PART I SOURCES OF DOCTRINE CHAPTER I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT THE primary question in Doctrinal Theology relates to the sources from which our knowledge must be derived, and the method by which we can elicit from these sources the truths of which we are in search. A claim is made on behalf of Christianity that it contains a body of dogmas supernaturally revealed. According to the Protestant position these dogmas are presented, though not in a systematic form, in the Bible, and this collection of writings is the one infallible source from which our religious knowledge must be derived. To this source the Roman and Greek Churches add, as co-ordinate with it, the tradition which has been handed down through authorized channels from the first; and each claims to be, when speaking through its proper organs and under certain defined conditions, the sole infallible custodian of both Bible and tradition. It will be incumbent on us, therefore, to seek for some conclusions about the Bible and the Church regarded as sources of doctrine. But prior to any inquiry into the reality and character of an alleged dogmatic revelation must logically come an inquiry into the religious competence of the mind to which the revelation is addressed; and the results of such an inquiry must largely affect our whole conception of the authority and value of an historical religion. We are thus led, as preliminary to all theological investigation, to a source of religious doctrine which has been recognized with more or less distinctness by widely divergent schools: namely, the human mind or soul. The authority of this source, up to a certain point, is no less emphatically admitted by John Henry than by Francis Newman. For instance, the belief in the existence of God is drawn by the great advocate of external authority from within rather than without, and in regard to certainty is placed on a par with the belief in his own existence.1 And indeed most theologians, whether they acknowledge it or not, consult the witness within; and their conclusions are largely influenced, far more largely than many of them are aware of, by the responses which they elicit. In short, whatever source be formally acknowledged, the mind of the interpreter inevitably colours the interpretation. It is therefore our first duty to bring under consideration the capacity and resources of the mind in its relation to theological doctrine, the method by which its inner witness to Divine truth may be interrogated, and the points where some external assistance might be rendered without any infringement of its laws, or without adding a superfluous confirmation to what is already certain. In this discussion we must necessarily touch on some questions which belong more properly to a philosophical treatise; but as the end in view is different, the treatment also will be dissimilar. Our necessary limits will permit only the presentation of an outline of thought, which, however, may possibly prove suggestive where it fails to be exhaustive. 1 Apologia, pp. 59, 323, 377. I. CHAPTER II THE HUMAN MIND The Rights and Limitations of the Intellect If there were no external authority entitled to control belief, the mind would have the same unlimited right of investigation as in all other subjects. But when a claim is set up on behalf of an infallible dogmatic revelation, it is often said that the right of question and criticism ceases as soon as the genuineness of the revelation is proved. Free inquiry is proper up to that point, but there it is destroyed by its own success; just as, on a journey, inquiry might enable us to secure the services of a trustworthy guide, but, when we had secured them, we should trust him implicitly, and never venture to call his judgment in question. It is, I suppose, for this reason that the treatment of evidences is so generally separated from that of doctrine. Let us assume, according to the older Protestant view, that it has pleased God to give to mankind infallible scriptures, containing, among other things, various doctrinal statements. In this case it might seem to be the logical order to prove, first of all, the reality of this divinely authorized document, and then, in the construction of a system of doctrine, to confine oneself to classification and interpretation, without seeking for further proof of the separate items of doctrine. The Divine authority being certified by rational methods, reason must not doubt in detail what it has accepted in the mass. This position appears to be untenable for the following reasons: I. The infallibility of the revelation confessedly can be established only by a process of reasoning from more or less certain data. Such a process may establish a very high degree of probability, but can never amount to absolute demonstration; and accordingly there is no authority which, by the completeness of its proof, commands universal assent. You therefore accept the revelation by an act of private judgment; and if you lay it down that this judgment can never, in any circumstances, be subject to reconsideration, you are really attributing infallibility to yourself, so far as relates to that particular conclusion. 2. A large part of the evidence depends on the contents of the revelation; for though these could not prove that the authority appealed to was infallible, they might afford clear evidence of the contrary. If in the Bible, for instance, there were not one statement inconsistent with any other, this would furnish indeed a corroboration of a previous proof; but one clear contradiction would disprove its infallibility, and show that there was something wrong in the reasoning which led to such a conclusion. And again, each statement of the authority can have no more weight, by virtue of its being there, than the amount of probability by which the whole is guaranteed; and therefore if other tests of its correctness are at hand, they ought to be applied. If these tests confirm it, it will be more certain than the general body of the revelation; if they are against it, its probability will be diminished; and it is possible that its improbability on these grounds may exceed its probability from being supported by the accepted authority. It is thus conceivable that a very strong proof in favour of the authority might be completely demolished by the improbabilities affecting the contents in detail. Instances which may serve to illustrate this reasoning are furnished by extra-Biblical testimonies to events recorded in the Gospels. These testimonies are justly regarded as confirming the truth of the Christian histories; and events thus attested are more certain than they would be if related nowhere but in the evangelical records. We may have, for example, a more absolute assurance that Christ was crucified by the sanction of Pontius Pilate than we can justly claim for many of the minor details of his biography. An obvious example of the force of counter-evidence is furnished by the question of the antiquity of man. As long as the Bible contained the only record which seemed to give any clear evidence upon the subject it was only reasonable to confine the estimate of the duration of man upon earth within Biblical limits. But as soon as geology unfolded its page, it had a right to be heard, and its evidence became with rational men an important element in testing the infallibility of the Bible. In proportion as it lent sanction to a far higher antiquity for the human race than can be gathered from the Biblical account the probability of the correctness of the ancient narrative in Genesis diminished; and at last the cumulative proof afforded by science, confirmed as it has been by archæological discoveries, has become so strong that no competent judge, I suppose, would hesitate in pronouncing the weight of probability almost overwhelming against the scientific accuracy of the Biblical narrative. The conclusion to which we are thus led does not, however, represent the human mind as the absolute judge of every separate article of a revelation. There might be doctrines lying entirely beyond the range of our faculties; and we ought, if the authority be rendered probable, to accept on its bare statement propositions which we could neither prove nor disprove on independent grounds. For the particular doctrines, though by themselves destitute of evidence, would be supported by the evidence which established the revelation as a whole. We may conveniently sum up the foregoing principles in the following proposition :-The human mind has an inalienable right to investigate subjects on which it is |