a

The conceivable objects of a revelation are, to increase what imperfect knowledge of the divine nature and our own destiny we may obtain through the light of reason and con. science, to confirm by an additional sanction the author. ity of the moral law within us, - and to impose new duties, lying beyond the sphere of conscience, and therefore neither commanded nor rejected by that faculty ; — such as acts of special acknowledgment of the Creator's infinite power and goodness. Should it be the will of God to make such a revelation, there is an antecedent presumption, that it will be accompanied with such evidence of its origin, that mankind will still be left free whether to accept or reject it. Thus only will it accord with other portions of the scheme of Divine Providence in the government of men; with the physical laws of the universe, for instance, in conformity to which our conduct must be regulated for the preservation of life and health, and which are not made known to us by intuition or demonstration, but must be slowly and carefully investigated. And then only, we may add, will it agree with the natural law of ethics ; for however simple and authoritative may be the dictates of this principle to a well-disciplined and inquiring mind, all history and experience abound with instances to prove the perils of an unenlightened conscience. The idea of a revelation

a forced upon mankind by demonstrative evidence is at war with the only proper conception of the object of the divine government; for the instances just adduced justify us in asserting, that this object must be, — not merely to raise men to a state of moral perfection, which would require only a simple act of omnipotence, - but to supply them with the means of raising themselves. Not mere attain. ment, but progress, is the law of our finite condition.

IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COUSIN. *

The writings of Cousin form the popular philosophy of the day. Their success in this country is attested by the appearance of the three translations, of which the titles are given above, one of which has already passed to a second edition, and has been introduced as a text-book in some of our principal colleges. There must be some grounds for this popularity, apart from the bias manifested by many people to adopt as their favorite system of philosophy, the one which happens to be the last published. Such a bias operated to swell the favor with which the writings of the late Dr. Brown were at first received, and, in its reaction, to depress his reputation with quite as much injustice as it had at first been elevated. We do not anticipate for Cousin such a rapid fall in public estimation, because his great

* From the North American Reviero, for July, 1841.

Introduction to the History of Philosophy. By Victor Cousin. Tsunslated from the French. By HENNING GOTFRIED LINBERG. Boston. 1832.

Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Vols. I. and II. Containing Philosophical Miscellanies, translated from the French of Cousin, JOUFFROY, and B. Constant. With Introductory and Critical Notices. By George Ripley. Boston. 1838.

Elements of Psychology; included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on [the] Human Understanding, with Additional Pieces. By Victor Cousin. Translated from the French, with an Introduclion and Notes. By the Rev. C. S. HENRY, D. D. Second Edition, prepared for the Use of Colleges. New York. 1838.

learning and the merits of his style, to carry the comparison no farther, give him a decided advantage over the Scotch professor ; and his lectures, moreover, are not a posthumous publication. His manner, after all, is not much to the taste of sober and accurate thinkers; but it has qualities which are sure to please the majority of readers. Evidently formed in the lecture room, it is sometimes eloquent, but more frequently declamatory. Profound subjects are treated without any affectation of profundity of manner, — the capital vice of the German metaphysicians ; and the general lucidness of the views set forth is due partly to the clearness of the writer's mind, and partly to the superficial character of his inquiries. He never fatigues the reader with a long train of argument, either because he dislikes the subtilties of logic, or is incapable of that severe exertion of mind which is necessary in order to bridge over the vast interval, that often separates ultimate truths from primitive perceptions. His conclusions lie but a step from the premises, when they have any premises at all, and they are repeated with a frequency, that marks the habits of a lecturer to a mixed audience, while it spares any severe effort of memory to those, who have the good fortune of being able to study the matter in print. We find nothing like terseness of manner, or simplicity of statement; and the rhetoric, though highly wrought, in our judgment at least, often appears cold and artificial, instead of being penetrated with real warmth of feeling. But there is great copiousness, and not unfrequently much dignity, of expression ; and the swell of diction often gives prominence and effect to the enunciation of simple and familiar truths. The fairness and candor, which, with one great exception, he displays in estimating the services of other metaphysicians, are quite as manifest as the complacency with which he alludes to his own merits.

Apart from the excellences and defects of his manner, the favor shown to the writings of Cousin is due to the skill with which he has borrowed from the works of other philosophers, to the lucid manner in which he has treated the materials thus obtained, and to the ingenuity with which he has interwoven them into his own system. He has known how to put all schools under contribution, and thus to build up, piece by piece, the mosaic work of the edifice, which he calls his own. The Scotch and Germans are those to whom he is most indebted, though the obligation is certainly mutual, for the doctrines thus transplanted are often freed from objectionable peculiarities, expressed with greater force and clearness, and thus brought within the reach of a wider circle of readers. The reputation of being a skilful borrower may not appear very flattering, but there are great merits in the able execution even of this secondary task. To break up the distinctions between various schools, to give universal currency to the treasures of intellect and taste, which had otherwise been confined to a single nation, to make available for common use the labors even of one master mind, which has been more successful in the discovery than the dissemination of truth, is an office which has sure claims on the gratitude, though it may not challenge the admiration, of mankind. We give all credit to Cousin for the ability with which he has used his stores of learning, and for the frankness which he shows in con. fessing the extent of his obligations.

But he is mistaken in imagining, that this manner of building up a system by patchwork is really a new method of conducting philosophical inquiry. He speaks of Eclecticism, as if it were a Novum Organon for the advancement of metaphysical science, and as if the neglect of it had been the leading cause of the errors and contradictions, with which the history of philosophy is filled. Here is the double error of supposing, in the first place, that Eclecticism as such can properly be called any method at all for the discovery of truth ; and, in the second place, of believing, that it is the peculiar characteristic of his own philosophy. As to the former point, one might as well talk about an Eclectic system of geometry. The word does not refer to any new method of finding truth, but only to the manner of presenting the result of one's labors to the world, whether alone or in connexion with the fruits of other men's researches. And in the second place, every system of philosophy, which has been broached since the time of Thales,' has been more or less Eclectic in its character. Indeed, if philosophy be any science at all, it must grow by addition, by the successive contributions of different minds. Every new fact discovered, every additional principle evolved, forms a new item to swell the previous store. It is true, that the longing after unity and completeness operates as a constant temptation to round off the whole into a single theory.

But in no case,

that ever we heard of, has such theory been presented as the entire growth of one mind. To go no farther for instances, every one perceives, that Kant is under great obligations to Aristotle, Reid to Locke, and Cousin to all the four, to say nothing of many others. If philosophy be considered, as some would have it, as the solution of a single problem, it it evident that no Eclecticism is possible, for there can be only one true solution. If, on the contrary, it be considered as a science, as it really is the most comprehensive of all sciences, then Eclecticism, to a greater or less degree, is unavoidable. One cannot, if he would, avoid incorporating into his own view of it some portion of the labors of other men, whether these elements of truth remain in the