purpose of assisting the Chancellor, and if lord Eldon did not call them in to his assistance, it was because they had sufficient business in their respective courts. He denied that it was any infraction of the constitution to introduce the present measure; and instanced the increase of the number of judges in the court of Common Pleas from three to six after the Charter of king John down to the reign of Henry 8, as a precedent. Neither had the judges of the present time the leisure which they for merly enjoyed. Sir Matthew Hale could find a season of relaxation from his judicial functions in which to pursue his studies and amusements, but no judge upon the bench could now allow himself any such indulgence. He regretted that the law establishments in the country were insufficient for the mass of business, and that the time of the judges was too much occupied in their duties. Here he begged leave to call the attention of the House to a book which he recently had occasion to read, and which, in point of authority, maintained a distinguished and undisputed rank. He alluded to the work written by sir W. Fortescue, in the reign of Henry the 6th-"De Laudibus Legum Angliæ.' That author stated, that only three hours, from eight to eleven in the forenoon, were occupied by the courts in the administration of justice, the rest of the time they spent either in the study of the laws or in reading the scriptures. If such a system were to prevail, what would become of the due administration of justice at present? How very different would be the situation of lord Ellenbrough! The truth was, that with the progress of time circum. stances had essentially changed, which re quired an alteration in the constitution of the authorities of the country. In fact, the number of judges remained the same, though the business had increased out of all proportion. Soon after king John's Charter, the number of judges in the King's-bench was increased from three to six; and in after times five judges frequently sat in the Common Pleas. The measure now proposed, was not a greater innovation than those to which he alluded. As matters stood at present, there was reason to apprehend, that causes would be too hastily decided, and haste was generally, or at least often the parent of mistake. This was also, in a great measure, the situation of the common law courts. It was said that the supporters of the Bill had shifted their ground, for that

the evil to be removed was said, at one. time to exist in the Court of Chancery, at another time in the House of Lords. It was not asserted by any person that there was not a great increase of business in the Court of Chancery. The suitors' money in that court had increased from 1,000,000l. to 35,500,0637. seven million of which had arisen since the year 1800, and ten million since 1780. The commercial business depending in that court did not amount to less than 25,000,000l. This was not even an adequate representation of the fact. He hoped the House was now fully persuaded of the evil of delay, and that they would see the necessity of appointing an assistant to discharge a part of those burthens which had nearly doubled since the time of lord Hardwicke. A remedy was absolutely demanded by the circumstances he had stated, and he trusted gentlemen would feel the necessity of applying it where it was most wanted. For his own part, he entirely approved of the measure offered, and concluded by observing, that he was persuaded whoever had the proposed jurisdiction vested in him would add dignity to the office.

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Mr. W. Courtenay opposed the present Bill, to which he had the most serious objections. He did not deny that the evil existed, and that a remedy should be applied; but he thought it should be more efficacious than that proposed by the Bill, which was much more extensive than the nature of the case required. He would now assume, whether justly or not, that the remedy proposed was two-fold: for the evil said to exist in the Court of Chancery, and the other for that said to exist in the House of Lords. With respect to the first, it was not easy to state how far those invested with the highest judicial functions could or could not, ought or ought not to conform to the judicial character. The different other expedients which had been suggested, had their apology in the taunting manner in which those who opposed this Bill had been called upon to substitute some other project in its place; and, therefore, he would suggest a remedy that had not hitherto been mentioned. In the House of Lords great part of the appeals, at least four-fifths, were from Scotland, and in cases where the decision must turn upon the facts, and not upon the law. The appeal in those cases was from a jurisdiction which had an opportunity of knowing the facts, to one which had not such an opportunity. Most lawyers, he believed,

found it difficult to see why an appeal, in matters of fact, was necessary to a higher tribunal. In England the Appeals were only upon questions of law, and many of the most eminent lawyers thought that this regulation might with advantage be extended to Scotland. If this were done, a great proportion of the Scotch Appeals would be cut off, and the pressure would in, a great measure be withdrawn, while some temporary expedient might be adopted to get rid of the present arrear. This was not the proper time, nor did he feel himself competent to propose a remedy, he merely alluded to a mode by which great assistance could be rendered to the justice of the country. With regard to the observation of his hon. and learned friend near him (Mr. Stephen) that it might be difficult to procure the attendance of the members of this House at so early an hour as 10 o'clock, he reminded him, that several bodies of the members did actually sit at that hour upon committees, and he saw no good reason why the Lords should not also enforce attendance at an early hour, if necessary for the purposes of justice. But if it was really impossible to procure such an attendance, how did this Bill remedy that evil?-He next called the attention of the House to the state of the arrears in the Exchequer, which was as formidable an evil as the arrears in the Court of Chancery. This being notorious, it would be unworthy of the legislature, when employed in providing a remedy for an evil of this nature, to pass over the state of the arrears in the Exchequer, without notice. A general comprehensive remedy ought to be applied; this narrow measure was utterly inefficient. It hardly created a judge at all. It was an intire innovation, in point of principle, in the administration of justice; for when a suitor set down his cause for the purpose of having the opinion of the Chancellor in the first instance, it would depend upon the arbitrium of the Chancellor whether the suitor should have it or not. With regard to the separation of bankruptcy causes from the other business of the Court, he was far from agreeing with those who thought that such a separation would yield no material relief. He was convinced it would; for the business in cases of bankruptcy now constituted a very considerable proportion of the whole business of the Court.

Mr. Smyth thought it was incumbent on the House not simply to ascertain that the (VOL. XXIV.)

evil existed, but to inquire into the na ture, extent, and origin of it. In doing this, they would find that the evil in its present magnitude arose from the number of Appeals from Scotland. Why, then, not advert to this fact, and look for the remedy in the country from whence it came, in a reform of the Scottish law. It was true that out of the whole number of Appeals, the enormous proportion of 4-5ths were from Scotland. From the first report it appeared that out of 253 Appeals, 200 were from that country. The Bill, in his opinion, was prematurely brought forward. Two acts had been passed which must contribute to lessen the number of Appeals from the Court of Session of Scot land. The operation of these acts could not be yet sufficiently known, and it was on this account that he considered the Bill premature. It was not known, nor could it be yet known, whether the evil proposed to be removed was temporary or permanent. He could not look upon the Bill as tending to less than a dissolution of the first judicial officer of the country. With respect to the Appeals in the Lords, 19 out of 20 were merely vexatious, and many of the Scotch Appeals were merely on account of delay. The attendance of a sufficient number of lords could, in his opinion, be secured by a compulsory order of their own. It was said that the increase of business in the Court of Chancery and the House of Lords, arose from the increase of wealth. For his part, he thought it depended more on the unsettled state of the law, and on the distresses of the nation. He conjured the House not to loosen the only tie which bound the Chancellor to the people. The number of motions did not, in his mind, furnish any reason for the delay in passing from one to another. It was well known that any sudden check to wealth, particularly to commercial wealth, occasioned an increase of litigation. It was asserted, that no mischief could arise from thus withdrawing a part of his duties from the Chancellor. It would at least lessen his intercourse with the public; and that daily and hourly intercourse was, in his opinion, one of the most effectual means for preserving him in the discharge of those duties.

Mr. Serjeant Best thought there was no measure more likely to produce the desired effect than that now before the House. It was said truly from the opposite side, that the number of Appeals (21)

amounted nearly to a denial of justice. The hon. gentleman who spoke last, thought that a permanent remedy was not necessary, because there was a probability that the Scotch Appeals would be considerably lessened; but he did not consider the great number that was already depending from that country, and that those from Ireland were to be added, which amounted at present to 52. He saw no likelihood that Appeals would decrease, because litigation always augmented with the augmentation of property. It was said, that this Bill would alter the character of the Chancellor; and that he would be come, in consequence of it, nothing more than a state officer. But the House should not forget the weight of legal duties that would still remain upon him-that he would sit for the discharge of business three days in every week during the session of parliament, and every day when parliament was not sitting. With respect to the separation of the business of bankrupts from the Lord Chancellor, it was liable to most grave and insurmountable objections. If his bankruptcy jurisdiction were to be withdrawn, no greater innovation could be introduced; bankruptcy proceeded from the great seal, and to change it would be to introduce a change in the original jurisdiction. Another reason against such an innovation was, that in cases of bankruptcy there ought to be no appeal, from the necessity there existed of distributing as speedily as possible the property of the bankrupt. They could not, therefore, entrust this most important function to an inferior officer, or place the decision of so great a mass of property in any hands less elevated than the first law authority of the state. Upon these grounds, he thought nothing better could be at present proposed than the Bill before the House, and he would therefore give it his support.

Mr. M. A. Taylor observed, that no no tice had been taken in the House of Lords of the arrears of business in the Court of Chancery previous to a motion which he made about two years ago. He did not then propose his plan as a perfect one, but as one which might be improved. The great delay of justice, he affirmed, at that time, was, in fact, a denial of justice. Lord Mansfield formerly sat for lord Thurlow, as temporary Speaker of the House of Lords; and why might not a temporary Speaker be now appointed? In his opinion, it became the House to repel an in

sinuation which had been thrown out against them as the Commons of England, which imputed to them some of the delays which had taken place. He declared it to be his intention to vote for postponing the further consideration of the Bill. This measure, he contended, would be attended with inconveniencies which might have been avoided had the course been pursued, which, on a former occasion, he had recommended. He thought it would be well for the House to pause, and to consider if some more effectual remedy could not be devised. The present measure was so inadequate, that had he not known from what quarter it came, he should have imagined it had originated with some country attorney, who had never seen the Court of Chancery. If any lawyer would take upon himself to say the Bill before the House would remedy the evil complained of, he would vote for it. [An hon. member here called out "I will."] Mr. Taylor, however, declined taking his opinion on the subject, and stated the impression on his mind to be such, that it could not be removed by the decision of all the Courts of Westminster.

Mr. Canning, thinking it inexpedient that this Bill should pass into a law, was desirous of stating his objections to it; and should do so very briefly, as the arguments which had been urged in favour of the Bill were so few in number, and so small in measure, as to require very little refutation. It seemed to be maintained, that the members of this House were not fit judges of such a question. If that disqualification were supposed to apply generally, much more forcibly must it apply to those members (of which he was one) who could boast of no means of forming a judgment but plain sense unadorned with legal learning. He must however protest against any such plea in bar of their discussions; and must deny that the lay part of the House were implicitly to adopt the dicta of certain learned personages in matter not of law, but of regulation. He yielded all respect possible to the House of Lords, but could not consent to pass the Bill they had sent down without examination. Some considerations indeed there were which might perhaps tend to diminish in this particular instance the general respect due to the authority of their lordships. It appeared, on the very face of the Bill, that it arose out of arrears in their lordships' jurisdiction. They might be better judges of the extent of the evil;