and action, and afford the most satisfactory proof of the sinceri. ty of published opinions. They are rendered interesting from the previously acquired reputation of the writer, and instructive from the insight they afford into the means by which that reputation was acquired.

But the character of Locke hardly needed the illustration to be obtained from such sources as these. It is apparent on the very face of his larger works, and we rise from the perusal of them with much the same feelings, as those excited by conversation with an old and valued friend. He never puts on the airs of an author professedly dictating sentences for the public ; but his thoughts flow from him

: with the same ease, simplicity, and not unfrequently the same vivacity, which we expect in the most unstudied tabletalk. Part of the effect produced on the reader is undoubtedly to be ascribed to the character of the style, which is always clear, homely, and repetitional ; but more is to be attributed to the writer's peculiar turn of mind, and his entire freedom from any desire for effect. Though somewhat positive in the statement of opinions, and pertinacious in their support, he never puts on the robes and declares his sentiments in the tone of a dogmatist. Hence, some peculiarities, which detract from the merit of his writings, enhance our admiration of his character as a man. Trite and puerile remarks are mingled with the most profound and sagacious observations, and the expression is as homely in the latter case, as in the former. His style is never ornamented but by accident, nor terse but from the nature of the argument. He uses perfect good faith with the reader, never attempting to hide the frivolity of an idea by a pompous enunciation, or to cover his retreat from a difficulty in the argument, by raising a mist of words. Though an acute reasoner, he avoids the common error of logicians, who regard as incontrovertible truths those assertions, which, in the set forms of their art, they are unable to disprove. His strong good sense breaks away from the tram

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mels of system, and cuts the Gordian knot, which his dialectical skill cannot untie.

His intellect was distinguished rather for originality than depth. He threw a new light upon speculative philosophy,J not by gaining a deeper insight into the questions of which it is composed, but by contemplating them from a new point of view. Thus his method in philosophy was like that of a great commander in war, whose opponents console themselves under defeat, by the reflection that they have been beaten contrary to the rules. Grant the exclusive propriety of their system, and they ought to have conquered. And in what did this originality consist? Not in the love of paradox, which he cautiously and even conscientiously avoided. Not in keeping away from positions, which another had occupied before him. His mind was of that generous cast, which welcomed truth wherever it was to be found. He considered the triteness of a remark rather as evidence of its truth, than as an argument against its repetition. But the novelty of his method consisted in treating the gravest and most abstract questions of philosophy with the same homeliness and perspicuity of manner, that one adopts in the discussion of the ordinary topics of every-day life. He examines man's claim to immortality, and the evidence for the being of a God, with as little effort after fine language, as a lawyer would make in settling the title deeds of an estate. Such a procedure aids not only the comprehension, but the solution, of metaphysical doubts. Difficulties vanish as language becomes less technical and involved. Such at least is the case, with subjects which the mind can effectu

On the other hand, when the faculties are tasked for purposes, to which they are entirely incompetent, simplicity of manner exposes the failure, which pompous technicality only veils. The errors of Locke's system lie upon the surface, and he must be a tyro indeed, who

ally grasp.

cannot detect them. But it is easier to criticise than to amend.

Hence the opinion, which seems to be gaining ground of late, that the author of the “ Essay on Human Understanding was a clear but shallow reasoner. Men affect to praise the soundness of his judgment, but sneer at his pretensions to the title of a philosopher. He uses arguments which are nothing but virtual appeals to common sense, and these are alleged to be inconsistent with the character of a deep thinker and sound logician. But what do such charges amount to? What is common sense, but the highest philosophy applied to the usual purposes of practical life? And what is philosophy, but common sense employ. ed in abstract investigations ? Genius consists in the bent of the faculties towards a particular pursuit, and may as frequently be displayed in the conduct of ordinary business, as in the prosecution of scientific research. It works with the same tools, though it looks to a different end. The sagacity employed in detecting minute differences of character among our friends is akin to the metaphysical tact, which distinguishes between neighboring affections of mind, that to common observers appear shaded into each other by imperceptible gradations. The wit which sparkles in con- . versation, often astonishes us, when applied to the philosophy of mind, by the novelty of its suggestions and its quickness of vision. Each of these faculties is productive of good in its lower as in its higher avocations. In the former it is more practical, in the latter more comprehen. sive.

But in thus asserting the equal appositeness of a plain style and simplicity of manner to philosophical subjects, we mean more than simply to defend Locke from the charge of a want of vigor and depth. What is alleged against him constitutes his peculiar merit. Whoever rescues any branch