66 and the sun,

lapse of hours during the sleep was wrong; like the timepiece, should have stopped." We copy Cousin's own quotation.

“ That we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me in that we have no perception of duration, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it ; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year ; of which duration of things, while he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him ; and the moment wherein he leaves off to

n; think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and the succession of others." *

Can any language more clearly repudiate the very consequence which Cousin endeavors to draw ? It is not duration itself, which ceases while we sleep, but "

our per• ception of duration ”; the timepiece goes right, but the "perception of the time is quite lost to him” who sleeps. The critic surely does not mean to deny the fact, that in sound slumber we are unconscious of the flight of hours. To remove all doubt, in another section of the same chapter, the 21st, Locke directly controverts the very doctrine here put into his mouth. “We must therefore carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the measures we make use of to judge of its length"; and in a subsequent part of the same section, “the train of our own ideas” is mentioned, as being this measure. And yet Cousin argues at great length this point, as if in opposition to Locke, finding under this head no other heresy with which to accuse the English philosopher. It is a fine specimen of the method of setting

*

Locke, on Human Understanding, Book 2. Ch. xiv. § 4.

up pins, that one may have the pleasure of knocking them down again. Better instances still are to come.

The idea of the Infinite is the next point, on which our author tries his strength with the founder of the Empirical school, as it is called. We shall not enter into the general discussion on this point, though it forms the corner-stone of the Eclectic system, for it has already been discussed and refuted with great ability by the present accomplished professor of logic at Edinburgh, whose article on the subject, though well known to Cousin, he has for sound reasons never attempted to answer. Our remarks will be confined to the incidental glimpse of this theory, which is afforded in the commentary upon Locke. The following paragraph contains the substance of the criticism on this head.

“ After having sported awhile with the idea of the infinite as obscure, Locke objects again that it is purely negative, that it has nothing positive in it. B. II. ch. XVII. § 13; “We have no positive idea of infinity.' $ 16; · We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.' $ 18; “We have no positive idea of infinite space.' Here we have the accusation, so often since repeated, against the conceptions of reason, that they are not positive. But first, observe, that there can no more be an idea of succession without the idea of time, than of time without the previous idea of succession ; and no more idea of body without the idea of space, than of space without the previous idea of body; that is to say, there can no more be the idea of the finite without the idea of infinite, than of the infinite without the previous idea of the finite. From whence it follows in strictness, that these ideas suppose each other, and, if any one pleases to say, reciprocally limit each other; and consequently, the idea of the infinite is no more the negative of that of the finite, than the idea of the finite is the negative of that of the infinite. They are both negatives on the same ground, or they are both positives; for they are two simultaneous affirmations, and every affirmation gives a positive

6

It would be difficult to find in any writer on philosophy a more remarkable instance of confused thought and incorrect reasoning. Because the idea of body involves that of space, and succession presupposes time, therefore, the conception of the finite necessarily requires that of the infinite. If he had said, that because bread is fabricated of flour, therefore the moon consists of green cheese, the logic would be quite as conclusive. Because in a given instance, two ideas mutually contain and limit each other, it does not follow that any other two, taken at random, bear the same correlation. The argument means nothing at all, unless the premise be construed into the affirmation, that the conception of body involves that of infinite space, and succession presupposes eternity; and in this form, the argument takes for granted the very point in question. Moreover, the assertion when thus interpreted is wholly untrue. The idea of pure space is the only necessary concomitant of body, that of infinite space being a subsequent deduction of the reason. Still further, the relations between the ideas in the two cases are wholly dissimilar, the comparison being drawn between perfectly incongruous things. The proposition, that the finite presupposes the infinite, corresponds to the assertion, that eternity is implied in time, or unlimited expansion in bounded extension. The relation between body and space, succession and duration, belongs to a different category.

The assertion of Locke, that the infinite is to our minds only a negative idea, as it is defended by those who were never suspected of favoring the doctrines of Condillac, is not enough to identify him with the Sensualist school. Cousin seeks for some remark, which shall appear tantamount to a denial of the existence of any such idea, but can find nothing which answers his purpose better than the following; “ Number affords us the clearest idea of

infinity." This observation is construed to mean, that the idea in every case may be resolved into that of number; though it really affirms no such thing, for it is not said, that number gives us the only notion of the infinite, but that the elearest conception of it is derived from this source. In many passages of the same chapter, Locke expatiates upon this idea as applicable to time, space, and the attributes of the Supreme Being. On the latter point he holds the following decisive language. “I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no beginning; and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have."

But, though the assertion should be held to convey all the meaning that Cousin attributes to it, we may well ask, What follows? The reply is so curious, that it deserves to be given in the writer's own words.

“ But what is number? It is, in the last analysis, such or such a number; for every number is a determinate number. It is then a finite number, whatever it may be. Raise the figure as high as you please, the number, as such, is only a particular number, an element of succession, and consequently a finite element. Number is the parent of succession, not of duration ; number and succession measure time, but are not adequate to it, and do not constitute it.

“ The reduction of the infinite to number is, then, the reduction of time infinite, to its measure indefinite, that is, to the finite; just as, in regard to space, the reduction of space to body is the reduc. tion of the infinite to the finite. Now to reduce the infinite to the finite is to destroy it; it is to destroy the belief of the human race; but as before observed, it saves the system of Locke."

Every number is a determinate number.” What mean then the surds, the imaginary quantities, and the infinite series of the algebraist? As to the remainder of the argu

*

a

ment against the infinity of number, we have only to remark, that it is equally applicable to our ideas of infinite space

and time. Whatever force the reasoning may have, in Cousin's theory, it is suicidal. If we were disposed to profit by the unlucky admissions of our author, the sentence, which immediately succeeds the passage quoted above, would afford à rich field for comment. “In fact, the infinite can be found neither in sense, nor consciousness, but the finite can be found there wonderfully well.” We would fain be told, where the idea of the infinite is found upon this hypothesis. In the reason, doubtless; but how does reason manifest itself, except through consciousness? If we are not conscious of any ideas or truths given by this faculty, for all practical purposes, it would seem, they might as well be withheld altogether.

The criticism upon Locke's account of Personal Identity is, in the main, just and clearly expressed. The chapter upon the subject is one of the most unsatisfactory passages in the whole Essay, the doctrine leading to the most absurd consequences, which were perceived, and yet intrepidly avowed and supported by the writer. We are at a loss how to account for the error, especially as the natural course of Locke's speculations by no means leads to such a wild doctrine, and the great blunder in it, that of confounding the witness, or evidence of identity with identity itself, is at variance with every other portion of the theory.

But as the remarks on our idea of Substance in general present no such unfortunate matter for criticism, Cousin, as usual, manufactures a theory on the subject, which he puts into the mouth of Locke, and then proceeds to refute it with great earnestness and ability. The account which Locke really gives, is one that coincides perfectly with all later speculations on the subject; namely, that our conception of any particular substance is a mere congeries of our ideas of various qualities or properties, together with a sup.